COMPLICATIONS ARISING OUT OF THE AFFAIRS OF THE PALATINATE.
During these years there had been persons at the helm of state in most
countries, who either from natural disposition or from a calculation
of present circumstances had cherished peaceful views. In spite of all
the activity of Spanish policy, Philip III and his minister Lerma
clung to the principle that the rest needed to restore the strength of
the exhausted monarchy must be granted to it. The Emperor Matthias
owed the crown he wore to his alliance with the Protestants: his first
minister Klesel, although a cardinal, was a lukewarm Catholic, and a
man of conciliatory views in general. The Regent of France, Mary de'
Medici, had surrendered the warlike designs of her husband when she
entered on the exercise of sovereign power. Christian IV of Denmark
held similar views. He declined the proposals of the Poles, which were
aimed at a renewal of the war against Sweden: he preferred, with the
approval of his council of state, to proceed with the building of
towns and harbours in which he was engaged.
Hence it was possible on the whole to carry out a policy such as that
maintained by James I. It corresponded to the tone prevalent among the
other powers.
[Sidenote: A.D. 1617.]
From time to time it seemed probable that the opposing forces which
were contending with one another in the depths of European life, would
burst forth and shatter the peaceful state of affairs. For the
advancing revival of Catholicism roused the hostile feelings of
Protestants, while the union of the German and the independent feeling
of the Italian princes resisted the extension of the alliances of
Spain. In the year 1615, on the Netherland frontier, and in the year
1616 on the boundaries between Austria and Venice, warlike movements
began which threatened to prove the commencement of a general
struggle: but these were disputes of an essentially local nature, and
peaceful dispositions still maintained the upper hand.
But in the year 1617 and 1618 a question arose which no longer allowed
this state of things to continue. It concerned the imperial dignity of
Germany, but it exercised so powerful a secondary influence upon
affairs most thoroughly English that even in a history of England a
short discussion must be devoted to it.
The increasing weakness of the Emperor Matthias rendered his speedy
end probable; and all preparations were already being made in the
house of Austria to secure the succession of the Archduke Ferdinand of
Styria to the imperial throne, as well as to his own hereditary
kingdoms and provinces. No arrangement could in itself have been more
suitable in the nature of things. Ferdinand was the most vigorous
scion of his house; and both the German Archdukes laid their own
well-founded claims at his feet. A resignation on the part of Philip
III of the claims which he inherited from his mother was thought
indispensable: but even this created no difficulty. It was merely
stipulated that Ferdinand should indemnify him for resigning them; and
this he was willing to do. It only remained that the crown of the
German Empire should also be assured to him. The Archdukes were eager
for an immediate negotiation on the subject, and were already certain
of the support of the spiritual electors.
It is clear however that the succession was not merely a change of
persons. The place of the peaceable and moderate Matthias would be
filled by one of the most devoted pupils of the Jesuits in the person
of Ferdinand, who had made himself terrible to the Protestants by an
unsparing restoration of Catholicism in his own country. Moreover the
alliance between the German and Spanish line, which had been loosened
in the last few years, was to be consolidated into a union resting on
common interests: so that it seemed likely that Austria would enjoy a
supremacy like that which had been established in the time of Charles
V. The letters which passed between the members of that house, and
which had accidentally been divulged, excited surprise by the note of
general hostility which they struck, while the share of the Palatinate
and of Brandenburg in the election was treated in them as a formality
which could be dispensed with in case of necessity.[400]
It is quite intelligible that the Protestants should be agitated by
this discovery, and should entertain the idea of opposing the election
of Ferdinand. Not that one of them thought of acquiring the throne for
himself; they did not resist the election of a Catholic emperor as
such, but they wished to guard against the resumption of the
combination between the Austro-Spanish power and the prerogatives of
the imperial crown. At first their eyes fell upon Duke Maximilian of
Bavaria, whom they would by this means have for ever detached from
that power. The Elector Frederick controlled the jealousy which, as
Elector Palatine, he felt for a branch of the same house, and went to
Munich in order to prevail on his cousin to consent to this
arrangement; for, according to the plea advanced on grounds of
imperial right, the imperial crown could not be allowed to become
hereditary in the house of Austria. He hoped that the Archbishop
Ferdinand of Cologne, the brother of the Duke of Bavaria, would
support him, and that his influence would win over the other spiritual
electors also. The Union and the League would then have combined to
oppose the house of Austria.
But meanwhile open resistance to the claims of this family had already
broken out in its own provinces. While the Emperor Matthias was still
alive, the Archduke Ferdinand, through the combination, as prescribed
by Bohemian usage, of an election with the recognition of his
hereditary claims, had been acknowledged future King of Bohemia, and
had been already crowned, on condition that he would not mix in public
affairs before the death of his predecessor. But immediately after the
coronation people thought that they could discover his hand in every
act of the government. Cardinal Klesel, the man in whom the greatest
confidence was reposed, especially by the Protestant portion of the
Estates, had been overthrown owing to the influence of the Spanish
ambassador. In opposition to the influence thus exercised, 'against
the practices and snares of the Jesuits,' as the phrase ran, the
zealous Protestants who, when Ferdinand was accepted as King, had been
thrust into the background or had retired, now obtained the upper hand
in the country, and proceeded to open insurrection while the Emperor
Matthias was still alive. This Prince was the first who was overturned
by the collision of the two parties, whose enmity was again reviving,
and between whom he had thought of mediating. He was bitterly
disappointed by his failure. After his death the Bohemians thought
themselves justified in refusing any longer to acknowledge Ferdinand
as their King, and in seeking on the contrary for a worthier successor
to the throne, on the ground that in Ferdinand's election the
traditional forms had not been accurately observed, and that he was
undermining all religious and political freedom. Their eyes had even
fallen on Catholic princes; but as the motive which prompted their
resistance was certainly the religious one, their attention was still
more drawn to the most eminent Protestant prince in their vicinity,
Frederick Elector Palatine, who as head of the Union was himself the
principal opponent of the election of Ferdinand as Emperor.
[Sidenote: A.D. 1618.]
On the very first steps taken in this matter, the King of England was
affected by these movements. We learn that, on the occasion of the
overtures made by Frederick, Maximilian of Bavaria had been moved to
write to James I, and to express to him his satisfaction at the family
connexion which had sprung up between them. The interest of the
Palatinate and of England seemed one and the same, especially as the
King was still considered a member and protector of the Union. The
presumption that the son-in-law of the King of England would find
support from his power, contributed greatly to the importance which
the Elector at this moment enjoyed.
But at the same time it was evident in what an embarrassing position
James I was now placed, and that not only on account of the danger
threatening the continuance of peace, which he thought no price too
high to secure: his hands were tied not merely by this general
consideration, but by another special reason as well. He was at that
moment seriously engaged in a treaty for the marriage of his son with
a Spanish infanta, which was to carry out the long-talked-of alliance
between his family and the Austro-Spanish line.
The first overtures in regard to the present Prince of Wales had been
made by the Duke of Lerma to the English envoy, Digby, to whom he
opened a proposal for the marriage of Prince Charles with Mary,
daughter of Philip III. The Spanish ambassador, Gondomar, had then
taken the management of the affair in hand. We should do him wrong by
supposing that he wished to deceive the King. Gondomar rather belonged
to the party who looked for the welfare of the Spanish monarchy in the
maintenance of peace, especially with England. The scheme of the
marriage was part of the system of powerful alliances by which it was
sought to prop the greatness of Spain. Even the uncertain rumour of
this scheme, which was instantly propagated, sufficed to agitate the
Protestant party in Europe and in England itself. The King declared
that he moved only with leaden foot towards the proposal which had
been made to him; and that, if it were seen that the alliance was
dangerous to religion or to existing agreements, it should never take
effect. But even the Secretary of State, Ralph Winwood, who repeated
this declaration, disapproved of the scheme, as did also the whole
school of Robert Cecil. They had wished to marry the Prince to the
daughter of a German line, perhaps to a Brandenburg princess; and the
States General offered their money and their services in order to win
the consent of any such princess, and to convey her to England. Many
would have preferred even a domestic alliance after the old fashion.
Opposition was also offered on the part of the Church of England.
Archbishop Abbot only delayed to urge it until the conditions of the
marriage should come under discussion. But the King likewise had the
approval of influential voices on his side. It was considered possible
to conclude the marriage, and yet to preserve the other alliances of
the country. People thought that England would in that case be only
the more courted by both parties, and that the peace of the world
would rest on the shoulders of the King.
[Sidenote: A.D. 1619.]
But what a contradiction was involved in the ascendancy which these
ideas obtained? The hereditary right to the crown of Bohemia, which
the estates of that country would no longer acknowledge, belonged to
the house of Spain. It was intended that the Elector Palatine should
step into its place by election; and this prince was son-in-law to the
King. After James had married his daughter to the head of the
Protestants in Germany, he conceived the thought of marrying his son
to the member of a family which had made the patronage and protection
of Catholicism its special calling. It seemed as if he was purposely
introducing into his own family the disunion which rent Europe in
twain.
The negotiations in Germany after a time resulted in the victory of
the house of Austria, which in spite of all opposition carried the day
in the election of the Emperor. The Elector Palatine acknowledged
Ferdinand II without hesitation. But almost at the same moment he
received the news that he had himself been elected king by the Estates
of Bohemia. It cannot be proved that he was privy to this beforehand:
even the rumour that his wife urged him to accept the crown because
she was a king's daughter meets with no confirmation. They were not so
blind as not to perceive the enormous danger in which the acceptance
of this offer would involve them. In reply to a question of the
Elector, his wife answered that she regarded the election as a divine
dispensation, that if he determined to accept it, which she left
entirely to his consideration, she for her part was resolved to
undergo everything that might follow from it. We must not regard as
hypocrisy the prominence which the prince and the princess alike gave
to religious considerations. Such was the fashion of the times
generally, and especially of the party to which they belonged.
The Elector Frederick however did not yet declare his decision. The
question of the acceptance of the crown of Bohemia was debated from
every point of view by the very councillors who had just been present
at the election of the Emperor. Their decision was in favour of the
prince inviting first of all the advice of his friends in the empire,
of the States-General, but especially of the King of England, and
making sure of their support.[401] The Bohemian envoys, who most
urgently requested an immediate answer, were put off with the reply
that the Elector must first of all be certain of the consent of the
father of his consort. Count Christopher Dohna was sent to England to
persuade King James to give it. He was commissioned to deliver to him
a letter from the Princess-Electress in which she most urgently
entreated her father to support her husband and to prove his paternal
love to them both.
King James came now face to face with the greatest question of his
life, which summed up and brought to light, so to speak, all the cross
purposes and conflicting political aims among which he had long moved.
A word from him was now of the greater consequence, as the
States-General declared that they would act as he did. But what was
his decision to be? He was not unmoved by the thought that the
prospect of possessing a crown was opened to his son-in-law and
grandchildren. On the other hand he was greatly impressed by a
representation which the King of Spain forwarded to him, that his
right to the crown of Bohemia was indisputable--as in fact the Spanish
line had a contingent claim to the succession--and that he would
contend for it with all his strength: on which King James said that he
also as a great sovereign had an interest in seeing that no one was
deprived of his own. The theories of James I about the hereditary
rights of princes, the electoral rights of the Estates, and the
influence of religious profession in these matters, presented
themselves to his mind together with his wishes on the question of the
aggrandisement of his dynasty. He remarked that it could not be
allowed that subjects should presume to fall away from their sovereign
on a question of religion; he even feared that this doctrine might
react to his own prejudice on England. In these considerations the
balance evidently was in favour of a refusal. James would have
deserved well of the world if he had given utterance to that refusal,
and had decisively dissuaded his son-in-law from accepting the crown.
And from his oft-repeated assertions at a later period, to the effect
that the Elector had proceeded on his own responsibility, we might
think that he had expressed himself in definite terms in favour of a
different course.
In reality however this is not the case. He condemned the revolt of
the Bohemians against Matthias: in regard to Ferdinand it was his
opinion that they should prove from the old capitulations their right
to declare his election and coronation invalid, and to proceed to a
new election, in which case he would himself support them.[402] He
expressed himself in such a manner, that even members of the Privy
Council received the impression that he would approve of and even
support the acceptance of the crown when once it had taken place.
Christopher Dohna relates that in the negotiations at that time he one
day declared that his master, the Elector, was ready to refuse the
crown if the King required him to do so; and that James replied, 'I do
not say that.'[403]
Monarchs are set in authority in order that they may pronounce
definitive decisions according to the best of their own judgment. It
is sometimes their duty to take a decided line. James, who hitherto
had always stood between different parties, could not nerve himself at
this eventful moment for a firm and straightforward resolve. In the
monstrous dilemma in which the various questions at issue were
becoming involved he could not come to any decision. The kindest thing
that can be said of him is that at this moment his nature was not
equal to the requirements of the situation.
Count Dohna, following the example of James's councillors, concluded
from his expressions that he was not only not opposed to the
acceptance of the crown, but that he would allow himself to be
enlisted in its favour, and would support it. And there is no doubt
that this view exercised a decisive influence upon the final
resolution of the Elector Frederick. He certainly was already strongly
inclined to accept the crown in opposition to his more clear-sighted
and sagacious mother, but in agreement with his ardent wife: but he
had not yet uttered the final words when Dohna's report came in.[404]
When he learned from this that the King was not decidedly
unfavourable, the Elector thought that he recognised a dispensation of
God which he would not decline to carry out. In the presence of his
councillors at the castle of Heidelberg he declared to the Bohemian
ambassadors that he accepted the crown; and soon afterwards he set out
for Bohemia. In October 1619 (Oct. 25/Nov. 4) he was crowned at
Prague.
What unforeseen consequences however for himself and his friends, for
Germany and for England, were destined to spring out of this
undertaking!
[Sidenote: A.D. 1620.]
In London, where the popular party had already from the first fixed
their eyes on the Princess, this step was welcomed with the most
joyous approval. It was represented to the King that the most
brilliant prospect was thus opened to his family; that on the next
vacancy his son-in-law, who already himself held two votes in the
electoral body, could not fail to be chosen Emperor; and that England
would by this means acquire the greatest influence on the continent.
It was expected that these feelings for his family, and the successful
issue of events, would work together to detach him again from Spain.
James on one occasion, on receiving the news of the confinement of his
daughter, drank a bowl of wine 'to the health of the King and Queen of
Bohemia.' He went so far as this, and people thought it worth while to
record the event; but he could not be brought to acknowledge Frederick
openly. He was not satisfied with the proof of their right advanced by
the Bohemians: in conversation he advocated the right of Austria.
Spain and the League, as was inevitable, joined forces with Austria.
In the first instance the Palatinate itself was the object of their
joint attack. How could men have helped thinking that King James would
resolutely take the inheritance of his grandsons under his protection?
The Union invited him to do so, reminding him of the obligation
imposed on him by his connexion with them mentioned above: they said
it was no favour, but justice which they demanded of him. But James
replied that he had pledged himself only to repel open and
unjustifiable attacks, but that in the present case the Palatinate was
the attacking party, and that Austria stood on the defensive. The
Union presently saw itself compelled to conclude a treaty with the
League, which left that power free to act against Bohemia. The
Palatinate however was not secured thereby against the Spaniards.[405]
To effect this, it would have been deemed advisable to make an attack
from Holland on the Spanish Netherlands; for if a single fortified
place had been occupied there, the Palatinate would have had nothing
more to fear from Spain. But to this measure also James refused his
consent: he thought that this would be equivalent to beginning war,
which he did not wish.
The general sympathy of the nation was strong enough at last to cause
a large English regiment of 2500 men, under Horace Vere, to be sent on
the continent, in order that the Palatinate, on which the Spaniards
now advanced, might not become utterly a prey to them. The Earls of
Essex and Oxford, who had contributed most to raise the regiment,
themselves took part in the campaign. They were joined by many other
young men of leading families, who wished to learn the art of war. But
they had received from the King positive commands to commit no act of
hostility. The troops of the Union, who showed themselves quite ready
to fight the Spaniards, were withheld by the threat that in that case
the King would recall these troops instead of sending two more
regiments to join them, the hope of which he held out to them in the
event of their obedience. It was enough for the King that the English
troops occupied the most important places. Vere held Mannheim, Herbert
Heidelberg, Burrows Frankenthal; while the greater part of the country
fell into the hands of the Spaniards.
Europe had reason to be alarmed at the advantage which accrued to the
Spanish monarchy from this affair. The Tyrol and Alsace were already
promised them to form links between Lombardy and the Netherlands: the
possession of the Lower Palatinate completed their chain of
communication.
The action of Spain and England presented a marked contrast. Spain,
while it forsook Lerma's policy, held together all its friends--Germany,
Austria, the League, the Pope, the Archducal Netherlands--and combined
their forces for joint action on a large scale; while King James, in
clinging to the policy of peace, let his allies fall asunder and
crippled their activity.
But if James so acted in the case of the Palatinate which he wished to
save, what might be fully expected in the case of Bohemia, with regard
to which he openly declared, after some hesitation, that he could take
no further part in its affairs? The new King found no hearty obedience
among the Bohemians, partly because they found themselves deceived in
their expectation of being assisted with troops by the Union, and with
money by England. But worse than all, the ill-disciplined soldiery
being without pay, broke out in mutiny: they were almost more ready to
help themselves to their arrears by an attack upon the capital than to
defend their sovereign or their country. On the other hand the
soldiers of Austria and of the League, well paid and well disciplined,
were spurred on by zealous priests. On their first attack they
scattered the troops of Frederick to the four winds (November 1620).
It would not have been impossible for Frederick to wage a defensive
war in Bohemia; but regard to the danger into which the Queen would
have been thrown in consequence prevented the attempt. That one day
cost them both crown and country.
It is impossible to describe the impression which the news of this
defeat produced in London. The King was held blameable because not a
single soldier commissioned by him had been found beside his daughter
to draw the sword in her defence. This was attributed either to
culpable negligence of his own affairs, or to the influence of the
Spanish ambassador. Not Gondomar himself, who was too shrewd to act
thus, but certainly his friends and Catholics generally, let their joy
at this event be known. The citizens responded with manifestations
that were directed against the King himself. A placard was put up in
which he was told that he would be made to feel the anger of the
people, if in this affair he any longer followed a policy opposed to
its views.
James I could no longer put off the question what steps he was to
take. The tidings reached him at Newmarket, where he was spending the
cold and gloomy days in hunting. He broke off this amusement and
hastened to Westminster, in order to attend council with his
ministers.
Towards the end of December a meeting was held, in which the secretary
Naunton depicted the whole position of the foreign policy of England,
and drew from it the conclusion that the King must above all arm, as
in that case he could carry on war, or at least negotiate with
firmness and some prospect of success. King James himself brought the
affair of Bohemia under discussion. He complained, and seemed to feel
it as an injury to his paternal authority, that the Elector Frederick
even now continued to make the acknowledgment of his right to the
crown of Bohemia a condition of his accepting the mediation offered by
the King. Viscount Doncaster, who had just returned from a mission to
Germany, fell on his knees before him, in order to remark to him that
Frederick deserved no blame for clinging to a right which he supposed
to be valid: that his refusal was not addressed to James as a father,
but as King of England.[406] James I distinctly stated afresh that he
could not and would not espouse the cause of his son-in-law in
Bohemia. But by this time not only was Frederick's new crown as good
as lost, but his whole existence was endangered; the greater part of
his hereditary territory was in the enemy's hands. James declared with
unusual decision that he would not allow the Palatinate, which would
one day descend to his grandchildren, to be wrested from them; that he
was resolved to send to the Continent in the next year an army
sufficient to reconquer it. It might be asked if this measure also
would not inevitably lead to a breach with Spain. King James did not
think so. He thought that he could carry on a merely local quarrel,
and yet at the same time avoid a war on the part of the one power
against the other. He did not intend to attack the King of Spain's own
dominion, so long as that sovereign did not meddle with his.
But however that might be, whether he was to begin war, though only on
a limited scale, or whether he wished to prosecute negotiations with
success, in any case it was necessary for him to arm. But for this
purpose he required other means besides those of which he could
dispose at his own discretion.
NOTES:
[400] Memorial of the Archduke Maximilian of Feb. 1, 1616, in Lunig,
Europäische Staatsconsilia i. 918. It is clear from this that the
anxiety of the members of the Union with regard to the Venetian war
was not so groundless as it might otherwise appear. The Archduke lays
before the Emperor the question whether 'in the event of the
continuance of the Venetian disturbances he would use the opportunity
to bring a numerous force into the field, and maintain it until the
laudable work had been everywhere set in train, and had been
prosecuted with the wished-for result.'
[401] Reasons for hesitating advanced by the Privy Councillors of the
Prince Elector, in Moser, who calls them prophetic, Patriotisches
Archiv. vii. 118. The Palatinate 'will not well be able to decide
anything certain and final: she has therefore made everything depend
on England and the States-General, and has asked them, as well other
her friends and potentates in the empire, for trusty counsel and
declaration of what they will do in every case by her.'
[402] 'Non approbare che in vita del imperatore li populi si
sollevassero, ma che bene consigliava dopo morte dassero in luce le
loro ragioni del jus eligendi sopra nullita dell'elettione di
Ferdinando, con elegerne un altro, nel qual caso offeriva anche
l'ajuto et il soccorso suo.'
[403] 'S. M., se non assenti all accettare della corona, non disse ne
anche mai all ora di dissentire: che anzi alla venuta di lui in questa
corte offerendole al nome dell'istesso suo signore, che quando ella
havesse voluto, l'averebbe anche lasciata, egli rispondesse: io non
dico questo.' Girolamo Lando, Feb. 5, 1621.
[404] Dohna mentioned that 'the leading English councillors held that,
if the Prince Elector would but soon accept the crown, the King on his
part would soon declare himself and give his approval, which
accordingly threw almost the greatest weight into the scale.' Secret
Report in Moser vii. 51.
[405] From the documents relating to these proceedings, it is proved
that Spinola had received instructions in June 1620 to gain possession
of the Palatinate; that assurances however were given to King James
even in August that nothing was really known of the object of his
expedition. Senkenberg iii. 545 n.
[406] Dispaccio Veneto, 8 Gennaio 1621.