Whether the Will Is Moved by the Sensitive Appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the
sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the
sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the
intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect.
Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
Obj. 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect.
But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows
the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the
movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the
universal apprehension of the intellect.
Obj. 3: Further, as is proved in _Phys._ viii, 5, the mover is not
moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal
motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the
sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite
does not move the will.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted
by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But man
would not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were
moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides.
Therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), that which is apprehended as
good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing
appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from
the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it
is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it
depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it
is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being
fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."
Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive
appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according
as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting,
which does not seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems
good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm.
And in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part
of the object.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in
itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly
the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in
respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he
is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
Reply Obj. 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars.
Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a
particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that
something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in
which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and
concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a
slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic
sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can
nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and
concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing
hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
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