Whether Fear Causes Involuntariness Simply?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply.
For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the
time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will.
But violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes
involuntariness simply.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever
be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it
remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done
through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with the
addition of fear, it is involuntary.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is
such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any
condition, is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a
condition, is necessary in some respect: but what is necessary
absolutely, is necessary simply. But that which is done through
fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a
condition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided.
Therefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary simply.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and
the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done
through fear are "voluntary rather than involuntary."
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise
Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such
things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly
voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear,
considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in
this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.
But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary
rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but
involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply,
according as it is in act; but according as it is only in
apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect. Now that
which is done through fear, is in act in so far as it is done. For,
since acts are concerned with singulars; and the singular, as such,
is here and now; that which is done is in act, in so far as it is
here and now and under other individuating circumstances. And that
which is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and
now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it
hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the
cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear
of the danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And
hence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary,
because its principle is within. But if we consider what is done
through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is
repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind.
And consequently what is done through fear is involuntary, considered
in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of
the case.
Reply Obj. 1: Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only
according to present and future time, but also in this, that the will
does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done
through compulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes
voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its
own sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to
avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act
are satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary:
since the voluntary is not only what we wish, for its own sake, as an
end, but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end.
It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will
does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will
does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat.
Hom. xxx.] says, in order to exclude things done through fear, a
violent action is defined as not only one, "the princip[le] whereof
is from without," but with the addition, "in which he that suffers
violence concurs not at all"; because the will of him that is in
fear, does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear.
Reply Obj. 2: Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever
be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but
things that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared
with different things. For what is big in comparison with one thing,
is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be
voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were absolutely; but also
for the sake of something else, as it were relatively. Accordingly,
nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with
one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared with another.
Reply Obj. 3: That which is done through fear, is voluntary without
any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but
it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such
a fear were not threatening. Consequently, this argument proves
rather the opposite.
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