brings to the Law of Reason, or Nature, that is to say, to Those
dictates which are the result of the determinate and unchangeable
Constitution of things (and which as being discoverable to us by our
rational Faculties, are therefore sometimes call'd the Law of Reason,
as well as the Law of Nature) Christianity does most conspicuously and
evidently appear to be a Divine Religion; _viz._ to be from the Author
of Nature; however incongruous some Men may phancy it to be for God
supernaturally to reveal to Men what is naturally discoverable to
them, by those Faculties he has given them: The which conceit together
with not considering, or rightly weighing the inforcements which
Natural Religion needs, and receives from Revelation, has very much
dispos'd many to reject reveal'd Religion. Whereunto such Notions of
Christianity as agree not to the Attributes of an Infinitely Wise and
Good Being, which Reason teaches the first cause of all things to be,
have also not a little contributed; for from hence many Men, zealous
for the Honour of God and lovers of Mankind, have been prejudic'd
against the Truth of the Christian Religion: In consequence whereof
they have reasonably concluded that there was no such thing as
reveal'd Religion; and from thence have again infer'd that Men had no
need thereof to the Ends of Natural Religion.
Those yet who think Revelation to be needless in this regard, how well
soever they may, possibly, intend to Natural Religion, do herein
entertain an Opinion that would undermine it: Experience shewing us
that Natural Light, unassisted by Revelation, is insufficent to the
Ends of Natural Religion: A Truth necessary to be acknowledg'd to the
having a due value for the benefit that we receive by the Revelation
of Jesus Christ; and many, who profess belief in him, have not a right
estimation of that benefit on this very account, _viz._ as thinking
too highly, or rather wrongly of Natural Light: notwithstanding that
nothing is more undeniably true than that from the meer Light of
Nature Men actually were so far from discovering the Law of Nature in
its full extent or force, as that they did not generally own, and but
very imperfectly discern, its prescriptions or obligation. 'Tis also
alike evident that as Christianity has prevail'd, it has together with
Polytheism, and (in great measure) Idolatry, beaten out likewise the
allow'd Practice of gross Immorality; which in the Heathen World was
countenanc'd, and incourag'd by the examples of their very Gods
themselves; and by being frequently made even a part in Religious
Worship. For the Truth of this effect of Christianity we must appeal
to History; from whence if any one should imagine they could oppose
any contrary example, it could (I think) be taken but from one only
Country; wherein (if the Historian says right) Morality was more
exemplary than in any other that we know of for near 400 Years that
its Pagan Natives possess'd it; whose exterminators (calling
themselves Christians) made it a most deplorable Scene of Injustice,
Cruelty and Oppression, bringing thither Vices unknown to those former
Inhabitants. But what only can follow from this example is, That a
People, having a continu'd Succession of Princes, who study to advance
the good of the Community, making that the sole Aim of their
Government; and directing all their Laws, and Institutions to that
End (which was the peculiar felicity of those happy _Americans_) will
without other than Natural Light much better practice all social
Vertues, than Men set loose from Law and Shame; who tho' Baptiz'd into
the Name of Christ have not yet so much as a true Notion of
Christianity, to the which, may certainly be added, or than any other
People, who tho' they have the Light of the Gospel among them, yet are
not govern'd by the Laws thereof; and a truly Christian Common-wealth
in this sense, remains yet to be seen in the World; which when it is,
the Vertue, and Felicity of such a People will be found much to
surpass the (perhaps partial) account which we have of that of the
_Peruvians_; whose so long uninterrupted Succession of Excellent
Princes, is what only is admirable in the account we have of them; and
not the Force of the Light of Nature in those People, who being
apparently of tractable, gentle dispositions, and tir'd with the
Miseries of a Life to the last degree Brutish, did from the visible
wretchedness and inconveniences thereof, gladly obey such whom they
believed were (as they told them they were) Divinely sent to teach
then a happier way of living. And in the Vertues which these their
first Lawgivers taught them, their Successors easily retain'd them;
continuing still to maintain in them a perswasion of their Divine
Extraction, and Authority. From the which it will be found that this
instance of the _Peruvian_ Morality makes for the need of Revelation
to inforce Natural Religion, and not against it. But how far
Revelation is needful to assist Natural Light, will be the best seen
in reflecting a little upon what we receive from each of these Guides
that God has given us. And if it shall appear from thence that
Natural Religion has need of Revelation to support it; and that the
Revelation which we have by Jesus Christ is exquisitely adapted to the
end of inforcing Natural Religion; this will both be the highest
confirmation possible, that to inforce Natural Religion or Morality,
was the design of Christianity; and will also shew that to the want of
their being in earnest Christians, is to be attributed the immorality
of such who, professing Christianity, live immoral Lives. The
consequence from whence must be, That to reclaim a Vicious People, it
should be consider'd, as the most effectual means of doing so, how to
make Men really, and in earnest Christians.
To see what light we receive from Nature to direct our Actions, and
how far we are Naturally able to obey that Light; Men must be
consider'd purely as in the state of Nature, _viz._ as having no
extrinsick Law to direct them, but indu'd only with a faculty of
comparing their distant Ideas by intermediate Ones, and Thence of
deducing, or infering one thing from another; whereby our Knowledge
immediately received from _Sense_, or _Reflection_, is inlarg'd to a
view of Truths remote, or future, in an Application of which Faculty
of the mind to a consideration of our own Existence and Nature,
together with the beauty and order of the Universe, so far as it falls
under our view, we may come to the knowledge of a _First Cause_; and
that this must be an _Intelligent Being, Wise_ and _Powerful_, beyond
what we are able to conceive. And as we delight in our selves, and
receive pleasure from the objects which surround us, sufficient to
indear to us the possession and injoyment of Life, we cannot from
thence but infer, that this _Wise_ and _Powerful Being_ is also most
_Good_, since he has made us out of nothing to give us a Being wherein
we find such Happiness, as makes us very unwilling to part therewith.
And thus, by a consideration of the Attributes of God, visible in the
Works of the Creation, we come to a knowledge of his Existence, who is
an Invisible Being: For since _Power, Wisdom_ and _Goodness,_ which we
manifestly discern in the production and conservation of our selves,
and the Universe, could not subsist independently on some substance
for them to inhere in, we are assur'd that there is a substance where
unto they do belong, or of which they are the Attributes.
Which Attributes of God would not be discoverable by us, did we not
discern a difference in Things; as between _Power_ and _Weakness,
Benevolence_ and _no Benevolence_, or its contrary; and betwixt
directing means to an End, and acting at hap-hazard without any
design, or choice: A knowledge, which, by whatever steps convey'd into
the mind, is no other than a seeing things to be what they are, and
that they cannot but be what they are.
From which diversity and immutability in the Nature of things, there
necessarily arises a diversity of respects and relations between them,
as unchangeable as the things themselves: wherein the Will of the
Creator in reference hereunto is reveal'd to every intelligent Agent,
so far as he is made capable of discerning these relations,
dependencies and consequences; and whatsoever with respect to his own
Actions, such a Being finds resulting from any of these as most
conformable to the design of his Creator in making him such a part as
he is of the whole, he cannot but consider as the Will of God, thereby
dictated to him; since otherwise, God would act contradictiously to
his Wisdom in making him what he is.
We being then indu'd, as we are, with a capacity of perceiving and
distinguishing these differences of Things; and also with a liberty of
acting, or not, suitably and agreeably hereunto; whence we can
according to the preference of our own minds, act either in conformity
to, or disconformity with, the Will of the Creator (manifested in his
Works no less than the Will of any Humane Architect is in his) it
follows, That to act answerably to the nature of such Beings as we
are, requires that we attentively examine, and consider the several
natures of Things, so far as they have any relation to our own
actions.
Which attentive consideration of the Works of God objected to our
view, implies an exercise thereupon of that Faculty in us by which we
deduce, or infer, one thing from another: Whence (as has been said)
our knowledge immediately deriv'd to us from sensation, or reflection,
is inlarg'd by the perception of remote, or distant Truths. The more
obviously eminent advantages accruing to us from which faculty of
reason, plainly make known the Superiority of its Nature; and that its
suggestions, ought to be hearken'd to by us preferably to those of
Sense; where these (as it too often happens) do not concur. For did we
know nothing by _Inference_ and _Deduction_, both our knowledge and
injoyment would be very short of what they now are; many considerable
pleasures depending almost intirely upon Reason; and there being none
of the greatest Enjoyments of Sense which would not lose their best
Relish, separated from those concomitant satisfactions which
accompany them only as we are rational Creatures. Neither is it our
greatest happiness alone which is manifestly provided for in our being
indu'd with this Faculty; but our much greater safety, and
preservation likewise; since _these_ require a capacity in us of
foreseeing distant Events, and directing means to an End, oftentimes
through a long train of Actions; which is what we can only do by that
in us, whereby the Relations, Dependencies and Consequences of things
are discoverable to us.
But as _Reason_ is that which either in kind or degree, differences
Men from Brutes; and that there are few, if any, who would lose this
distinction, it is by common consent acknowledg'd that Reason is in
respect of all others, a preferable indowment. And if Beasts, only
inferiour to Men in the advantages of this Faculty, appear hereby
intended to be subjected to Men, it cannot be less evident That that
part in Men which they have in common with Beasts, was likewise
design'd by their Maker to be subjected to their Reason also. From All
which, it undeniably follows that we do not act answerably to the
Will, or pleasure of God, in making us such Creatures as we are, if we
either neglect the Search of those Measures of our Actions prescrib'd
to us by the discernable Natures of Things; or, if seeing these, we
yet conform not our selves thereunto.
Now for any Creature knowingly to oppose the Will of its Creator, is
not only disingenuity in regard of what is owing from it to its
Sovereign Benefactor, and Folly in respect of that dependence which it
has on him for its Being, as it is commonly represented to us to be;
but is also in the Nature of Things (simply consider'd) so repugnant
to right Reason, that were such a Creature consistent with it self
herein, and could act pursuantly to That Will, it would operate to its
own destruction; since its Existence evidently depends upon That of
its Maker; whose Will, as reveal'd to us, being but a different
consideration of his Attributes, the knowledge whereof is all the
Knowledge we have of God, cannot be so much as conceiv'd by us
separable from the Being of God; unless the God, which we conceive, be
a Fiction of our own Imagination, and not the Creator of All Things;
who is an invisible Being only knowable to us in, and by, the
exemplifications of his Attributes: The infinite Perfection, and the
inseparable Correspondence, and Harmony of which (discernable in the
Frame and Government of the Universe) plainly tells us, That the
Divine Will cannot be (like ours) successive Determinations without
dependance, or connection one upon another; much less inconsistent,
contradictory, and mutable; but one steady, uniform, unchangeable
result of infinite Wisdom and Benevolence, extending to, and including
All his Works. So that Sin, or disobedience to our Maker is manifestly
the greatest Nonsense, Folly and contradiction conceivable, with
regard purely to the immutable perfection of the Divine Nature; and to
the Natural constitution of things, independently upon any positive
command of God to us, or his irresistible power over us.
But as without a capacity in The Creature to act contrary to the will
of the Creator there could be no defect, or self-excellency in any
Created Being; contrariety to the Will of God is therefore permitted
in the Universe as a necessary result of Creaturely imperfection,
under the greatest endowment that a Created Being is capable of
having, viz. _That of Freedom or Liberty of Action_: And as the
constitution of such Creature, as this, implies that what is _best_ in
reference to the design of the Creator, and of its own Happiness,
should not be always necessarily present to the Mind as Best; such a
Creature may oppose the Will of his Maker with various degrees of
Guilt in so doing; or (possibly) with none at all; for no Agent can
offend farther than he wilfully abuses the Freedom he has to act.
But God having made Men so as that they find in themselves, very
often, a liberty of acting according to the preference of their own
Minds, it is incumbent upon them to study the Will of their Maker; in
an application of the Faculty of Reason which he has given them, to
the consideration of the different respects, consequences, and
dependencies of Things, so as to discern from thence, the just
measures of their actions in every circumstance and relation they
stand plac'd in; which _measures_ are nothing else but the dictates
resulting from those views which such a consideration of things as
this gives us, of what is consonant, or not so, to the design of the
Creator in every particular, wherein we are concern'd to act. And
these manifestations of his Will, thus discoverable to us, ought to be
regarded by us, as his Commands.
Yet however certain it is, that the dictates of _Reason_, or _Nature_,
discernable by our natural Faculties, are the commands of God to us,
as rational Creatures; it is equally true that the love of happiness
(which consists in pleasure) is the earliest, and strongest principle
of Humane Nature; and therefore whatever measures Reason does, or
might, prescribe, when particular occasions occur, the sentiment of
what Men find pleasing or displeasing to them, however contrary to
those dictates of right Reason, is very apt to determine their choice.
God yet who is the Author of Order, and not of Confusion, has fram'd
all things with Consistency, and Harmony; and however, in Fact, it too
often happens that we are misled by that strong desire of happiness
implanted in us, yet does this no way necessarily interfere with our
acting in an intire conformity to the prescriptions of the Law of
Reason; but the contrary: For from hence it is that this Law has its
Sanction, _viz._ That, duly considering it, we shall evidently find
our happiness, and misery, are annex'd to the observance, or neglect,
of that unalterable Rule of Rectitude, discoverable to us by the
Nature of Things; so that this Rule of Rectitude, or Eternal Will of
God, has also the force of a Law given to it by that inseparable
accord that there is betwixt our happiness or misery, with our
obedience, or disobedience, hereunto. Thus our duty and happiness, can
never be divided, but when we prefer a less happiness to a greater;
and therein act not conformably to the dictates of our natural desire
of happiness, or pleasure; which two Terms differ only in this, that
we apply the Term _Pleasure_ to any agreeable Sentiment, or Sensation,
how small, or short soever in its duration; but that of _Happiness_,
only to such degrees of pleasure, as do, in some considerable degree,
out-ballance our Evils.
That we are many ways capable of receiving pleasure, we experimentally
find; every sense furnishes something to delight, and please us, in
its Application to Objects suited to a grateful exercise thereof. And
the operations of our own Minds upon the Ideas presented to them by
our Senses, afford us also other pleasures, oftentimes preferable by
us to those that we receive immediately from Sense. But be our
pleasures excited how they will; or whatsoever they consist in, Those
that Men receive from the Gratification of antecedent desire, are the
pleasures that they have the strongest relish of. _A Good_ not
desir'd, making (comparatively) but a small Impression upon us.
Now the Gratification of their desires is not always in Men's Power,
but oftentimes it is so. It is then often in their choice to procure
to themselves pleasure, or not. Whence it is reasonable for them to
inquire, since happiness consists in pleasure; and the Gratification
of their Desires, and Appetites, always gives them pleasure; whether,
or no, to Gratifie _These_ should not therefore always be that which
should determine their actions in pursuance of this their chief End?
That happiness consisting in pleasure, we are so much the happier as
we enjoy more pleasure, must unquestionably, be found true; but that
the Gratification of Men's Desires and Appetites cannot therefore be
that which should always, as they are rational Agents, determine, or
regulate their actions in pursuit of happiness, is no less evident; in
that we perceive our selves, and the Things to which we have relation,
to be so fram'd, and constituted, in respect one of another, that the
Gratification of our present Desires and Appetites, does sometimes for
a short, or small pleasure, procure to us a greater, and more durable
Pain: and that on the contrary, the denial, or restraint of our
present Desires, and Appetites, does sometimes for a short, or small
Pain, procure to us a greater, or more durable Pleasure. Since then
that we should act contrary to our own end therein, and prefer less
pleasure to greater, it is apparent that the Gratification of our
present Appetites cannot be that which always, as we are rational
Agents, proposing to our selves happiness for our chief end, should
determine, or regulate our voluntary actions; present Appetite telling
us only what will give us present pleasure; not what will, in the
whole, procure to us the most pleasure. What else then appears to be
the Rule, or Measure of Men's actions acting purely with respect to
the pursuit of happiness as their chief End, but the determinations of
that Faculty in them which, in reference to the different properties
and relations discernable in Things, can alone be the Judge what will,
in the whole, procure to them the most pleasure? And thus the very
desire of happiness, or love of pleasure, rightly pursu'd, does oblige
us to make the determinations or dictates of Reason, and not the
suggestions of present Appetite, the Measure, and Rule of our actions
in our pursuit after happiness. Which that we might possess was no
doubt the end of our Creator in giving us Being; since he could not
stand in need of, or be better'd by our Existence. And if that we
might be happy was the end for which God made us, it is most certain
that he has neither set any such measures to our Actions, or put any
such unhappy Biass upon our Minds, as shall necessarily contradict
this his end. Whence it again appears that the love of Pleasure
implanted in us (if we faithfully pursue it in prefering always that
which will, on the whole, procure to us the most pleasure) can never
mislead us from the observance of the Law of Reason: And that this Law
enjoyns only a right regulation of our natural desire of pleasure, to
the end of our obtaining the greatest happiness that we are capable
of: so that there is an inseparable connection, or relation of Moral
Good and Evil, with our Natural Good, and Evil. To assert therefore
that our chief Good does consist in pleasure, is far from drawing
after it any such consequence as many have pretended it does, in
prejudice to the Law of Reason, that Natural Revelation of Gods Will
to us; since no Man can upon due consideration thereof Judge, That the
Gratification of his present Appetites ought to be to him the Measure
or Rule of his Actions in consequence of Pleasures being his chief
Good: experience it self, we see, contradicting such a consequence:
and that so evidently that I think we do not in fact find that even
Those, who the most indulge to their Passions and Appetites, do so as
believing upon a cool examination thereof, that to do thus is the
truest Wisdom, in consequence of our greatest Good consisting in
pleasure; but such Men indulge to their present Appetites meerly as
being strongly induc'd (contrary oftentimes to the suggestions of
their own minds therein) thro' the love of pleasure, and abhorrence of
pain, to do, or forbear whatever they find will procure to them the
one, or free them from the other at the present Time; the
Gratification whereof They prefer to that which is Future. It is
however true that such declamations as are sometimes made against
pleasure absolutely (not the irregular pursuit of it) as if pleasure
was in its own Nature, a false, and deceitful, not a real and solid
Good, have produc'd this ill effect, that many from the absurdity
hereof are confirm'd in an evil indulgence of their Appetites, as if
to Gratifie These was indeed the truest Wisdom of a rational Creature,
in consequence of pleasure, being his chief Good. But they judge not
thus from a due examination, or any examination at all of the nature
of Things, but from a Reason (if it may be call'd so) of opposition.
For so ridiculously weak are a great part of Men in their Reasoning,
that seeing they are in the wrong who oppose them, they become from
thence as much perswaded, and as well satisfy'd that the contrary to
such Mens Assertions is true; or that themselves are in the right, as
if they saw that these things really were so. This arguing yet is no
more irrational than that whereby a palpable Truth is deny'd, only
because some have indeavour'd to draw, or have been thought to have
drawn ill consequences from it: Which is yet all the ground of not
allowing that Pleasure, and Pain, are truly Good, and Evil; the
denying of which, can be of no Service to Morality, but the contrary,
since Moral Good, and Evil, consider'd antecedently to any positive
Law of our Maker, are apt to be thought but a Notion where that
inseparable Relation is overlook'd which there is between actions
denominated by us vertuous, or vicious, and the Natural Good, and Evil
of Mankind.