The United States government, both before and immediately after the
expeditions of Lopez, exhibited an increasing desire to acquire
possession of Cuba by purchase or otherwise. We have already referred to
the historic expression of John Quincy Adams upon this subject. It is
also to be recalled that in 1823, in commenting upon the prospective
results of the Monroe Doctrine, Thomas Jefferson looked upon Cuba as the
most interesting addition that could be made to the United States. The
control which, with Florida, this island would give the United States
over the Gulf of Mexico, and all the countries bordering thereon, as
well as all those whose waters flowed into the Gulf, would well be, he
thought, the measure of American well-being. Such an end could be
attained, he added, by no other means than that of war, and that was
something to which he was reluctant to resort. He was, therefore,
willing to accept the next best thing, to wit, the independence of Cuba,
and especially its independence of England. James Madison, at the same
time, and discussing the same general subject, expressed much curiosity
to know what England's attitude toward Cuba would be, and what the
rights of the United States toward that island would be, under the
Monroe Doctrine. John C. Calhoun was willing to pledge the United States
not to take Cuba, although he had already expressed a desire for such
acquisition, and Monroe himself would have adopted Calhoun's policy, had
it not been for the resolute opposition of John Quincy Adams. That
strenuous patriot was for reserving the plenary rights and powers of
the United States, and for permitting Europe to have nothing whatever to
do in the matter, and his counsel fortunately prevailed.
A little later, after the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine and in the
course of Congressional discussion of the Panama Congress, it was
emphatically stated in the Senate that, because of the great interest in
the United States in Cuba, there ought to be no discussion with other
powers concerning the destiny of that island, particularly with Colombia
and Mexico, which were then contemplating the invasion of Cuba in order
to take her forcibly from Spain. The British government, in August,
1825, proposed to the United States government, through its minister in
London, that the United States, Great Britain and France should unite in
a treaty engagement that none of them would take Cuba for itself or
permit of the taking of it by either of the others. This proposal was
promptly rejected by the United States. One of the grounds for her
rejection of it was that such action guaranteeing Spain her possession
of Cuba would encourage her to prolong indefinitely her struggle with
her other American colonies. Another was that this country had already
declared that it did not mean to seize Cuba for itself, and that it
would not permit its seizure by any other power. The United States
apparently did not fear that Great Britain would attempt to seize the
island, since for her to do so would mean a rupture with the United
States, which was at that time the last thing that the British
government desired. There was much more cause to fear that France might
attempt to take forcible possession of Cuba, and the suspicion that she
might do so was strengthened by the fact that while, at first, she
indicated a willingness to enter into the arrangement proposed by Great
Britain, she suddenly changed her attitude, and refused to do so. As a
result of this change of front on the part of France, the United States
government, in September, 1825, instructed its minister at Paris to
inform the French government that under no contingency, either with or
without the consent of Spain, would the United States permit France to
occupy Cuba.
Scarcely less marked was the opposition of the United States to any
scheme for the acquirement of Cuba by any of the American republics. It
was notorious that both Colombia and Mexico had designs upon Cuba. These
were not so much that either of these countries should acquire the
island for itself, but that Cuba and Porto Rico should, nilly willy, be
taken away from Spain and made independent, and that thus Spain should
be deprived of her last foothold in the Western hemisphere. This purpose
was cherished, not only as a matter of sentiment, but as one of
prudence. Spain was still trying to reconquer her revolted American
provinces, and her possession of Cuba, of course, afforded her an
admirable base for such operations. But the United States government
took the ground that any such intervention in Cuba would make it much
more difficult to secure Spanish recognition of the independence of the
Central and South American States. In addition, there was
undoubtedly--indeed it was very openly, emphatically and repeatedly
expressed--the unwillingness of the slaveholding southern states of the
United States to see Cuba made free soil, as the other Spanish colonies
had been. It was because of the former consideration, however, that the
American Secretary of State, Henry Clay, immediately after the rejection
of the British proposal for a tripartite guarantee, addressed a note to
the governments of Colombia and Mexico, urging them to refrain from
sending the expeditions which they were fitting out against the Spanish
power in Cuba. To this request, the Colombian government promptly
acceded, and so informed not only the United States, but also the
government of Russia, which was, at that time, endeavoring to mediate
between Spain and her late American colonies. The Mexican government did
not receive the request so favorably, though it did withhold the
threatened expedition.
With such antecedents set forth, we can more perfectly understand the
attitude of the United States toward Cuba at the time of which we are
now writing. In 1848 a change of policy occurred, and the United States
entered upon a new attitude. At that time James K. Polk was President of
the United States, and James Buchanan was his Secretary of State; both
men of southern, proslavery and expansionist proclivities. The American
minister to Spain was Romulus M. Saunders, of North Carolina, also a
proslavery expansionist. He was instructed by Polk and Buchanan to sound
the Spanish government as to the terms on which it would sell Cuba to
the United States. The response to his overtures was immediate and left
no room for doubt as to Spain's position. It was to the effect that Cuba
was not for sale. Under no circumstances would the Spanish government so
much as consider the sale of the island at any price whatever. No
Spanish Minister of State would venture for a moment to entertain such a
proposal. Such was the feeling of the Spanish government and of the
Spanish nation, that they would rather see Cuba sunk in the depths of
the sea, if it were possible, than transferred to the sovereignty of any
other power. Cuba was the "Ever-Faithful Isle." She was the last
remnant, the priceless memento of Spain's once vast empire in America,
and as such she would be forever retained and treasured. Although not
openly expressed, there was undoubtedly the additional feeling that
Spain had already suffered too much spoliation at the hands of the
United States. The United States, under Jefferson, had practically
compelled Spain to sacrifice her vast Louisiana territory by nominally
selling, but really giving it outright, to France. It had next taken
West Florida from her without compensation. Following this, under the
Monroe Doctrine, it had compelled her to sell it East Florida for a
pitifully inadequate sum, not one dollar of which had ever found its way
into the Spanish treasury. It had aided, abetted, and protected the
Central and South American provinces in their revolt. Certainly, after
such a record, it would be unthinkable to permit the United States to
proceed with the acquisition of the last remaining portion of the
Spanish American empire. The overtures for the United States purchase of
Cuba were, therefore, for the time being, abruptly abandoned, but it was
significant that they were promptly followed by the expeditions of Lopez
and the widespread and intense manifestations of American interest
therein.
There next occurred one of the most noteworthy and it must be confessed
least creditable episodes in the whole story of the relations between
the United States, Cuba and Spain. Franklin Pierce became President of
the United States, and the active and aggressive William L. Marcy was
his Secretary of State. Because of the strained relations between Spain
and the United States, growing out of the Lopez expeditions, there was a
well defined expectation that Marcy would pursue a vigorous policy
leading to the annexation of Cuba, even at the cost of war with Spain.
Marcy was an expansionist, and would doubtless have been glad to have
annexed Cuba, but he was something more than an expansionist. He was a
statesman. He therefore considered the subject from its various aspects
with a prudence and conservatism which were probably not at all pleasing
to the impetuous proslavery propagandists of the south, but which were
in the highest degree creditable to his good sense and to the honor of
the United States. Unfortunately not even Marcy could remain entirely
exempt from political and partizan considerations. He was practically
compelled to acquiesce in the appointment as his minister to Spain of
one of the more egregious misfits that ever disgraced American
diplomacy. This man was Pierre Soule. He was of French origin, and had
been a political conspirator and prisoner in that country. He had come
to the United States as a refugee, but had continued there his political
intrigues and revolutionary designs. Settling in New Orleans, he had
been in active sympathy with the filibustering enterprises of Lopez and
others against the Spanish rule in Cuba; he was suspected of having
incited the anti-Spanish mob in that city; and he was known to be an
ardent advocate of the annexation of Cuba by any means which might prove
effective. The choice of such a man as American minister to Spain was
certainly extraordinary. It must be assumed that Marcy agreed to it only
with great reluctance and under protest; while it is plausible, and
indeed permissible, to suspect that some ulterior influence dictated it
for the deliberate purpose of provoking trouble with Spain.
In these circumstances, Marcy did his best. He instructed Soule to
repress his anti-Spanish zeal, to do nothing which would irritate
Spanish susceptibilities, and especially to be particularly cautious in
making any suggestions or overtures concerning a change of relations in
Cuba. He instructed him, however, to seek reparation for the gross
injuries which Americans had undoubtedly suffered in Cuba, and to
suggest to the Spanish government that it would greatly facilitate the
friendly conduct of affairs for it to invest the Captain-General or
other governor of Cuba with a degree of diplomatic authority and
functions so that complaint could be addressed to him, and indeed all
such matters could be negotiated with him directly, instead of their
being referred to the government at Madrid. He did not urge Soule to
seek the purchase of Cuba, but he did authorize him to enter into
negotiations to that end, if the Spanish government should manifest a
favorable inclination.
Despite these wise instructions and admonitions, Soule promptly entered
upon a career of the wildest indiscretion. He went to Spain by way of
France, where he was under political proscription, and this gave offence
to the government of that country. On arriving at Madrid, he immediately
quarreled with the French party there, and fought a duel with the French
ambassador in which the latter was crippled for life.
Then word came to him that the Spanish authorities at Havana had seized
an American steamer, the _Black Warrior_. That steamer had, for a long
time, been plying regularly between the United States and Cuba in a
perfectly legitimate way. There was not the slightest proof or
suggestion that she had ever engaged in filibustering or in any
illegitimate commerce. Indeed she was not accused of it. But she was
seized and her cargo was condemned simply for alleged disregard of some
insignificant port regulation which, as a matter of fact, had not been
enforced or observed by any vessel for many years. The master of the
vessel resented and protested against the seizure and when the Spanish
authorities arbitrarily persisted in it, he abandoned the vessel
altogether, and reported the circumstances to the United States
government. The President promptly laid the matter before Congress at
Washington, stating that a demand for redress and indemnity was being
made. Passions flamed high in Congress, and southern members made
speeches demanding war and the conquest of Cuba. Marcy, however,
retained his sanity of judgment, and contented himself with instructing
Soule at Madrid to demand an indemnity of $300,000 and to express the
hope that the Spanish government would disavow and rebuke the act which
it was confidently assumed had not been authorized and could not be
approved. This gave Soule a fine opportunity to show himself a capable
diplomat and to do a good stroke of work, for Spain was manifestly wrong
and a proper presentation of the case would doubtless have caused her to
accede pretty promptly to Marcy's reasonable demands.
Soule began well. He followed Marcy's instructions closely at the
outset, and had a friendly and temperate interview with the Spanish
Minister for Foreign Affairs; but when three days thereafter had passed
without a complete settlement, he seemed altogether to lose his head. He
sent to the minister a peremptory note, demanding payment of the
indemnity, and the immediate dismissal from the Spanish service of all
persons in any way responsible for the seizure of the _Black Warrior_.
If this was not done within forty-eight hours, he added, he would
immediately demand his passports and sever diplomatic relations between
the two countries. With customary arrogance, he instructed the messenger
by whom he transmitted the note to call the attention of the Spanish
minister to the exact hour and minute at which the messenger should
deliver the note into his hands, and to remind him that an answer would
be expected, under penalty, within forty-eight hours after that precise
moment of time. Worst of all, perhaps, this occurred during Holy Week,
when it was not customary for the Spanish government to transact any
business which could possibly be deferred.
The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs was Calderon de la Barca, who
had formerly been Spanish minister to the United States, and with whom
Soule had personally very violently quarrelled at Washington. With
characteristic Spanish courtesy, he very promptly, within twenty-four
hours, replied to Soule that the matter would be most carefully
considered at the earliest possible moment, but that it manifestly would
not be practicable, and indeed would not be just, to dispose of so
important a matter so hastily, and upon the hearing of only one side of
it. He also added, quite properly, that the Spanish government was not
accustomed to being addressed in so harsh and imperious a manner, and
that he could not regard such a mode of procedure as calculated to
facilitate the amicable settlement which both parties undoubtedly
desired.
Thus placed, through his own folly, at a hopeless disadvantage, Soule
abandoned the case. He sent to Marcy his own absurd and unauthorized
ultimatum, together with Calderon's dignified and statesmanlike reply,
possibly in the vain hope that Marcy would back him up in the impossible
attitude which he had assumed. Of course, Marcy did nothing of the sort.
As a matter of fact, it was not necessary for Marcy to pay any attention
whatever to Soule's report, since, before it reached Washington, the
Spanish authorities in Cuba had restored the _Black Warrior_ to her
owners, with the amplest possible amends for their improper seizure of
her, and the whole incident was thus happily ended.
The project of acquiring Cuba for the United States continued to be
cherished by the American government. It must be supposed that the
Secretary of State appreciated the immense value of Cuba, both in its
resources and in its strategic position and so, for that reason, was
desirous of acquiring the island. It must also be believed that he was
to a degree moved by a desire to get rid of what he plainly saw would be
a perennial cause of annoyance and even of danger. Since the beginning
of the nineteenth century, Cuba had been a cause of anxiety to the
United States, and since the beginning of insurrections in that island,
and especially insurrections looking to the United States for sympathy
and aid, there was a constantly increasing danger of unpleasant and
possibly hostile complications with Spain. There is no indication,
however, that Marcy ever had any other thought than that of the peaceful
acquisition of the island through friendly negotiations. It was most
unfortunate that because of the political conditions which prevailed
during that administration, he was compelled to act through unfit and
indeed unworthy agents.
At the beginning of 1854, Mr. Marcy directed the United States ministers
to Spain, France and Great Britain to confer among themselves as to the
best means, if indeed any were practicable, to persuade Spain to sell
Cuba to the United States, and at the same time to avoid or to overcome
objections which France and Great Britain might make to such a
transaction. That was a perfectly legitimate proposal, and indeed, under
the circumstances, was desirable and should have been productive of
excellent results. Its fatal defect lay in the personality of the men
who were called upon to put it into execution. The minister to Spain was
Soule, of whom we have already heard enough to indicate his very
conspicuous unfitness for the task assigned to him. The minister to
France was James M. Mason, a Virginian, and one of the most aggressive
and extreme Southern advocates of the extension of slavery. The
minister to Great Britain was James Buchanan, who was afterward
President of the United States, a northern man with strong southern
sympathies and in complete subservience to the slaveholding interests of
the south. The result of a conference among these three was practically
a foregone conclusion.
They came together at Ostend in the summer of 1854, and a little later
concluded their deliberations at Aix-la-Chapelle, and the result of
their conference was embodied in that extraordinary document known to
history as the Ostend Manifesto.
That document, which was drawn up in October, 1854, and was signed by
these three ministers and sent by them to Mr. Marcy, was written chiefly
by Soule. It set forth the various reasons why, in the opinion of Soule
and his colleagues, Cuba ought to belong to the United States. A variety
of reasons was set forth, but chief among them was this, that such
acquisition of Cuba was necessary for the security and perpetuity of the
slave system in the United States. Then Soule went on to tell why Spain
ought to be willing to sell the island, and why Britain and France ought
to be willing for her to sell it to the United States. The price to be
paid for Cuba was not stated. It ought not, however, Soule said, to
exceed a certain maximum sum to be prescribed by the United States; and
there are reasons for believing that the price which Soule had in mind
was $120,000,000. All this was bad enough. It was far removed from what
Marcy had intended. But the worst was to come. With astounding
effrontery and cynicism, the manifesto proceeded to say that if Spain
should be so swayed by the voice of her own interest and actuated by a
false sense of honor as to refuse to sell Cuba, then, by every law,
human and divine, the United States would be justified in taking Cuba
forcibly from her, on the ground that such seizure was necessary for the
protection of the domestic peace of the United States. This Manifesto
was sent by the three ministers to Marcy, with a memorandum written by
Soule, suggesting that that would be a good time to start a war with
Spain for the seizure of Cuba, because France and Great Britain were
just then engaged in fighting Russia in the Crimea, and therefore would
not be able to interfere with Spain's behalf.
Marcy never for a moment, of course, thought of acting upon these
abominable recommendations. The overwhelming sentiment of this nation
would have been against it. Even in the South, the majority of
thoughtful men held that Soule and his colleagues had gone too far,
while throughout the North, the Manifesto was scathingly denounced as a
proposal of international brigandage. Not only in Spain, but almost
equally in France and Great Britain, American diplomacy and the honor of
the American government were regarded as seriously compromised. In these
circumstances Marcy, to whom the Manifesto must have been revolting,
very adroitly declined to recognize its real purport, but insisted upon
interpreting it in an entirely different way from that which its authors
had intended. The result was that the note was practically pigeonholed.
Soule was so chagrined and enraged at this disposition of a favorite
child of his mind that he resigned his office as Minister to Spain, to
the unmistakable relief both of Marcy and of the Spanish government.
Buchanan, another of the signers, became President of the United States
a couple of years later, and in his second annual message, in December,
1858, sought to revive the Manifesto, referring to the possibility of
its sometime being necessary for the United States to seize Cuba under
the law of self-preservation. He also requested Congress to appropriate
$30,000,000 for the purchase of the island, and a bill to that effect
was introduced, but it was never pressed to final passage. Again in 1859
he referred to the subject, being still apparently obsessed with the
idea that the conquest of Cuba was necessary for the preservation of the
United States, but on this occasion his reference to the subject was
entirely ignored by Congress. Then came the Civil War in the United
States, which, for a number of years, debarred that country from paying
any attention to the affairs of its southern neighbor.