SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 6]

Whether the Will Is Moved by God Alone, As Exterior Principle?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as

exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by

its superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies.

But there is something which is higher than the will of man and below

God, namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel

also, as exterior principle.

Obj. 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the

intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone,

but also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel.

Hier. iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by

an angel.

Obj. 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things,

according to Gen. 1:31: "God saw all the things that He had made, and

they were very good." If, therefore man's will were moved by God

alone, it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby

"we sin and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh

in us" [Vulg.'you'] "both to will and to accomplish."

_I answer that,_ The movement of the will is from within, as also is

the movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to

move a natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet

that alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature, can

cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards

by a man, who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this

movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the

stone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore

it is said in _Phys._ vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy

and light things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes

moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary

movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his

will, is impossible.

Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is

evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the

rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was

stated in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 2). Secondly, it is evident from

the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore

nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is

the universal good: while every other good is good by participation,

and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a

universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is

potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.

Reply Obj. 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the

cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural

forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.

Reply Obj. 2: Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of

the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to

man's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a

creature from without, as stated above (A. 4).

Reply Obj. 3: God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the

universal object of the will, which is good. And without this

universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines

himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent

good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing

of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom

He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (Q. 109, A. 2).

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 79 / 746 题