On Error

There is an elusive idea that has floated through the minds of most of

us as we grew older and learnt more and more things. It is an idea

extremely difficult to get into set terms. It is an idea very difficult

to put so that we shall not seem nonsensical; and yet it is a very

useful idea, and if it could be realized its realization would be of

very practical value. It is the idea of a Dictionary of Ignorance and

Error.

On the face of it a definition of the work is impossible. Strictly

speaking it would be infinite, for human knowledge, however far

extended, must always be infinitely small compared with all possible

knowledge, just as any given finite space is infinitely small compared

with all space.

But that is not the idea which we entertain when we consider this

possible Dictionary of Ignorance and Error. What we really mean is a

Dictionary of the sort of Ignorance and the sort of Error which we know

ourselves to have been guilty of, which we have escaped by special

experience or learning as time went on, and against which we would warn

our fellows.

Flaubert, I think, first put it down in words, and said that such an

encyclopaedia was very urgently needed.

It will never exist, but we all know that it ought to exist. Bits of it

appear from time to time piecemeal and here and there, as for instance

in the annotations which modern scholarship attaches to the great text,

in the printed criticisms to which sundry accepted doctrines are

subjected by the younger men to-day, in the detailed restatement of

historical events which we get from modern research as our fathers

could never have them—but the work itself, the complete Encyclopaedia

or Dictionary of Ignorance and Error, will never be printed. It is a

great pity.

Incidentally one may remark that the process by which a particular

error is propagated is as interesting to watch as the way in which a

plant grows.

The first step seems to be the establishing of an authority and the

giving of that authority a name which comes to connote doctrinal

infallibility. A very good example of this is the title “Science.” Mere

physical research, its achievements, its certitudes, even its

conflicting and self-contradictory hypotheses, having got lumped

together in many minds under this one title Science, the title is now

sacred. It is used as a priestly title, as an immediate estopper to

doubt or criticism.

The next step is a very interesting one for the student of psychical

pathology to note. It seems to be a disease as native and universal to

the human mind as is the decay of the teeth to the human body. It seems

as though we all must suffer somewhat from it, and most of us suffer a

great deal from it, though in a cool aspect we easily perceive it to be

a lesion of thought. And this second step is as follows:

The whole lump having been given its sacred title and erected into an

infallible authority, which you are to accept as directly superior to

yourself and all personal sources of information, there is attributed

to this idol a number of attributes. We give it a soul, and a habit and

manners which do not attach to its stuff at all. The projection of this

imagined living character in our authority is comparable to what we

also do with mountains, statues, towns, and so forth. Our living

individuality lends individuality to them. I might here digress to

discuss whether this habit of the mind were not a distorted reflection

of some truth, and whether, indeed, there be not such beings as demons

or the souls of things. But, to leave that, we take our authority—this

thing “Science,” for instance—we clothe it with a creed and appetites

and a will, and all the other human attributes.

This done, we set out in the third step in our progress towards fixed

error. We make the idol speak. Of course, being only an idol, it talks

nonsense. But by the previous steps just referred to we must believe

that nonsense, and believe it we do. Thus it is, I think, that fixed

error is most generally established.

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