Whether the Will Is Moved by an Exterior Principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything
exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is
essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle,
just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of
the will is not from anything exterior.
Obj. 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above
(Q. 6, A. 4). But the violent act is one "the principle of which is
outside the agent" [*Aristotle, _Ethic._ iii, 1]. Therefore the will
cannot be moved by anything exterior.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs
not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently.
Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
_On the contrary,_ The will is moved by the object, as stated above
(A. 1). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered
to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
_I answer that,_ As far as the will is moved by the object, it is
evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as
it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be
moved by some exterior principle.
For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another
time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it
is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously
it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by
something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above
(A. 3), in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the
act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of
counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how
this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the
conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills.
But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of
necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be
healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of
necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some
previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity.
Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to
its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior
mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics
(vii, 14).
Reply Obj. 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle
be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward
principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though
the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its
first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of
the natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves
nature.
Reply Obj. 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that its
principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of
him that suffers violence." This does not happen when the will is
moved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though
moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were
counter to the movement of the will: which in the present case is
impossible; since then the will would will and not will the same
thing.
Reply Obj. 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and
in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot
move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to
be moved by another as first mover.
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