THE COURSE OF FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1625 TO 1627.
In reviewing so important a conflict as that which had broken out at
home, it almost requires an effort of will to bestow deep interest
upon foreign affairs in turn. But not only is this necessary from the
connexion between the two, but we should not be able to understand the
history of England if we left out of consideration its relation to
those great events of European importance which absorbed even the
largest share of public attention.
Charles I had undertaken to do what his father avoided to the end of
his life,--to offer open opposition to the Spanish monarchy and its
aims. Like Queen Elizabeth he took this step in alliance with France,
Holland, and the Protestants of Germany and the North, but yet not in
full agreement with his own people. This was due mainly to the
circumstance that France had become far more Catholic under Mary de'
Medici and Louis XIII than it had been under Henry IV. The offensive
alliance between France and England now developed a character which
rather irritated than quieted the religious feelings which prevailed
in England.
[Sidenote: A.D. 1625.]
On the first shocks sustained by the close alliance which had existed
between the Catholic powers, the Huguenots in France rose in order to
recover their former rights which had been curtailed. But the French
government was not at all inclined to give fresh life to these
powerful and dangerous movements: on the contrary it invoked the
assistance of England and Holland to put them down. For the great
strength of the Huguenots lay in their naval resources, and without
the help of the maritime powers the French government would never
have been able to overcome them. And so imperative seemed the
necessity of internal peace in France,[460] if she was to be induced
to take an active share in the war against Spain, that the English and
Dutch were actually persuaded to put their crews and vessels at the
disposal of the French government, which then used them with decisive
results. The naval power of the Huguenots, which had formed so large
an element of the fighting strength of the Protestants, was broken by
the assistance of England and Holland. Queen Elizabeth, in the midst
of her war with Philip II, would certainly never have been brought to
this step, and even now it roused the bitterest dislike. It was found
that the execution of the orders issued met with resistance even on
board the ships themselves. A light is thrown upon the ill-feeling at
home, when a member of the Privy Council, Lord Pembroke, tells a
captain who resisted this mutinous spirit, that the news of the
insubordination of his crew was the best which he had heard for a long
time, and that it was welcome even to the King: that he must deal
leniently with his men, and only see that he remained master of the
ship.[461] But what an impression must doubtless have been produced on
the population of England, which still stood in the closest relation
to the French Reformed! Sermons were delivered from the pulpits
against these proceedings of the government.
But if the active alliance of France against Spain and Austria was
secured by this immense sacrifice, what could have appeared more
natural than to employ the whole strength of that country for the
restoration of the Count Palatine, which the French saw to be
advantageous to themselves, and for the support of German
Protestantism? In pursuance of the stipulations which had been made
the King of Denmark was already in the field: his troops had already
fought hand to hand at Nienburg in the circle of Lower Saxony with
the forces of the League which were pressing forward into that
country. He was strong in cavalry but weak in infantry: the German
envoys who were present in England insisted that gallant English
troops should be sent to his assistance, and that the fleet which was
ready for service should be ordered to the Weser; for that the support
which the fleet would give to the King would encourage him to advance
with good heart. And then, as they added with extravagant hopefulness,
the King of Sweden, who had already offered his aid, would come
forward actively, if only he had some security; the Elector of
Brandenburg, who had just married his sister to the King of Sweden,
would declare himself; the Prince of Transylvania, who was connected
with the same family, would force his way into Bohemia: every one
would withstand the League and compel it to restore the lands occupied
by it to their former sovereigns, and to the religion hitherto
professed in them.
But Buckingham had as little sympathy with the German as with the
French Protestants: his passionate ambition was to make the Spaniards
directly feel the weight of his hatred. For this purpose he had just
concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the United
Provinces; even the great maritime interests of England were
themselves a reason for opposing Spain. At all events, in the autumn
of 1625 he despatched the fleet, not to the Weser, which appeared to
him almost unworthy of this great expedition, but against the coasts
of the Spanish peninsula. Orders were given to it to enter the mouth
of the Guadalquivir, and to alarm Seville, or else to take the town of
Cadiz, for which object it had on board a considerable number of land
troops; or, finally, to lie in wait for the Spanish fleet laden with
silver, and to bring home the cargo as a lawful prize. Buckingham
proceeded on the supposition that the foundation of the Spanish power
and its influence would be undermined by the interruption of the
Spanish trade with America, and that in the next year the Spaniards
would be able to effect nothing. He did not perceive that this would
have no decisive influence on that undertaking on which in the first
instance everything depended, that of the King of Denmark, as
meanwhile in Rome, Vienna, and Munich, native forces, independent of
Spain, had been collected. But while he preferred the more distant to
the more immediate end, it was his fate to achieve neither the one nor
the other. In December 1625 the fleet returned without having effected
anything at sea or on the Spanish coasts. On the contrary it had
suffered the heaviest losses itself.
[Sidenote: A.D. 1626.]
The discredit into which Buckingham fell with those whom he had
desired to win over, and whose wishes were fixed on the struggle with
Spain, is exhibited in a very extraordinary enterprise which sprung up
at this time, and which had for its object the formation of what we
may almost call a joint-stock war company. A wish was felt to form a
company for making war on Spain, upon the basis, it is true, of a
royal charter, but under the authority of Parliament, with the
intention of sharing the booty and the conquests, as well as the costs
among the members.[462]
By the late enterprise moreover the means had been wasted which might
have been used for supporting the German allies of England. Left
without sufficient subsidies in his quarrel with Parliament, the King
was unable to pay the arrears due both to the seamen who were
returning from Spain, and to his troops in Holland. He could not
repair his fleet; he could hardly defend his coasts: how could he be
in a position to make any persevering effort for the conduct of the
war in Germany? The King of Sweden asked for only £15,000 in order to
set his forces in motion; but at that time this sum could not be
raised. The King of Denmark was the more thrown on England, as the
French also made their services depend on what the English would do:
but Conway, the Secretary of State, declared himself unable to pay the
stipulated sum. Could men feel astonished that the Danish war was not
carried on with the energy which the cause seemed to demand?
Christian IV had not troops enough, and could not pay even those which
he had. The cavalry, which constituted his main strength, had on one
occasion refused to fight, because they had not received their pay. He
himself threw the chief blame on the English for the defeat which he
now sustained at Lutter; and which was the more decisive, as meanwhile
Mansfeld also, who wished to turn his steps to the hereditary
dominions of Austria in order to combine with the Prince of
Transylvania, had been not only defeated, but almost annihilated. The
armies which were to have defended the Protestant cause disappeared
from off the field. The forces of the Emperor and of the League now
occupied North Germany also on both sides of the Elbe.
To Germany the alliance with England had at that time brought no good.
It may be doubted whether the Elector Palatine would have accepted the
crown of Bohemia but for the support which he thought to find in
England. This affair had a great part in bringing on the outbreak of
the great religious conflict. But James I sought to retrieve the
misfortune into which the Elector had fallen, not so much by employing
his own power, as by developing his relations with the Spaniards; and
thus he had himself given them the opportunity of establishing
themselves in the Palatinate, and had caused the Catholic reaction to
triumph in Upper Germany. Without the instigation of England, and the
great combination of the powers in East and West hostile to the house
of Austria, the King of Denmark would not have determined to begin
war, nor would the circle of Lower Saxony have aided him. On this
occasion as on others in England the interests of its own power
outweighed consideration for the allies. The policy of the English had
formerly been ruled by their friendly relations with Spain: it was now
ruled by their hostile intentions towards that country. All available
forces were employed for their purpose, and the movement in Germany
was left to its fate.
Meanwhile another consequence of the breach with Spain came to light,
which King James had always feared. In order not to be forced to fight
both great powers at once, Spain found it advisable to show a
compliance hitherto unprecedented in the affairs of Italy, in which
France had interested herself. After this the irritation against the
ascendancy of the Spaniards evidently abated in France.
For in alliances of great powers it is self-evident that their
political points of view, if for a moment they coincide, must
nevertheless in a short time be again opposed to one another. How
should one power really seek the permanent advantage of another?
At that time also, as on so many occasions, other relations arising
out of the position of the leading statesmen as members of parties,
produced an effect on politics. Cardinal Richelieu met with opposition
from a zealously Catholic party, which gathered round the queen
mother, and considered the influence of Spain to a certain degree
necessary. This party seized the first favourable opportunity of
setting on foot a preliminary treaty of peace, to which Richelieu,
however long he hesitated, and however much he disliked it, could not
help acceding.
Quite in keeping with this understanding between the Catholic powers
was the partial recoil of Protestantism in England from the advances
which it had made to the Catholic party. The French who surrounded the
Queen were so numerous, that a strong feeling of opposition on
religious and national grounds was awakened in them by their contact
with the English character. They saw in the English nothing but
heretics and apostates; the Catholics who had formerly been executed
at Tyburn as rebels they honoured as martyrs. The Queen herself, upon
whom her priests laid all kinds of penance corresponding to her
dignity, was once induced to take part in a procession to this place
of execution. It is conceivable how deeply wounded and irritated the
English must have felt at these odious demonstrations. To the King it
seemed insufferable that the household of his consort should take up a
position of open hostility to the ecclesiastical laws of the land.
Personally also he felt injured and affronted. We hear complaints from
him that he was robbed of his sleep at night by these demonstrations.
He quickly and properly resolved to rid himself once for all of these
refractory people, whatever might be the consequence. The Queen's
court was then refusing to admit into it the English ladies whom he
had appointed to attend on her. The King seized the opportunity: he
invited his wife to dine with him, for they still had separate
households; and after dinner he made her understand by degrees that he
could no longer put up with this exhibition of feeling on the part of
her retinue, but must send them all home again, priests and laymen,
men and women alike.[463] This resolution was carried out in spite of
all the resistance offered by those whom it affected. Only some few
ladies and two priests of moderate views were left with the Queen; all
the rest were shipped off to France. There they filled the court and
the country with their complaints. Those about the Queen-mother
assumed an air as if the most sacred agreements had been infringed,
and any measure of retaliation was thought justifiable.
Marshal Bassompierre indeed set out once more for England in order to
bring about a reconciliation. Though ill received at first, he
nevertheless won his way by his splendid appearance and by clever talk
and moderation. In a preliminary agreement leave was given to the
Queen to receive back a number of priests and some French ladies;[464]
and Buckingham prepared to go to France to remove the obstacles still
remaining. But meanwhile the feeling of estrangement at the French
court had become still stronger. The agreement was not approved: and
the court would not hear of a visit from Buckingham, as it was thought
that he would be sure to use the opportunity afforded by his presence
to stir up the Huguenots. Richelieu thought that the dispute with
England had been provoked by his enemies in order to break up the
friendly relations which he had established. But nevertheless he too
did not wish to see Buckingham in France, for he feared that the
English minister might side outright with his opponents.
Personal considerations of many kinds co-operated in producing this
result, but it was not due mainly to their influence. The religious
sympathies and hatreds at work had incalculable effects. While the
opposition between the two religions again awoke in all its strength,
and a struggle for life and death was being fought out between them in
Germany, an alliance could not well be maintained between two courts
which professed opposite religious views. The current of the general
tendencies of affairs has a power by which the best considered
political combinations are swept into the background.
The paramount importance of religious movements not only prevented a
combination between France and England, but also brought both Catholic
powers into closer agreement with one another, as soon as their
immediate differences had been in some measure adjusted. Father
Berulle had promoted the marriage of a French princess with the King
of England in the hope of converting him; but now that he became
conscious of his mistake, he lent his pen to a project for a common
attack to be made by the Catholic powers upon England. The domestic
dissensions in that country, which again aroused Catholic sympathies
among a part of the population, appeared to favour such a project. An
agreement on the subject was in treaty for some time. It was at last
concluded and ratified in France in the form in which it was sent back
from Spain.[465]
Although it is not clear that people in England had authentic
information of these negotiations, yet the advances made by the two
courts to one another, which were visible to every one, could not but
cause some anxiety in the third. The English were always anxiously
considering what Philip IV might have in view for the next year; at
times even in Charles' reign they feared another attack from the
Belgian coast. What would happen if France lent her aid in such an
enterprise? It was known at all events that the priests exhorted her
to do so. That France and Spain should make a joint attack on England
appeared to be most for the interest of the Catholic world.[466]
Another ground for anxiety in England was from that resolution to
revive the French naval power, which Richelieu had already taken in
consequence of his late experiences. He bought ships of war, or had
them built, and took foreign sailors into his service. Charles I
perceived this with the greatest displeasure. He regarded it as a
threat against England, for he thought that the French could have no
other intention than that of robbing England of the supremacy that she
had exercised from time immemorial over the sea which bears her name.
He declared that he was resolved to prevent matters from going so far.
A great effect was produced by a very definite misunderstanding which
now arose between England and France, and affected naval interests as
well as the question of religion.
Of all the French Huguenots, who had been compelled by their last
defeat to seek peace with the King, the citizens of Rochelle felt the
blow most deeply. They had at that time been hemmed in on all sides,
and were especially harassed by a fort erected in their neighbourhood.
They had been assured that at the proper time they would be relieved
of this annoyance. They had not an express and unequivocal promise;
but the English ambassador, who had been invited to mediate, had
guaranteed to them, after conference with the French ministry, such an
interpretation of the expressions used as would secure the wished-for
result.[467] But just the contrary took place: they were constantly
being more closely shut in, and more seriously threatened with the
loss of that measure of independence which they had hitherto enjoyed.
They turned to Charles I. They would rather have acknowledged him as
their sovereign than have submitted to such a loss, and he felt the
full weight of his obligation to them. But, if he desired to grant
them assistance, it could only be rendered by open war.
[Sidenote: A.D. 1627.]
When the English resolved to undertake an expedition against the
Island of Rhé, the prevention of the fall of Rochelle was not the
only object in view. It was rather considered that nothing could be
more desirable and advantageous than the command of this island in the
event of a struggle with the two powers. For Biscay could be reached
in a voyage of one night from thence, and the communication between
the Netherlands and the harbours on the north-east coast of Spain
could at any time be interrupted by the possessors of the island,
which might be used at the same time for keeping up constant
communication with the Huguenots, and for giving the French power
employment at home.[468] The Huguenots had already taken up arms
again, and Rochelle displayed the English banner on its walls. Charles
I intended to use Rhé as a station for his fleet, but to cede the
general sovereignty over it to Rochelle. A successful result here
might serve to infuse new life into the Protestant cause.
In order to achieve so great an end the King thought it admissible to
levy a forced loan, and thus to collect those sums which Parliament
had promised him by word of mouth, but had not yet formally granted.
We shall have hereafter to consider the resistance which he
encountered in this attempt, and the various arbitrary acts to which
he resorted for its suppression; for they formed one of the turning
points of his history. At first he actually succeeded so far, that a
fleet of more than a hundred sail was able to put to sea for the
attack of Rhé and the support of Rochelle. It was considered in
raising this loan that a war with France had greater claims upon
popular support than any other. In the present doubtful state of
affairs a decided advantage gained in such a war might even now have
exercised great influence upon the internal state of the kingdom.
At this juncture Buckingham assumed a position of extraordinary
importance. After the repeated failures of the Protestants, his
undertaking aroused all their hopes. Directed against both the
Catholic powers, it must, if successful, have directly benefited the
French Protestants, and indirectly the German Protestants also by the
effect which it would inevitably have produced. But it was besides one
enterprise more undertaken by the sole power of the monarch: it was
carried out independently of any Parliamentary grants properly so
called. It represented the principle of a moderate monarchical
Protestantism, combined with toleration for the native Catholics,
among whom Buckingham endeavoured to find support. His was a position
of which the occupant must either be a great man or perish.
Buckingham, who had no equal in restless activity, and was by nature
not devoid of adroitness and ability, nevertheless had not that
persevering and comprehensive energy which is required for the
performance of great actions. He had not gone through the school of
those experiences in which minds ripen: and for the want of this
training his native gifts were not sufficient to compensate. He was so
far fortunate as to gain possession of the Island of Rhé; but Fort
Martin, which had been erected there a short time before, and on which
the possession of the island depended, defied his attacks, and he was
not skilful enough to intercept the support which was thrown into the
fort in the hour of its greatest danger. The defence of the French
certainly showed greater perseverance than the attack of the English.
Buckingham did not know how to awaken among his men that fiery
devotion which shrinks from no obstacle, and which would have been
necessary here. And the measures which were arranged at home were not
so effective as to bring him at the right moment the reinforcement he
needed. In November 1627 he returned to England without having
effected his object. He left behind him the French Protestants, and
Rochelle especially, in the greatest distress.
Charles I had no intention of proving false to the promises which he
had given them, any more than he wished to allow the King of Denmark
to sink under his difficulties. But what means did he possess of
bestowing help either on the former or on the latter?
After the battle of Lutter he had told the Danish ambassador, that he
would come to the assistance of his uncle, even if he should have to
pawn his crown. How heavily his position weighed on him at that time!
While he had undertaken the responsibility of contending for the
greatest interests of the world, he was obliged to confess, and did so
with tears in his eyes, that at present he hardly had at his disposal
the means of defraying the necessary expenses of his daily life.
The King of Denmark advised him to call Parliament together again, and
make the needful concessions, in order to obtain such subsidies as
would enable him to give vigorous support to his allies. Charles I in
the first instance took umbrage at this, because it was good advice
from an uncle and an elder, as if some blame were thereby cast on him:
by degrees he became convinced of the necessity of this measure.
It was quite evident from the events of the last few years that the
King would not be able to maintain the position he had assumed,
without active support from Parliament.
NOTES:
[460] Z. Pesaro, April 25, 1625: 'Che la conservatione della pace in
Francia sara il fondamento del beneficio comune, che li rumori civili
in quella natione sariano il solo remedio che Spagnoli procurano alli
loro mali.'
[461] 'That the King and all the rest were exceedingly glad of that
relation which he made of the discontent and mutiny of his compagnie.'
[462] M. A. Correro: 'Trattano di formar una compagnia per la quale
possino con l'autorità del parlamente e privilegi reggi attaccare con
una flotte il re di Spagna per dividere l'interesse della spesa e
l'utile delli bottini e delli acquisti nelli compagni che ne averanno
parte (27 Mayo 1626).'
[463] Letter to Joseph Mead: Court and Times of Charles I, i. 134.
[464] According to Ruszdorf, who was well acquainted with
Bassompierre, the latter represented 'hoc facto regem obligatum nihil
esse intermissurum, quod ad conservationem fortunae illius queat
conducere.'
[465] Siri, Memorie recondite vi. 261.
[466] Letter to Joseph Mead, March 16, 1626: 'It still holds that both
France and Spain make exceeding great preparations both for sea and
land.--The priests of the Dunkirkers are said to preach that God had
delivered us into their hands.' (Court and Times of Charles I, i.
205).
[467] I refer for the fuller explanation of these transactions to my
History of the Popes and my French History. My meaning is very fully
recognised in an essay in the Revue Germanique, Nov. 1859.
[468] Beaulieu to Pickering. 'It lieth in the way to intercept the
salt that cometh from Biscaje and serveth almost all France, and what
so ever cometh out of the river of Bourdeaux: besides it commandeth
the haven of Rochelle.' (Court and Times of Charles I, i. 257).