immigrant in America, particularly in the urban environment,
accommodates himself too quickly rather than too slowly to American
life. Statistics show, particularly in the second generation, a notable
increase in juvenile delinquency, and this seems to be due to the fact
that in America the relation between parents and children is reversed.
Owing to the children's better knowledge of English and their more rapid
accommodation to the conditions of American life, parents become
dependent upon their children rather than the children dependent upon
their parents.
Social epidemics, however, are evidence of a social disintegration due
to more fundamental and widespread disorders. The literature has
recorded the facts but writers have usually interpreted the phenomena in
medical rather than sociological terms. Stoll, in his very interesting
but rather miscellaneous collection of materials upon primitive life,
disposes of the phenomena by giving them another name. His volume is
entitled _Suggestion and Hypnotism in Folk Psychology_.[314] Friedmann,
in his monograph, _Über Wahnideen im Völkerleben_, is disposed as a
psychiatrist to treat the whole matter as a form of "social" insanity.
3. Mass Movements
In spite of the abundance of materials on the subject of mass movements
no attempt has been made as yet to collect and classify them. There have
been a number of interesting books in the field of collective
psychology, so called mainly by French and Italian writers--Sighele,
Rossi, Tarde, and Le Bon--but they are not based on a systematic study
of cases. The general assumption has been that the facts are so obvious
that any attempt to study systematically the mechanisms involved would
amount to little more than academic elaboration of what is already
obvious, a restatement in more abstract terms of what is already
familiar.
On the other hand, shepherds and cowboys, out of their experience in
handling cattle and sheep, have learned that the flock and the herd have
quite peculiar and characteristic modes of collective behavior which it
is necessary to know if one is to handle them successfully. At the same
time, practical politicians who make a profession of herding voters,
getting them out to the polls at the times they are needed and
determining for them, by the familiar campaign devices, the persons and
the issues for which they are to cast their ballots, have worked out
very definite methods for dealing with masses of people, so that they
are able to predict the outcome with considerable accuracy far in
advance of an election and make their dispositions accordingly.
Political manipulation of the movements and tendencies of popular
opinion has now reached a point of perfection where it can and will be
studied systematically. During the world-war it was studied, and all the
knowledge which advertisers, newspaper men, and psychologists possessed
was used to win the war.
Propaganda is now recognized as part of the grand strategy of war. Not
only political and diplomatic victories, but battles were won during the
world-war by the aid of this insidious weapon. The great victory of the
Austrian and German armies at Caporetto which in a few days wiped out
all the hard-won successes of the Italian armies was prepared by a
psychic attack on the morale of the troops at the front and a defeatist
campaign among the Italian population back of the lines.
In the battle of Caporetto the morale of the troops at the
front was undermined by sending postal cards and letters to
individual soldiers stating that their wives were in illicit
relations with officers and soldiers of the allies. Copies of
Roman and Milanese newspapers were forged and absolute
facsimiles of familiar journals were secretly distributed or
dropped from Austrian aeroplanes over the Italian lines. These
papers contained sensational articles telling the Italians that
Austria was in revolt, that Emperor Charles had been killed.
Accompanying these were other articles describing bread riots
throughout Italy and stating that the Italian government,
unable to quell them with its own forces, had sent British and
French re-enforcing troops and even Zulus into the cities, and
that these troops were shooting down women and children and
priests without mercy.
This attack upon the morale of the troops was followed by an
unforeseen assault upon a quiet sector, which succeeded in
piercing the line at numerous points. In the confusion that
followed the whole structure of the defense crumbled, and the
result was disastrous.
When the final history of the world-war comes to be written, one of its
most interesting chapters will be a description of the methods and
devices which were used by the armies on both sides to destroy the will
to war in the troops and among the peoples behind the lines. If the
application of modern science to war has multiplied the engines of
destruction, the increase of communication and the interpenetration of
peoples has given war among civilized peoples the character of an
internal and internecine struggle. Under these circumstances propaganda,
in the sense of an insidious exploitation of the sources of dissension
and unrest, may as completely change the character of wars of peoples as
they were once changed by the invention of gunpowder.
In this field there is room for investigation and study, for almost all
attempts thus far made to put advertising on a scientific basis have
been made by students of individual rather than social psychology.
4. Revivals, Religious and Linguistic
For something more than a hundred years Europe has experienced a series
of linguistic and literary revivals, that is to say revivals of the folk
languages and the folk cultures. The folk languages are the speech of
peoples who have been conquered but not yet culturally absorbed by the
dominant language group. They are mostly isolated rural populations who
have remained to a large extent outside of the cosmopolitan cultures of
the cities. These people while not wholly illiterate have never had
enough education in the language of the dominant peoples of the cities
to enable them to use this alien speech as a medium of education. The
consequence is that, except for a relatively small group of
intellectuals, they have been cut off from the main current of European
life and culture. These linguistic revivals have not been confined to
any one nation, since every nation in Europe turns out upon analysis to
be a mosaic of minor nationalities and smaller cultural enclaves in
which the languages of little and forgotten peoples have been preserved.
Linguistic revivals have, in fact, been well-nigh universal. They have
taken place in France, Spain, Norway, Denmark, in most of the Balkan
States, including Albania, the most isolated of them all, and in all the
smaller nationalities along the Slavic-German border--Finland, Esthonia,
Letvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bohemia, Slovakia, Roumania, and the Ukraine.
Finally, among the Jews of Eastern Europe, there has been the Haskala
Movement, as the Jews of Eastern Europe call their period of
enlightenment, a movement that has quite unintentionally made the
Judeo-German dialect (Yiddish) a literary language.
At first blush, it seems strange that the revivals of the folk
speech should have come at a time when the locomotive and the
telegraph were extending commerce and communication to the
uttermost limits of the earth, when all barriers were breaking
down, and the steady expansion of cosmopolitan life and the
organization of the Great Society, as Graham Wallas has called
it, seemed destined to banish all the minor languages,
dialects, and obsolescent forms of speech, the last props of an
international provincialism, to the limbo of forgotten things.
The competition of the world-languages was already keen; all
the little and forgotten peoples of Europe--the Finns, Letts,
Ukrainians, Russo-Carpathians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Croatians,
the Catalonians of eastern Spain, whose language, by the way,
dates back to a period before the Roman Conquest, the Czechs,
and the Poles--began to set up presses and establish schools to
revive and perpetuate their several racial languages.
To those who, at this time, were looking forward to
world-organization and a universal peace through the medium of
a universal language, all this agitation had the appearance of
an anachronism, not to say a heresy. It seemed a deliberate
attempt to set up barriers, where progress demanded that they
should be torn down. The success of such a movement, it seemed,
must be to bring about a more complete isolation of the
peoples, to imprison them, so to speak, in their own languages,
and so cut them off from the general culture of Europe.[315]
The actual effect has been different from what was expected. It is
difficult, and for the masses of the people impossible, to learn through
the medium of a language that they do not speak. The results of the
efforts to cultivate Swedish and Russian in Finland, Polish and Russian
in Lithuania, Magyar in Slovakia and at the same time to prohibit the
publication of books and newspapers in the mother-tongue of the country
has been, in the first place, to create an artificial illiteracy and, in
the second, to create in the minds of native peoples a sense of social
and intellectual inferiority to the alien and dominant race.
The effect of the literary revival of the spoken language, however, has
been to create, in spite of the efforts to suppress it, a vernacular
press which opened the gates of western culture to great masses of
people for whom it did not previously exist. The result has been a great
cultural awakening, a genuine renaissance, which has had profound
reverberations on the political and social life of Europe.
The literary revival of the folk speech in Europe has
invariably been a prelude to the revival of the national spirit
in subject peoples. The sentiment of nationality has its roots
in memories that attach to the common possessions of the
people, the land, the religion, and the language, but
particularly the language.
Bohemian patriots have a saying, "As long as the language
lives, the nation is not dead." In an address in 1904 Jorgen
Levland, who was afterward Premier of Norway, in a plea for
"freedom with self-government, home, land, and our own
language," made this statement: "Political freedom is not the
deepest and greatest. Greater is it for a nation to preserve
her intellectual inheritance in her native tongue."
The revival of the national consciousness in the subject
peoples has invariably been connected with the struggle to
maintain a press in the native language. The reason is that it
was through the medium of the national press that the literary
and linguistic revivals took place. Conversely, the efforts to
suppress the rising national consciousness took the form of an
effort to censor or suppress the national press. There were
nowhere attempts to suppress the spoken language as such. On
the other hand, it was only as the spoken language succeeded in
becoming a medium of literary expression that it was possible
to preserve it under modern conditions and maintain in this way
the national solidarity. When the Lithuanians, for example,
were condemned to get their education and their culture through
the medium of a language not their own, the effect was to
denationalize the literate class and to make its members aliens
to their own people. If there was no national press, there
could be no national schools, and, indeed, no national church.
It was for this reason that the struggle to maintain the
national language and the national culture has always been a
struggle to maintain a national press.
European nationalists, seeking to revive among their peoples
the national consciousness, have invariably sought to restore
the national speech, to purge it of foreign idioms, and
emphasize every mark which serves to distinguish it from the
languages with which it tended to fuse.[316]
Investigation of these linguistic revivals and the nationalist movement
that has grown out of them indicates that there is a very intimate
relation between nationalist and religious movements. Both of them are
fundamentally cultural movements with incidental political consequences.
The movement which resulted in the reorganization of rural life in
Denmark, the movement that found expression in so unique an institution
as the rural high schools of Denmark, was begun by Bishop Grundtvig,
called the Luther of Denmark, and was at once a religious and a
nationalist movement. The rural high schools are for this reason not
like anything in the way of education with which people outside of
Denmark are familiar. They are not technical schools but cultural
institutions in the narrowest, or broadest, sense of that term.[317] The
teaching is "scientific," but at the same time "inspirational." They
are what a Sunday school might be if it were not held on Sunday and was
organized as Mr. H. G. Wells would organize it and with such a bible as
he would like to have someone write for us.[318]
The popular accounts which we have of religious revivals do not at first
suggest any very definite relations, either psychological or
sociological, between them and the literary revivals to which reference
has just been made. Religious revivals, particularly as described by
dispassionate observers, have the appearance of something bizarre,
fantastic, and wild, as indeed they often are.
What must strike the thoughtful observer, however, is the marked
similarity of these collective religious excitements, whether among
civilized or savage peoples and at places and periods remote in time and
in space. Frederick Morgan Davenport, who has collected and compared the
materials in this field from contemporary sources, calls attention in
the title of his volume, _Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals_, to
this fundamental similarity of the phenomena. Whatever else the word
"primitive" may mean in this connection it does mean that the phenomena
of religious revivals are fundamentally human.
From the frantic and disheveled dances of the Bacchantes, following a
wine cart through an ancient Greek village, to the shouts and groans of
the mourners' bench of an old-time Methodist camp-meeting, religious
excitement has always stirred human nature more profoundly than any
other emotion except that of passionate love.
In the volume by Jean Pélissier, _The Chief Makers of the National
Lithuanian Renaissance_ (_Les Principaux artisans de la renaissance
nationale lituanienne_), there is a paragraph describing the conversion
of a certain Dr. Kudirka, a Lithuanian patriot, to the cause of
Lithuanian nationality. It reads like a chapter from William James's
_The Varieties of Religious Experience_.[319]
It is materials like this that indicate how close and intimate are the
relations between cultural movements, whether religious or literary and
national, at least in their formal expression. The question that remains
to be answered is: In what ways do they differ?
5. Fashion, Reform and Revolution
A great deal has been written in recent times in regard to fashion. It
has been studied, for example, as an economic phenomenon. Sombart has
written a suggestive little monograph on the subject. It is in the
interest of machine industry that fashions should be standardized over a
wide area, and it is the function of advertising to achieve this result.
It is also of interest to commerce that fashions should change and this
also is largely, but not wholly, a matter of advertising. Tarde
distinguishes between custom and fashion as the two forms in which all
cultural traits are transmitted. "In periods when custom is in the
ascendant, men are more infatuated about their country than about their
time; for it is the past which is pre-eminently praised. In ages when
fashion rules, men are prouder, on the contrary, of their time than of
their country."[320]
The most acute analysis that has been made of fashion is contained in
the observation of Sumner in _Folkways_. Sumner pointed out that fashion
though differing from, is intimately related to, the mores. Fashion
fixes the attention of the community at a given time and place and by so
doing determines what is sometimes called the Spirit of the Age, the
_Zeitgeist_. By the introduction of new fashions the leaders of society
gain that distinction in the community by which they are able to
maintain their prestige and so maintain their position as leaders. But
in doing this, they too are influenced by the fashions which they
introduce. Eventually changes in fashion affect the mores.[321]
Fashion is related to reform and to revolution, because it is one of the
fundamental ways in which social changes take place and because, like
reform and revolution, it also is related to the mores.
Fashion is distinguished from reform by the fact that the changes it
introduces are wholly irrational if not at the same time wholly
unpredictable. Reform, on the other hand, is nothing if not rational. It
achieves its ends by agitation and discussion. Attempts have been made
to introduce fashions by agitation, but they have not succeeded. On the
other hand, reform is itself a fashion and has largely absorbed in
recent years the interest that was formerly bestowed on party politics.
There has been a great deal written about reforms but almost nothing
about _reform_. It is a definite type of collective behavior which has
come into existence and gained popularity under conditions of modern
life. The reformer and the agitator, likewise, are definite,
temperamental, and social types. Reform tends under modern conditions to
become a vocation and a profession like that of the politician. The
profession of the reformer, however, is social, as distinguished from
party politics.
Reform is not revolution. It does not seek to change the mores but
rather to change conditions in conformity with the mores. There have
been revolutionary reformers. Joseph II of Austria and Peter the Great
of Russia were reformers of that type. But revolutionary reforms have
usually failed. They failed lamentably in the case of Joseph II and
produced many very dubious results under Peter.
A revolution is a mass movement which seeks to change the mores by
destroying the existing social order. Great and silent revolutionary
changes have frequently taken place in modern times, but as these
changes were not recognized at the time and were not directly sought by
any party they are not usually called revolutions. They might properly
be called "historical revolutions," since they are not recognized as
revolutions until they are history.
There is probably a definite revolutionary process but it has not been
defined. Le Bon's book on the _Psychology of Revolution_, which is the
sequel to his study of _The Crowd_, is, to be sure, an attempt, but the
best that one can say of it is that it is suggestive. Many attempts have
been made to describe the processes of revolution as part of the whole
historical process. This literature will be considered in the chapter on
"Progress."
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. DISORGANIZATION, SOCIAL UNREST, AND PSYCHIC EPIDEMICS
A. _Social Disorganization_
(1) Cooley, Charles H. _Social Organization._ Chap. xxx, "Formalism and
Disorganization," pp. 342-55; chap. xxxi, "Disorganization: the Family,"
pp. 356-71; chap. xxxii, "Disorganization: the Church," pp. 372-82;
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1909.
(2) Thomas, W. I., and Znaniecki, Florian. _The Polish Peasant in Europe
and America._ Monograph of an immigrant group. Vol. IV, "Disorganization
and Reorganization in Poland," Boston, 1920.
(3) ----. _The Polish Peasant in Europe and America._ Vol. V,
"Organization and Disorganization in America," Part II, "Disorganization
of the Immigrant," pp. 165-345. Boston, 1920.
(4) Friedländer, L. _Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire._
Authorized translation by L. A. Magnus from the 7th rev. ed. of the
Sittengeschichte Roms. 4 vols. London, 1908-13.
(5) Lane-Poole, S. _The Mohammedan Dynasties._ Charts showing "Growth of
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London, 1894.
(6) Taine, H. _The Ancient Régime._ Translated from the French by John
Durand. New York, 1896.
(7) Wells, H. G. _Russia in the Shadows._ New York, 1921.
(8) Patrick, George T. W. _The Psychology of Social Reconstruction._
Chap. vi, "Our Centripetal Society," pp. 174-98. Boston, 1920.
(9) Ferrero, Guglielmo. "The Crisis of Western Civilization," _Atlantic
Monthly_, CXXV (1920), 700-712.
B. _Social Unrest_
(1) Brooks, John Graham. _The Social Unrest._ Studies in labor and
socialist movements. London, 1903.
(2) Fuller, Bampfylde. _Life and Human Nature._ Chap. ii, "Change," pp.
24-45. London, 1914.
(3) Wallas, Graham. _The Great Society._ A psychological analysis. Chap.
iv, "Disposition and Environment," pp. 57-68. New York, 1914. [Defines
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(4) Healy, William. _The Individual Delinquent._ A textbook of diagnosis
and prognosis for all concerned in understanding offenders. "Hypomania,
Constitutional Excitement," pp. 609-13. Boston, 1915.
(5) Janet, Pierre. _The Major Symptoms of Hysteria._ Fifteen lectures
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(6) Barr, Martin W., and Maloney, E. F. _Types of Mental Defectives._
"Idiot Savant," pp. 128-35. Philadelphia, 1920.
(7) Thomas, Edward. _Industry, Emotion and Unrest._ New York, 1920.
(8) Parker, Carleton H. _The Casual Laborer and Other Essays._ Chap. i,
"Toward Understanding Labor Unrest," pp. 27-59. New York, 1920.
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(10) Ferrero, Guglielmo. _Ancient Rome and Modern America._ A
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(12) Lippmann, Walter. "Unrest," _New Republic_, XX (1919), 315-22.
(13) Tannenbaum, Frank. _The Labor Movement._ Its conservative functions
and social consequences. New York, 1921.
(14) Baker, Ray Stannard. _The New Industrial Unrest._ Its reason and
remedy. New York, 1920.
(15) MacCurdy, J. T. "Psychological Aspects of the Present Unrest,"
_Survey_, XLIII (1919-20), 665-68.
(16) Myers, Charles S. _Mind and Work._ The psychological factors in
industry and commerce. Chap. vi, "Industrial Unrest," pp. 137-69. New
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(17) Adler, H. M. "Unemployment and Personality--a Study of Psychopathic
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(19) Münsterberg, Hugo. _Social Studies of Today._ Chap. ii, "The
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(20) ----. _American Problems._ From the point of view of a
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C. _Psychic Epidemics_
(1) Hecker, J. F. C. _The Black Death and the Dancing Mania._ Translated
from the German by B. G. Babington. Cassell's National Library. New
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(2) Stoll, Otto. _Suggestion und Hypnotismus in der Völkerpsychologie._
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(3) Friedmann, Max. _Über Wahnideen im Völkerleben._ Wiesbaden, 1901.
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(6) Gowen, B. S. "Some Aspects of Pestilences and Other Epidemics,"
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(8) _Histoire des diables de Loudun._ Ou de la possession des
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(9) Finsler, G. "Die religiöse Erweckung der zehner und zwanziger Jahre
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(13) Kotik, Dr. Naum. "Die Emanation der psychophysischen Energie,"
_Grenzfragen des Nerven- und Seelenlebens._ Wiesbaden, 1908.
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criminels," _Archives d'anthropologie criminelle_, VIII (1893), 565-80.
(15) Achelis, T. _Die Ekstase in ihrer kulturetten Bedeutung._
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II. MUSIC, DANCE, AND RITUAL
(1) Wallaschek, Richard. _Primitive Music._ An inquiry into the origin
and development of music, songs, instruments, dances, and pantomimes of
savage races. London, 1893.
(2) Combarieu, J. _La Musique et le magic._ Étude sur les origines
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220-26.
(5) Densmore, Frances. "The Music of the Filipinos," _American
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(6) Fletcher, Alice C. _Indian Story and Song from North America._
Boston, 1906.
(7) ----. "Indian Songs and Music," _Journal of American Folk-Lore_, XI
(1898), 85-104.
(8) Grinnell, G. B. "Notes on Cheyenne Songs," _American
Anthropologist_, N.S., V (1903), 312-22.
(9) Mathews, W. "Navaho Gambling Songs," _American Anthropologist_, II
(1889), 1-20.
(10) Hearn, Lafcadio. "Three Popular Ballads," _Transactions of the
Asiatic Society of Japan_, XXII (1894), 285-336.
(11) Ellis, Havelock. "The Philosophy of Dancing," _Atlantic Monthly_,
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(12) Hirn, Yrjö. _The Origins of Art._ A psychological and sociological
inquiry. Chap. xvii, "Erotic Art," pp. 238-48. London, 1900.
(13) Pater, Walter. _Greek Studies._ A series of essays. London, 1911.
(14) Grosse, Ernst. _The Beginnings of Art._ Chap. viii, "The Dance,"
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(15) Bücher, Karl. _Arbeit und Rhythmus._ 3d ed. Leipzig, 1902.
(16) Lhérisson, E. "La Danse du vaudou," _Semaine médicale_, XIX (1899),
xxiv.
(17) Reed, V. Z. "The Ute Bear Dance," _American Anthropologist_, IX
(1896) 237-44.
(18) Gummere, F. B. _The Beginnings of Poetry._ New York, 1901.
(19) Fawkes, J. W. "The Growth of the Hopi Ritual," _Journal of American
Folk-Lore_, XI (1898), 173-94.
(20) Cabrol, F. _Les origines liturgiques._ Paris, 1906.
(21) Gennep, A. van. _Les Rites de passage._ Paris, 1909.
(22) Pitre, Giuseppe. _Feste patronali in Sicilia._ Palermo, 1900.
(23) Murray, W. A. "Organizations of Witches in Great Britain,"
_Folk-Lore_, XXVIII (1917), 228-58.
(24) Taylor, Thomas. _The Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries._ New York,
1891.
(25) Tippenhauer, L. G. _Die Insel Haiti._ Leipzig, 1893. [Describes the
Voudou Ritual.]
(26) Wuensch, R. _Das Frühlingsfest der Insel Malta._ Ein Beitrag zur
Geschichte der antiken Religion. Leipzig, 1902.
(27) Loisy, Alfred. _Les mystères païens et le mystère chrétien._ Paris,
1919.
(28) Lummis, Charles F. _The Land of Poco Tiempo._ Chap. iv, "The
Penitent Brothers," pp. 77-108. New York, 1893.
(29) "Los Hermanos Penitentes," _El Palacio_, VIII (1920), 3-20, 73-74.
III. THE CROWD AND THE PUBLIC
A. _The Crowd_
(1) Le Bon, Gustave. _The Crowd._ A study of the popular mind. London,
1920.
(2) Tarde, G. _L'Opinion et la foule._ Paris, 1901.
(3) Sighele, S. _Psychologie des Aulaufs und der Massenverbrechen._
Translated from the Italian by Hans Kurella. Leipzig, 1897.
(4) ----. _La foule criminelle._ Essai de psychologie collective. 2d
ed., entièrement refondue. Paris, 1901.
(5) Tarde, Gabriel. "Foules et sectes au point de vue criminel," _Revue
des deux mondes_, CXX (1893), 349-87.
(6) Miceli, V. "La Psicologia della folla," _Rivista italiana di
sociologia_, III (1899), 166-95.
(7) Conway, M. _The Crowd in Peace and War._ New York, 1915.
(8) Martin, E. D. _The Behavior of Crowds._ New York, 1920.
(9) Christensen, A. _Politics and Crowd-Morality._ New York, 1915.
(10) Park, R. E. _Masse und Publikum._ Bern, 1904.
(11) Clark, H. "The Crowd." "University of Illinois Studies."
_Psychological Monograph_, No. 92, XXI (1916), 26-36.
(12) Tawney, G. A. "The Nature of Crowds," _Psychological Bulletin_, II
(1905), 329-33.
(13) Rossi, P. _Le suggesteur et la foule, psychologie du meneur._
Paris, 1904.
(14) ----. _I suggestionatori e la folla._ Torino, 1902.
(15) ----. "Dell'Attenzione collettiva e sociale," _Manicomio_, XXI
(1905), 248 ff.
B. _Political Psychology_
(1) Beecher, Franklin A. "National Politics in Its Psychological
Aspect," _Open Court_, XXXIII (1919), 653-61.
(2) Boutmy, Émile. _The English People._ A study of their political
psychology. London, 1904.
(3) Palanti, G. "L'Esprit de corps. (Remarques sociologiques.)" _Revue
philosophique_, XLVIII (1899), 135-45.
(4) Gardner, Chas. S. "Assemblies," _American Journal of Sociology_, XIX
(1914), 531-55.
(5) Bentham, Jeremy. _Essay on Political Tactics._ Containing six of the
principal rules proper to be observed by a political assembly, in the
process of forming a decision: with the reasons on which they are
grounded; and a comparative application of them to British and French
practice. London, 1791.
(6) Tönnies, Ferdinand. "Die grosse Menge und das Volk," _Schmollers
Jahrbuch_, XLIV (1920), 317-45. [Criticism of Le Bon's conception of the
crowd.]
(7) Botsford, George W. _The Roman Assemblies._ From their origin to the
end of the Republic. New York, 1909.
(8) Crothers, T. D. "A Medical Study of the Jury System," _Popular
Science Monthly_, XLVII (1895), 375-82.
(9) Coleman, Charles T. "Origin and Development of Trial by Jury,"
_Virginia Law Review_, VI (1919-20), 77-86.
C. _Collective Psychology in General_
(1) Rossi, P. _Sociologia e psicologia collettiva._ 2d ed. Roma, 1909.
(2) Straticò, A. _La Psicologia collettiva._ Palermo, 1905.
(3) Worms, René. "Psychologie collective et psychologie individuelle,"
_Revue international de sociologie_, VII (1899), 249-74.
(4) Brönner, W. "Zur Theorie der kollektiv-psychischen Erscheinungen,"
_Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik_, CXLI (1911),
1-40.
(5) Newell, W. W. "Individual and Collective Characteristics in
Folk-Lore," _Journal of American Folk-Lore_, XIX (1906), 1-15.
(6) Campeano, M. _Essai de psychologie militaire individuelle et
collective._ Avec une préface de M. Th. Ribot. Paris, 1902.
(7) Hartenberg, P. "Les émotions de Bourse. (Notes de psychologie
collective)." _Revue philosophique_, LVIII (1904), 163-70.
(8) Scalinger, G. M. _La Psicologia a teatro._ Napoli, 1896.
(9) Burckhard, M. "Das Theater." Die Gesellschaft. _Sammlung
Sozial-Psychologische Monographien_, 18. Frankfurt-am-Main, 1907.
(10) Woolbert, C. H. "The Audience." "University of Illinois Studies."
_Psychological Monograph_, No. 92, XXI (1916), 36-54.
(11) Howard, G. E. "Social Psychology of the Spectator," _American
Journal of Sociology_, XVIII (1912), 33-50.
(12) Peterson, J. "The Functioning of Ideas in Social Groups,"
_Psychological Review_, XXV (1918), 214-26.
IV. MASS MOVEMENTS
(1) Bryce, James. "Migrations of the Races of Men Considered
Historically," _Contemporary Review_, LXII (1892), 128-49.
(2) Mason, Otis T. "Migration and the Food Quest: A Study in the
Peopling of America," _American Anthropologist_, VII (1894), 275-92.
(3) Pflugk-Harttung, Julius von. _The Great Migrations._ Translated from
the German by John Henry Wright. Philadelphia, 1905.
(4) Bradley, Henry. _The Story of the Goths._ From the earliest times to
the end of the Gothic dominion in Spain. New York, 1888.
(5) Jordanes. _The Origin and Deeds of the Goths._ English version by
Charles C. Mierow. Princeton, 1908.
(6) Archer, T. A., and Kingsford, C. L. _The Crusades._ New York, 1894.
(7) Ireland, W. W. "On the Psychology of the Crusades," _Journal of
Mental Science_, LII (1906), 745-55; LIII (1907), 322-41.
(8) Groves, E. R. "Psychic Causes of Rural Migration," _American Journal
of Sociology_, XXI (1916), 623-27.
(9) Woodson, Carter G. _A Century of Negro Migrations._ Washington,
1918. [Bibliography.]
(10) Fleming, Walter L. "'Pap' Singleton, the Moses of the Colored
Exodus," _American Journal of Sociology_, XV (1909-10), 61-82.
(11) Bancroft, H. H. _History of California._ Vol. VI, 1848-59. Chaps.
ii-ix, pp. 26-163. San Francisco, 1888. [The discovery of gold in
California.]
(12) Down, T. C. "The Rush to the Klondike," _Cornhill Magazine_, IV
(1898), 33-43.
(13) Ziegler, T. _Die geistigen und socialen Strömungen des neunzehnten
Jahrhunderts._ Berlin, 1899.
(14) Zeeb, Frieda B. "Mobility of the German Woman," _American Journal
of Sociology_, XXI (1915-16), 234-62.
(15) Anthony, Katharine S. _Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia._ New
York, 1915. [Bibliography.]
(16) Croly, Jane (Mrs.). _The History of the Woman's Club Movement in
America._ New York, 1898.
(17) Taft, Jessie. _The Woman Movement from the Point of View of Social
Consciousness._ Chicago, 1916.
(18) Harnack, Adolf. _The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the
First Three Centuries._ Translated from the 2d rev. German ed. by James
Moffatt. New York, 1908.
(19) Buck, S. J. _The Agrarian Crusade._ A chronicle of the farmer in
politics. New Haven, 1920.
(20) _Labor Movement._ The last six volumes of _The Documentary History
of American Industrial Society_. Vols. V-VI, 1820-40, by John R. Commons
and Helen L. Sumner; Vols. VII-VIII, 1840-60, by John R. Commons; Vols.
IX-X, 1860-80, by John R. Commons and John B. Andrews. Cleveland, 1910.
(21) Begbie, Harold. _The Life of General William Booth._ The Founder of
the Salvation Army. 2 vols. New York, 1920.
(22) Wittenmyer, Annie (Mrs.). _History of the Women's Temperance
Crusade._ A complete official history of the wonderful uprising of the
Christian women of the United States against the liquor traffic which
culminated in the Gospel Temperance Movement. Introduction by Frances E.
Willard. Philadelphia, 1878.
(23) Gordon, Ernest. _The Anti-alcohol Movement in Europe._ New York,
1913.
(24) Cherrington, Ernest H. _The Evolution of Prohibition in the United
States of America._ A chronological history of the liquor problem and
the temperance reform in the United States from the earliest settlements
to the consummation of national prohibition. Westerville, Ohio, 1920.
(25) Woods, Robert A. _English Social Movements._ New York, 1891.
(26) Zimand, Savel. _Modern Social Movements._ Descriptive summaries and
bibliographies. New York, 1921.
V. REVIVALS, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC
A. _Religious Revivals and the Origin of Sects_
(1) Meader, John R. Article on "Religious Sects," _Encyclopedia
Americana_, XXIII, 355-61. [List of nearly 300 denominations and sects.]
(2) Articles on "sects," _Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics_, XI,
307-47. [The subject and author of the different articles are "Sects
(Buddhist)," T. W. Rhys Davids; "Sects (Chinese)," T. Richard; "Sects
(Christian)," W. T. Whitley; "Sects (Hindu)," W. Crooke; "Sects
(Jewish)," I. Abrahams; "Sects (Russian)," K. Grass and A. von
Stromberg; "Sects (Samaritan)," N. Schmidt; "Sects (Zoroastrian)," E.
Edwards. Bibliographies.]
(3) United States Bureau of the Census. _Religious Bodies, 1906._ 2
vols. Washington, 1910.
(4) ----. _Religious Bodies, 1916._ 2 vols. Washington, 1919.
(5) Davenport, Frederick M. _Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals._ A
study in mental and social evolution. New York, 1905.
(6) Mooney, James. "The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of
1890." _14th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology_
(1892-93), 653-1136.
(7) Stalker, James. Article on "Revivals of Religion," _Encyclopaedia of
Religion and Ethics_, X, 753-57. [Bibliography.]
(8) Burns, J. _Revivals, Their Laws and Leaders._ London, 1909.
(9) Tracy, J. _The Great Awakening._ A history of the revival of
religion in the time of Edwards and Whitefield. Boston, 1842.
(10) Finney, C. G. _Autobiography._ London, 1892.
(11) Hayes, Samuel P. "An Historical Study of the Edwardean Revivals,"
_American Journal of Psychology_, XIII (1902), 550-74.
(12) Maxon, C. H. _The Great Awakening in the Middle Colonies._ Chicago,
1920. [Bibliography.]
(13) Gibson, William. _Year of Grace._ Edinburgh, 1860. [Irish revival,
1859.]
(14) Moody, W. R. _The Life of Dwight L. Moody._ New York, 1900.
(15) Bois, Henri. _Le Réveil au pays de Galles._ Paris, 1906. [Welsh
revival of 1904-6.]
(16) ----. _Quelques réflexions sur la psychologie des réveils._ Paris,
1906.
(17) Cartwright, Peter. _Autobiography of Peter Cartwright, the
Backwoods Preacher._ Cincinnati, 1859.
(18) MacLean, J. P. "The Kentucky Revival and Its Influence on the Miami
Valley," _Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications_, XII (1903),
242-86. [Bibliography.]
(19) Cleveland, Catharine C. _The Great Revival in the West, 1797-1805._
Chicago, 1916. [Bibliography.]
(20) Rogers, James B. _The Cane Ridge Meeting-House._ To which is
appended the autobiography of B. W. Stone. Cincinnati, 1910.
(21) Stchoukine, Ivan. _Le Suicide collectif dans le Raskol russe._
Paris, 1903.
(22) Bussell, F. W. _Religious Thought and Heresy in the Middle Ages._
London, 1918.
(23) Egli, Emil. _Die Züricher Wiedertäufer zur Reformationszeit._
Zürich, 1878.
(24) Bax, Ernest Belfort. _Rise and Fall of the Anabaptists._ New York,
1903.
(25) Schechter, S. _Documents of Jewish Sectaries._ 2 vols. Cambridge,
1910.
(26) Graetz, H. _History of the Jews._ 6 vols. Philadelphia, 1891-98.
(27) Jost, M. _Geschichte des Judenthums und seiner Sekten._ 3 vols.
Leipzig, 1857-59.
(28) Farquhar, J. N. _Modern Religious Movements in India._ New York,
1915.
(29) Selbie, W. B. _English Sects._ A history of non-conformity. Home
University Library. New York, 1912.
(30) Barclay, Robert. _The Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the
Commonwealth._ London, 1876. [Bibliography.]
(31) Jones, Rufus M. _Studies in Mystical Religion._ London, 1909.
(32) Braithwaite, W. C. _Beginnings of Quakerism._ London, 1912.
(33) Jones, Rufus M. _The Quakers in the American Colonies._ London,
1911.
(34) Evans, F. W. _Shakers._ Compendium of the origin, history,
principles, rules and regulations, government, and doctrines of the
United Society of Believers in Christ's Second Appearing. With
biographies of Ann Lee, William Lee, James Whittaker, J. Hocknell, J.
Meacham, and Lucy Wright. New York, 1859.
(35) Train, J. _The Buchanites from First to Last._ Edinburgh, 1846.
(36) Miller, Edward. _The History and Doctrines of Irvingism._ Or of the
so-called Catholic and Apostolic Church. 2 vols. London, 1878.
(37) Neatby, W. Blair. _A History of the Plymouth Brethren._ London,
1901.
(38) Lockwood, George B. _The New Harmony Movement._ "The Rappites."
Chaps. ii-iv, pp. 7-42. [Bibliography.]
(39) James, B. B. _The Labadist Colony of Maryland._ Baltimore, 1899.
(40) Dixon, W. H. _Spiritual Wives._ 2 vols. London, 1868.
(41) Randall, E. O. _History of the Zoar Society from Its Commencement
to Its Conclusion._ Columbus, 1899.
(42) Loughborough, J. N. _The Great Second Advent Movement._ Its rise
and progress. Nashville, Tenn., 1905. [Adventists.]
(43) Harlan, Rolvix. _John Alexander Dowie and the Christian Catholic
Apostolic Church in Zion._ Evansville, Wis., 1906.
(44) Smith, Henry C. _Mennonites of America._ Mennonite Publishing
House, Scotdale, Pa., 1909. [Bibliography.]
(45) La Rue, William. _The Foundations of Mormonism._ A study of the
fundamental facts in the history and doctrines of the Mormons from
original sources. With introduction by Alfred Williams Anthony. New
York, 1919. [Bibliography.]
B. _Language Revivals and Nationalism_
(1) Dominian, Leon. _Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe._
New York, 1917.
(2) Bourgoing, P. de. _Les Guerres d'idiome et de nationalité._ Paris,
1849.
(3) Meillet, A. "Les Langues et les nationalités," _Scientia_, XVIII,
(1915), 192-201.
(4) Rhys, John, and Brynmor-Jones, David. _The Welsh People._ Chap. xii,
"Language and Literature of Wales," pp. 501-50. London, 1900.
(5) Dinneen, P. S. _Lectures on the Irish Language Movement._ Delivered
under the auspices of various branches of the Gaelic League. London,
1904.
(6) Montgomery, K. L. "Some Writers of the Celtic Renaissance,"
_Fortnightly Review_, XCVI (1911), 545-61.
(7) ----. "Ireland's Psychology: a Study of Facts," _Fortnightly
Review_, CXII (1919), 572-88.
(8) Dubois, L. Paul. _Contemporary Ireland._ With an introduction by T.
M. Kettle, M. P. London, 1908.
(9) _The Teaching of Gaelic in Highland Schools._ Published under the
auspices of the Highland Association. London, 1907.
(10) Fedortchouk, Y. "La Question des nationalités en Austriche-Hongrie:
les Ruthenes de Hongrie," _Annales des nationalités_, VIII (1915),
52-56.
(11) Seton-Watson, R. W. [Scotus Viator, _pseud_.] _Racial Problems in
Hungary._ London, 1908. [Bibliography.]
(12) Samassa, P. "Deutsche und Windische in Sudösterreich," _Deutsche
Erde_, II (1903), 39-41.
(13) Wace, A. J. B., and Thompson, M. S. _The Nomads of the Balkans._
London, 1914.
(14) Tabbé, P. _La vivante Roumanie._ Paris, 1913.
(15) Louis-Jarau, G. _L'Albanie inconnue._ Paris, 1913.
(16) Brancoff, D. M. _La Macédoine et sa population Chrétienne._ Paris,
1905.
(17) Fedortchouk, Y. _Memorandum on the Ukrainian Question in Its
National Aspect._ London, 1914.
(18) Vellay, Charles. "L'Irredentisme hellénique," _La Revue de Paris_,
XX (Juillet-Août, 1913), 884-86.
(19) Sands, B. _The Ukraine._ London, 1914.
(20) Auerbach, B. "La Germanization de la Pologne Prussienne. La loi
d'expropriation," _Revue Politique et Parlementaire_, LVII (1908),
109-125.
(21) Bernhard, L. _Das polnische Gemeinwesen im preussischen Staat._ Die
Polenfrage. Leipzig, 1910.
(22) Henry, R. "La Frontière linguistique en Alsace-Lorraine," _Les
Marches de l'Est_, 1911-1912, pp. 60-71.
(23) Nitsch, C. "Dialectology of Polish Languages," _Polish
Encyclopaedia_, Vol. III. Cracow, 1915.
(24) Witte, H. "Wendische Bevölkerungsreste in Mecklenburg,"
_Forschungen zur deutschen Landes- und Volkskunde_, XVI (1905), 1-124.
(25) Kaupas, A. "L'Église et les Lituaniens aux États-Unis d'Amérique,"
_Annales des Nationalités_, II (1913), 233 ff.
(26) Pélissier, Jean. _Les Principaux artisans de la renaissance
nationale lituanienne._ Hommes et choses de Lituanie. Lausanne, 1918.
(27) Jakstas, A. "Lituaniens et Polonais." _Annales des nationalités_,
VIII (1915), 219 ff.
(28) Headlam, Cecil. _Provence and Languedoc._ Chap. v, "Frédéric
Mistral and the Félibres." London, 1912.
(29) Belisle, A. _Histoire de la presse franco-américaine._ Comprenant
l'historique de l'émigration des Canadiens-Français aux États-Unis, leur
développement, et leur progrès. Worcester, Mass., 1911.
VI. ECONOMIC CRISES
(1) Wirth, M. _Geschichte der Handelskrisen._ Frankfurt-am-Main, 1890.
(2) Jones, Edward D. _Economic Crises._ New York, 1900.
(3) Gibson, Thomas. _The Cycles of Speculation._ 2d ed. New York, 1909.
(4) Bellet, Daniel. _Crises économique._ Crises commerciales. Crises de
guerre. Leur caractères, leur indices, leurs effects. Paris, 1918.
(5) Clough, H. W. "Synchronous Variations in Solar and Terrestrial
Phenomena," _Astrophysical Journal_, XXII (1905), 42-75.
(6) Clayton, H. H. "Influence of Rainfall on Commerce and Politics,"
_Popular Science Monthly_, LX (1901-2), 158-65.
(7) Mitchell, Wesley C. _Business Cycles._ Berkeley, Cal., 1913.
(8) Moore, Henry L. _Economic Cycles: Their Law and Cause._ New York,
1914.
(9) Hurry, Jamieson B. _Vicious Circles in Sociology and Their
Treatment._ London, 1915.
(10) Thiers, Adolphe. _The Mississippi Bubble._ A memoir of John Law. To
which are added authentic accounts of the Darien expedition and the
South Sea scheme. Translated from the French by F. S. Fiske. New York,
1859.
(11) Wiston-Glynn, A. W. _John Law of Lauriston._ Financier and
statesman, founder of the Bank of France, originator of the Mississippi
scheme, etc. London, 1907.
(12) Mackay, Charles. _Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and
the Madness of Crowds._ 2 vols. in one. London, 1859. [Vol. I, the
Mississippi scheme, the South Sea bubble, the tulipomania, the
alchymists, modern prophecies, fortune-telling, the magnetisers,
influence of politics and religion on the hair and beard. Vol. II, the
crusades, the witch mania, the slow prisoners, haunted houses, popular
follies of great cities, popular admiration of great thieves, duels and
ordeals, relics.]
VII. FASHION, REFORM, AND REVOLUTION
A. _Fashion_
(1) Spencer, Herbert. _Principles of Sociology._ Part IV, chap. xi,
"Fashion," II, 205-10. London, 1893.
(2) Tarde, Gabriel. _Laws of Imitation._ Translated from the 2d French
ed. by Elsie Clews Parsons. Chap. vii, "Custom and Fashion," pp.
244-365. New York, 1903.
(3) Simmel, G. _Philosophie der Mode._ Berlin, 1905.
(4) ----. "The Attraction of Fashion," _International Quarterly_, X
(1904), 130-55.
(5) Sumner, W. G. _Folkways._ "Fashion," pp. 184-220. Boston, 1906.
(6) Sombart, Werner. "Wirtschaft und Mode," _Grenzfragen des Nerven- und
Seelenlebens._ Wiesbaden, 1902.
(7) Clerget, Pierre. "The Economic and Social Rôle of Fashion." _Annual
Report of the Smithsonian Institution_, 1913, pp. 755-65. Washington,
1914.
(8) Squillace, Fausto. _La Moda._ L'abito è l'uomo. Milano, 1912.
(9) Shaler, N. S. "The Law of Fashion," _Atlantic Monthly_, LXI (1888),
386-98.
(10) Patrick, G. T. W. "The Psychology of Crazes," _Popular Science
Monthly_, LVII (1900), 285-94.
(11) Linton, E. L. "The Tyranny of Fashion," _Forum_ III (1887), 59-68.
(12) Bigg, Ada H. "What is 'Fashion'?" _Nineteenth Century_, XXXIII
(1893), 235-48.
(13) Foley, Caroline A. "Fashion," _Economic Journal_, III (1893),
458-74.
(14) Aria, E. "Fashion, Its Survivals and Revivals," _Fortnightly
Review_, CIV (1915), 930-37.
(15) Thomas, W. I. "The Psychology of Woman's Dress," _American
Magazine_, LXVII (1908-9), 66-72.
(16) Schurtz, Heinrich. _Grundzüge einer Philosophie der Tracht._
Stuttgart, 1871.
(17) Wechsler, Alfred. _Psychologie der Mode._ Berlin, 1904.
(18) Stratz, Carl H. _Die Frauenkleidung und ihre natürliche
Entwicklung._ Stuttgart, 1904.
(19) Holmes, William H. "Origin and Development of Form and Ornament in
Ceramic Art," _Fourth Annual Report of the U.S. Bureau of American
Ethnology, 1882-83_, pp. 437-65. Washington, 1886.
(20) Kroeber, A. L. "On the Principle of Order in Civilization as
Exemplified by Changes of Fashion," _American Anthropologist_, N.S., XXI
(1919), 235-63.
B. _Reform_
(1) Sumner, W. G. _Folkways._ "Reform and Revolution," pp. 86-95.
Boston, 1906.
(2) Patrick, G. T. W. _The Psychology of Social Reconstruction._ Chaps.
i-ii, "Psychological Factors in Social Reconstruction," pp. 27-118.
Boston, 1920.
(3) Jevons, William S. _Methods of Social Reform._ And other papers.
London, 1883.
(4) Pearson, Karl. _Social Problems._ Their treatment, past, present,
and future. London, 1912.
(5) Mallock, W. H. _Social Reform as Related to Realities and
Delusions._ An examination of the increase and distribution of wealth
from 1801 to 1910. New York, 1915.
(6) Matthews, Brander. "Reform and Reformers," _North American_,
CLXXXIII (1906), 461-73.
(7) Miller, J. D. "Futilities of Reformers," _Arena_, XXVI (1901),
481-89.
(8) Lippmann, Walter. _A Preface to Politics._ Chap. v, "Well Meaning
but Unmeaning: The Chicago Vice Report," pp. 122-58. New York, 1913.
(9) Stanton, Henry B. _Sketches of Reforms and Reformers, of Great
Britain and Ireland._ 2d rev. ed. New York, 1850.
(10) Stoughton, John. _William Wilberforce._ London, 1880.
(11) Field, J. _The Life of John Howard._ With comments on his character
and philanthropic labours. London, 1850.
(12) Hodder, Edwin. _The Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, K.G., as Social
Reformer._ New York, 1898.
(13) Atkinson, Charles M. _Jeremy Bentham, His Life and Work._ London,
1905.
(14) Morley, John. _The Life of Richard Cobden._ Boston, 1890.
(15) Bartlett, David W. _Modern Agitators._ Or pen portraits of living
American reformers. New York, 1855.
(16) Greeley, Horace. _Hints toward Reforms._ In lectures, addresses,
and other writing. New York, 1850.
(17) Austin, George L. _The Life and Times of Wendell Phillips._ New ed.
Boston, 1901.
(18) Hill, Georgiana. _Women in English Life._ From medieval to modern
times. Period III, chap. v, "The Philanthropists," Vol. II, pp. 59-74;
Period IV, chap. xi, "The Modern Humanitarian Movement," Vol. II, pp.
227-36. 2 vols. London, 1896.
(19) Yonge, Charlotte M. _Hannah More._ Famous women. Boston, 1888.
(20) Besant, Annie. _An Autobiography._ 2d ed. London, 1908.
(21) Harper, Ida H. _The Life and Work of Susan B. Anthony._ Including
public addresses, her own lectures and many from her contemporaries
during fifty years. A story of the evolution of the status of woman. 3
vols. Indianapolis, 1898-1908.
(22) Whiting, Lilian. _Women Who Have Ennobled Life._ Philadelphia,
1915.
(23) Willard, Frances E. _Woman and Temperance._ Or the work and workers
of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union. 3d ed. Hartford, Conn., 1883.
(24) Gordon, Anna A. _The Beautiful Life of Frances E. Willard._ A
memorial volume. Introduction by Lady Henry Somerset. Chicago, 1898.
C. _Revolution_
(1) Le Bon, Gustave. _The Psychology of Revolution._ Translated from the
French by Bernard Miall. New York, 1913.
(2) Petrie, W. M. F. _The Revolutions of Civilisation._ London, 1912.
(3) Hyndman, Henry M. _The Evolution of Revolution._ London, 1920.
(4) Adams, Brooks. _The Theory of Social Revolutions._ New York, 1913.
(5) Landauer, G. _Die Revolution._ "Die Gesellschaft, Sammlung
sozial-psychologischer Monographien." Frankfurt-am-Main, 1907.
(6) Thomas, W. I. _Source Book for Social Origins._ "Crisis and
Control," pp. 13-22. Chicago, 1909.
(7) Ellwood, Charles A. "A Psychological Theory of Revolutions,"
_American Journal of Sociology_, XI (1905-6), 49-59.
(8) ----. _Introduction to Social Psychology._ Chap. viii, "Social
Change under Abnormal Conditions," pp. 170-87. New York, 1917.
(9) King, Irving. "The Influence of the Form of Social Change upon the
Emotional Life of a People," _American Journal of Sociology_, IX
(1903-4), 124-35.
(10) Toynbee, Arnold. _Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the
Eighteenth Century in England._ New ed. London, 1908.
(11) Knowles, L. C. A. _The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in
Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century._ London, 1921.
(12) Taine, H. A. _The French Revolution._ Translated from the French by
John Durand. 3 vols. New York, 1878-85.
(13) Olgin, Moissaye J. _The Soul of the Russian Revolution._
Introduction by Vladimir G. Simkhovitch. New York, 1917.
(14) Spargo, John. _The Psychology of Bolshevism._ New York, 1919.
(15) Khoras, P. "La Psychologie de la révolution chinoise," _Revue des
deux mondes_, VIII (1912), 295-331.
(16) Le Bon, Gustave. _The World in Revolt._ A psychological study of
our times. Translated from the French by Bernard Miall. New York, 1921.
(17) Lombroso, Cesare. _Le Crime politique et les révolutions par
rapport au droit, à l'anthropologie criminelle et à science du
gouvernement._ Translated by A. Bouchard. Paris, 1912.
(18) Prince, Samuel H. _Catastrophe and Social Change._ Based upon a
sociological study of the Halifax disaster. "Columbia University Studies
in Political Science." New York, 1920.
TOPICS FOR WRITTEN THEMES
1. Collective Behavior and Social Control
2. Unrest in the Person and Unrest in the Group
3. The Agitator as a Type of the Restless Person
4. A Study of Adolescent Unrest: the Runaway Boy and the Girl Who Goes
Wrong
5. A Comparison of Physical Epidemics with Social Contagion
6. Case Studies of Psychic Epidemics: the Mississippi Bubble, Gold
Fever, War-Time Psychosis, the Dancing Mania in Modern Times, etc.
7. Propaganda as Social Contagion: an Analysis of a Selected Case
8. A Description and Interpretation of Crowd Behavior: the Orgy, the
Cult, the Mob, the Organized Crowd
9. The "Animal" Crowd: the Flock, the Herd, the Pack
10. A Description of Crowd Behavior on Armistice Day
11. The Criminal Crowd
12. The Jury, the Congenial Group, the Committee, the Legislature, the
Mass Meeting, etc., as Types of Collective Behavior
13. Crowd Excitements and Mass Movements
14. A Study of Mass Migrations: the Barbarian Invasions, the Settlement
of Oklahoma, the Migrations of the Mennonnites, the Treks of the Boers,
the Rise of Mohammedanism, the Mormon Migrations, etc.
15. Crusades and Reforms: the Crusades, the Abolition Movement,
Prohibition, the Woman's Temperance Crusades, Moving-Picture Censorship,
etc.
16. Fashions, Revivals, and Revolutions
17. The Social Laws of Fashions
18. Linguistic Revivals and the Nationalist Movements
19. Religious Revivals and the Origin of Sects
20. Social Unrest, Social Movements, and Changes in Mores and
Institutions
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
1. What do you understand by collective behavior?
2. Interpret the incident in a Lancashire cotton factory in terms of
sympathy, imitation, and suggestion.
3. What simple forms of social contagion have you observed?
4. In what sense may the dancing mania of the Middle Ages be compared to
an epidemic?
5. Why may propaganda be interpreted as social contagion? Describe a
concrete instance of propaganda and analyze its _modus operandi_.
6. What are the differences in behavior of the flock, the pack, and the
herd?
7. Is it accurate to speak of these animal groups as "crowds"?
8. What do you understand Le Bon to mean by "the mental unity of
crowds"?
9. Describe and analyze the behavior of crowds which you have observed.
10. "The crowd is always intellectually inferior to the isolated
individual." "The crowd may be better or worse than the individual." Are
these statements consistent? Elaborate your position.
11. In what sense may we speak of sects, castes, and classes as crowds?
12. What do you mean by a social movement?
13. What is the significance of a movement?
14. Why is movement to be regarded as the fundamental form of freedom?
15. How does crowd excitement lead to mass movements?
16. What were the differences in the characteristics of mass movements
in the Klondike Rush, the Woman's Crusade, Methodism, and bolshevism?
17. What are the causes of social unrest?
18. What is the relation of social unrest to social organization?
19. How does Le Bon explain the mental anarchy at the time of the French
Revolution?
20. What was the nature of this mental anarchy in the different social
classes? Are revolutions always preceded by mental anarchy?
21. What was the relative importance of belief and of reason in the
French Revolution?
22. What are the likenesses and differences between the origin and
development of bolshevism and of the French Revolution?
23. Do you agree with Spargo's interpretation of the psychology (a) of
the intellectual Bolshevists, and (b) of the I.W.W.?
24. Are mass movements organizing or disorganizing factors in society?
Illustrate by reference to Methodism, the French Revolution, and
bolshevism.
25. Under what conditions will a mass movement (a) become organized,
and (b) become an institution?
FOOTNOTES:
[280] W. G. Sumner, _Folkways_. A study of the sociological importance
of usages, manners, customs, mores, and morals, pp. 12-13. (Boston,
1906.)
[281] Scipio Sighele, in a note to the French edition of his _Psychology
of Sects_, claims that his volume, _La Folla delinquente_, of which the
second edition was published at Turin in 1895, and his article
"Physiologie du succès," in the _Revue des Revues_, October 1, 1894,
were the first attempts to describe the crowd from the point of view of
collective psychology. Le Bon published two articles, "Psychologie des
foules" in the _Revue scientifique_, April 6 and 20, 1895. These were
later gathered together in his volume _Psychologie des foules_, Paris,
1895. See Sighele _Psychologie des sectes_, pp. 25, 39.
[282] Gustave Le Bon, _The Crowd_. A study of the popular mind, p. 19.
(New York, 1900.)
[283] _Ibid._, p. 83.
[284] _L'Opinion et la foule_, pp. 6-7. (Paris, 1901.)
[285] _The Crowd_, p. 41.
[286] Sidney L. Hinde, _The Fall of the Congo Arabs_, p. 147. (London,
1897.) Describing a characteristic incident in one of the strange
confused battles Hinde says: "Wordy war, which also raged, had even more
effect than our rifles. Mahomedi and Sefu led the Arabs, who were
jeering and taunting Lutete's people, saying that they were in a bad
case, and had better desert the white man, who was ignorant of the fact
that Mohara with all the forces of Nyange was camped in his rear.
Lutete's people replied: 'Oh, we know all about Mohara; we ate him the
day before yesterday.'" This news became all the more depressing when it
turned out to be true. See also Hirn, _The Origins of Art_, p. 269, for
an explanation of the rôle of threats and boastings in savage warfare.
[287] Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller, _Old World Traits
Transplanted_. Document 23, pp. 32-33. (New York, 1921.)
[288] Yrjö Hirn, _The Origins of Art_. A psychological and sociological
inquiry, p. 87. (London, 1900.)
[289] _Ibid._, p. 89.
[290] Le Bon, _op. cit._, p. 82.
[291] _Ibid._, p. 82.
[292] Scipio Sighele, _Psychologie des sectes_, p. 46. (Paris, 1898.)
[293] W. E. H. Lecky, _History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit
of Rationalism in Europe._ 2 vols. (Vol. I.) (New York, 1866.)
[294] See Gabriel Tarde, _Laws of Imitation._
[295] J. F. C. Hecker, _Die Tanzwuth, eine Volkskrankheit im
Mittelalter._ (Berlin, 1832.) See Introduction of _The Black Death and
the Dancing Mania_. Translated from the German by B. G. Babington.
Cassell's National Library. (New York, 1888.)
[296] Le Bon, _op. cit._, p. 26.
[297] Vernon Lee [pseud.], _Vital Lies._ Studies of some varieties of
recent obscurantism. (London, 1912.)
[298] Taken from _Gentleman's Magazine_, March, 1787, p. 268.
[299] Adapted from J. F. C. Hecker, _The Black Death, and the Dancing
Mania_, pp. 106-11. (Cassell & Co., 1888.)
[300] From Mary Austin, _The Flock_, pp. 110-29. (Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1906.)
[301] From W. H. Hudson, "The Strange Instincts of Cattle," in
_Longman's Magazine_, XVIII (1891), 389-91.
[302] From Ernest Thompson Seton, "The Habits of Wolves," in _The
American Magazine_, LXIV (1907), 636.
[303] Adapted from Gustave Le Bon, _The Crowd_, pp. 1-14. (T. Fisher
Unwin, 1897.)
[304] From Robert E. Park, _The Crowd and the Public_. (Unpublished
manuscript.)
[305] Moll, _Hypnotism_, pp. 134-36.
[306] Sighele, _Psychologie des Auflaufs und der Massenverbrechen_
(translated from the Italian), p. 79.
[307] Durkheim, _The Elementary Forms of Religious Life_, pp. 432-37.
[308] Adapted from T. C. Down, "The Rush to the Klondike," in the
_Cornhill Magazine_, IV (1898), 33-43.
[309] Adapted from Mrs. Annie Wittenmyer, _History of the Woman's
Temperance Crusade_ (1878), pp. 34-62.
[310] Adapted from Gustave Le Bon, _The Psychology of Revolution_, pp.
147-70. (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913.)
[311] Adapted from John Spargo, _The Psychology of Bolshevism_, pp.
1-120. (Harper & Brothers, 1919.)
[312] Adapted from William E. H. Lecky, _A History of England in the
Eighteenth Century_, III, 33-101. (D. Appleton & Co., 1892.)
[313 1] _Supra_, pp. 652-53; 657-58.
[314] Otto Stoll, _Suggestion und Hypnotismus in der Völkerpsychologie_.
2d ed. (Leipzig, 1904.)
[315] Robert E. Park, _Immigrant Press and Its Control_, chap. ii,
"Background of the Immigrant Press." (New York, 1921. In press.)
[316] _Ibid._
[317] Anton H. Hollman, _Die dänische Volkshochschule und ihre Bedeutung
für die Entwicklung einer völkischen Kultur in Dänemark_. (Berlin,
1909.)
[318] H. G. Wells, _The Salvaging of Civilization_, chaps. iv-v, "The
Bible of Civilization," pp. 97-140. (New York, 1921.)
[319] See _The Immigrant Press and Its Control_, chap. ii, for a
translation of Dr. Kudirka's so-called "Confession."
[320] Gabriel Tarde, _The Laws of Imitation_. Translated from the 2d
French ed. by Elsie Clews Parsons, p. 247. (New York, 1903.)
[321] Sumner, _Folkways_, pp. 200-201.
CHAPTER XIV
PROGRESS
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Popular Conceptions of Progress
It seems incredible that there should have been a time when mankind had
no conception of progress. Ever since men first consciously united their
common efforts to improve and conserve their common life, it would seem
there must have been some recognition that life had not always been as
they found it and that it could not be in the future what it then was.
Nevertheless, it has been said that the notion of progress was unknown
in the oriental world, that the opposite conception of deterioration
pervaded all ancient Asiatic thought. In India the prevailing notion was
that of vast cycles of time "through which the universe and its
inhabitants must pass from perfection to destruction, from strength and
innocence to weakness and depravity until a new mahá-yuga begins."[322]
The Greeks conceived the course of history in various ways, as progress
and as deterioration, but in general they thought of it as a cycle. The
first clear description of the history of mankind as a progression by
various stages, from a condition of primitive savagery to civilization,
is in Lucretius' great poem _De Rerum Natura_. But Lucretius does not
conceive this progress will continue. On the contrary he recognizes that
the world has grown old and already shows signs of decrepitude which
foreshadow its ultimate destruction.
It is only in comparatively recent times that the world has sought to
define progress philosophically, as part of the cosmic process, and has
thought of it abstractly as something to be desired for its own sake.
Today the word progress is in everyone's mouth; still there is no
general agreement as to what progress is, and particularly in recent
years, with all the commonly accepted evidences of progress about them,
skeptics have appeared, who, like the farmer who saw for the first time
a camel with two humps, insisted "there's no such animal."
The reason there is no general understanding in regard to the meaning of
progress, as it has been defined by the philosophers, is not because
there is no progress in detail, but because the conception of progress
in general involves a balancing of the goods against the ills of life.
It raises the question whether the gains which society makes as a whole
are compensation for the individual defeats and losses which progress
inevitably involves. One reason why we believe in progress, perhaps, is
that history is invariably written by the survivors.
In certain aspects and with people of a certain temperament, what we
ordinarily call progress, considering what it costs, will always seem a
very dubious matter. William Ralph Inge, Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral,
London, seems to be the most eminent modern example of the skeptic.
Human nature has not been changed by civilization. It has
neither been leveled up nor leveled down, to an average
mediocrity. Beneath the dingy uniformity of international
fashions in dress, man remains what he has always been--a
splendid fighting animal, a self-sacrificing hero, and a
bloodthirsty savage. Human nature is at once sublime and
horrible, holy and satanic. Apart from the accumulation of
knowledge and experience, which are external and precarious
acquisitions, there is no proof that we have changed much since
the first stone age.[323]
It must be remembered in this connection that progress, in so far as it
makes the world more comfortable, makes it more complicated. Every new
mechanical device, every advance in business organization or in science,
which makes the world more tolerable for most of us, makes it impossible
for others. Not all the world is able to keep pace with the general
progress of the world. Most of the primitive races have been
exterminated by the advance of civilization, and it is still uncertain
where, and upon what terms, the civilized man will let the remnant of
the primitive peoples live.
It has been estimated that, in the complicated life of modern cities, at
least one-tenth of the population is not competent to maintain an
independent, economic existence, but requires an increasing amount of
care and assistance from the other nine-tenths.[324] To the inferior,
incompetent, and unfortunate, unable to keep pace with progress, the
more rapid advance of the world means disease, despair, and death. In
medicine and surgery alone does progress seem wholly beneficent, but the
eugenists are even now warning us that our indiscriminate efforts to
protect the weak and preserve the incompetent are increasing the burdens
of the superior and competent, who are alone fit to live.
On the other hand, every new invention is a response to some specific
need. Every new form of social control is intended to correct some
existing evil. So far as they are successful they represent progress.
Progress in the concrete has reference to recognized social values.
Values, as Cooley points out, have no meaning except with reference to
an organism.
"The organism is necessary to give meaning to the idea [value];
there must be worth _to_ something. It need not be a person; a
group, an institution, a doctrine, any organized form of life
will do; and that it be conscious of the values that motivates
it is not at all essential."[325]
Any change or adaptation to an existing environment that makes
it easier for a person, group, institution, or other "organized
form of life" to live may be said to represent progress.
Whether the invention is a new plow or a new six-inch gun we
accept it as an evidence of progress if it does the work for
which it is intended more efficiently than any previous device.
In no region of human life have we made greater progress than
in the manufacture of weapons of destruction.
Not everyone would be willing to admit that progress in weapons
of warfare represents "real" progress. That is because some
people do not admit the necessity of war. Once admit that
necessity, then every improvement is an evidence of progress,
at least in that particular field. It is more easy to recognize
progress in those matters where there is no conflict in regard
to the social values. The following excerpt from Charles
Zueblin's preface to his book on American progress is a
concrete indication of what students of society usually
recognize as progress.
Already this century has witnessed the first municipalized
street railways and telephones in American cities; a national
epidemic of street paving and cleaning; the quadrupling of
electric lighting service and the national appropriation of
display lighting; a successful crusade against dirt of all
kinds--smoke, flies, germs,--and the diffusion of constructive
provisions for health like baths, laundries, comfort stations,
milk stations, school nurses and open air schools; fire
prevention; the humanizing of the police and the advent of the
policewomen; the transforming of some municipal courts into
institutions for the prevention of crime and the cure of
offenders; the elaboration of the school curriculum to give
every child a complete education from the kindergarten to the
vocational course in school or university or shop; municipal
reference libraries; the completion of park systems in most
large cities and the acceptance of the principle that the
smallest city without a park and playground is not quite
civilized; the modern playground movement giving organized and
directed play to young and old; the social center; the
democratic art museum; municipal theaters; the commission form
of government; the city manager; home rule for cities; direct
legislation--a greater advance than the whole nineteenth
century compassed.[326]
2. The Problem of Progress
Sociology inherited its conception of progress from the philosophy of
history. That problem seems to have had its origin in the paradox that
progress at retail does not insure progress at wholesale. The progress
of the community as individuals or in specific directions may, for
example, bring about conditions which mean the eventual destruction of
the community as a whole. This is what we mean by saying that
civilizations are born, grow, and decay. We may see the phenomenon in
its simplest form in the plant community, where the very growth of the
community creates a soil in which the community is no longer able to
exist. But the decay and death of one community creates a soil in which
another community will live and grow. This gives us the interesting
phenomenon of what the ecologists call "succession." So individuals
build their homes, communities are formed, and eventually there comes
into existence a great city. But the very existence of a great city
creates problems of health, of family life, and social control which did
not exist when men lived in the open, or in villages. Just as the human
body generates the poisons that eventually destroy it, so the communal
life, in the very process of growth and as a result of its efforts to
meet the changes that its growth involves, creates diseases and vices
which tend to destroy the community. This raises the problem in another
form. Communities may and do grow old and die, but new communities
profiting by the experience of their predecessors are enabled to create
social organizations, more adequate and better able to resist social
diseases and corrupting vices. But in order to do this, succeeding
communities have had to accumulate more experience, exercise more
forethought, employ more special knowledge and a greater division of
labor. In the meantime, life is becoming constantly more complex. In
place of the simple spontaneous modes of behavior which enable the lower
animals to live without education and without anxiety, men are compelled
to supplement original nature with special training and with more and
more elaborate machinery, until life, losing its spontaneity, seems in
danger of losing all its joy.
Knowledge accumulates apace and its applications threaten the
very existence of civilized man. The production of the flying
machine represented a considerable advance in mechanical
knowledge; but I am unaware of any respect in which human
welfare has been increased by its existence; whereas it has not
only intensified enormously the horrors of war, and, by
furnishing criminal and other undesirable characters with a
convenient means of rapid and secret movement, markedly
diminished social security, but it threatens, by its inevitable
advance in construction, to make any future conflict virtually
equivalent to the extermination of civilized man. And the
maleficent change in the conditions of human life which the
flying machine has produced from the air, the submarine
parallels from the depths of the sea; indeed, the perception of
this truth has led to the very doubtfully practicable
suggestion that the building of submarines be made illegal....
Moreover if life itself is more secure, there is at the present
moment a distinct tendency towards a diminution of personal
liberty. The increasing control by the state over the conduct
and activities of the individual; the management of his
children, the details of his diet and the conduct of his
ordinary affairs; tend more and more to limit his personal
freedom. But the restriction of his liberty amounts to a
reduction of his available life just as complete loss of
liberty differs little from complete loss of life.[327]
It is this condition which, in spite of progress in details, has raised
in men's minds a question whether there is progress in general, and if
there is, whether the mass of mankind is better or worse because of it.
3. History of the Concept of Progress
The great task of mankind has been to create an organization which would
enable men to realize their wishes. This organization we call
civilization. In achieving this result man has very slowly at first, but
more rapidly in recent times, established his control over external
nature and over himself. He has done this in order that he might remake
the world as he found it more after his own heart.
But the world which man has thus remade has in turn reacted back upon
man and in doing so has made him human. Men build houses to protect them
from the weather and as places of refuge. In the end these houses have
become homes, and man has become a domesticated animal, endowed with the
sentiments, virtues, and lasting affections that the home inevitably
cultivates and maintains.
Men made for themselves clothing for ornament and for comfort, and
men's, and especially women's, clothes have become so much a part of
their personalities that without them they cease to be persons and have
no status in human society. Except under very exceptional circumstances
a man who appeared without clothing would be treated as a madman, and
hunted like a wild animal.
Men have built cities for security and for trade, and cities have made
necessary and possible a division of labor and an economic organization.
This economic organization, on the other hand, has been the basis of a
society and a social order which imposes standards of conduct and
enforces minute regulations of the individual life. Out of the
conditions of this common life there has grown a body of general and
ruling ideas: liberty, equality, democracy, fate, providence, personal
immortality, and progress.
J. B. Bury, who has written a history of the idea of progress, says that
progress is "the animating and controlling idea of western
civilization." But in defining progress he makes a distinction between
ideas like progress, providence, and fate and ideas like liberty,
toleration, and socialism. The latter are approved or condemned because
they are good or bad. The former are not approved or condemned. They are
matters of fact, they are true or false. He says:
When we say that ideas rule the world, or exercise a decisive
power in history, we are generally thinking of those ideas
which express human aims and depend for their realisation on
the human will, such as liberty, toleration, equality of
opportunity, socialism. Some of these have been partly
realised, and there is no reason why any of them should not be
fully realised, in a society or in the world, if it were the
united purpose of a society or of the world to realise it. They
are approved or condemned because they are held to be good or
bad, not because they are true or false. But there is another
order of ideas that play a great part in determining and
directing the course of man's conduct but do not depend on his
will--ideas which bear upon the mystery of life, such as Fate,
Providence, or personal immortality. Such ideas may operate in
important ways on the forms of social action, but they involve
a question of fact and they are accepted or rejected not
because they are believed to be useful or injurious, but
because they are believed to be true or false.
The idea of the progress of humanity is an idea of this kind,
and it is important to be quite clear on the point.[328]
All of the ideas mentioned are of such a general nature, embody so much
of the hopes, the strivings, and the sentiments of the modern world,
that they have, or did have until very recently, something of the
sanctity and authority of religious dogmas. All are expressions of
wishes, but there is this difference: ideas, like liberty, toleration,
etc., reflect the will of the people who accept them; ideas like
providence and progress, on the contrary, represent their hopes. The
question of the progress of humanity like that of personal immortality
is, as Bury points out, a question of fact. "It is true or false but it
cannot be proved whether true or false. Belief in it is an act of
faith." When we hypostatize our hopes and wishes and treat them as
matters of fact, even though they cannot be proved to be either true or
false, they assume a form which Sorel describes as myth. The progress of
humanity, as Herbert Spencer and the other Victorians understood it, is
such a myth. Dean Inge calls it a "superstition" and adds: "To become a
popular religion, it is only necessary for a superstition to enslave a
philosophy. The superstition of progress had the singular good fortune
to enslave at least three philosophies--those of Hegel, of Comte, and of
Darwin."[329]
The conception of progress, if a superstition, is one of recent origin.
It was not until the eighteenth century that it gained general
acceptance and became part of what Inge describes as the popular
religion. The conception which it replaced was that of providence. But
the Greeks and Romans knew nothing of providence. They were under the
influence of another idea of a different character, the idea, namely, of
nemesis and fate. And before them there were more primitive peoples who
had no conception of man's destiny at all. In a paper, not yet
published, Ellsworth Faris has sketched the natural history of the idea
of progress and its predecessors and of a new conception, control, that
is perhaps destined to take its place.
The idea of progress which has been so influential in modern
times is not a very old conception. In its distinctive form it
came into existence in the rationalistic period which
accompanied the Renaissance. Progress, in this sense, means a
theory as to the way in which the whole cosmic process is
developing. It is the belief that the world as a whole is
growing better through definite stages, and is moving "to one
far-off divine event."
The stages preceding this idea may be thought of under several
heads. The first may be called "cosmic anarchy," in which we
find "primitive people" now living. It is a world of chaos,
without meaning, and without purpose. There is no direction in
which human life is thought of as developing. Death and
misfortune are for the most part due to witchcraft and the evil
designs of enemies; good luck and bad luck are the forces which
make a rational existence hopeless.
Another stage of thinking is that which was found among the
Greeks, the conception of the cosmic process as proceeding in
cycles. The golden age of the Greeks lay in the past, the
universe was considered to be following a set course, and the
whole round of human experience was governed and controlled by
an inexorable fate that was totally indifferent to human
wishes. The formula which finally arose to meet this situation
was "conformity to nature," a submission to the iron laws of
the world which it was vain to attempt to change.
This idea was succeeded in medieval Europe by the idea of
providence, in which the world was thought of as a theater on
which the drama of human redemption was enacted. God has
created man free, but man was corrupted by the fall, given an
opportunity to be redeemed by the gospel, and the world was
soon to know the final triumph and happiness of the saved. Most
of the early church fathers expected the end of the world very
soon, many of them in their own lifetime. This is distinctly
different from the preceding two ideas. All life had meaning to
them, for the evil in the world was but God's way to
accomplish his good purposes. It was man's duty to submit, but
submission was to take the form of faith in an all-wise
beneficent and perfect power, who was governing the world and
who would make everything for the best.
The idea of progress arose on the ruins of this concept of
providence. In the fourteenth century, progress did not mean
merely the satisfaction of all human desires either individual
or collective. The idea meant far more than that. It was the
conviction that the world as a whole was proceeding onward
indefinitely to greater and greater perfection. The atmosphere
of progress was congenial to the construction of utopias and
schemes of perfection which were believed to be in harmony with
the nature of the world itself. The atmosphere of progress
produced also optimists who were quite sure everything was in
the long run to be for the best, and that every temporary evil
was sure to be overcome by an ultimate good.
The difficulty in demonstrating the fact of progress has become
very real as the problem has been presented to modern minds. It
is possible to prove that the world has become more complex. It
is hardly possible to prove that it has become better, and
quite impossible to prove that it will continue to do so. From
the standpoint of the Mohammedan Turks, the last two hundred
years of the world's history have not been years of marked
progress; from the standpoint of their enemies, the reverse
statement is obviously true.
The conception which seems to be superseding the idea of
progress in our day is that of control. Each problem whether
personal or social is thought of as a separate enterprise.
Poverty, disease, crime, vice, intemperance, or war, these are
definite situations which challenge human effort and human
ingenuity. Many problems are unsolved; many failures are
recorded. The future is a challenge to creative intelligence
and collective heroism. The future is thought of as still to be
made. And there is no assurance that progress will take place.
On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that progress
will not take place unless men are able by their skill and
devotion to find solutions for their present problems, and for
the newer ones that shall arise.
The modern man finds this idea quite as stimulating to him as
the idea of progress was to his ancestor of the Renaissance or
the idea of providence to his medieval forebears. For while he
does not blindly believe nor feel optimistically certain things
will come about all right, yet he is nerved to square his
shoulders, to think, to contrive, and to exert himself to the
utmost in his effort to conquer the difficulties ahead, and to
control the forces of nature and man. The idea of providence
was not merely a generalization on life, it was a force that
inspired hope. The idea of progress was likewise not merely a
concept, it was also an energizing influence in a time of great
intellectual activity. The idea that the forces of nature can
be controlled in the service of man, differs from the others,
but is also a dynamic potency that seems to be equally well
adapted to the twentieth century.
The conception that man's fate lies somehow in his own hands, if it
gains general acceptance, will still be, so far as it inspires men to
work and strive, an article of faith, and the image in which he pictures
the future of mankind, toward which he directs his efforts, will still
have the character of myth. That is the function of myths. It is this
that lends an interest to those ideal states in which men at different
times have sought to visualize the world of their hopes and dreams.
4. Classification of the Materials
The purpose of the materials in this chapter is to exhibit the variety
and diversity of men's thought with reference to the concept of
progress. What they show is that there is as yet no general agreement in
regard to the meaning of the term. In all the special fields of social
reform there are relatively definite conceptions of what is desirable
and what is not desirable. In the matter of _progress in general_ there
is no such definition. Except for philosophical speculation there is no
such thing as "progress in general." In practice, progress turns out to
be a number of special tasks.
The "progress of civilization" is, to be sure, a concept in good
standing in history. It is, however, a concept of appreciation rather
than one of description. If history has to be rewritten for every new
generation of men, it is due not merely to the discovery of new
historical materials, but just to the fact that there is a new
generation. Every generation has its own notion of the values of life,
and every generation has to have its own interpretation of the facts of
life.
It is incredible that Strachey's _Life of Queen Victoria_ could have
been written forty years ago. It is incredible that the mass of men
should have been able to see the Victorian Age, as it is here presented,
while they were living it.
The materials in this chapter fall under three heads: (a) the concept
of progress, (b) progress and science, (c) progress and human
nature.
a) _The concept of progress._--The first difficulty in the study of
progress is one of definition. What are the signs and symptoms, the
criteria of progress? Until we have framed some sort of a definition we
cannot know. Herbert Spencer identified progress with evolution. The law
of organic progress is the law of all progress. Intelligence, if we
understand by that the mere accumulations of knowledge, does not
represent progress. Rather it consists in "those internal modifications
of which this larger knowledge is an expression." In so far, Spencer's
conception is that of the eugenists. Real progress is in the breed--in
the germ plasm. For men like Galton, Karl Pearson, and Madison
Grant,[330] what we call civilization is merely the efflorescence of
race. Civilizations may pass away, but if the racial stock is preserved,
civilization will reproduce itself. In recent years, a school of
political philosophy has sprung up in Europe and in the United States,
which is seeking to define our social policy toward the "inner enemies,"
the dependents, the defectives, and the delinquents, and a foreign
policy toward immigrant races and foreign peoples, on the general
conception that the chief aim of society and the state is to preserve
the germ plasm of the Nordic race.[331] For Spencer, however, the
conception that all values were in the organism was modified by the
conviction that all life was involved in an irreversible process called
evolution which would eventually purge the race and society of the weak,
the wicked, and the unfit.
In contrast, both with the views of Spencer and of the eugenists,
Hobhouse, voicing a conviction that was first expressed by Huxley,[332]
believes that man is bound to intervene in the beneficent law of natural
selection. He insists, in fact, that social development is something
quite distinct and relatively independent of the organic changes in the
individual. It is, in other words, a sociological rather than a
biological product. It is an effect of the interaction of individuals
and is best represented by organized society and by the social tradition
in which that organization is handed on from earlier to later
generations.
b) _Progress and science._--In contrast with other conceptions of
progress is that of Dewey, who emphasizes science and social control,
or, as he puts it, the "problem of discovering the needs and capacities
of collective human nature as we find it aggregated in racial or
national groups on the surface of the globe." The distinction between
Hobhouse and Dewey is less in substance than in point of view. Hobhouse,
looking backward, is interested in progress itself rather than in its
methods and processes. Dewey, on the other hand, looking forward, is
interested in a present program and in the application of scientific
method to the problems of social welfare and world-organization.
Arthur James Balfour, the most intellectual of the elder statesmen of
England, looking at progress through the experience of a politician,
speaks in a less prophetic and authoritative tone, but with a wisdom
born of long experience with men. For him, as for many other thoughtful
minds, the future of the race is "encompassed with darkness," and the
wise man is he who is content to act in "a sober and a cautious spirit,"
seeking to deal with problems as they arise.
c) _Progress and human nature._--Progress, which is much a matter of
interpretation, is also very largely a matter of temperament. The
purpose of the material upon human nature and progress is to call
attention to this fact. Progress is with most people an article of
faith, and men's faiths, as to their content, at least, are matters of
temperament. The conservative who perhaps takes a mild interest in
progress is usually "a sober and cautious" person, fairly content with
the present and not very sure about the future. The radical, on the
other hand, is usually a naturally hopeful and enthusiastic individual,
profoundly pessimistic about the present, but with a boundless
confidence in even the most impossible future.
Philosophy, like literature, is, in the final analysis, the expression
of a temperament, more or less modified by experience. The selections
from Schopenhauer and Bergson may be regarded, therefore, as the
characteristic reactions of two strikingly different temperaments to the
conception of progress and to life. The descriptions which they give of
the cosmic process are, considered formally, not unlike. Their
interpretations and the practical bearings of these interpretations are
profoundly different.
It is not necessary for the students of sociology to discuss the merits
of these different doctrines. We may accept them as human documents.
They throw light, at any rate, upon the idea of progress, and upon all
the other fundamental ideas in which men have sought to formulate their
common hopes and guide their common life.
II. MATERIALS
A. THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS
1. The Earliest Conception of Progress[333]
The word "progress," like the word "humanity," is one of the most
significant. It is a Latin word, not used in its current abstract sense
until after the Roman incorporation of the Mediterranean world. The
first writer who expounds the notion with sufficient breadth of view and
sufficiently accurate and concrete observation to provide a preliminary
sketch was the great Roman poet, Lucretius.
He begins by describing a struggle for existence in which the less
well-adapted creatures died off, those who wanted either the power to
protect themselves or the means of adapting themselves to the purposes
of man. In this stage, however, man was a hardier creature than he
afterward became. He lived like the beasts of the field and was ignorant
of tillage or fire or clothes or houses. He had no laws or government or
marriage and, though he did not fear the dark, he feared the real danger
of fiercer beasts. Men often died a miserable death, but not in
multitudes on a single day as they do now by battle or shipwreck.
The next stage sees huts and skins and fire which softened their bodies,
and marriage and the ties of family which softened their tempers. And
tribes began to make treaties of alliance with other tribes. Speech
arose from the need which all creatures feel to exercise their natural
powers, just as the calf will butt before his horns protrude. Men began
to apply different sounds to denote different things, just as brute
beasts will do to express different passions, as anyone must have
noticed in the cases of dogs and horses and birds. No one man set out to
invent speech.
Fire was first learned from lightning and the friction of trees, and
cooking from the softening and ripening of things by the sun. Then men
of genius invented improved methods of life, the building of cities and
private property in lands and cattle. But gold gave power to the wealthy
and destroyed the sense of contentment in simple happiness. It must
always be so whenever men allow themselves to become the slaves of
things which should be their dependents and instruments.
They began to believe in and worship gods, because they saw in dreams
shapes of preterhuman strength and beauty and deemed them immortal; and
as they noted the changes of the seasons and all the wonders of the
heavens they placed their gods there and feared them when they spoke in
the thunder.
Metals were discovered through the burning of the woods, which caused
the ores to run. Copper and brass came first and were rated above gold
and silver. And then the metals took the place of hands, nails, teeth,
and clubs, which had been men's earliest arms and tools. Weaving
followed the discovery of the use of iron. Sowing, planting, and
grafting were learned from nature herself, and gradually the cultivation
of the soil was carried farther and farther up the hills.
Men learned to sing from the birds, and to blow on pipes from the
whistling of the zephyr through the reeds; and those simple tunes gave
as much rustic jollity as our more elaborate tunes do now.
Then, in a summary passage at the end, Lucretius enumerates all the
chief discoveries which men have made in the age-long process--ships,
agriculture, walled cities, laws, roads, clothes, songs, pictures,
statues, and all the pleasures of life--and adds, "These things practice
and the experience of the unresting mind have taught mankind gradually
as they have progressed from point to point."
It is the first definition and use of the word in literature.
2. Progress and Organization[334]
The current conception of progress is shifting and indefinite. Sometimes
it comprehends little more than simple growth--as of a nation in the
number of its members and the extent of territory over which it spreads.
Sometimes it has reference to quantity of material products--as when the
advance of agriculture and manufactures is the topic. Sometimes the
superior quality of these products is contemplated; and sometimes the
new or improved appliances by which they are produced. When, again, we
speak of moral or intellectual progress, we refer to states of the
individual or people exhibiting it; while, when the progress of science
or art is commented upon, we have in view certain abstract results of
human thought and action.
Not only, however, is the current conception of progress more or less
vague, but it is in great measure erroneous. It takes in not so much the
reality of progress as its accompaniments--not so much the substance as
the shadow. That progress in intelligence seen during the growth of the
child into the man, or the savage into the philosopher, is commonly
regarded as consisting in the greater number of facts known and laws
understood; whereas the actual progress consists in those internal
modifications of which this larger knowledge is the expression. Social
progress is supposed to consist in the making of a greater quantity and
variety of the articles required for satisfying men's wants; in the
increasing security of person and property; in widening freedom of
action; whereas, rightly understood, social progress consists in those
changes of structure in the social organism which have entailed these
consequences. The current conception is a ideological one. The phenomena
are contemplated solely as bearing on human happiness. Only those
changes are held to constitute progress which directly or indirectly
tend to heighten human happiness; and they are thought to constitute
progress simply because they tend to heighten human happiness. But
rightly to understand progress, we must learn the nature of these
changes, considered apart from our interests. Ceasing, for example, to
regard the successive geological modifications that have taken place in
the earth as modifications that have gradually fitted it for the
habitation of man, and as therefore constituting geological progress, we
must ascertain the character common to these modifications--the law to
which they all conform. And similarly in every other case. Leaving out
of sight concomitants and beneficial consequences, let us ask what
progress is in itself.
In respect to that progress which individual organisms display in the
course of their evolution, this question has been answered by the
Germans. The investigations of Wolff, Goethe, and von Baer have
established the truth that the series of changes gone through during the
development of a seed into a tree, or an ovum into an animal, constitute
an advance from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure.
In its primary stage, every germ consists of a substance that is
uniform throughout, both in texture and chemical composition. The first
step is the appearance of a difference between two parts of this
substance; or, as the phenomenon is called in physiological language, a
differentiation. Each of these differentiated divisions presently begins
itself to exhibit some contrast of parts; and by and by these secondary
differentiations become as definite as the original one. This process is
continuously repeated--is simultaneously going on in all parts of the
growing embryo; and by endless differentiations of this sort there is
finally produced that complex combination of tissues and organs
constituting the adult animal or plant. This is the history of all
organisms whatever. It is settled beyond dispute that organic progress
consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.
Now, we propose to show that this law of organic progress is the law of
all progress. Whether it be in the development of the earth, in the
development of life upon its surface, in the development of society, of
government, of manufactures, of commerce, of language, literature,
science, art--this same evolution of the simple into the complex,
through successive differentiations, holds throughout. From the earliest
traceable cosmic changes down to the latest results of civilization, we
shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the
heterogeneous is that in which progress essentially consists.
3. The Stages of Progress[335]
If we regard the course of human development from the highest scientific
point of view, we shall perceive that it consists in educing more and
more the characteristic faculties of humanity, in comparison with those
of animality; and especially with those which man has in common with the
whole organic kingdom. It is in this philosophical sense that the most
eminent civilization must be pronounced to be fully accordant with
nature, since it is, in fact, only a more marked manifestation of the
chief properties of our species, properties which, latent at first, can
come into play only in that advanced state of social life for which they
are exclusively destined. The whole system of biological philosophy
indicates the natural progression. We have seen how, in the brute
kingdom, the superiority of each race is determined by the degree of
preponderance of the animal life over the organic. In like manner we see
that our social evolution is only the final term of a progression which
has continued from the simplest vegetables and most insignificant
animals, up through the higher reptiles to the birds and the mammifers,
and still on to the carnivorous animals and monkeys, the organic
characteristics retiring and the animal prevailing more and more, till
the intellectual and moral tend toward the ascendancy which can never be
fully obtained, even in the highest state of human perfection that we
can conceive of. This comparative estimate affords us the scientific
view of human progression, connected, as we see it is, with the whole
course of animal advancement, of which it is itself the highest degree.
The analysis of our social progress proves indeed that, while the
radical dispositions of our nature are necessarily invariable, the
highest of them are in a continuous state of relative development, by
which they rise to be preponderant powers of human existence, though the
inversion of the primitive economy can never be absolutely complete. We
have seen that this is the essential character of the social organism in
a statical view; but it becomes much more marked when we study its
variations in their gradual succession.
4. Progress and the Historical Process[336]
The conclusion which these reflections suggest is that the uncritical
application of biological principles to social progress results in an
insuperable contradiction. The factors which determine the survival of
physical organism, if applied as rules for the furtherance of social
progress, appear to conflict with all that social progress means. A
sense of this conflict is no doubt responsible for the further
reconstruction which the biological view has in recent years undergone.
Biologists now begin to inquire seriously whether "natural" selection
may not be replaced by a rational selection in which "fitness for
survival" would at length achieve its legitimate meaning, and the
development of the race might be guided by reasoned conceptions of
social value. This is a fundamental change of attitude, and the new
doctrine of eugenics to which it has given rise requires careful
examination. Before proceeding to this examination, however, it will be
well to inquire into the causes of the contrast on which we have
insisted between biological evolution and social progress. Faced by this
contradiction, we ask ourselves whether social development may not be
something quite distinct from the organic changes known to biology, and
whether the life of society may not depend upon forces which never
appear in the individual when he is examined merely as an individual or
merely as a member of a race.
Take the latter point first. It is easily seen in the arguments of
biologists that they conceive social progress as consisting essentially
in an improvement of the stock to which individuals belong. This is a
way of looking at the matter intelligible enough in itself. Society
consists of so many thousand or so many million individuals, and if,
comparing any given generation with its ancestors, we could establish an
average improvement in physical, mental, or moral faculty, we should
certainly have cause to rejoice. There is progress so far. But there is
another point of view which we may take up. Society consists of
individual persons and nothing but individual persons, just as the body
consists of cells and the product of cells. But though the body may
consist exclusively of cells, we should never understand its life by
examining the lives of each of its cells as a separate unit. We must
equally take into account that organic interconnection whereby the
living processes of each separate cell co-operate together to maintain
the health of the organism which contains them all. So, again, to
understand the social order we have to take into account not only the
individuals with their capabilities and achievements but the social
organization in virtue of which these individuals act upon one another
and jointly produce what we call social results; and whatever may be
true of the physical organism, we can see that in society it is possible
that individuals of the very same potentialities may, with good
organization, produce good results, and, with bad organization, results
which are greatly inferior.
The social phenomenon, in short, is not something which occurs in one
individual, or even in several individuals taken severally. It is
essentially an interaction of individuals, and as the capabilities of
any given individual are extraordinarily various and are only called
out, each by appropriate circumstances, it will be readily seen that the
nature of the interaction may itself bring forth new and perhaps
unexpected capacities, and elicit from the individuals contributing to
it forces which, but for this particular opportunity, might possibly
remain forever dormant. If this is so, sociology as a science is not the
same thing as either biology or psychology. It deals neither with the
physical capacities of individuals as such nor with their psychological
capacities as such. It deals rather with results produced by the play of
these forces upon one another, by the interaction of individuals under
the conditions imposed by their physical environment. The nature of the
forces and the point of these distinctions may be made clear by a very
simple instance.
The interplay of human motives and the interaction of human beings is
the fundamental fact of social life, and the permanent results which
this interaction achieves and the influence which it exercises upon the
individuals who take part in it constitute the fundamental fact of
social evolution. These results are embodied in what may be called,
generically, tradition. So understood, tradition--its growth and
establishment, its reaction upon the very individuals who
contribute to building it up, and its modifications by subsequent
interactions--constitutes the main subject of sociological inquiry.
Tradition is, in the development of society, what heredity is in the
physical growth of the stock. It is the link between past and future, it
is that in which the effects of the past are consolidated and on the
basis of which subsequent modifications are built up. We might push the
analogy a little further, for the ideas and customs which it maintains
and furnishes to each new generation as guides for their behavior in
life are analogous to the determinate methods of reaction, the inherited
impulses, reflexes, and instincts with which heredity furnishes the
individual. The tradition of the elders is, as it were, the instinct of
society. It furnishes the prescribed rule for dealing with the ordinary
occasions of life, which is for the most part accepted without inquiry
and applied without reflection. It furnishes the appropriate institution
for providing for each class of social needs, for meeting common
dangers, for satisfying social wants, for regulating social relations.
It constitutes, in short, the framework of society's life which to each
new generation is a part of its hereditary outfit.
But of course in speaking of tradition as a kind of inheritance we
conceive of it as propagated by quite other than biological methods. In
a sense its propagation is psychological, it is handed on from mind to
mind, and even though social institutions may in a sense be actually
incorporated in material things, in buildings, in books, in coronation
robes, or in flags, still it need not be said that these things are
nothing but for the continuity of thought which maintains and develops
their significance. Yet the forces at work in tradition are not purely
psychological; at least they are not to be understood in terms of
individual psychology alone. What is handed on is not merely a set of
ideas but the whole social environment; not merely certain ways of
thinking or of acting but the conditions which prescribe to individuals
the necessity for thinking or acting in certain specific ways if they
are to achieve their own desires. The point is worth dwelling on,
because some writers have thought to simplify the working of tradition
by reducing it to some apparently simple psychological phenomenon like
that of imitation. In this there is more than one element of fallacy.
Now the growth of tradition will in a sense gravely modify the
individual members of the society which maintains it. To any given set
of institutions a certain assemblage of qualities, mental and physical,
will be most appropriate, and these may differ as much as the qualities
necessary for war differ from those of peaceful industry. Any tradition
will obviously call forth from human beings the qualities appropriate to
it, and it will in a sense select the individuals in which those
qualities are the best developed and will tend to bring them to the top
of the social fabric, but this is not to say that it will assert the
same modification upon the stock that would be accomplished by the
working of heredity. The hereditary qualities of the race may remain the
same, though the traditions have changed and though by them one set of
qualities are kept permanently in abeyance, while the other are
continually brought by exercise to the highest point of efficiency.