These things must somehow be provided. And then there must be a system

of education of our young differing widely from our present system. The

new education will not look to efficiency merely and ever more

efficiency, but to the production of a harmonized and balanced

personality. We must cease our worship of American efficiency and German

_Streberthum_ and go back to Aristotle and his teaching of "the mean."

3. The Fighting Animal and the Great Society[211]

We must agree that man as he has existed, so far as we can read the

story of his development, has been, and as he exists today still is, a

fighting animal--that is to say that he has in the past answered, and

still answers, certain stimuli by the immediate reactions which

constitute fighting.

We find evidence of the existence of this fighting instinct in the

ordinary men around us. Remove but for a moment the restraints given in

our civilized lands and this tendency is likely to become prominent upon

the slightest stimulation. We see this exemplified in the lives of the

pioneer and adventurer the world over: in that of the cowboy of the far

West, in that of the rubber collector on the Amazon, in that of the

ivory trader on the Congo.

Then, too, the prize fighter is still a prominent person in our

community, taken as a whole, and even in our sports, as engaged in by

"gentlemen amateurs," we find it necessary to make rigid rules to

prevent the friendly contest from developing into a fierce struggle for

individual physical dominance.

But man gained his pre-eminent position among the animals mainly through

his ability to form co-operative groups working to common ends; and long

before the times of which anthropological research give us any clear

knowledge, man had turned his individualistic fighting instincts to the

service of his group or clan. That is to say, he had become a warrior,

giving his best strength to co-operative aggression in behalf of

satisfactions that could not be won by him as an individual acting for

himself.

Our earlier studies have taught us also that if man's instinctive

tendencies could in any manner be inhibited or modified, so that he came

to display other characteristics than those observed in the present

expression of these inborn instincts, then the law of his nature would

in that very fact be changed. We are thus led to ask whether the

biologist finds evidence that an animal's instincts can be thus changed

in mode of expression.

The biologist speaks to us somewhat as follows. Although new racial

characteristics have very rarely, if ever, been gained by the

obliteration of instincts, changes in racial characteristics have not

infrequently occurred as the result of the control, rather than the

loss, of these inherited instincts.

This control may become effective in either one of two ways: first, by

the thwarting or inhibition of the expression of the instincts; or

secondly, by the turning of its expression to other uses than that which

originally resulted in its fixation.

As an example of the thwarting of the expression of an instinct we may

take the functioning of the sexual instinct, which, as we see it in

animals in general, has been inhibited in the human animal by the habits

acquired by man as he has risen in the scale.

This mode of change--that of the mere chaining of the instinctive

tendency--is subject to one great difficulty. The chain may by chance be

broken; the inhibition may be removed; then the natural instinctive

tendency at once shows itself. Remove the restraints of civilized

society but a little, and manifestations of the sexual instinct of our

race appear in forms that are not far removed from those observed in the

animal. Place a man under conditions of starvation and he shows himself

as greedy as the dog.

The second mode of change--that of the transference of functioning of

the instincts into new channels--meets this special difficulty, for it

does not depend upon the chaining of the instinct. It actually makes use

of the instinct. And the more important to the race the newer reference

of the instinct's functioning turns out to be, the more certain is it to

replace the original reference. If the new mode of functioning brings

marked advantage that is lost by reversion to the earlier manifestation

of the instinct, so that such a reversion to this earlier manifestation

is a detriment to the race, then the change is likely to become a

permanent one.

No better example of this second mode of change of an instinct's

functioning can be found than in the very existence of war itself. The

basic instinct is one that led the savage man to fight to protect

himself or to gain something for himself by aggressive attack. War has

come into being as the result of a transfer of the functioning of this

instinct, which at first had only an individualistic reference, so that

it has come to have a clan or national reference. The early man found he

could not have success as an individual unless he joined with his

fellow-men in defense and aggression; and that meant war.

And note that this transfer of reference of the expression of this

fighting instinct soon became so important to the race that reversion to

its primal individualistic reference had to be inhibited. Aggressive

attack by an individual upon another of his own clan or nation

necessarily tended to weaken the social unit and to reduce its strength

in its protective and aggressive wars; and thus such attacks by

individuals came to be discountenanced and finally in large measure

repressed.

Here, it will be observed, the fighting instinct of the individual has

not been obliterated; it has not even been bound with chains; but its

modes of expression have been altered to have racial significance, and

to have so great a significance in this new relation that reversion to

its primary form of expression has become a serious obstacle to racial

advance.

So it appears after all that, although instincts can rarely if ever be

obliterated, their manifestations may be so altered as to give the

animal quite new characteristics. And this means that if the

characteristics which we describe as the expressions of man's fighting

instincts could be so changed that these expressions were inhibited or

turned into quite new channels, the man would no longer be describable

as a fighting animal.

The first indication in our conscious life of any tendency to inhibit or

modify the functioning of any instinct or habit must appear in the form

of a dislike of, a revulsion from, the resultants of this functioning;

and in the creation of an ideal of functioning that shall avoid the

discomforts attendant upon this revulsion. And when such an ideal has

once been gained, it is possible, as we have seen, that the

characteristics of nature may be changed by our creative efficiency

through the devising of means looking to the realization of the ideal.

We have the clearest evidence that this process is developing in

connection with these special instincts that make for war; for we men

and women in these later times are repelled by the results of the

functioning of these fighting instincts, and we have created the ideal

of peace, the conception of a condition that is not now realized in

nature, but which we think of as possible of realization.

But the very existence of an ideal is indicative of a tendency, on the

part of the man who entertains it, to modify his characteristic

activities. Thus it appears that we have in the very existence of this

ideal of peace the evidence that we may look for a change in man's

nature, the result of which will be that we shall no longer be warranted

in describing him as a fighting animal.

C. RIVALRY, CULTURAL CONFLICTS, AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

1. Animal Rivalry[212]

Among mammals the instinct of one and all is to lord it over the others,

with the result that the one more powerful or domineering gets the

mastery, to keep it thereafter as long as he can. The lower animals are,

in this respect, very much like us; and in all kinds that are at all

fierce-tempered the mastery of one over all, and of a few under him over

the others, is most salutary; indeed, it is inconceivable that they

should be able to exist together under any other system.

On cattle-breeding establishments on the pampas, where it is usual to

keep a large number of fierce-tempered dogs, I have observed these

animals a great deal and presume they are much like feral dogs and

wolves in their habits. Their quarrels are incessant; but when a fight

begins, the head of the pack as a rule rushes to the spot, whereupon the

fighters separate and march off in different directions or else cast

themselves down and deprecate their tyrant's wrath with abject gestures

and whines. If the combatants are both strong and have worked themselves

into a mad rage before their head puts in an appearance, it may go hard

with him; they know him no longer and all he can do is to join in the

fray; then if the fighters turn on him he may be so injured that his

power is gone and the next best dog in the pack takes his place. The

hottest contests are always between dogs that are well matched; neither

will give place to the other and so they fight it out; but from the

foremost in power down to the weakest there is a gradation of authority;

each one knows just how far he can go, which companion he can bully when

he is in a bad temper or wishes to assert himself, and to which he must

humbly yield in his turn. In such a state the weakest one must yield to

all the others and cast himself down, seeming to call himself a slave

and worshiper of any other member of the pack that chances to snarl at

him or command him to give up his bone with good grace.

This masterful or domineering temper, so common among social mammals, is

the cause of the persecution of the sick and weakly. When an animal

begins to ail he can no longer hold his own; he ceases to resent the

occasional ill-natured attacks made on him; his non-combative condition

is quickly discovered, and he at once drops down to a place below the

lowest; it is common knowledge in the herd that he may be buffeted with

impunity by all, even by those that have hitherto suffered buffets but

have given none. But judging from my own observation, this persecution

is not, as a rule, severe, and is seldom fatal.

2. The Rivalry of Social Groups[213]

Conflict, competition, and rivalry are the chief causes which force

human beings into groups and largely determine what goes on within them.

Conflicts, like wars, revolutions, riots, still persist, but possibly

they may be thought of as gradually yielding to competitions which are

chiefly economic. Many of these strivings seem almost wholly individual,

but most of them on careful analysis turn out to be intimately related

to group competition. A third form, rivalry, describes struggle for

status, for social prestige, for the approval of inclusive publics which

form the spectators for such contests. The nation is an arena of

competition and rivalry.

Much of this emulation is of a concealed sort. Beneath the union

services of churches there is an element, for the most part unconscious,

of rivalry to secure the approval of a public which in these days

demands brotherliness and good will rather than proselyting and

polemics. Many public subscriptions for a common cause are based upon

group rivalry or upon individual competition which is group-determined.

The Rhodes scholarships are in one sense a means of furthering imperial

interest. Christmas presents lavished upon children often have a bearing

upon the ambition of the family to make an impression upon rival

domestic groups. In the liberal policy of universities which by adding

to the list of admission subjects desire to come into closer relations

with the public schools, there is some trace of competition for students

and popular applause. The interest which nations manifest in the Hague

Tribunal is tinged with a desire to gain the good will of the

international, peace-praising public. The professed eagerness of one or

both parties in a labor dispute to have the differences settled by

arbitration is a form of competition for the favor of the onlooking

community. Thus in international relationships and in the life-process

of each nation countless groups are in conflict, competition, or

rivalry.

This idea of the group seeking survival, mastery, aggrandizement,

prestige, in its struggles with other groups is a valuable means of

interpretation. Let us survey rapidly the conditions of success as a

group carries on its life of strife and emulation. In order to survive

or to succeed the group must organize, cozen, discipline, and stimulate

its members. Fortunately it finds human nature in a great measure

fashioned for control.

Collective pride or group egotism is an essential source of strength in

conflict. Every efficient group cultivates this sense of honor,

importance, superiority, by many devices of symbol, phrase, and legend,

as well as by scorn and ridicule of rivals. The college fraternity's

sublime self-esteem gives it strength in its competition for members and

prestige. There is a chauvinism of "boom" towns and religious sects, as

well as of nations. What pride and self-confidence are to the

individual, ethnocentrism, patriotism, local loyalty are to social

unities. Diffidence, humility, self-distrust, tolerance, are as

dangerous to militant groups as to fighting men.

Then too the group works out types of personality, hero types to be

emulated, traitor types to be execrated. These personality types merge

into abstract ideals and standards. "Booster" and "knocker" bring up

pictures of a struggling community which must preserve its hopefulness

and self-esteem at all hazards. "Statesman" and "demagogue" recall the

problem of selection which every self-governing community must face.

"Defender of the faith" and "heretic" are eloquent of the Church's

dilemma between rigid orthodoxy and flexible accommodation to a changing

order.

With a shifting in the conflict or rivalry crises, types change in value

or emphasis, or new types are created in adjustment to the new needs.

The United Stated at war with Spain sought martial heroes. The economic

and political ideals of personality, the captains of industry, the

fascinating financiers, the party idols, were for the time retired to

make way for generals and admirals, soldiers and sailors, the heroes of

camp and battleship. The war once over, the displaced types reappeared

along with others which are being created to meet new administrative,

economic, and ethical problems. The competing church retires its

militant and disputatious leaders in an age which gives its applause to

apostles of concord, fraternal feeling, and co-operation. At a given

time the heroes and traitors of a group reflect its competitions and

rivalries with other groups.

Struggle forces upon the group the necessity of cozening, beguiling,

managing its members. The vast majority of these fall into a broad zone

of mediocrity which embodies group character and represents a general

adjustment to life-conditions. From this medial area individuals vary,

some in ways which aid the group in its competition, others in a fashion

which imperils group success. It is the task of the group both to

preserve the solidarity of the medial zone and to discriminate between

the serviceable and the menacing variants. The latter must be coerced or

suppressed, the former encouraged and given opportunity. In Plato's

_Republic_ the guardians did this work of selection which in modern

groups is cared for by processes which seem only slightly conscious and

purposeful.

The competing group in seeking to insure acquiescence and loyalty

elaborates a protective philosophy by which it creates within its

members the belief that their lot is much to be preferred to that of

other comradeships and associations. Western Americans take satisfaction

in living in a free, progressive, hospitable way in "God's country."

They try not to be pharisaical about the narrowness of the East, but

they achieve a sincere scorn for the hidebound conventions of an effete

society. Easterners in turn count themselves fortunate in having a

highly developed civilization, and they usually attain real pity for

those who seem to live upon a psychic, if not a geographic, frontier.

The middle class have a philosophy with which they protect themselves

against the insidious suggestions that come from the life of the

conspicuous rich. These, on the other hand, half expecting that

simplicity and domesticity may have some virtue, speak superciliously of

middle-class smugness and the bourgeois "home." The less prosperous of

the professional classes are prone to lay a good deal of stress upon

their intellectual resources as compared with the presumptive spiritual

poverty of the affluent. Country folk encourage themselves by asserting

their fundamental value to society and by extolling their own simple

straightforward virtues, which present so marked a contrast to the

devious machinations of city-dwellers. Booker Washington's reiterated

assertion that if he were to be born again he would choose to be a

Negro because the Negro race is the only one which has a great problem

contains a suggestion of this protective philosophy. This tendency of a

group to fortify itself by a satisfying theory of its lot is obviously

related to group egotism and is immediately connected with group

rivalry.

The competing group derides many a dissenter into conformity. This

derision may be spontaneous, or reflective and concerted. The loud

guffaw which greets one who varies in dress or speech or idea may come

instantly or there may be a planned and co-operative ridicule

systematically applied to the recalcitrant. Derision is one of the most

effective devices by which the group sifts and tests the variants.

Upon the small number of rebels who turn a deaf ear to epithets,

ostracism is brought to bear. This may vary from the "cold shoulder" to

the complete "boycott." Losing the friendship and approval of comrades,

being cut off from social sympathy, is a familiar form of group

pressure. Ridicule and derision are a kind of evanescent ostracism, a

temporary exclusion from the comradeship. There are many degrees in the

lowering of the social temperature: coolness, formality of intercourse,

averted looks, "cutting dead," "sending to Coventry," form a progressive

series. Economic pressure is more and more a resort of modern groups.

Loss of employment, trade, or professional practice brings many a rebel

to time. All coercion obviously increases as the group is hard pressed

in its conflicts, competitions, and rivalries.

These crises and conflicts of a competing group present problems which

must be solved--problems of organization, of inventions of many kinds,

of new ideas and philosophies, of methods of adjustment. The conditions

of competition or rivalry upset an equilibrium of habit and custom, and

a process of problem-solving ensues. A typhoid epidemic forces the

village to protect itself against the competition of a more healthful

rival. The resourceful labor union facing a corporation which offers

profit-sharing and retiring allowances must formulate a protective

theory and practice. A society clique too closely imitated by a lower

stratum must regain its distinction and supremacy. A nation must be

constantly alert to adjust itself to the changing conditions of

international trade and to the war equipment and training of its

rivals.

The theory of group rivalry throws light upon the individual. The person

has as many selves as there are groups to which he belongs. He is simple

or complex as his groups are few and harmonious or many and conflicting.

What skilful management is required to keep business and moral selves

from looking each other in the eye, to prevent scientific and

theological selves from falling into discussion! Most men of many groups

learn, like tactful hosts, to invite at a given time only congenial

companies of selves. A few brave souls resolve to set their house in

order and to entertain only such selves as can live together with good

will and mutual respect. With these earnest folk their groups have to

reckon. The conflicts of conscience are group conflicts.

Tolerance is a sign that once vital issues within the group are losing

their significance, or that the group feels secure, or that it is

slowly, even unconsciously, merging into a wider grouping. Theological

liberality affords a case in point. In the earlier days of sectarian

struggle tolerance was a danger both to group loyalty and to the

militant spirit. Cynicism for other reasons is also a menace. It means

loss of faith in the collective ego, in the traditions, shibboleths,

symbols, and destiny of the group. Fighting groups cannot be tolerant;

nor can they harbor cynics. Tolerance and cynicism are at once causes

and results of group decay. They portend dissolution or they foreshadow

new groupings for struggle over other issues on another plane.

Evangelical churches are drawing together with mutual tolerance to

present a united front against modern skepticism and cynicism which are

directed against the older faiths and moralities.

The subjective side of group rivalry offers an important study. The

reflection of the process of control in personal consciousness is full

of interest. The means by which the rebellious variant protects himself

against the coercion of his comrades have been already suggested in the

description of ridicule and epithet. These protective methods resolve

themselves into setting one group against another in the mind of the

derided or stigmatized individual.

A national group is to be thought of as an inclusive unity with a

fundamental character, upon the basis of which a multitude of groups

compete with and rival each other. It is the task of the nation to

control and to utilize this group struggle, to keep it on as high a

plane as possible, to turn it to the common account. Government gets its

chief meaning from the rivalry of groups to grasp political power in

their own interests. Aristocracy and democracy may be interpreted in

terms of group antagonism, the specialized few versus the

undifferentiated many. The ideal merges the two elements of efficiency

and solidarity in one larger group within which mutual confidence and

emulation take the place of conflict. Just as persons must be

disciplined into serving their groups, groups must be subordinated to

the welfare of the nation. It is in conflict or competition with other

nations that a country becomes a vivid unity to the members of

constituent groups. It is rivalry which brings out the sense of team

work, the social consciousness.

3. Cultural Conflicts and the Organization of Sects[214]

It is assumed, I suppose, that contradictions among ideas and beliefs

are of various degrees and of various modes besides that specific one

which we call logical incompatibility. A perception, for example, may be

pictorially inconsistent or tonically discordant with another

perception; a mere faith unsupported by objective evidence may be

emotionally antagonistic to another mere faith, as truly as a judgment

may be logically irreconcilable with another judgment. And this wide

possibility of contradiction is particularly to be recognized when the

differing ideas or beliefs have arisen not within the same individual

mind but in different minds, and are therefore colored by personal or

partisan interest and warped by idiosyncrasy of mental constitution. The

contradictions of, or rather _among_, ideas and beliefs, with which we

are now concerned, are more extensive and more varied than mere logical

duels; they are also less definite, less precise. In reality they are

culture conflicts in which the opposing forces, so far from being

specific ideas only or pristine beliefs only, are in fact more or less

bewildering complexes of ideas, beliefs, prejudices, sympathies,

antipathies, and personal interests.

It is assumed also, I suppose, that any idea or group of ideas, any

belief or group of beliefs, may happen to be or may become a common

interest, shared by a small or a large number of individuals. It may

draw and hold them together in bonds of acquaintance, of association,

even of co-operation. It thus may play a group-making rôle.

Contradictory ideas or beliefs, therefore, may play a group-making rôle

in a double sense. Each draws into association the individual minds that

entertain it or find it attractive. Each also repels those minds to whom

it is repugnant, and drives them toward the group which is being formed

about the contradictory idea or belief. Contradictions among ideas and

beliefs, then, it may be assumed, tend on the whole to sharpen the lines

of demarcation between group and group.

These assumptions are, I suppose, so fully justified by the everyday

observation of mankind and so confirmed by history that it is

unnecessary now to discuss them or in any way to dwell upon them. The

question before us therefore becomes specific: "Are contradictions among

ideas and beliefs likely to play an _important_ group-making rôle in the

future?" I shall interpret the word important as connoting quality as

well as quantity. I shall, in fact, attempt to answer the question set

for me by translating it into this inquiry, namely: What kind or type of

groups are the inevitable contradictions among ideas and beliefs most

likely to create and to maintain within the progressive populations of

the world from this time forth?

Somewhat more than three hundred years ago, Protestantism and

geographical discovery had combined to create conditions extraordinarily

favorable to the formation of groups or associations about various

conflicting ideas and beliefs functioning as nuclei; and for nearly

three hundred years the world has been observing a remarkable

multiplication of culture groups of two fundamentally different types.

One type is a sect, or denomination, having no restricted local

habitation but winning adherents here and there in various communes,

provinces, or nations, and having, therefore, a membership either

locally concentrated or more or less widely dispersed; either regularly

or most irregularly distributed. The culture group of the other type, or

kind, is a self-sufficing community. It may be a village, a colony, a

state, or a nation. Its membership is concentrated, its habitat is

defined.

To a very great extent, as everybody knows, American colonization

proceeded through the formation of religious communities. Such were the

Pilgrim and the Puritan commonwealths. Such were the Quaker groups of

Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. Such were the localized societies of the

Dunkards, the Moravians, and the Mennonites.

As late as the middle of the nineteenth century the American people

witnessed the birth and growth of one of the most remarkable religious

communities known in history. The Mormon community of Utah, which,

originating in 1830 as a band of relatives and acquaintances, clustered

by an idea that quickly became a dogma, had become in fifty years a

commonwealth _de facto_, defying the authority _de jure_ of the United

States.

We are not likely, however, again to witness a phenomenon of this kind

in the civilized world. Recently we have seen the rise and the

astonishingly rapid spread of another American religion, namely, the

Christian Science faith. But it has created no community group. It has

created only a dispersed sect. It is obvious to any intelligent

observer, however untrained in sociological discrimination he may be,

that the forces of Protestantism, still dividing and differentiating as

they are, no longer to any great extent create new self-sufficing

communities. They create only associations of irregular geographical

dispersion, of more or less unstable or shifting membership. In a word,

the conflicting-idea forces, which in our colonial days tended to create

community groups as well as sects, tend now to create sectarian bodies

only--mere denominational or partisan associations.

A similar contrast between an earlier and a later stage of culture

group-making may be observed if we go back to centuries before the

Protestant Reformation, there to survey a wider field and a longer

series of historical periods.

It is a commonplace of historical knowledge that in all of the earliest

civilizations there was an approximate identification of religion with

ethnic consciousness and of political consciousness with both religious

and race feeling. Each people had its own tribal or national gods, who

were inventoried as national assets at valuations quite as high as those

attached to tribal or national territory.

When, however, Roman imperial rule had been extended over the civilized

world, the culture conflicts that then arose expended their

group-creating force in simply bringing together like believers in

sectarian association. Christianity, appealing to all bloods, in some

measure to all economic classes, and spreading into all sections of the

eastern Mediterranean region, did not to any great extent create

communities. And what was true of Christianity was in like manner true

of the Mithras cult, widely diffused in the second Christian century.

Even Mohammedanism, a faith seemingly well calculated to create

autonomous states, in contact with a world prepared by Roman

organization could not completely identify itself with definite

political boundaries.

The proximate causes of these contrasts are not obscure. We must suppose

that a self-sufficing community might at one time, as well as at

another, be drawn together by formative beliefs. But that it may take

root somewhere and, by protecting itself against destructive external

influences, succeed for a relatively long time in maintaining its

integrity and its solidarity, it must enjoy a relative isolation. In a

literal sense it must be beyond easy reach of those antagonistic forces

which constitute for it the outer world of unbelief and darkness.

Such isolation is easily and often possible, however, only in the early

stages of political integration. It is always difficult and unusual in

those advanced stages wherein nations are combined in world-empires. It

is becoming well-nigh impossible, now that all the continents have been

brought under the sovereignty of the so-called civilized peoples, while

these peoples themselves, freely communicating and intermingling,

maintain with one another that good understanding which constitutes

them, in a certain broad sense of the term, a world-society. The

proximate effects also of the contrast that has been sketched are

generally recognized.

So long as blood sympathy, religious faith, and political consciousness

are approximately coterminous, the groups that they form, whether local

communities or nations, must necessarily be rather sharply delimited.

They must be characterized also by internal solidarity. Their membership

is stable because to break the bond of blood is not only to make one's

self an outcast but is also to be unfaithful to the ancestral gods; to

change one's religion is not only to be impious but is also to commit

treason; to expatriate one's self is not only to commit treason but is

also to blaspheme against high heaven.

But when associations of believers or of persons holding in common any

philosophy or doctrine whatsoever are no longer self-sufficing

communities, and when nations composite in blood have become compound in

structure, all social groups, clusters, or organizations, not only the

cultural ones drawn together by formative ideas, but also the economic

and the political ones, become in some degree plastic. Their membership

then becomes to some extent shifting and renewable. Under these

circumstances any given association of men, let it be a village, a

religious group, a trade union, a corporation, or a political party, not

only takes into itself new members from time to time; it also permits

old members to depart. Men come and men go, yet the association or the

group itself persists. As group or as organization it remains

unimpaired.

The economic advantage secured by this plasticity and renewableness is

beyond calculation enormous. It permits and facilitates the drafting of

men at any moment from points where they are least needed, for

concentration upon points where they are needed most. The spiritual or

idealistic advantage is not less great. The concentration of attention

and of enthusiasm upon strategic points gives ever-increasing impetus to

progressive movements.

Let us turn now from these merely proximate causes and effects of group

formation to take note of certain developmental processes which lie

farther back in the evolutionary sequence and which also have

significance for our inquiry, since, when we understand them, they may

aid us in our attempt to answer the question, What kind of group-making

is likely to be accomplished by cultural conflicts from this time forth?

The most readily perceived, because the most pictorial, of the conflicts

arising between one belief and another are those that are waged between

beliefs that have been localized and then through geographical expansion

have come into competition throughout wide frontier areas. Of all such

conflicts, that upon which the world has now fully entered between

occidental and oriental ideas is not merely the most extensive; it is

also by far the most interesting and picturesque.

Less picturesque but often more dramatic are the conflicts that arise

within each geographical region, within each nation, between old beliefs

and new--the conflicts of sequent, in distinction from coexistent,

ideas; the conflicts in time, in distinction from the conflicts in

space. A new knowledge is attained which compels us to question old

dogmas. A new faith arises which would displace the ancient traditions.

As the new waxes strong in some region favorable to it, it begins there,

within local limits, to supersede the old. Only then, when the conflict

between the old as old and the new as new is practically over, does the

triumphant new begin to go forth spatially as a conquering influence

from the home of its youth into regions outlying and remote.

Whatever the form, however, that the culture conflict assumes, whether

serial and dramatic or geographical and picturesque, its antecedent

psychological conditions are in certain great essentials the same. Men

array themselves in hostile camps on questions of theory and belief, not

merely because they are variously and conflictingly informed, but far

more because they are mentally unlike, their minds having been prepared

by structural differentiation to seize upon different views and to

cherish opposing convictions. That is to say, some minds have become

rational, critical, plastic, open, outlooking, above all, intuitive of

objective facts and relations. Others in their fundamental constitution

have remained dogmatic, intuitive only of personal attitudes or of

subjective moods, temperamentally conservative and instinctive. Minds of

the one kind welcome the new and wider knowledge; they go forth to

embrace it. Minds of the other kind resist it.

In the segregation thus arising, there is usually discoverable a certain

tendency toward grouping by sex.

Whether the mental and moral traits of women are inherent and therefore

permanent, or whether they are but passing effects of circumscribed

experience and therefore possibly destined to be modified, is immaterial

for my present purpose. It is not certain that either the biologist or

the psychologist is prepared to answer the question. It is certain that

the sociologist is not. It is enough for the analysis that I am making

now if we can say that, as a merely descriptive fact, women thus far in

the history of the race have generally been more instinctive, more

intuitive of subjective states, more emotional, more conservative than

men; and that men, more generally than women, have been intuitive of

objective relations, inclined therefore to break with instinct and to

rely on the later-developed reasoning processes of the brain, and

willing, consequently, to take chances, to experiment, and to innovate.

If so much be granted, we may perhaps say that it is because of these

mental differences that in conflicts between new and old ideas, between

new knowledge and old traditions, it usually happens that a large

majority of all women are found in the camp of the old, and that the

camp of the new is composed mainly of men.

In the camp of the new, however, are always to be found women of alert

intelligence, who happen also to be temperamentally radical; women in

whom the reasoning habit has asserted sway over instinct, and in whom

intuition has become the true scientific power to discern objective

relations. And in the camp of the old, together with a majority of all

women, are to be found most of the men of conservative instinct, and

most of those also whose intuitive and reasoning powers are unequal to

the effort of thinking about the world or anything in it in terms of

impersonal causation. Associated with all of these elements, both male

and female, may usually be discovered, finally, a contingent of priestly

personalities; not necessarily religious priests, but men who love to

assert spiritual dominion, to wield authority, to be reverenced and

obeyed, and who naturally look for a following among the non-skeptical

and easily impressed.

Such, very broadly and rudely sketched, is the psychological background

of culture conflict. It is, however, a background only, a certain

persistent grouping of forces and conditions; it is not the cause from

which culture conflicts proceed.

D. RACIAL CONFLICTS

1. Social Contacts and Race Conflict[215]

There is a conviction, widespread in America at the present time, that

among the most fruitful sources of international wars are racial

prejudice and national egotism. This conviction is the nerve of much

present-day pacifism. It has been the inspiration of such unofficial

diplomacy, for example, as that of the Federal Council of the Churches

of Christ in its effort to bring about a better understanding between

the Japanese and America. This book, _The Japanese Invasion_, by Jesse

F. Steiner, is an attempt to study this phenomenon of race prejudice and

national egotism, so far as it reveals itself in the relations of the

Japanese and the Americans in this country, and to estimate the rôle it

is likely to play in the future relations of the two countries.

So far as I know, an investigation of precisely this nature has not

hitherto been made. One reason for this is, perhaps, that not until very

recent times did the problem present itself in precisely this form. So

long as the nations lived in practical isolation, carrying on their

intercourse through the medium of professional diplomats, and knowing

each other mainly through the products they exchanged, census reports,

and the discreet observations of polite travelers, racial prejudice did

not disturb international relations. With the extension of international

commerce, the increase of immigration, and the interpenetration of

peoples, the scene changes. The railway, the steamship, and the

telegraph are rapidly mobilizing the peoples of the earth. The nations

are coming out of their isolation, and distances which separated the

different races are rapidly giving way before the extension of

communication.

The same human motives which have led men to spread a network of

trade-communication over the whole earth in order to bring about an

exchange of commodities are now bringing about a new distribution of

populations. When these populations become as mobile as the commodities

of commerce, there will be practically no limits--except those

artificial barriers, like the customs and immigration restrictions,

maintained by individual states--to a world-wide economic and personal

competition. Furthermore when the natural barriers are broken down,

artificial barriers will be maintained with increasing difficulty.

Some conception of the extent of the changes which are taking place in

the world under the influence of these forces may be gathered from the

fact that in 1870 the cost of transporting a bushel of grain in Europe

was so great as to prohibit its sale beyond a radius of two hundred

miles from a primary market. By 1883 the importation of grains from the

virgin soil of the western prairies in the United States had brought

about an agricultural crisis in every country in western Europe.

One may illustrate, but it is scarcely possible to estimate, the

economic changes which have been brought about by the enormous increase

in ocean transportation. In 1840 the first Cunard liner, of 740

horse-power with a speed of 8.5 knots per hour, was launched. In 1907,

when the Lusitania was built, ocean-going vessels had attained a speed

of 25 knots an hour and were drawn by engines of 70,000 horse-power.

It is difficult to estimate the economic changes which have been brought

about by the changes in ocean transportation represented by these

figures. It is still less possible to predict the political effects of

the steadily increasing mobility of the peoples of the earth. At the

present time this mobility has already reached a point at which it is

often easier and cheaper to transport the world's population to the

source of raw materials than to carry the world's manufactures to the

established seats of population.

With the progressive rapidity, ease, and security of transportation, and

the increase in communication, there follows an increasing detachment of

the population from the soil and a concurrent concentration in great

cities. These cities in time become the centers of vast numbers of

uprooted individuals, casual and seasonal laborers, tenement and

apartment-house dwellers, sophisticated and emancipated urbanites, who

are bound together neither by local attachment nor by ties of family,

clan, religion, or nationality. Under such conditions it is reasonable

to expect that the same economic motive which leads every trader to sell

in the highest market and to buy in the lowest will steadily increase

and intensify the tendency, which has already reached enormous

proportions of the population in overcrowded regions with diminished

resources, to seek their fortunes, either permanently or temporarily, in

the new countries of undeveloped resources.

Already the extension of commerce and the increase of immigration have

brought about an international and inter-racial situation that has

strained the inherited political order of the United States. It is this

same expansive movement of population and of commerce, together with the

racial and national rivalries that have sprung from them, which first

destroyed the traditional balance of power in Europe and then broke up

the scheme of international control which rested on it. Whatever may

have been the immediate causes of the world-war, the more remote sources

of the conflict must undoubtedly be sought in the great cosmic forces

which have broken down the barriers which formerly separated the races

and nationalities of the world, and forced them into new intimacies and

new forms of competition, rivalry, and conflict.

Since 1870 the conditions which I have attempted to sketch have steadily

forced upon America and the nations of Europe the problem of

assimilating their heterogeneous populations. What we call the race

problem is at once an incident of this process of assimilation and an

evidence of its failure.

The present volume, _The Japanese Invasion: A Study in the Psychology of

Inter-racial Contact_, touches but does not deal with the general

situation which I have briefly sketched. It is, as its title suggests, a

study in "racial contacts," and is an attempt to distinguish and trace

to their sources the attitudes and the sentiments--that is to say,

mutual prejudices--which have been and still are a source of mutual

irritation and misunderstanding between the Japanese and American

peoples.

Fundamentally, prejudice against the Japanese in the United States is

merely the prejudice which attaches to every alien and immigrant people.

The immigrant from Europe, like the immigrant from Asia, comes to this

country because he finds here a freedom of individual action and an

economic opportunity which he did not find at home. It is an instance of

the general tendency of populations to move from an area of relatively

closed, to one of relatively open, resources. The movement is as

inevitable and, in the long run, as resistless as that which draws water

from its mountain sources to the sea. It is one way of redressing the

economic balance and bringing about an economic equilibrium.

The very circumstances under which this modern movement of population

has arisen implies then that the standard of living, if not the cultural

level, of the immigrant is lower than that of the native population. The

consequence is that immigration brings with it a new and disturbing form

of competition, the competition, namely, of peoples of a lower and of a

higher standard of living. The effect of this competition, where it is

free and unrestricted, is either to lower the living standards of the

native population; to expel them from the vocations in which the

immigrants are able or permitted to compete; or what may, perhaps, be

regarded as a more sinister consequence, to induce such a restriction of

the birth rate of the native population as to insure its ultimate

extinction. The latter is, in fact, what seems to be happening in the

New England manufacturing towns where the birth rate in the native

population for some years past has fallen below the death rate, so that

the native stock has long since ceased to reproduce itself. The foreign

peoples, on the other hand, are rapidly replacing the native stocks, not

merely by the influence of new immigration, but because of a relatively

high excess of births over deaths.

It has been assumed that the prejudice which blinds the people of one

race to the virtues of another and leads them to exaggerate that other's

faults is in the nature of a misunderstanding which further knowledge

will dispel. This is so far from true that it would be more exact to say

that our racial misunderstandings are merely the expression of our

racial antipathies. Behind these antipathies are deep-seated, vital, and

instinctive impulses. Racial antipathies represent the collision of

invisible forces, the clash of interests, dimly felt but not yet clearly

perceived. They are present in every situation where the fundamental

interests of races and peoples are not yet regulated by some law,

custom, or any other _modus vivendi_ which commands the assent and the

mutual support of both parties. We hate people because we fear them,

because our interests, as we understand them at any rate, run counter to

theirs. On the other hand, good will is founded in the long run upon

co-operation. The extension of our so-called altruistic sentiments is

made possible only by the organization of our otherwise conflicting

interests and by the extension of the machinery of co-operation and

social control.

Race prejudice may be regarded as a spontaneous, more or less

instinctive, defense-reaction, the practical effect of which is to

restrict free competition between races. Its importance as a social

function is due to the fact that free competition, particularly between

people with different standards of living, seems to be, if not the

original source, at least the stimulus to which race prejudice is the

response.

From this point of view we may regard caste, or even slavery, as one of

those accommodations through which the race problem found a natural

solution. Caste, by relegating the subject race to an inferior status,

gives to each race at any rate a monopoly of its own tasks. When this

status is accepted by the subject people, as is the case where the caste

or slavery systems become fully established, racial competition ceases

and racial animosity tends to disappear. That is the explanation of the

intimate and friendly relations which so often existed in slavery

between master and servant. It is for this reason that we hear it said

today that the Negro is all right in his place. In his place he is a

convenience and not a competitor. Each race being in its place, no

obstacle to racial co-operation exists.

The fact that race prejudice is due to, or is in some sense dependent

upon, race competition is further manifest by a fact that Mr. Steiner

has emphasized, namely, that prejudice against the Japanese is nowhere

uniform throughout the United States. It is only where the Japanese are

present in sufficient numbers to actually disturb the economic status of

the white population that prejudice has manifested itself to such a

degree as to demand serious consideration. It is an interesting fact

also that prejudice against the Japanese is now more intense than it is

against any other oriental people. The reason for this, as Mr. Steiner

has pointed out, is that the Japanese are more aggressive, more disposed

to test the sincerity of that statement of the Declaration of

Independence which declares that all men are equally entitled to "life,

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"--a statement, by the way, which

was merely a forensic assertion of the laissez faire doctrine of free

and unrestricted competition as applied to the relations of individual

men.

The Japanese, the Chinese, they too would be all right in their place,

no doubt. That place, if they find it, will be one in which they do not

greatly intensify and so embitter the struggle for existence of the

white man. The difficulty is that the Japanese is still less disposed

than the Negro or the Chinese to submit to the regulations of a caste

system and to stay in his place. The Japanese are an organized and

morally efficient nation. They have the national pride and the national

egotism which rests on the consciousness of this efficiency. In fact, it

is not too much to say that national egotism, if one pleases to call it

such, is essential to national efficiency, just as a certain

irascibility of temper seems to be essential to a good fighter.

Another difficulty is that caste and the limitation of free competition

is economically unsound, even though it be politically desirable. A

national policy of national efficiency demands that every individual

have not merely the opportunity but the preparation necessary to perform

that particular service for the community for which his natural

disposition and aptitude fit him, irrespective of race or "previous

condition."

Finally, caste and the limitation of economic opportunity is contrary,

if not to our traditions, at least to our political principles. That

means that there will always be an active minority opposed to any

settlement based on the caste system as applied to either the black or

the brown races, on grounds of political sentiment. This minority will

be small in parts of the country immediately adversely affected by the

competition of the invading race. It will be larger in regions which are

not greatly affected. It will be increased if immigration is so rapid as

to make the competition more acute. We must look to other measures for

the solution of the Japanese problem, if it should prove true, as seems

probable, that we are not able or, for various reasons, do not care

permanently to hold back the rising tide of the oriental invasion.

I have said that fundamentally and in principle prejudice against the

Japanese in America today was identical with the prejudice which

attaches to any immigrant people. There is, as Mr. Steiner has pointed

out, a difference. This is due to the existence in the human mind of a

mechanism by which we inevitably and automatically classify every

individual human being we meet. When a race bears an external mark by

which every individual member of it can infallibly be identified, that

race is by that fact set apart and segregated. Japanese, Chinese, and

Negroes cannot move among us with the same freedom as the members of

other races because they bear marks which identify them as members of

their race. This fact isolates them. In the end the effect of this

isolation, both in its effects upon the Japanese themselves and upon the

human environment in which they live, is profound. Isolation is at once

a cause and an effect of race prejudice. It is a vicious

circle--isolation, prejudice; prejudice, isolation. Were there no other

reasons which urge us to consider the case of the Japanese and the

oriental peoples in a category different from that of the European

immigrant, this fact, that they are bound to live in the American

community a more or less isolated life, would impel us to do so.

In conclusion, I may perhaps say in a word what seems to me the

practical bearing of Mr. Steiner's book. Race prejudice is a mechanism

of the group mind which acts reflexly and automatically in response to

its proper stimulus. That stimulus seems to be, in the cases where I

have met it, unrestricted competition of peoples with different

standards of living. Racial animosities and the so-called racial

misunderstandings that grow out of them cannot be explained or argued

away. They can only be affected when there has been a readjustment of

relations and an organization of interests in such a way as to bring

about a larger measure of co-operation and a lesser amount of friction

and conflict. This demands something more than a diplomacy of kind

words. It demands a national policy based on an unflinching examination

of the facts.

2. Conflict and Race Consciousness[216]

The Civil War weakened but did not fully destroy the _modus vivendi_

which slavery had established between the slave and his master. With

emancipation the authority which had formerly been exercised by the

master was transferred to the state, and Washington, D.C., began to

assume in the mind of the freedman the position that formerly had been

occupied by the "big house" on the plantation. The masses of the Negro

people still maintained their habit of dependence, however, and after

the first confusion of the change had passed, life went on, for most of

them, much as it had before the war. As one old farmer explained, the

only difference he could see was that in slavery he "was working for old

Marster and now he was working for himself."

There was one difference between slavery and freedom, nevertheless,

which was very real to the freedman. And this was the liberty to move.

To move from one plantation to another in case he was discontented was

one of the ways in which a freedman was able to realize his freedom and

to make sure that he possessed it. This liberty to move meant a good

deal more to the plantation Negro than one not acquainted with the

situation in the South is likely to understand.

If there had been an abundance of labor in the South; if the situation

had been such that the Negro laborer was seeking the opportunity to

work, or such that the Negro tenant farmers were competing for the

opportunity to get a place on the land, as is so frequently the case in

Europe, the situation would have been fundamentally different from what

it actually was. But the South was, and is today, what Nieboer called a

country of "open," in contradistinction to a country of "closed"

resources. In other words, there is more land in the South than there is

labor to till it. Land owners are driven to competing for laborers and

tenants to work their plantations.

Owing to his ignorance of business matters and to a long-established

habit of submission, the Negro after emancipation was placed at a great

disadvantage in his dealings with the white man. His right to move from

one plantation to another became, therefore, the Negro tenant's method

of enforcing consideration from the planter. He might not dispute the

planter's accounts, because he was not capable of doing so, and it was

unprofitable to attempt it, but if he felt aggrieved he could move.

This was the significance of the exodus in some of the southern states

which took place about 1879, when 40,000 people left the plantations in

the Black Belts of Louisiana and Mississippi and went to Kansas. The

masses of the colored people were dissatisfied with the treatment they

were receiving from the planters and made up their minds to move to "a

free country," as they described it. At the same time it was the attempt

of the planter to bind the Negro tenant who was in debt to him to his

place on the plantation that gave rise to the system of peonage that

still exists in a mitigated form in the South today.

When the Negro moved off the plantation upon which he was reared he

severed the personal relations which bound him to his master's people.

It was just at this point that the two races began to lose touch with

each other. From this time on the relations of the black man and white,

which in slavery had been direct and personal, became every year, as the

old associations were broken, more and more indirect and secondary.

There lingers still the disposition on the part of the white man to

treat every Negro familiarly, and the disposition on the part of every

Negro to treat every white man respectfully. But these are habits which

are gradually disappearing. The breaking down of the instincts and

habits of servitude and the acquisition by the masses of the Negro

people of the instincts and habits of freedom have proceeded slowly but

steadily. The reason the change seems to have gone on more rapidly in

some cases than others is explained by the fact that at the time of

emancipation 10 per cent of the Negroes in the United States were

already free, and others, those who had worked in trades, many of whom

had hired their own time from their masters, had become more or less

adapted to the competitive conditions of free society.

One of the effects of the mobilization of the Negro has been to bring

him into closer and more intimate contact with his own people. Common

interests have drawn the blacks together, and caste sentiment has kept

the black and white apart. The segregation of the races, which began as

a spontaneous movement on the part of both, has been fostered by the

policy of the dominant race. The agitation of the Reconstruction period

made the division between the races in politics absolute. Segregation

and separation in other matters have gone on steadily ever since. The

Negro at the present time has separate churches, schools, libraries,

hospitals, Y.M.C.A. associations, and even separate towns. There are,

perhaps, a half-dozen communities in the United States, every inhabitant

of which is a Negro. Most of these so-called Negro towns are suburban

villages; two of them, at any rate, are the centers of a considerable

Negro farming population. In general it may be said that where the Negro

schools, churches, and Y.M.C.A. associations are not separate they do

not exist.

It is hard to estimate the ultimate effect of this isolation of the

black man. One of the most important effects has been to establish a

common interest among all the different colors and classes of the race.

This sense of solidarity has grown up gradually with the organization of

the Negro people. It is stronger in the South, where segregation is more

complete, than it is in the North where, twenty years ago, it would have

been safe to say it did not exist. Gradually, imperceptibly, within the

larger world of the white man, a smaller world, the world of the black

man, is silently taking form and shape.

Every advance in education and intelligence puts the Negro in possession

of the technique of communication and organization of the white man, and

so contributes to the extension and consolidation of the Negro world

within the white.

The motive for this increasing solidarity is furnished by the increasing

pressure, or perhaps I should say by the increasing sensibility of

Negroes to the pressure and the prejudice without. The sentiment of

racial loyalty, which is a comparatively recent manifestation of the

growing self-consciousness of the race, must be regarded as a response

and "accommodation" to changing internal and external relations of the

race. The sentiment which Negroes are beginning to call "race pride"

does not exist to the same extent in the North as in the South, but an

increasing disposition to enforce racial distinctions in the North, as

in the South, is bringing it into existence.

One or two incidents in this connection are significant. A few years ago

a man who is the head of the largest Negro publishing business in this

country sent to Germany and had a number of Negro dolls manufactured

according to specifications of his own. At the time this company was

started, Negro children were in the habit of playing with white dolls.

There were already Negro dolls on the market, but they were for white

children and represented the white man's conception of the Negro and not

the Negro's ideal of himself. The new Negro doll was a mulatto with

regular features slightly modified in favor of the conventional Negro

type. It was a neat, prim, well-dressed, well-behaved, self-respecting

doll. Later on, as I understand, there were other dolls, equally tidy

and respectable in appearance, but in darker shades, with Negro features

a little more pronounced. The man who designed these dolls was perfectly

clear in regard to the significance of the substitution that he was

making. He said that he thought it was a good thing to let Negro girls

become accustomed to dolls of their own color. He thought it important,

as long as the races were to be segregated, that the dolls, which, like

other forms of art, are patterns and represent ideals, should be

segregated also.

This substitution of the Negro model for the white is a very interesting

and a very significant fact. It means that the Negro has begun to

fashion his own ideals and in his own image rather than in that of the

white man. It is also interesting to know that the Negro doll company

has been a success and that these dolls are now widely sold in every

part of the United States. Nothing exhibits more clearly the extent to

which the Negro had become assimilated in slavery or the extent to

which he has broken with the past in recent years than this episode of

the Negro doll.

The incident is typical. It is an indication of the nature of tendencies

and of forces that are stirring in the background of the Negro's mind,

although they have not succeeded in forcing themselves, except in

special instances, into clear consciousness.

In this same category must be reckoned the poetry of Paul Lawrence

Dunbar, in whom, as William Dean Howells has said, the Negro "attained

civilization." Before Paul Lawrence Dunbar, Negro literature had been

either apologetic or self-assertive, but Dunbar "studied the Negro

objectively." He represented him as he found him, not only without

apology, but with an affectionate understanding and sympathy which one

can have only for what is one's own. In Dunbar, Negro literature

attained an ethnocentric point of view. Through the medium of his verses

the ordinary shapes and forms of the Negro's life have taken on the

color of his affections and sentiments, and we see the black man, not as

he looks, but as he feels and is.

It is a significant fact that a certain number of educated--or rather

the so-called educated--Negroes were not at first disposed to accept at

their full value either Dunbar's dialect verse or the familiar pictures

of Negro life which are the symbols in which his poetry usually found

expression. The explanation sometimes offered for the dialect poems was

that "they were made to please white folk." The assumption seems to have

been that if they had been written for Negroes it would have been

impossible in his poetry to distinguish black people from white. This

was a sentiment which was never shared by the masses of the people, who,

upon the occasions when Dunbar recited to them, were fairly bowled over

with amusement and delight because of the authenticity of the portraits

he offered them. At the present time Dunbar is so far accepted as to

have hundreds of imitators.

Literature and art have played a similar and perhaps more important rôle

in the racial struggles of Europe than of America. One reason seems to

be that racial conflicts, as they occur in secondary groups, are

primarily sentimental and secondarily economic. Literature and art, when

they are employed to give expression to racial sentiment and form to

racial ideals, serve, along with other agencies, to mobilize the group

and put the masses _en rapport_ with their leaders and with each other.

In such cases art and literature are like silent drummers which summon

into action the latent instincts and energies of the race.

These struggles, I might add, in which a submerged people seek to rise

and make for themselves a place in a world occupied by superior and

privileged races, are not less vital or less important because they are

bloodless. They serve to stimulate ambitions and inspire ideals which

years, perhaps, of subjection and subordination have suppressed. In

fact, it seems as if it were through conflicts of this kind, rather than

through war, that the minor peoples were destined to gain the moral

concentration and discipline that fit them to share, on anything like

equal terms, in the conscious life of the civilized world.

Until the beginning of the last century the European peasant, like the

Negro slave, bound as he was to the soil, lived in the little world of

direct and personal relations, under what we may call a domestic régime.

It was military necessity that first turned the attention of statesmen

like Frederick the Great of Prussia to the welfare of the peasant. It

was the overthrow of Prussia by Napoleon in 1807 that brought about his

final emancipation in that country. In recent years it has been the

international struggle for economic efficiency which has contributed

most to mobilize the peasant and laboring classes in Europe.

As the peasant slowly emerged from serfdom he found himself a member of

a depressed class, without education, political privileges, or capital.

It was the struggle of this class for wider opportunity and better

conditions of life that made most of the history of the previous

century. Among the peoples in the racial borderland the effect of this

struggle has been, on the whole, to substitute for a horizontal

organization of society--in which the upper strata, that is to say, the

wealthy or privileged class, was mainly of one race and the poorer and

subject class was mainly of another--a vertical organization in which

all classes of each racial group were united under the title of their

respective nationalities. Thus organized, the nationalities represent,

on the one hand, intractable minorities engaged in a ruthless partisan

struggle for political privilege or economic advantage and, on the

other, they represent cultural groups, each struggling to maintain a

sentiment of loyalty to the distinctive traditions, language, and

institutions of the race they represent.

This sketch of the racial situation in Europe is, of course, the barest

abstraction and should not be accepted realistically. It is intended

merely as an indication of similarities, in the broader outlines, of the

motives that have produced nationalities in Europe and are making the

Negro in America, as Booker Washington says, "a nation within a nation."

It may be said that there is one profound difference between the Negro

and the European nationalities, namely, that the Negro has had his

separateness and consequent race consciousness thrust upon him because

of his exclusion and forcible isolation from white society. The Slavic

nationalities, on the contrary, have segregated themselves in order to

escape assimilation and escape racial extinction in the larger

cosmopolitan states.

The difference is, however, not so great as it seems. With the exception

of the Poles, nationalistic sentiment may be said hardly to have existed

fifty years ago. Forty years ago when German was the language of the

educated classes, educated Bohemians were a little ashamed to speak

their own language in public. Now nationalist sentiment is so strong

that, where the Czech nationality has gained control, it has sought to

wipe out every vestige of the German language. It has changed the names

of streets, buildings, and public places. In the city of Prag, for

example, all that formerly held German associations now fairly reeks

with the sentiment of Bohemian nationality.

On the other hand, the masses of the Polish people cherished very little

nationalist sentiment until after the Franco-Prussian War. The fact is

that nationalist sentiment among the Slavs, like racial sentiment among

the Negroes, has sprung up as the result of a struggle against privilege

and discrimination based upon racial distinctions. The movement is not

so far advanced among Negroes; sentiment is not so intense, and for

several reasons probably never will be.

From what has been said it seems fair to draw one conclusion, namely:

under conditions of secondary contact, that is to say, conditions of

individual liberty and individual competition, characteristic of modern

civilization, depressed racial groups tend to assume the form of

nationalities. A nationality, in this narrower sense, may be defined as

the racial group which has attained self-consciousness, no matter

whether it has at the same time gained political independence or not.

In societies organized along horizontal lines the disposition of

individuals in the lower strata is to seek their models in the strata

above them. Loyalty attaches to individuals, particularly to the upper

classes, who furnish, in their persons and in their lives, the models

for the masses of the people below them. Long after the nobility has

lost every other social function connected with its vocation the ideals

of the nobility have survived in our conception of the gentleman,

genteel manners and bearing--gentility.

The sentiment of the Negro slave was, in a certain sense, not merely

loyalty to his master but to the white race. Negroes of the older

generations speak very frequently, with a sense of proprietorship, of

"our white folks." This sentiment was not always confined to the

ignorant masses. An educated colored man once explained to me "that we

colored people always want our white folks to be superior." He was

shocked when I showed no particular enthusiasm for that form of

sentiment.

The fundamental significance of the nationalist movement must be sought

in the effort of subject races, sometimes consciously, sometimes

unconsciously, to substitute, for those supplied them by aliens, models

based on their own racial individuality and embodying sentiments and

ideals which spring naturally out of their own lives.

After a race has achieved in this way its moral independence,

assimilation, in the sense of copying, will still continue. Nations and

races borrow from those whom they fear as well as from those whom they

admire. Materials taken over in this way, however, are inevitably

stamped with the individuality of the nationalities that appropriate

them. These materials will contribute to the dignity, to the prestige,

and to the solidarity of the nationality which borrows them, but they

will no longer inspire loyalty to the race from which they are borrowed.

A race which has attained the character of a nationality may still

retain its loyalty to the state of which it is a part, but only in so

far as that state incorporates, as an integral part of its organization,

the practical interests, the aspirations and ideals of that

nationality.

The aim of the contending nationalities in Austria-Hungary at the

present time seems to be a federation, like that of Switzerland, based

upon the autonomy of the different races composing the empire. In the

South, similarly, the races seem to be tending in the direction of a

bi-racial organization of society, in which the Negro is gradually

gaining a limited autonomy. What the ultimate outcome of this movement

may be it is not safe to predict.

3. Conflict and Accommodation[217]

In the first place, what is race friction? To answer this elementary

question it is necessary to define the abstract mental quality upon

which race friction finally rests. This is racial "antipathy," popularly

spoken of as "race prejudice." Whereas prejudice means mere

predilection, either for or against, antipathy means "natural

contrariety," "incompatibility," or "repugnance of qualities." To quote

the Century Dictionary, antipathy "expresses most of constitutional

feeling and least of volition"; "it is a dislike that seems

constitutional toward persons, things, conduct, etc.; hence it involves

a dislike for which sometimes no good reason can be given." I would

define racial antipathy, then, as a natural contrariety, repugnancy of

qualities, or incompatibility between individuals or groups which are

sufficiently differentiated to constitute what, for want of a more exact

term, we call races. What is most important is that it involves an

instinctive feeling of dislike, distaste, or repugnance, for which

sometimes no good reason can be given. Friction is defined primarily as

a "lack of harmony," or a "mutual irritation." In the case of races it

is accentuated by antipathy. We do not have to depend on race riots or

other acts of violence as a measure of the growth of race friction. Its

existence may be manifested by a look or a gesture as well as by a word

or an act.

A verbal cause of much useless and unnecessary controversy is found in

the use of the word "race." When we speak of "race problems" or "racial

antipathies," what do we mean by "race"? Clearly nothing scientifically

definite, since ethnologists themselves are not agreed upon any

classification of the human family along racial lines. Nor would this

so-called race prejudice have the slightest regard for such

classification, if one were agreed upon. It is something which is not

bounded by the confines of a philological or ethnological definition.

The British scientist may tell the British soldier in India that the

native is in reality his brother, and that it is wholly absurd and

illogical and unscientific for such a thing as "race prejudice" to exist

between them. Tommy Atkins simply replies with a shrug that to him and

his messmates the native is a "nigger"; and in so far as their attitude

is concerned, that is the end of the matter. The same suggestion,

regardless of the scientific accuracy of the parallel, if made to the

American soldier in the Philippines, meets with the same reply. We have

wasted an infinite amount of time in interminable controversies over the

relative superiority and inferiority of different races. Such

discussions have a certain value when conducted by scientific men in a

purely scientific spirit. But for the purpose of explaining or

establishing any fixed principle of race relations they are little

better than worthless. The Japanese is doubtless quite well satisfied of

the superiority of his people over the mushroom growths of western

civilization, and finds no difficulty in borrowing from the latter

whatever is worth reproducing, and improving on it in adapting it to his

own racial needs. The Chinese do not waste their time in idle chatter

over the relative status of their race as compared with the white

barbarians who have intruded themselves upon them with their grotesque

customs, their heathenish ideas, and their childishly new religion. The

Hindu regards with veiled contempt the racial pretensions of his

conqueror, and, while biding the time when the darker races of the earth

shall once more come into their own, does not bother himself with such

an idle question as whether his temporary overlord is his racial equal.

Only the white man writes volumes to establish on paper the fact of a

superiority which is either self-evident and not in need of

demonstration, on the one hand, or is not a fact and is not

demonstrable, on the other. The really important matter is one about

which there need be little dispute--the fact of racial differences. It

is the practical question of differences--the fundamental differences of

physical appearance, of mental habit and thought, of social customs and

religious beliefs, of the thousand and one things keenly and clearly

appreciable, yet sometimes elusive and undefinable--these are the things

which at once create and find expression in what we call race problems

and race prejudices, for want of better terms. In just so far as these

differences are fixed and permanently associated characteristics of two

groups of people will the antipathies and problems between the two be

permanent.

Probably the closest approach we shall ever make to a satisfactory

classification of races as a basis of antipathy will be that of grouping

men according to color, along certain broad lines, the color being

accompanied by various and often widely different, but always fairly

persistent, differentiating physical and mental characteristics. This

would give us substantially the white--not Caucasian, the yellow--not

Chinese or Japanese, and the dark--not Negro, races. The antipathies

between these general groups and between certain of their subdivisions

will be found to be essentially fundamental, but they will also be found

to present almost endless differences of degrees of actual and potential

acuteness. Here elementary psychology also plays its part. One of the

subdivisions of the Negro race is composed of persons of mixed blood. In

many instances these are more white than black, yet the association of

ideas has through several generations identified them with the

Negro--and in this country friction between this class and white people

is on some lines even greater than between whites and blacks.

Race conflicts are merely the more pronounced concrete expressions of

such friction. They are the visible phenomena of the abstract quality of

racial antipathy--the tangible evidence of the existence of racial

problems. The form of such expressions of antipathy varies with the

nature of the racial contact in each instance. Their different and

widely varying aspects are the confusing and often contradictory

phenomena of race relations. They are dependent upon diverse conditions,

and are no more susceptible of rigid and permanent classification than

are the whims and moods of human nature. It is more than a truism to say

that a condition precedent to race friction or race conflict is contact

between sufficient numbers of two diverse racial groups. There is a

definite and positive difference between contact between individuals and

contact between masses. The association between two isolated individual

members of two races may be wholly different from contact between masses

of the same race groups. The factor of numbers embraces, indeed, the

very crux of the problems arising from contact between different races.

A primary cause of race friction is the vague, rather intangible, but

wholly real, feeling of "pressure" which comes to the white man almost

instinctively in the presence of a mass of people of a different race.

In a certain important sense all racial problems are distinctly problems

of racial distribution. Certainly the definite action of the controlling

race, particularly as expressed in laws, is determined by the factor of

the numerical difference between its population and that of the inferior

group. This fact stands out prominently in the history of our colonial

legislation for the control of Negro slaves. These laws increased in

severity up to a certain point as the slave population increased in

numbers. The same condition is disclosed in the history of the

ante-bellum legislation of the southern, eastern, New England, and

middle western states for the control of the free Negro population. So

today no state in the Union would have separate car laws where the Negro

constituted only 10 or 15 per cent of its total population. No state

would burden itself with the maintenance of two separate school systems

with a negro element of less than 10 per cent. Means of local separation

might be found, but there would be no expression of law on the subject.

Just as a heavy increase of Negro population makes for an increase of

friction, direct legislation, the protection of drastic social customs,

and a general feeling of unrest or uneasiness on the part of the white

population, so a decrease of such population, or a relatively small

increase as compared with the whites, makes for less friction, greater

racial tolerance, and a lessening of the feeling of necessity for

severely discriminating laws or customs. And this quite aside from the

fact of a difference of increase or decrease of actual points of

contact, varying with differences of numbers. The statement will

scarcely be questioned that the general attitude of the white race, as a

whole, toward the Negro would become much less uncompromising if we were

to discover that through two census periods the race had shown a

positive decrease in numbers. Racial antipathy would not decrease, but

the conditions which provoke its outward expression would undergo a

change for the better. There is a direct relation between the mollified

attitude of the people of the Pacific coast toward the Chinese

population and the fact that the Chinese population decreased between

1890 and 1900. There would in time be a difference of feeling toward the

Japanese now there if the immigration of more were prohibited by treaty

stipulation. There is the same immediate relation between the tolerant

attitude of whites toward the natives in the Hawaiian Islands and the

feeling that the native is a decadent and dying race. Aside from the

influence of the Indian's warlike qualities and of his refusal to submit

to slavery, the attitude and disposition of the white race toward him

have been influenced by considerations similar to those which today

operate in Hawaii. And the same influence has been a factor in

determining the attitude of the English toward the slowly dying Maoris

of New Zealand.

At no time in the history of the English-speaking people and at no place

of which we have any record where large numbers of them have been

brought into contact with an approximately equal number of Negroes have

the former granted to the latter absolute equality, either political,

social, or economic. With the exception of five New England states, with

a total Negro population of only 16,084 in 1860, every state in the

Union discriminated against the Negro politically before the Civil War.

The white people continued to do so--North as well as South--as long as

they retained control of the suffrage regulations of their states. The

determination to do so renders one whole section of the country

practically a political unit to this day. In South Africa we see the

same determination of the white man to rule, regardless of the numerical

superiority of the black. The same determination made Jamaica surrender

the right of self-government and renders her satisfied with a hybrid

political arrangement today. The presence of practically 100,000 Negroes

in the District of Columbia makes 200,000 white people content to live

under an anomaly in a self-governing country. The proposition is too

elementary for discussion that the white man when confronted with a

sufficient number of Negroes to create in his mind a sense of political

unrest or danger either alters his form of government in order to be rid

of the incubus or destroys the political strength of the Negro by force,

by evasion, or by direct action.

In the main, the millions in the South live at peace with their white

neighbors. The masses, just one generation out of slavery and thousands

of them still largely controlled by its influences, accept the

superiority of the white race as a race, whatever may be their private

opinion of some of its members. And, furthermore, they accept this

relation of superior and inferior as a mere matter of course--as part

of their lives--as something neither to be questioned, wondered at, or

worried over. Despite apparent impressions to the contrary, the average

southern white man gives no more thought to the matter than does the

Negro. As I tried to make clear at the outset, the status of superior

and inferior is simply an inherited part of his instinctive mental

equipment--a concept which he does not have to reason out. The

respective attitudes are complementary, and under the mutual acceptance

and understanding there still exist unnumbered thousands of instances of

kindly and affectionate relations--relations of which the outside world

knows nothing and understands nothing. In the mass, the southern Negro

has not bothered himself about the ballot for more than twenty years,

not since his so-called political leaders let him alone; he is not

disturbed over the matter of separate schools and cars, and he neither

knows nor cares anything about "social equality."

But what of the other class? The "masses" is at best an unsatisfactory

and indefinite term. It is very far from embracing even the southern

Negro, and we need not forget that seven years ago there were 900,000

members of the race living outside of the South. What of the class,

mainly urban and large in number, who have lost the typical habit and

attitude of the Negro of the mass, and who, more and more, are becoming

restless and chafing under existing conditions? There is an intimate and

very natural relation between the social and intellectual advance of the

so-called Negro and the matter of friction along social lines. It is, in

fact, only as we touch the higher groups that we can appreciate the

potential results of contact upon a different plane from that common to

the masses in the South. There is a large and steadily increasing group

of men, more or less related to the Negro by blood and wholly identified

with him by American social usage, who refuse to accept quietly the

white man's attitude toward the race. I appreciate the mistake of laying

too great stress upon the utterances of any one man or group of men, but

the mistakes in this case lie the other way. The American white man

knows little or nothing about the thought and opinion of the colored men

and women who today largely mold and direct Negro public opinion in this

country. Even the white man who considers himself a student of "the race

question" rarely exhibits anything more than profound ignorance of the

Negro's side of the problem. He does not know what the other man is

thinking and saying on the subject. This composite type which we

poetically call "black," but which in reality is every shade from black

to white, is slowly developing a consciousness of its own racial

solidarity. It is finding its own distinctive voice, and through its own

books and papers and magazines, and through its own social

organizations, is at once giving utterance to its discontent and making

known its demands.

And with this dawning consciousness of race there is likewise coming an

appreciation of the limitations and restrictions which hem in its

unfolding and development. One of the best indices to the possibilities

of increased racial friction is the Negro's own recognition of the

universality of the white man's racial antipathy toward him. This is the

one clear note above the storm of protest against the things that are,

that in his highest aspirations everywhere the white man's "prejudice"

blocks the colored man's path. And the white man may with possible

profit pause long enough to ask the deeper significance of the Negro's

finding of himself. May it not be only part of a general awakening of

the darker races of the earth? Captain H. A. Wilson, of the English

army, says that through all Africa there has penetrated in some way a

vague confused report that far off somewhere, in the unknown, outside

world, a great war has been fought between a white and a yellow race,

and won by the yellow man. And even before the Japanese-Russian

conflict, "Ethiopianism" and the cry of "Africa for the Africans" had

begun to disturb the English in South Africa. It is said time and again

that the dissatisfaction and unrest in India are accentuated by the

results of this same war. There can be no doubt in the mind of any man

who carefully reads American Negro journals that their rejoicing over

the Japanese victory sounded a very different note from that of the

white American. It was far from being a mere expression of sympathy with

a people fighting for national existence against a power which had made

itself odious to the civilized world by its treatment of its subjects.

It was, instead, a quite clear cry of exultation over the defeat of a

white race by a dark one. The white man is no wiser than the ostrich if

he refuses to see the truth that in the possibilities of race friction

the Negro's increasing consciousness of race is to play a part scarcely

less important than the white man's racial antipathies, prejudices, or

whatever we may elect to call them.

III. INVESTIGATIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. The Psychology and Sociology of Conflict, Conscious Competition, and

Rivalry

Consciousness has been described as an effect of conflict--conflict of

motor tendencies in the individual, conflict of sentiments, attitudes,

and cultures in the group. The individual, activated in a given

situation by opposing tendencies, is compelled to redefine his attitude.

Consciousness is an incident of this readjustment.

Frequently adjustment involves a suppression of one tendency in the

interest of another, of one wish in favor of another. Where these

suppressions are permanent, they frequently result in disorders of

conduct and disorganization of the personality. The suppressed wish,

when suppression results in disturbances of the conscious life, has been

called by psychoanalysts a _complex_. Freud and his colleagues have

isolated and described certain of these complexes. Most familiar of

these are the Oedipus complex, which is explained as an effect of the

unconscious conflict of father and son for the love of the mother; and

the Electra complex, which similarly has as its source the unconscious

struggle of mother and daughter for the affection of the father. Adler,

in his description of the "inferiority" complex, explains it as an

effect of the conflict growing out of the contrast between the ideal and

the actual status of the person. Other mental conflicts described by the

psychoanalysts are referred to the "adopted child" complex, the

Narcissus complex, the sex shock, etc. These conflicts which disturb the

mental life of the person are all the reflections of social relations

and are to be explained in terms of status and the rôle of the

individual in the group.

Emulation and rivalry represent conflict at higher social levels, where

competition has been translated into forms that inure to the survival

and success of the group. Research in this field, fragmentary as it is,

confirms the current impression of the stimulation of effort in the

person through conscious competition with his fellows. Adler's theory of

"psychic compensation" is based on the observation that handicapped

individuals frequently excel in the very fields in which they are

apparently least qualified to compete. Demosthenes, for example, became

a great orator in spite of the fact that he stuttered. Ordahl presents

the only comprehensive survey of the literature in this field.

Simmel has made the outstanding contribution to the sociological

conception of conflict. Just as the attitudes of the individual person

represent an organization of antagonistic elements, society, as he

interprets it, is a unity of which the elements are conflicting

tendencies. Society, he insists, would be quite other than it is, were

it not for the aversions, antagonisms, differences, as well as the

sympathies, affections, and similarities between individuals and groups

of individuals. The unity of society includes these opposing forces,

and, as a matter of fact, society is organized upon the basis of

conflict.

Conflict is an organizing principle in society. Just as the individual,

under the influences of contact and conflict with other individuals,

acquires a status and develops a personality, so groups of individuals,

in conflict with other groups, achieve unity, organization, group

consciousness, and assume the forms characteristic of conflict

groups--that is to say, they become parties, sects, and nationalities,

etc.

2. Types of Conflict

Simmel, in his study of conflict, distinguished four types--namely, war,

feud and faction, litigation, and discussion, i.e., the impersonal

struggles of parties and causes. This classification, while

discriminating, is certainly not complete. There are, for example, the

varied forms of sport, in which conflict assumes the form of rivalry.

These are nevertheless organized on a conflict pattern. Particularly

interesting in this connection are games of chance, gambling and

gambling devices which appeal to human traits so fundamental that no

people is without example of them in its folkways.

Gambling is, according to Groos, "a fighting play," and the universal

human interest in this sport is due to the fact that "no other form of

play displays in so many-sided a fashion the combativeness of human

nature."[218]

The history of the duel, either in the form of the judicial combat, the

wager of battle of the Middle Ages, or as a form of private vengeance,

offers interesting material for psychological or sociological

investigation. The transition from private vengeance to public

prosecution, of which the passing of the duel is an example, has not

been completed. In fact, new forms are in some cases gradually gaining

social sanction. We still have our "unwritten laws" for certain

offenses. It is proverbially difficult to secure the conviction, in

certain parts of the country, Chicago, for example, of a woman who kills

her husband or her lover. The practice of lynching Negroes in the

southern states, for offenses against women, and for any other form of

conduct that is construed as a challenge to the dominant race, is an

illustration from a somewhat different field, not merely of the

persistence, but the gradual development of the so-called unwritten law.

The circumstances under which these and all other unwritten laws arise,

in which custom controls in contravention of the formal written code,

have not been investigated from the point of view of sociology and in

their human-nature aspects.

Several studies of games and gambling, in some respects the most unique

objectivations of human interest, have been made from the point of view

of the fundamental human traits involved, notably Thomas' article on

_The Gaming Instinct_, Groos's chapter on "Fighting Play," in his _Play

of Man_, and G. T. W. Patrick's _Psychology of Relaxation_, in which the

theory of catharsis, familiar since Aristotle, is employed to explain

play, laughter, profanity, the drink habit, and war.

Original materials exist in abundance for the study of feud, litigation,

and war. No attempt seems to have been made to study feud and litigation

comparatively, as Westermarck has studied marriage institutions.

Something has indeed been done in this direction with the subject of

war, notably by Letourneau in France and by Frobenius in Germany.

Sumner's notable essay on _War_ is likewise an important contribution to

the subject. The literature upon war, however, is so voluminous and so

important that it will be discussed later, separately, and in greater

detail.

Quite as interesting and important as that of war is the natural history

of discussion, including under that term political and religious

controversy and social agitation, already referred to as impersonal or

secondary conflict.

The history of discussion, however, is the history of freedom--freedom,

at any rate, of thought and of speech. It is only when peace and

freedom have been established that discussion is practicable or

possible. A number of histories have been written in recent years

describing the rise of rationalism, as it is called, and the rôle of

discussion and agitation in social life. Draper's _History of the

Intellectual Development of Europe_ and Lecky's _History of the Rise and

Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe_ are among the earlier

works in this field. Robertson's _History of Free Thought_ is mainly a

survey of religious skepticism but contains important and suggestive

references to the natural processes by which abstract thought has arisen

out of the cultural contacts and conflicts among peoples, which conquest

and commerce have brought into the same universe of discourse. What we

seem to have in these works are materials for the study of the communal

processes through which thought is formulated. Once formulated it

becomes a permanent factor in the life of the group. The rôle of

discussion in the communal process will be considered later in

connection with the newspaper, the press agent, propaganda, and the

various factors and mechanisms determining the formation of public

opinion.

3. The Literature of War

The emphasis upon the struggle for existence which followed the

publication of Darwin's _The Origin of Species_, in 1859, seemed to many

thinkers to give a biological basis for the necessity and the

inevitability of war. No distinction was made by writers of this school

of thought between competition and conflict. Both were supposed to be

based on instinct. Nicolai's _The Biology of War_ is an essay with the

avowed design of refuting the biological justification of war.

Psychological studies of war have explained war either as an expression

of instinct or as a reversion to a primordial animal-human type of

behavior. Patrick, who is representative of this latter school,

interprets war as a form of relaxation. G. W. Crile has offered a

mechanistic interpretation of war and peace based on studies of the

chemical changes which men undergo in warfare. Crile comes to the

conclusion, however, that war is an action pattern, fixed in the social

heredity of the national group, and not a type of behavior determined

biologically.

The human nature of war and the motives which impel the person to the

great adventure and the supreme risk of war have not been subjected to

sociological study. A mass of material, however, consisting of personal

documents of all types, letters, common-sense observation, and diaries

is now available for such study.

Much of the literature of war has been concentrated on this problem of

the abolition of war. There are the idealists and the conscientious

objectors who look to good will, humanitarian sentiment, and pacificism

to end war by the transformation of attitudes of men and the policies of

nations. On the other hand, there are the hard-headed and practical

thinkers and statesmen who believe, with Hobbes, that war will not end

until there is established a power strong enough to overawe a

recalcitrant state. Finally, there is a third group of social thinkers

who emphasize the significance of the formation of a world public

opinion. This "international mind" they regard of far greater

significance for the future of humanity than the problem of war or

peace, of national rivalries, or of future race conflicts.

4. Race Conflict

A European school of sociologists emphasizes conflict as the fundamental

social process. Gumplowicz, in his book _Die Rassenkampf_, formulated a

theory of social contacts and conflicts upon the conception of original

ethnic groups in terms of whose interaction the history of humanity

might be written. Novicow and Ratzenhofer maintain similar, though not

so extreme, theories of social origins and historical developments.

With the tremendous extension of communication and growth of commerce,

the world is today a great community in a sense that could not have been

understood a century ago. But the world, if it is now one community, is

not yet one society. Commerce has created an economic interdependence,

but contact and communication have not resulted in either a political or

a cultural solidarity. Indeed, the first evidences of the effects of

social contacts appear to be disruptive rather than unifying. In every

part of the world in which the white and colored races have come into

intimate contact, race problems have presented the most intractable of

all social problems.

Interest in this problem manifests itself in the enormous literature on

the subject. Most of all that has been written, however, is superficial.

Much is merely sentimental, interesting for the attitudes it exhibits,

but otherwise adding nothing to our knowledge of the facts. The best

account of the American situation is undoubtedly Ray Stannard Baker's

_Following the Color Line_. The South African situation is interestingly

and objectively described by Maurice Evans in _Black and White in South

East Africa_. Steiner's book, _The Japanese Invasion_, is, perhaps, the

best account of the Japanese-American situation.

The race problem merges into the problem of the nationalities and the

so-called subject races. The struggles of the minor nationalities for

self-determination is a phase of racial conflict; a phase, however, in

which language rather than color is the basis of division and conflict.

5. Conflict Groups

In chapter i conflict groups were divided into gangs, labor

organizations, sects, parties, and nationalities.[219] Common to these

groups is an organization and orientation with reference to conflict

with other groups of the same kind or with a more or less hostile social

environment, as in the case of religious sects.

The spontaneous organizations of boys and youths called gangs attracted

public attention in American communities because of the relation of

these gangs to juvenile delinquency and adolescent crime. An interesting

but superficial literature upon the gang has developed in recent years,

represented typically by J. Adams Puffer _The Boy and his Gang_. The

brief but picturesque descriptions of individual gangs seem to indicate

that the play group tends to pass over into the gang when it comes into

conflict with other groups of like type or with the community. The fully

developed gang appears to possess a restricted membership, a natural

leader, a name--usually that of a leader or a locality--a body of

tradition, custom and a ritual, a rendezvous, a territorial area which

it holds as a sort of possession and defends against invasion by other

groups. Attention was early called, as by Mr. Brewster Adams in an

article _The Street Gang as a Factor in Politics_, to the facility with

which the gang graduates into a local political organization,

representing thus the sources of political power of the typical American

city.

Although the conflict of economic groups is not a new nor even a modern

phenomenon, no such permanent conflict groups as those represented by

capital and labor existed until recent times. Veblen has made an acute

observation upon this point. The American Federation of Labor, he

states, "is not organized for production but for bargaining." It is, in

effect, an organization for the strategic defeat of employers and rival

organizations, by recourse to enforced unemployment and obstruction; not

for the production of goods and services.[220]

Research in the labor problem by the Webbs in England and by Commons,

Hoxie, and others in this country has been primarily concerned with the

history and with the structure and functions of trade unions. At present

there is a tendency to investigate the human-nature aspects of the

causes of the industrial conflict. The current phrases "instincts in

industry," "the human factor in economics," "the psychology of the labor

movement," "industry, emotion, and unrest" indicate the change in

attitude. The essential struggle is seen to lie not in the conflict of

classes, intense and ruthless as it is, but more and more in the

fundamental struggle between a mechanical and impersonal system, on the

one hand, and the person with his wishes unsatisfied and insatiable on

the other. All attempts to put the relations of capital and labor upon a

moral basis have failed hitherto. The latest and most promising

experiment in this direction is the so-called labor courts established

by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and their employees.

The literature upon sects and parties has been written for the most part

with the purpose of justifying, to a critical and often hostile public,

the sectarian and partisan aims and acts of their several organizations.

In a few works such as Sighele's _Psychologie des sectes_ and Michels'

_Political Parties_ an attempt has been made at objective description

and analysis of the mechanisms of the behavior of the sect and of the

party.

The natural history of the state from the tribe to the modern nation has

been that of a political society based on conflict. Franz Oppenheimer

maintains the thesis in his book _The State: Its History and Development

Viewed Sociologically_, that conquest has been the historical basis of

the state. The state is, in other words, an organization of groups that

have been in conflict, i.e., classes and castes; or of groups that are

in conflict, i.e., political parties.

A nationality, as distinct from a nation, as for instance the Irish

nationality, is a language and cultural group which has become group

conscious through its struggle for status in the larger imperial or

international group. Nationalism is, in other words, a phenomenon of

internationalism.

The literature upon this subject is enormous. The most interesting

recent works on the general topic are Dominian's _The Frontiers of

Language and Nationality in Europe_, Pillsbury's _The Psychology of

Nationality and Internationalism_, and Oakesmith's _Race and

Nationality_.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF CONFLICT

A. _Conflict and Social Process_

(1) Simmel, Georg. "The Sociology of Conflict." Translated from the

German by Albion W. Small. _American Journal of Sociology_, IX (1903-4),

490-525; 672-89; 798-811.

(2) Gumplowicz, Ludwig. _Der Rassenkampf._ Sociologische Untersuchungen.

Innsbruck, 1883.

(3) Novicow, J. _Les Luttes entre sociétés humaines et leurs phases

successives._ Paris, 1893.

(4) Ratzenhofer, Gustav. _Wesen und Zweck der Politik._ Als Theil der

Sociologie und Grundlage der Staatswissenschaften. 3 vols. Leipzig,

1893.

(5) ----. _Die sociologische Erkenntnis._ Positive Philosophie des

Socialen Lebens. Leipzig, 1898.

(6) Sorel, Georges. _Reflections on Violence._ New York, 1914.

B. _Conflict and Mental Conflict_

(1) Healy, William. _Mental Conflicts and Misconduct._ Boston, 1917.

(2) Prince, Morton. _The Unconscious._ The fundamentals of personality,

normal and abnormal. Chap. xv, "Instincts, Sentiments, and Conflicts,"

pp. 446-87; chap, xvi, "General Phenomena Resulting from Emotional

Conflicts," pp. 488-528. New York, 1914.

(3) Adler, Alfred. _The Neurotic Constitution._ Outlines of a

comparative individualistic psychology and psychotherapy. Translated by

Bernard Glueck and John E. Lind. New York, 1917.

(4) Adler, Alfred. _A Study of Organ Inferiority and Its Psychical

Compensation._ A contribution to clinical medicine. Translated by S. E.

Jelliffe. "Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series," No. 24. New

York, 1917.

(5) Lay, Wilfrid. _Man's Unconscious Conflict._ A popular exposition of

psychoanalysis. New York, 1917.

(6) Blanchard, Phyllis. _The Adolescent Girl._ A study from the

psychoanalytic viewpoint. Chap. iii, "The Adolescent Conflict," pp.

87-115. New York, 1920.

(7) Weeks, Arland D. _Social Antagonisms._ Chicago, 1918.

C. _Rivalry_

(1) Baldwin, J. Mark, editor. _Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology._

Article on "Rivalry." Vol. II, pp. 476-78.

(2) Vincent, George E. "The Rivalry of Social Groups," _American Journal

of Sociology_, XVI (1910-11), 469-84.

(3) Ordahl, George. "Rivalry: Its Genetic Development and Pedagogy,"

_The Pedagogical Seminary_, XV (1908), 492-549. [Bibliography.]

(4) Ely, Richard T. _Studies in the Evolution of Industrial Society._

Chap. ii, "Rivalry and Success in Economic Life," pp. 152-63. New York,

1903.

(5) Cooley, Charles H. _Personal Competition: Its Place in the Social

Order and Effect upon Individuals; with Some Considerations on Success._

"Economic Studies," Vol. IV, No. 2. New York, 1899.

(6) Triplett, Norman. "The Dynamogenic Factors in Pacemaking and

Competition," _American Journal of Psychology_, IX (1897-98), 507-33.

(7) Baldwin, J. Mark. "La Concurrence sociale et l'individualisme,"

_Revue Internationale de sociologie_, XVIII (1910), 641-57.

(8) Groos, Karl. _The Play of Man._ Translated with author's

co-operation by Elizabeth L. Baldwin with a preface by J. Mark Baldwin.

New York, 1901.

D. _Discussion_

(1) Bagehot, Walter. _Physics and Politics._ Or thoughts on the

application of the principles of "Natural Selection" and "Inheritance"

to political society. Chap. v, "The Age of Discussion," pp. 156-204. New

York, 1875.

(2) Robertson, John M. _A Short History of Free Thought, Ancient and

Modern._ 2 vols. New York, 1906.

(3) Windelband, Wilhelm. _Geschichte der alten Philosophie._ "Die

Sophistik und Sokrates," pp. 63-92. München, 1894.

(4) Mackay, R. W. _The Progress of the Intellect as Exemplified in the

Religious Development of the Greeks and Hebrews._ 2 vols. London, 1850.

(5) Stephen, Sir Leslie. _History of English Thought in the Eighteenth

Century._ 2d ed., 2 vols. London, 1881.

(6) Damiron, J. Ph. _Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la philosophie

au 18ième siècle._ 3 vols. Paris, 1858-64.

(7) Draper, J. W. _History of the Intellectual Development of Europe._

Rev. ed., 2 vols. New York, 1904.

(8) ----. _History of the Conflict between Religion and Science._ New

York, 1873.

(9) Lecky, W. E. H. _History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of

Rationalism in Europe._ Rev. ed., 2 vols. New York, 1903.

(10) White, Andrew D. _History of the Warfare of Science with Theology._

An expansion of an earlier essay, "The Warfare of Science," 2d. ed.,

1877. 2 vols. New York, 1896.

(11) Haynes, E. S. P. _Religious Persecution._ A study in political

psychology. London, 1904.

II. TYPES OF CONFLICT

A. _War_

1. Psychology and Sociology of War:

(1) Darwin, Charles. _The Descent of Man._ Chaps. xvii and xviii.

"Secondary Sexual Characters of Mammals," pp. 511-67. (Gives account of

the fighting instinct in males and the methods of fighting of animals.)

2d rev. ed. New York, 1907.

(2) Johnson, George E. "The Fighting Instinct: Its Place in Life,"

_Survey_, XXXV (1915-16), 243-48.

(3) Thorndike, Edward L. _The Original Nature of Man._ "Fighting," pp.

68-75. New York, 1913.

(4) Hall, G. Stanley. "A Study of Anger," _American Journal of

Psychology_, X (1898-99), 516-91.

(5) Patrick, G. T. W. _The Psychology of Social Reconstruction._ Boston,

1920.

(6) ----. _The Psychology of Relaxation._ Chap. vi, "The Psychology of

War," pp. 219-52. Boston, 1916.

(7) Pillsbury, W. B. _The Psychology of Nationalism and

Internationalism._ New York, 1919.

(8) Trotter, W. _Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War._ London, 1916.

(9) La Grasserie, R. de. "De l'intolerance comme phénomène social,"

_Revue International de Sociologie_, XVIII (1910), 76-113.

(10) Percin, Alexandra. _Le Combat._ Paris, 1914.

(11) Huot, Louis, and Voivenel, Paul. _Le Courage._ Paris, 1917.

(12) Porter, W. T. _Shock at the Front._ Boston, 1918.

(13) Lord, Herbert Gardiner. _The Psychology of Courage._ Boston, 1918.

(14) Hall, G. Stanley. _Morale, the Supreme Standard of Life and

Conduct._ New York, 1920.

(15) Roussy, G., and Lhermitte, J. _The Psychoneuroses of War._

Translated by W. B. Christopherson. London, 1918.

(16) Babinski, J. F., and Froment, J. _Hysteria or Pithiatism, and

Reflex Nervous Disorders in the Neurology of the War._ Translated by J.

D. Rolleston, with a preface by E. Farquhar Buzzard. London, 1918.

2. The Natural History of War:

(1) Sumner, William G. _War and Other Essays._ Edited with an

introduction by Albert Galloway Keller. New Haven, 1911.

(2) Letourneau, Ch. _La Guerre dans les diverses races humaines._ Paris,

1895.

(3) Frobenius, Leo. _Weltgeschichte des Krieges._ Unter Mitwirkung von

Oberstleutnant a. D. H. Frobenius u. Korvetten-Kapitän a. D. E.

Kohlhauer. Hannover, 1903.

(4) Bakeless, John. _The Economic Causes of Modern Wars._ A study of the

period 1878-1918. New York, 1921.

(5) Crosby, Oscar T. _International War, Its Causes and Its Cure._

London, 1919.

(6) Sombart, Werner. _Krieg und Kapitalismus._ Studien zur

Entwicklungsgeschichte des modernen Kapitalismus. Vol. II, München,

1913.

(7) Lagorgette, Jean. _Le Rôle de la guerre._ Étude de sociologie

générale. Préface de M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu. Paris, 1906.

(8) Steinmetz, S. R. _Der Krieg als sociologisches Problem._ Pp. 21 ff.

Amsterdam, 1899.

(9) ----. _Die Philosophie des Krieges._ "Natur- und

kultur-philosophische Bibliothek," Band VI. Leipzig, 1907.

(10) Constantin, A. _Le rôle sociologique de la guerre et le sentiment

national._ Suivi de la guerre comme moyen de sélection collective, par

S. R. Steinmetz. "Bibliothèque scientifique internationale," Tome CVIII.

Paris. 1907.

(11) Keller, Albert G. _Through War to Peace._ New York, 1918.

(12) Worms, René, editor. "Les luttes sociales." Études et paroles de E.

Levasseur, Lord Avebury, René Worms, J. Novicow, Lester F. Ward, A. P.

Xénopol, Louis Gumplowicz, Ferdinand Tönnies, Raoul de la Grasserie,

Simon Halpércine, Ludwig Stein, Émile Worms, Charles M. Limousin,

Frederick Harrison, C. L. Loch, G. Arcoleo, R. Garofalo, J. K.

Kochanowski, Léon Phillipe, Alfredo Niceforo, N. A. Abrikossof, Adolphe

Landry. _Annales de l'institut international de sociologie._ Tome XI.

Paris, 1907.

(13) Fielding-Hall, H. _Nature of War and Its Causes._ London, 1917.

(14) Oliver, Frederick S. _Ordeal by Battle._ London, 1915.

3. War and Human Nature:

(1) Petit-Dutaillis, C. E. "L'Appel de guerre en Dauphiné Ier 2 août

1914," _Annales de l'Université de Grenoble_, XXVII (1915), 1-59.

[Documents consisting of letters written by instructors and others

describing the sentiments with which the declaration of war was

received.]

(2) Wood, Walter, editor. _Soldiers' Stories of the War._ London, 1915.

(3) Buswell, Leslie. _Ambulance No. 10: Personal Letters from the

Front._ Boston, 1916.

(4) Kilpatrick, James A. _Tommy Atkins at War as Told in His Own

Letters._ New York, 1914.

(5) Fadl, Said Memun Abul. "Die Frauen des Islams und der Weltkrieg,"

_Nord und Süd_, CLV (Nov. 1915), 171-74. [Contains a letter from a

Turkish mother to her son at the front.]

(6) Maublanc, René. "La guerre vue par des enfants (septembre, 1914)."

(Recits par des enfants de campagne.) _Revue de Paris_, XXII

(septembre-octobre, 1915), 396-418.

(7) Daudet, Ernest, editor. "L'âme française et l'âme allemande."

Lettres de soldats. _Documents pour l'histoire de la guerre._ Paris,

1915.

(8) "Heimatsbriefe an russische Soldaten." (Neue philologische

Rundschau; hrsg. von dr. C. Wagener und dr. E. Ludwig in Bremen, jahrg.

1886-1908.) _Die neue Rundschau_, II (1915), 1673-83.

(9) "The Attack at Loos," by a French Lieutenant. "Under Shell-Fire at

Dunkirk," by an American Nurse. "The Winter's War," by a British

Captain. "The Bitter Experience of Lorraine," by the Prefect of

Meurthe-et-Moselle. _Atlantic Monthly_, CXVI (1915), 688-711.

(10) Böhme, Margarete. _Kriegsbriefe der Familie Wimmel._ (Personal

experiences in the Great War). Dresden, 1915.

(11) Chevillon, André. "Lettres d'un soldat," _Revue de Paris_, XXII

(juillet-août, 1915), 471-95.

(12) Boutroux, Pierre. "Les soldats allemands en campagne, d'après leur

correspondance," _Revue de Paris_, XXII (septembre-octobre, 1915),

323-43; 470-91

(13) West, Arthur Graeme. _The Diary of a Dead Officer._ Posthumous

papers. London, 1918.

(14) Mayer, Émile. "Emotions des chefs en campagne," _Bibliothèque

universelle et Revue Suisse_, LXIX (1913), 98-131.

(15) Wehrhan, K. "Volksdichtung über unsere gefallenen Helden," _Die

Grenzboten_, LXXIV (No. 28, July 14, 1915), 58-64. [Calls attention to

growth of a usage (anfangs, wagte sich der Brauch nur schüchtern, hier

und da, hervor) of printing verses, some original, some quoted, in the

death notices.]

(16) Naumann, Friedrich. "Der Kriegsglaube," _Die Hilfe_, XXI (No. 36,

Sept. 9, 1915), 576. [Sketches the forces that have created a war creed,

in which all confessions participate, immediately and without

formalities.]

(17) Roepke, Dr. Fritz. "Der Religiöse Geist in deutschen

Soldatenbriefen," _Die Grenzboten_, LXXIV (No. 30, July 28, 1915),

124-28. [An interesting analysis of letters which are not reproduced in

full.]

(18) Wendland, Walter, "Krieg und Religion," _Die Grenzboten_, LXXIV

(No. 33, Sept. 11, 1915), 212-19. [Reviews the literature of war and

religion.]

(19) Bang, J. P. _Hurrah and Hallelujah._ The teaching of Germany's

poets, prophets, professors, and preachers; a documentation. From the

Danish by Jessie Bröchner. London and New York, 1917.

B. _Race Conflict_

1. Race Relations in General:

(1) Bryce, James. _The Relations of the Advanced and the Backward Races

of Mankind._ Oxford, 1903.

(2) Simpson, Bertram L. _The Conflict of Colour._ The threatened

upheaval throughout the world, by Weale, B. L. P. [_pseud._]. London,

1910.

(3) Steiner, Jesse F. _The Japanese Invasion._ A study in the psychology

of inter-racial contacts. Chicago, 1917.

(4) Stoddard, T. Lothrop. _The Rising Tide of Color against White

World-Supremacy._ New York, 1920.

(5) Blyden, Edward W. _Christianity, Islam, and the Negro Race._ London,

1888.

(6) Spiller, G., editor. _Papers on Inter-racial Problems._ Communicated

to the First Universal Races Congress, London, 1911, pp. 463-77. Boston,

1911. [Bibliography on Race Problems.]

(7) Baker, Ray Stannard. _Following the Color Line._ An account of Negro

citizenship in the American democracy. New York, 1908.

(8) Miller, Kelly. _Race Adjustment._ Essays on the Negro in America.

New York, 1908.

(9) Stephenson, Gilbert T. _Race Distinctions in American Law._ New

York, 1910.

(10) Mecklin, John M. _Democracy and Race Friction._ A study in social

ethics. New York, 1914.

(11) Evans, Maurice. _Black and White in South East Africa._ London,

1911.

(12) ----. _Black and White in the Southern States._ A study of the race

problem in the United States from a South African point of view. London,

1915.

(13) Brailsford, H. N. _Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future._ London,

1906.

(14) Means, Philip A. _Racial Factors in Democracy._ Boston, 1918.

2. Race Prejudice:

(1) Crawley, Ernest. _The Mystic Rose._ A study of primitive marriage.

Pp. 33-58; 76-235. London, 1902. [Taboo as a mechanism for regulating

contacts.]

(2) Thomas, W. I. "The Psychology of Race-Prejudice," _American Journal

of Sociology_, IX (1903-4), 593-611.

(3) Finot, Jean. _Race Prejudice._ Translated from the French by

Florence Wade-Evans. London, 1906.

(4) Pillsbury, W. B. _The Psychology of Nationality and

Internationalism._ Chap. iii, "Hate as a Social Force," pp. 63-89. New

York, 1919.

(5) Shaler, N. S. "Race Prejudices," _Atlantic Monthly_, LVIII (1886),

510-18.

(6) Stone, Alfred H. _Studies in the American Race Problem._ Chap. vi,

"Race Friction," pp. 211-41. New York, 1908.

(7) Mecklin, John M. _Democracy and Race Friction._ A study in social

ethics. Chap v, "Race-Prejudice," pp. 123-56. New York, 1914.

(8) Bailey, T. P. _Race Orthodoxy in the South._ And other aspects of

the negro question. New York, 1914.

(9) Parton, James. "Antipathy to the Negro," _North American Review_,

CXXVII (1878), 476-91.

(10) Duncan, Sara Jeannette. "Eurasia," _Popular Science Monthly_, XLII

(1892), 1-9.

(11) Morse, Josiah. "The Psychology of Prejudice," _International

Journal of Ethics_, XVII (1906-7), 490-506.

(12) McDougall, William. _An Introduction to Social Psychology._ Chap.

xi, "The Instinct of Pugnacity," pp. 279-95; "The Instinct of Pugnacity

and the Emotion of Anger," pp. 49-61. 4th rev. ed. Boston, 1912.

(13) Royce, Josiah. _Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American

Problems._ Chap. i, "Race Questions and Prejudices," pp. 1-53. New York,

1908.

(14) Thomas, William I. "Race Psychology: Standpoint and Questionnaire,

with Particular Reference to the Immigrant and the Negro," _American

Journal of Sociology_, XVII (1912-13), 725-75.

(15) Bryce, James. _Race Sentiment as a Factor in History._ A lecture

delivered before the University of London, February 22, 1915. London,

1915.

3. Strikes:

(1) Schwittau, G. _Die Formen des wirtschaftlichen Kampfes, Streik,

Boykott, Aussperung, usw._ Eine volkswirtschaftliche Untersuchung auf

dem Gebiete der gegenwärtigen Arbeitspolitik. Berlin, 1912.

[Bibliography.]

(2) Hall, Frederick S. _Sympathetic Strikes and Sympathetic Lockouts._

"Columbia University Studies in Political Science." Vol. X. New York,

1898. [Bibliography.]

(3) Bing, Alexander M. _War-time Strikes and Their Adjustment._ With an

introduction by Felix Adler. New York, 1921.

(4) Egerton, Charles E., and Durand, E. Dana. _U. S. Industrial

Commission Reports of the Industrial Commission on Labor Organizations._

"Labor Disputes and Arbitration." Washington, 1901.

(5) Janes, George M. _The Control of Strikes in American Trade Unions._

Baltimore, 1916.

(6) United States Strike Commission, 1895. _Report on the Chicago Strike

of June-July, 1894, by the United States Strike Commission._ Washington,

1895.

(7) Warne, Frank J. "The Anthracite Coal Strike," _Annals of the

American Academy_, XVII (1901), 15-52.

(8) Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, 1902-3. _Report to the President

on the Anthracite Coal Strike of May-October, 1902, by the Anthracite

Coal Strike Commission._ Washington, 1903.

(9) Hanford, Benjamin. _The Labor War in Colorado._ New York, 1904.

(10) Rastall, B. M. _The Labor History of the Cripple Creek District._ A

study in industrial evolution. Madison, Wis., 1908.

(11) United States Bureau of Labor. _Report on Strike at Bethlehem Steel

Works, South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania._ Prepared under the direction of

Charles P. Neill, commissioner of labor. Washington, 1910.

(12) Wright, Arnold. _Disturbed Dublin._ The story of the great strike

of 1913-14, with a description of the industries of the Irish Capital.

London, 1914.

(13) Seattle General Strike Committee. _The Seattle General Strike._ An

account of what happened in the Seattle labor movement, during the

general strike, February 6-11, 1919. Seattle, 1919.

(14) Interchurch World Movement. _Report on the Steel Strike of 1919._

New York, 1920.

(15) U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. _Report in Regard to the Strike of

Mine Workers in the Michigan Copper District._ Bulletin No. 139.

February 7, 1914.

(16) ----. _Strikes and Lockouts, 1881-1905._ Twenty-first annual

report, 1906.

(17) Foster, William Z. _The Great Steel Strike and Its Lessons._ New

York, 1920.

(18) Wolman, Leo. "The Boycott in American Trade Unions," _Johns Hopkins

University Studies in Historical and Political Science_, Vol. XXXIV.

Baltimore, 1916.

(19) Laidler, Harry W. _Boycotts and the Labor Struggle._ Economic and

legal aspects. With an introduction by Henry R. Seager. New York and

London, 1914.

(20) Hunter, Robert. _Violence and the Labour Movement._ New York, 1914.

[Bibliography.]

4. Lynch Law and Lynching:

(1) Walling, W. E. "The Race War in the North," _Independent_, LXV

(July-Sept. 1908), 529-34.

(2) "The So-Called Race Riot at Springfield," by an Eye Witness.

_Charities_, XX (1908), 709-11.

(3) Seligmann, H. J. "Race War?" _New Republic_, XX (1919), 48-50. [The

Washington race riot.]

(4) Leonard, O. "The East St. Louis Pogrom," _Survey_, XXXVIII (1917),

331-33.

(5) Sandburg, Carl. _The Chicago Race Riots, July, 1919._ New York,

1919.

(6) Chicago Commission on Race Relations. _Report on the Chicago Race

Riot._ [In Press.]

(7) Cutler, James E. _Lynch-Law._ An investigation into the history of

lynching in the United States. New York, 1905.

(8) National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. _Thirty

Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889-1918._ New York, 1919.

(9) ----. _Burning at Stake in the United States._ A record of the

public burning by mobs of six men, during the first six months of 1919,

in the states of Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas. New

York, 1919.

C. _Feuds_

(1) Miklosich, Franz. _Die Blutrache bei den Slaven._ Wien, 1887.

(2) Johnston, C. "The Land of the Blood Feud," _Harper's Weekly_, LVII

(Jan. 11, 1913), 42.

(3) Davis, H., and Smyth, C. "The Land of Feuds," _Munseys'_, XXX

(1903-4), 161-72.

(4) "Avenging Her Father's Death," _Literary Digest_, XLV (November 9,

1912), 864-70.

(5) Campbell, John C. _The Southern Highlander and His Homeland._ Pp.

110-13. New York, 1921.

(6) Wermert, Georg. _Die Insel Sicilien, in volkswirtschaftlicher,

kultureller, und sozialer Beziehung._ Chap. xxvii, "Volkscharacter und

Mafia." Berlin, 1901.

(7) Heijningen, Hendrik M. K. van. _Het Straf- en Wraakrecht in den

Indischen Archipel._ Leiden, 1916.

(8) Steinmetz, S. R. _Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der

Strafe, nebst einer psychologischen Abhandlung über Grausamkeit und

Rachsucht._ 2 vols. Leiden, 1894.

(9) Wesnitsch, Milenko R. _Die Blutrache bei den Südslaven._ Ein Beitrag

zur Geschichte des Strafrechts. Stuttgart, 1889.

(10) Bourde, Paul. _En Corse._ L'esprit de clan--les moeurs

politiques--les vendettas--le banditisme. Correspondances adressées au

"Temps." Cinquième édition. Paris, 1906.

(11) Dorsey, J. Owen. "Omaha Sociology," chap. xii, "The Law," sec. 310,

"Murder," p. 369. In _Third Annual Report of the U.S. Bureau of American

Ethnology, 1881-82._ Washington, 1884.

(12) Woods, A. "The Problem of the Black Hand," _McClure's_, XXXIII

(1909), 40-47.

(13) Park, Robert E., and Miller, Herbert A. _Old World Traits

Transplanted._ New York, 1921. [See pp. 241-58 for details of rise and

decline of Black Hand in New York.]

(14) White, F. M. "The Passing of the Black Hand," _Century_, XCV, N. S.

73 (1917-18), 331-37.

(15) Cutrera, A. _La Mafia e i mafiosi._ Origini e manifestazioni.

Studio di sociologia criminale, con una carta a colori su la densità

della Mafia in Sicilia. Palermo, 1900.

D. _The Duel and the Ordeal of Battle_

(1) Millingen, J. G. _The History of Duelling._ Including narratives of

the most remarkable personal encounters that have taken place from the

earliest period to the present time. 2 vols. London, 1841.

(2) Steinmetz, Andrew. _The Romance of Duelling in All Times and

Countries._ London, 1868.

(3) Sabine, Lorenzo. _Notes on Duels and Duelling._ Boston, 1855.

(4) Patetta, F. _Le Ordalie._ Studio di storia del diritto e scienza del

diritto comparato. Turino, 1890.

(5) Lea, Henry C. _Superstition and Force._ Essays on the wager of law,

the wager of battle, the ordeal, torture. 4th ed., rev., Philadelphia,

1892.

(6) Neilson, George. _Trial by Combat._ In Great Britain. Glasgow and

London, 1890.

E. _Games and Gambling_

(1) Culin, Stewart. "Street Games of Boys in Brooklyn, N.Y.," _The

Journal of American Folk-Lore_, IV (1891), 221-37.

(2) ----. _Korean Games._ With notes on the corresponding games of China

and Japan. Philadelphia, 1895.