Whether There Is Anything Voluntary in Human Acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human
acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself."
as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De
Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the
principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since
man's appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is
outside him, and is as a "mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10).
Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in
animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from
without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal.
Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and
therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.
Obj. 3: Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But
this is not true of man; for it is written (John 15:5): "Without Me
you can do nothing." Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human
acts.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the
voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation." Now such are
human acts. Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
_I answer that,_ There must needs be something voluntary in human
acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the
principle of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that
which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is
outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this
movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards,
the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things
that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some
not. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an
end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2); those are perfectly moved by an
intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of
movement but of movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be
done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore,
whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has
some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its
act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other
hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an
intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle
of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in
something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end
is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle
of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like
things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others.
But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move
themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not
only act but also act for an end. And consequently, since both are
from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act
for an end, the movements of such things are said to be voluntary:
for the word "voluntary" implies that their movements and acts are
from their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the
definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [*See
Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as having "a principle
within" the agent, but also as implying "knowledge." Therefore, since
man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his
acts especially is the voluntary to be found.
Reply Obj. 1: Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore,
although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be
within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of
the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by
an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary
act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet again it
must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be first
in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things subject
to alteration, the first principle of alteration is a heavenly body,
which nevertheless is not the first mover simply, but is moved
locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the
voluntary act, i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first
principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved
by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.
Reply Obj. 2: New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a
motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by
means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with
something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite.
Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him,
begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far as some
extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as
in the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by
the motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the
power of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens
that through some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to
the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of
voluntariness, as stated above (ad 1), for such movements caused by
an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement.
Reply Obj. 3: God moves man to act, not only by proposing the
appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but
also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the
will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as
it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from
God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God
moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act,
that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God.
Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this in common,
that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within
the agent.
________________________