Whether Violence Can Be Done to the Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For
everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there
is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will.
Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
Obj. 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active
principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force:
for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is
sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it
is compelled.
Obj. 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to
nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature;
as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to
nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the
movement of the will can be compelled.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is
done by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under
compulsion is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the
will, cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to
act.
_I answer that,_ The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate
act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an
act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of
some other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which are
commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.
As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer
violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from
executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act,
violence cannot be done to the will.
The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than
an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge:
just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an
interior principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or
violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to
the nature of the will's own act, that it should be subject to
compulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the nature of
a natural inclination or movement. For a stone may have an upward
movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its
natural inclination is impossible. In like manner a man may be
dragged by force: but it is contrary to the very notion of violence,
that he be dragged of his own will.
Reply Obj. 1: God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move
the will of man, according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is
in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But
if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the
will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against
the will.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not always a violent movement, when a passive
subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is done
against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise
every alteration and generation of simple bodies would be unnatural
and violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural
interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In
like manner when the will is moved, according to its own inclination,
by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.
Reply Obj. 3: That to which the will tends by sinning, although in
reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless
is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as
it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some
vicious habit.
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