PART III

THE BEST POSSIBLE EFFECT

XIX

THE SATISFACTION OF ECONOMIC DEMANDS

Every economic function comes in contact with the mental life of man,

first from the fact that the work is produced by the psyche of

personalities. This gave us the material for the first two parts of

our discussion. We asked what mind is best fitted for the particular

kind of work, and how the mind can be led to the best output of work.

But it is evident that the real meaning of the economic process

expresses itself in an entirely different contact between work and

mind. The economic activity is separated from all other processes in

the world, not by the fact that it involves labor and achievement by

personalities, but by the fact that this labor satisfies a certain

group of human desires which we acknowledge as economic. The mere

performance of labor, with all the psychical traits of attention and

fatigue and will-impulses and personal qualities, does not in itself

constitute anything of economic value. For instance, the sportsman

who climbs a glacier also performs such a fatiguing activity which

demands the greatest effort of attention and will; and yet the

psychotechnics of sport do not belong in economic psychology, because

this mountain climbing does not satisfy economic desires. The ultimate

characteristic which designates an activity as economic is accordingly

a certain effect on human souls. The whole whirl of the economic world

is ultimately controlled by the purpose of satisfying certain

psychical desires. Hence this psychical effect is still more

fundamental for the economic process than its psychical origin in the

mental conditions of the worker. The task of psychotechnics is

accordingly to determine by exact psychological experiments how this

mental effect, the satisfaction of economic desires, can be secured in

the quickest, in the easiest, in the safest, in the most enduring, and

in the most satisfactory way.

But we must not deceive ourselves as to the humiliating truth that so

far not the slightest effort has been made toward the answering of

this central scientific question. If the inquiry into the psychical

effects were really to be confined to this problem of the ultimate

satisfaction of economic desires, scientific psychology could not

contribute any results and could not offer anything but hopes and

wishes for the future. At the first glance it might appear as if just

here a large amount of literature exists; moreover, a literature rich

in excellent investigations and ample empirical material. On the one

side the political economists, with their theories of economic value

and their investigations concerning the conditions of prices and the

development of luxury, the calculation of economic values from

pleasure and displeasure and many similar studies, have connected the

economic processes with mental life; on the other side the

philosophers, with their theories of value, have not confined

themselves to the ethical and æsthetic motives, but have gone deeply

into the economic life too. While such studies of the economists and

of the philosophers are chiefly meant to serve theoretical

understanding, it might seem easy to deduce from them technical

practical prescriptions as well. If we know that under particular

conditions certain demands will be satisfied, we draw the conclusion

that we must realize those conditions whenever such demands are to be

satisfied. The theoretical views of the economists and of the

philosophers of value might thus be directly translated into

psychotechnical advice.

As soon as we look deeper into the situation, we must recognize that

this surface impression is entirely misleading. Certainly whenever

the philosophers or political economists discuss the problems of value

and of the satisfaction of human demands, they are using psychological

terms, but the whole meaning which they attach to these terms,

feeling, emotion, will, desire, pleasure, displeasure, joy, and pain,

is essentially different from that which controls the causal

explanations of scientific psychology. We cannot enter into the real

fundamental questions here, which are too often carelessly ignored

even in scientific quarters. Too often psychology is treated, even by

psychologists, as if it covered every possible systematic treatment of

inner experience, and correspondingly outsiders like the economists

fancy that they are on psychological ground and are handling

psychological conceptions as soon as they make any statements

concerning the inner life. But if we examine the real purposes and

presuppositions of the various sciences, we must recognize that the

human experience can be looked on from two entirely different points

of view. Only from one of the two does it present itself as

psychological material and as a fit object for psychological study.

From the other point of view, which is no less valuable and no less

important for the understanding of our inner life, human experience

offers itself as a reality with which psychology as such has nothing

to do, even though it may be difficult to eliminate the usual

psychological words.

The psychologist considers human experience as a series of objects for

consciousness. All the perceptions and memory ideas and imaginative

ideas and feelings and emotions, are taken by him as mental objects of

which consciousness becomes aware, and his task is to describe and to

explain them and to find the laws for their succession. He studies

them as a naturalist studies the chemical elements or the stars. It

makes no difference whether his explanation leads him to connect these

mental contents with brain processes as one theory proposes, or with

subconscious processes as another theory suggests. The entirely

different aspect of inner life is the one which is most natural in our

ordinary intercourse. Whenever we give an account of our inner life or

are interested in the experience of our friends, we do not consider

how their mental experiences as such objective contents of

consciousness are to be described and explained, but we take them as

inner actions and attitudes toward the world, and our aim is not to

describe and to explain them but to interpret and to understand them.

We do not seek their elements but their meaning, we do not seek their

causes and effects but their inner relations and their inner

purposes. In short, we do not take them at all as objects but as

functions of the subject, and our dealing with them has no similarity

to the method of the naturalist.

This method of practical life in which we seek to express and to

understand a meaning, and relate every will-act to its aim, is not

confined to the mere popular aspect; it can lead to very systematic

scholarly treatment. It is exactly the treatment which is fundamental

in the case of all history, for example, or of law, or of logic. That

is, the historian makes us understand the meaning of a personality of

the past and is really interested in past events only as far as human

needs are to be interpreted. It would be pseudo-psychology, if we

called such an account in the truly historical spirit a psychological

description and explanation. The student of law interprets the meaning

of the will of the legislator; he does not deal with the idea of the

law as a psychological content. And the logician has nothing to do

with the idea as a conscious object in the mind; he asks as to the

inner relations of it and as to the conclusions from the premises. In

short, wherever historical interpretations or logical deductions are

needed, we move on in the sphere of human life as it presents itself

from the standpoint of immediate true experience without artificially

moulding it into the conceptions of psychology. On the other hand, as

soon as the psychological method is applied, this immediate life

meaning of human experience is abandoned, and instead of it is gained

the possibility of considering the whole experience as a system of

causes and effects. Mental life is then no longer what it is to us in

our daily intercourse, because it is reconstructed for the purposes of

this special treatment, just as the water which we drink is no longer

our beverage if we consider it under the point of view of chemistry as

a combination of hydrogen and oxygen. Hence we have not two statements

one of which is true and the other ultimately untrue; on the contrary,

both are true. We have a perfect right to give the value of truth to

our experience with water as a refreshing drink, and also to the

formula of the chemist. With a still better right we may claim that

both kinds of mental experience are equally true. Hence not a word of

objection is raised against the discussions of the historians and the

philosophers, if we insist that their so-called psychology stands

outside of the really descriptive and explanatory account of mental

life, and is therefore not psychology in the technical sense of the

word.

It is this historical attitude which controls all the studies of the

political economists. They speak of the will-acts of the individuals

and of their demands and desires and satisfactions, but they do not

describe and explain them; they want to interpret and understand them.

They may analyze the motives of the laborer or of the manufacturer,

but those motives and impulses interest them not as contents of

consciousness, but only as acts which are directed toward a goal. The

aim toward which these point by their meaning, and not the elements

from which they are made up or their causes and effects, is the

substance of such economic studies. For such a subjective account of

the meaning of actions the only problem is, indeed, the correct

understanding and interpretation, and the consistent psychologist who

knows that it is not his task to interpret but to explain has no right

to raise any questions here. It is, therefore, only a confusing

disturbance, if a really psychological, causal explanation is mixed

into the interpretation of such a system of will-acts and purposes. It

is true we find this confusion in many modern works on economics.

Economists know that a scientific explanatory study of the human mind

exists, and they have a vague feeling that they have no right to

ignore this real psychology, instead of recognizing that the

psychology really has nothing to do with their particular problem. The

result is that they constantly try to discuss the impulses and

instincts, the hunger and thirst and sexual desire, and the higher

demands for fighting and playing and acquiring, for seeking power and

social influence, as a psychologist would discuss them, referring them

to biological and physiological conditions and explaining them

causally. Yet as soon as they come to their real problems and enter

into the interpretation and meaning of these economic energies, they

naturally slide back into the historical, economic point of view and

discuss the economic relations of men without any reference to their

psychologizing preambles. The application of the psychological,

scientific method to the true economic experience is therefore not

secured at all in this way. The demands and volitions which they

disentangle are not the ones which the psychophysiologist studies,

because they are left in their immediate form of life reality. They

are accordingly inaccessible to the point of view of experimental

psychology, and nothing can be expected from such interpretative

discussions of the economists for the psychotechnics at which the

psychologist is aiming. Even where the political economists deal with

the problems of value in exact language, nothing is gained for the

kind of insight for which the psychologist hopes, and the

psychologists must therefore go on with their own methods, if they

are ever to reach a causal understanding of the means by which a

satisfaction of the economic demands may be effected.

So far the psychologists have not even started to examine these

economic feelings, demands, and satisfactions with the means of

laboratory psychology. Hence no one can say beforehand how it ought to

be done and how to gain access to the important problems, inasmuch as

the right formulation of the problem and the selection of the right

method would here as everywhere be more than half of the solution. It

must be left to the development of science for the right

starting-point and the right methods to be discovered. Sometimes, to

be sure, the experiment has at least approached this group of economic

questions. For instance, the investigations of the so-called

psychophysical law have often been brought into contact with the

experiences of ownership and acquirement. The law, well known to every

student of psychology, is that the differences of intensity in two

pairs of sensations are felt as equal, when the two pairs of stimuli

are standing in the same relation. The difference between the

intensities of the light sensations from 10 candles and 11 candles is

equal to that from 50 candles and 55 candles, from 100 candles and

110, from 500 candles and 550: that is, the difference of one

additional candle between 10 and 11 appears just as great as the

difference of 50 candles between 500 and 550. The psychologists have

claimed that in a corresponding way the same feeling of difference

arises when the amounts of possessions stand in the same relation.

That is, the man who owns $100 feels the gain or loss of $1 as much as

one who owns $100,000 feels the gain or loss of $1000. Not the

absolute amount of the difference, but the relative value of the

increase or decrease is the decisive influence on the psychological

effect. Some experimental investigations concerning feelings have also

come near to the economic boundaries. The study of the contrast

feelings and of the relativity of feelings, for instance, has points

of contact with the economic problem of how far economic progress,

with its stirring up and satisfying of continually new demands, really

adds to the quantity of human enjoyment. In other words, how far are

those sociologists right who are convinced that by the technical

complexity of modern life, with all its comforts and mechanizations,

the level of individual life is raised, but that the oscillations

about this average level remain the same and produce the same amount

of pleasure and pain? The technical advance would therefore bring no

increase of human pleasure.

We might also put into this class the meagre experimental

investigations concerning the mutual influence of feelings. When

sound, light, and touch impressions, each of which, isolated, produces

a feeling of a certain degree, are combined with one another, the

experiment can show very characteristic changes in the intensity of

pleasure and displeasure. From such routine experiments of the

laboratory it might not be difficult to come to more complex

experiments on the mutual relations of feeling values and especially

of the combinations of pleasure with displeasure. This would lead to

an insight into the processes which are involved in the fixing of

prices, as they are always dependent upon the pleasure in the

acquisition and the displeasure in the outlay. The exact psychology of

the future may thus very well determine the conditions under which the

best effects for the satisfaction of economic demands may be secured,

but our present-day science is still far from such an achievement: and

it seems hardly justifiable to propose methods to-day, as it would be

like drawing a map with detailed paths for a primeval forest which is

still inaccessible.

XX

EXPERIMENTS ON THE EFFECTS OF ADVERTISEMENTS

We have said that the time has not yet come for discussing from the

standpoint of experimental psychology the means to secure the ultimate

effects of economic life, namely, the satisfaction of economic

demands. If this were the only effect which had economic significance,

this whole last part of our little book would have to remain a blank,

as we wanted to deal here with the securing of the best effects after

having studied the securing of the best man and of the best work. Yet

these ultimate ends are certainly not the only mental effects which

become important in the course of economic processes. In order to

reach that final end of the economic movement, often an unlimited

number of part processes distributed over space and time must

coöperate. The satisfaction of our thirst in a tea-room may be a

trivial illustration of such a final effect, but it is clear that in

order to produce this ultimate mental effect of satisfying the thirst,

thousands of economic processes must have preceded. To bring the tea

and the sugar and the lemon to the table, the porcelain cup and the

silver spoon, wage-earners, manufacturers and laborers, exporters,

importers, storekeepers, salesmen, and customers had to coöperate.

Among such part processes which serve the economic achievement are

always many which succeed only if they produce characteristic effects

in human minds. The propaganda which the storekeeper makes, for

instance, his display and his posters, serve the economic interplay by

psychical effects without themselves satisfying any ultimate economic

demand. They must attract the passer-by or impress the reader or

stimulate his impulse to buy, and through all this they reach an end

which is in itself not final, as no human desire to read

advertisements exists. When the salesman influences the customer to

buy something which may later help to satisfy a real economic demand,

the art of his suggestive words secures a mental effect which again is

in itself not ultimate. If the manufacturer influences his employees

to work with more attention or with greater industry, or if the

community stirs up the desire for luxury or the tendency to saving, we

have mental effects which are of economic importance without being

really ultimate economic effects.

As far as these effects are necessary and justified stages leading to

the ultimate satisfaction of economic demands, it certainly is the

duty of applied psychology to bring psychological experience and exact

methods into their service. We emphasize the necessary and justified

character of these steps, as it is evident that psychological methods

may be made use of also by those who aim toward mental effects which

are unjustified and which are not necessary for the real satisfaction

of valuable demands. Psychological laws can also be helpful in

fraudulent undertakings or in advertisements for unfair competition.

The psychotechnical scientist cannot be blamed if the results of his

experiments are misused for immoral purposes, just as the chemist is

not responsible if chemical knowledge is applied to the construction

of anarchistic bombs. But while psychology, as we have emphasized

before, cannot from its own point of view determine the value of the

end, the psychologist as a human being is certainly willing to

coöperate only where the soundness and correctness of the ends are

evident from the point of view of social welfare.

In order to demonstrate the principle of this kind of psychotechnical

help with fuller detail, at least by one illustration, I may discuss

the case of the advertisements, the more as this problem has already

been taken up in a somewhat systematic way by the psychological

laboratories. We have a number of careful experimental investigations

referring to the memory-value, the attention-value, the

suggestion-value, and other mental effects of the printed business

advertisements. Of course this group of experimental investigations at

once suggests an objection which we cannot ignore. A business

advertisement, as it appears in the newspapers, is such an extremely

trivial thing and so completely devoted to the egotistical desire for

profit that it seems undignified for the scientist to spend his time

on such nothings and to shoot sparrows with his laboratory

cannon-balls. But on the one side nothing can be unworthy of thorough

study from a strictly theoretical point of view. The dirtiest chemical

substance may become of greatest importance for chemistry, and the

ugliest insect for zoölogy. On the other side, if the practical point

of view of the applied sciences is taken, the importance of the

inquiry may stand in direct relation to the intensity of the human

demand which is to be satisfied by the new knowledge. Present-day

society is so organized that the economic advertisement surely serves

a need, and its intensity is expressed by the well-known fact that in

every year billions are paid for advertising. Measured by the amount

of expenditure, advertising has become one of the largest and

economically most important human industries. It is, then, not

astonishing that scientists consider it worth while to examine the

exact foundations of this industry, but it is surprising that this

industry could reach such an enormous development without being guided

by the spirit of scientific exactitude which appears a matter of

course in every other large business. As it is a function of science

to study the physics of incandescent lamps or gas motors so as to

bring the economically most satisfactory devices into the service of

the community, it cannot be less important from the standpoint of

national economics to study scientifically the efficiency of the

advertisements in order that the national means may in this industry,

too, secure the greatest possible effects. It is only a secondary

point that experiments of this kind are of high interest to the

theoretical scientist as well. For us the advertisement is simply an

instrument constructed to satisfy certain human demands by its effects

on the mind. It is a question for psychology to determine the

conditions under which this instrument may be best adapted to its

purpose.

The mental effect of a well-adapted advertisement is manifold. It

appeals to the memory. Whatever we read at the street corner, or in

the pages of the newspaper or magazine, is not printed with the idea

that we shall immediately turn to the store, but first of all with

the expectation that we keep the content of the advertisement in our

memory for a later purchase. It will therefore be the more valuable

the more vividly it forces itself on the memory. But if practical

books about the art of advertising usually presuppose that this

influence on the memory will be proportionate to the effect on the

attention, the psychologist cannot fully agree. The advertisement may

attract the attention of the reader strongly and yet by its whole

structure may be unfit to force on the memory its characteristic

content, especially the name of the firm and of the article. The pure

memory-value is especially important, as according to a well-known

psychological law the pleasure in mere recognition readily attaches

itself to the recognized object. The customer who has the choice among

various makes and brands in the store may not have any idea how far

one is superior to another, but the mere fact that one among them

bears a name which has repeatedly approached his consciousness before

through advertisements is sufficient to arouse a certain warm feeling

of acquaintance, and by a transposition of feeling this pleasurable

tone accentuates the attractiveness of that make and leads to its

selection. This indirect help through the memory-value is economically

no less important than the direct service.

In order to produce a strong effect on memory the advertisement must

be easily apprehensible. Psychological laboratory experiments with

exact time-measurement of the grasping of various advertisements of

the same size for the same article, but in different formulations,

demonstrated clearly how much easier or harder the apprehension became

through relatively small changes. No mistake in the construction of

the advertisement causes so much waste as a grouping which makes the

quick apperception difficult. The color, the type, the choice of

words, every element, allows an experimental analysis, especially by

means of time-measurement. If we determine in thousandths of a second

the time needed to recognize the characteristic content of an

advertisement, we may discriminate differences which would escape the

naïve judgment, and yet which in practical life are of considerable

consequence, as the effect of a deficiency is multiplied by the number

of readers.

We must insist on the further demand that the advertisement make a

vivid impression, so that it may influence the memory through its

vividness. Size is naturally the most frequent condition for the

increase of vividness, but only the relative size is decisive. The

experiment shows that the full-page advertisement in a folio magazine

does not influence the memory more than the full page in a quarto

magazine, if the reader is for the time adjusted to the particular

size. No less important than the size is the originality and the

unusual form, the vivid color, the skillful use of empty spaces, the

associative elements, the appeal to humor or to curiosity, to sympathy

or to antipathy. Every emotion can help to impress the content of the

advertisement on the involuntary memory. Unusual announcements

concerning the prices or similar factors move in the same direction.

Together with the question of the apprehension and the vividness of

the impression, we must acknowledge the frequency of repetition as an

equally important factor. We know from daily life how an indifferent

advertisement can force itself on our mind, if it appears daily in the

same place in the newspaper or is visible on every street corner. But

the psychologically decisive factor here is not the fact of the mere

repetition of the impression, but rather the stimulation of the

attention which results from the repetition. If we remained simply

passive and received the impression the second and third and fourth

time with the same indifference with which we noticed it the first

time, the mere summation would not be sufficient for a strong effect.

But the second impression makes the consciousness of recognition,

thus exciting the attention, and through it we now turn actively to

the repeated impression which forces itself on our memory with

increased vividness on account of this active personal reaction.

We may consider how such factors can be tested by the psychotechnical

experiment. Scott, for instance, studied the direct influence of the

relative size of the advertisements.[50] He constructed a book of a

hundred pages from advertisements which had been cut from various

magazines and which referred to many different articles. Fifty persons

who did not know anything about the purpose of the experiment had to

glance over the pages of the book as they would look though the

advertising parts of a monthly. The time which they used for it was

about ten minutes. As soon as they had gone through the hundred pages,

they were asked to write down what they remembered. The result from

this method was that the 50 persons mentioned on an average every

full-page advertisement 6-1/2 times, every half-page less than 3

times, every fourth-page a little more than 1 time, and the still

smaller advertisements only about 1/7 time. This series of experiments

suggested accordingly that the memory value of a fourth-page

advertisement is much smaller than one fourth of the memory-value of

a full-page advertisement, and that of an eighth-page again much

smaller than one half of the psychical value of a fourth-page. The

customer who pays for one eighth of a page receives not the eighth

part, but hardly the twentieth part of the psychical influence which

is produced by a full page.

These experiments, which were carried on in various forms, demanded as

a natural supplement a study of the effects of repetition in relation

to size. This was the object of a series of tests which I carried on

recently in the Harvard laboratory. I constructed the following

material: 60 sheets of Bristol board in folio size were covered with

advertisements which were cut from magazines the size of the "Saturday

Evening Post" and the "Ladies' Home Journal." We used advertisements

ranging from full-page to twelfth-page in size. Every one of the 6

full-page advertisements which we used occurred only once, each of the

12 half-page advertisements was given 2 times, each of the fourth-page

size, 4 times, each of the eighth-page size, 8 times, and each of the

twelfth-page size, 12 times. The repetitions were cut from 12 copies

of the magazine number. The same advertisement never occurred on the

same page; every page, unless it was covered by a full-page

advertisement, offered a combination of various announcements. It is

evident that by this arrangement every single advertisement occupied

the same space, as the 8 times repeated eighth-page advertisement

filled a full page too. Thus no one of the 60 announcements which we

used was spatially favored above another.

Thirty persons took part in the experiment. Each one had to devote

himself to the 60 pages in such a way that every page was looked at

for exactly 20 seconds. Between each two pages was a pause of 3

seconds, sufficient to allow one sheet to be laid aside and the next

to be grasped. In 23 minutes the whole series had been gone through,

and immediately after that every one had to write down what he

remembered, both the names of the firms and the article announced. In

the cases where only the name or only the article was correctly

remembered, the result counted 1/2. We found great individual

differences, probably not only because the memory of the different

persons was different, but also because they varied in the degree of

interest with which they looked at such material. The smallest number

of reproductions was 18, of which 14 were only half remembered, that

is, only the name or only the article, and as we counted these half

reproductions 1/2, the memory-value for this person was counted 11.

The maximum reproduction was 46, of which 6 were half remembered.

If these calculated values are added and the sum divided by the number

of participants, that is, 30, and this finally by the number of the

advertisements shown, that is, 60, we obtain the average memory-value

of a single advertisement. The results showed that this was 0.44. But

our real interest referred to the distribution for the advertisements

of different size. If we make the same calculation, not for the

totality of the advertisements but for those of a particular size, we

find that the memory-value for the full-page advertisement was 0.33,

for the 2 times repeated half-page advertisement, 0.30, for the 4

times repeated fourth-page advertisement, 0.49, for the 8 times

repeated eighth-page advertisement, 0.44, and for the 12 times

repeated twelfth-page advertisement, 0.47. Hence we come to the result

that the 4 times repeated fourth-page advertisement as 1-1/2 times

stronger than one offering of a full-page, or the 2 times repeated

half-page, but that this relation does not grow with a further

reduction of the size. Two thirds of the subjects were men and one

third women. On the whole, the same relation exists for both groups,

but the climax of psychical efficiency was reached in the case of the

men by the 4 times repeated fourth-page, in the case of the women by

the 8 times repeated eighth-page. The 4 times repeated fourth-page in

the case of the women was 0.45, in the case of the men, 0.51, the 8

times repeated eighth-page, women, 0.53, men, 0.37.

I am inclined to believe that the ascent of the curve of the

memory-value from the full-page to the fourth-page or eighth-page

would have been still more continuous, if the whole-page

advertisements had not naturally been such as are best known to the

American reader. The whole-page announcement, therefore, had a certain

natural advantage. But when we come to another calculation, even the

effect of this advantage is lost. We examined the relations for the

first 10 names and articles, which every one of the 30 persons wrote

down. These first 10 were mostly dashed down quickly without special

thought. They also included only a few half reproductions. When we

study these 300 answers which the 30 persons wrote as their first 10

reproductions, and calculate from them the chances which every one of

the 60 advertisements had for being remembered, we obtain the

following values: The probability of being remembered among the first

10 was for the full-page advertisement, 0.5, for the half-page 2 times

repeated, 1.2, for the fourth-page 4 times repeated, 2.9, for the

eighth-page 8 times repeated, 2.3, and for the twelfth-page 12 times

repeated, 2.4. The superiority of repetition over mere size appears

most impressively in this form, but we see again in this series that

the effect decreases even with increased number of repetitions as soon

as the single advertisement sinks below a certain relative size, so

that the 12 times repeated twelfth-page advertisement does not possess

the memory-value of the 4 times repeated fourth-page advertisement. If

Scott's experiments concerning the size and these experiments of mine

concerning the repetition are right, the memory-value of the

advertisements for economic purposes is dependent upon complicated

conditions. A business man who brings out a full-page advertisement

once in a paper which has 100,000 readers would leave the desired

memory-impression on a larger number of individuals than if he were to

print a fourth-page advertisement in four different cities in four

local papers, each of which has 100,000 readers. But if he uses the

same paper in one town, he would produce a much greater effect by

printing a fourth of a page four times than by using a full-page

advertisement once only.

As a matter of course this would hold true only as far as size and

repetition are concerned. Many other factors have to be considered

besides. Some of these could even be studied with our material. We

could study from our results what memory-value is attached to the

various forms of type or suggestive words, what influence to

illustrations, how far they reinforce the impressiveness and how far

they draw away the attention from the name and the object, how these

various factors influence men and women differently, and so on. Other

questions, however, demand entirely different forms of experiment. We

may examine the effects of special contrast phenomena, of unusual

background, of irregular borders and original headings. The particular

position of the advertisement also deserves our psychological

interest. The magazines receive higher prices for the cover pages and

the newspapers for advertisements which are surrounded by reading

matter. In both cases obvious practical motives are decisive. The

cover page comes into the field of vision more frequently. What is

surrounded by reading matter is less easily overlooked.

But the newspaper world hardly realizes how much other variations of

position influence the psychological effect. Starch[51] made

experiments in which he did not use real advertisements, but

meaningless syllables so as to exclude the influence of familiarity

with any announcement. He arranged little booklets, each of 12 pages,

on which a syllable such as _lod_, _zan_, _mep_, _dut_, _yib_, and so

on was printed in the middle of each page. Each of his 50 subjects

glanced over the book and then wrote down what syllables remained in

memory. He found that the syllables which stood on the first and last

page were remembered by 34 persons, those on the second and eleventh

by about 26, and those on the eight other pages by an average of 17

persons. In the next experiment he printed one syllable in the middle

of the upper and one in the middle of the lower half of each page. The

results now showed that of those syllables which were remembered 54

per cent stood on the upper half and 46 per cent on the lower half of

the page. Finally, he divided every page into four parts and printed

one syllable on the middle of each fourth of a page. The results

showed that of the remembered syllables 28 per cent stood on the

left-hand upper fourth, 33 per cent on the right-hand upper fourth, 16

per cent left-hand lower, and 23 per cent right-hand lower. A

fourth-page advertisement which is printed on the outer side of the

upper half of the page thus probably has more than twice the

psychological value of one which is printed on the inner side of the

lower half. The economic world spends millions every year for

advertisements on the upper right-hand side and millions for

advertisements on the lower left-hand side, and is not aware that one

represents twice the value of the other. These little illustrations

of advertisement experiments may suffice to indicate how much

haphazard methods are still prevalent in the whole field of economic

psychotechnics, methods which would not be tolerated in the sphere of

physical and chemical technology.

XXI

THE EFFECT OF DISPLAY

If we turn from the simple newspaper advertisement to the means of

propaganda in general, we at once stand before a question which is

often wrongly answered. The practical handbooks of advertisements and

means of display treat it as a self-evident fact that every

presentation should be as beautiful as possible. In the first place,

we cannot deny that the ugly and even the disgusting possess a strong

power for attracting attention. Yet it is true that by a transposition

of feelings the displeasure in the advertisement may easily become a

displeasure in the advertised object. But, on the other hand, it is

surely a mistake to believe that pure beauty best fulfills the

function of the advertisement. Even the draftsman who draws a poster

ought to give up the ambition to create a perfect picture. It might

have the power to attract attention, but it would hardly serve its

true purpose of fixing the attention on the article which is

advertised by the picture. The very meaning of beauty lies in its

self-completeness. The beautiful picture rests in itself and does not

point beyond itself. A really beautiful landscape painting is an end

in itself, and must not stir up the practical wish to visit the

landscape which has stimulated the eye of the painter. If the display

is to serve economic interests, every line and every curve, every form

and every color, must be subordinated to the task of leading to a

practical resolution, and to an action, and yet this is exactly the

opposite of the meaning of art. Art must inhibit action, if it is

perfect. The artist is not to make us believe that we deal with a real

object which suggests a practical attitude. The æsthetic forms are

adjusted to the main æsthetic aim, the inhibition of practical

desires. The display must be pleasant, tasteful, harmonious, and

suggestive, but should not be beautiful, if it is to fulfill its

purpose in the fullest sense. It loses its economic value, if by its

artistic quality it oversteps the boundaries of that middle region of

arts and crafts. This of course stands in no contradiction to the

requirement that the advertised article should be made to appear as

beautiful as possible. The presentation of something beautiful is not

necessarily a beautiful presentation, just as a perfectly beautiful

picture need not have something beautiful as its content. A perfect

painting may be the picture of a most ugly person.

We have not yet spoken of the suggestive power of the means of

propaganda. Every one knows the influence on taste and smell, on

social vanity, on local pride, on the gambling instinct, on the

instinctive fear of diseases, and above all on the sexual instinct,

can gain suggestive power. Everywhere among the uncritical masses such

appeals reach individuals whose psychophysical attitudes make such

influences vivid and overpowering. Every one knows, too, those often

clever linguistic forms which are to aid the suggestion. They are to

inhibit the opposing impulses. The mere use of the imperative, to be

sure, has gradually become an ineffective, used-up pattern. It is a

question for special economic psychotechnics to investigate how the

suggestive strength of a form can be reinforced or weakened by various

secondary influences. What influence, for example, belongs to the

electric sign advertisements in which the sudden change from light to

darkness produces strong psychophysical effects, and what value

belongs to moving parts in the picture?

The psychologist takes the same interest in the examples of window

displays, sample distributions, and similar vehicles of commerce by

which the offered articles themselves and not their mere picture or

description are to influence the consciousness of the prospective

customer. Here, too, every element may be isolated and may be brought

under psychotechnical rules. The most external question would refer to

the mere quantity of the presented material. The psychologist would

ask how the mere mass of the offering influences the attention, how

far the feeling of pleasure in the fullness, how far the æsthetic

impression of repetition, how far the associative thought of a

manifold selection, how far the mere spatial expansion, affects the

impression. In any case, as soon as it is acknowledged as desirable to

produce with certain objects the impression of the greatest possible

number, the experimental psychologist stands before the concrete

problem of how a manifoldness of things is to be distributed so that

it will not be underestimated, perhaps even overestimated as to

quantity. Again, the laboratory experiment would not proceed with real

window displays or real exhibitions, but would work out the principle

with the simplified experimental means.

An investigation in the Harvard laboratory, for instance, tested the

influence which various factors have upon the estimation of a number

of objects seen.[52] The question was how far the form or the size or

the distribution makes a group of objects appear larger or smaller.

The experiment was started by showing 20 small cards on a black

background in comparison with another group of cards the number of

which varied between 17 and 23. At first the form of these little

cards was changed: triangles, squares, and circles were tried. Or the

color was changed: light and dark, saturated and unsaturated colors

were used. Or the order was varied: sometimes the little cards lay in

regular rows, sometimes in close clusters, sometimes widely

distributed, sometimes in quite irregular fashion. Or the background

was changed, or the surrounding frame, or the time of exposure, and so

on. Each time the subjects had to estimate whether the second group

was the larger or equal or the smaller. These experiments indicated

that such comparative estimation was indeed influenced by every one of

the factors mentioned. If the experiments show that an irregular

distribution makes the number appear larger or a close clustering

reduces the apparent number, and so on, the business man would be

quite able to profit from such knowledge. The jeweler who shows his

rings and watches in his window wishes to produce with his small stock

the impression of an ample supply. He lacks the psychology which might

teach him whether he would act more wisely in having the rings and the

watches separated, or whether he should mix the two, whether he ought

to choose a background which is similar in color or one which

contrasts with the pieces exhibited, whether he ought to present the

single object in a special background as in a case, or to show it

without one. He is not aware that by simple psychological illusions,

it is not difficult to change the apparent size of an isolated object

by special treatment, making his show-piece appear larger by a fitting

background or intentionally making a dainty object appear smaller by

contrasting surroundings. These, to be sure, are very trivial

illustrations, but the same fundamental psychological laws which are

true for the show-window of the next corner store are true for the

world-display of the nation. The point is to present clearly the idea,

which can be most simply expressed in such trivial material. But it

may be added that even in the case of the most indifferent example a

few hasty experiments with one or two subjects cannot yield any

results of value.

All parts of physiological psychological optics can contribute similar

material. The questions of color harmony and color contrast, light

intensity and mutual support of uniformly colored objects, of

irradiation, depth and perspective, are significant for an effective

display in the show-window, and the laboratory results can easily be

translated into psychotechnical prescriptions. But here it is still

more necessary to separate carefully the merely optical impression

from its æsthetic side. All that we claimed as to the poster is still

more justified for the presentation of the saleable objects

themselves. As soon as the display of the articles forms a real work

of art, it must produce inhibitions in the soul of the spectator by

which the practical economic desire is turned aside. Beauty here too

has strong power of attraction, and moreover the suggestive power, by

which it withdraws our senses from the chance surroundings, forces us

to lose ourselves in the offered presentation. But just through this

process the content of the display becomes isolated and separated from

the world of our practical interests. Our desires are brought to

silence, we do not seek a personal relation to the things which we

face as admiring spectators, and the intended economic effect is

therefore eliminated. Whoever is to examine the psychotechnics of

displays and exhibitions must therefore study the psychology of

æsthetic stimulation, of suggestion, of the effects of light, color,

form and movement, of apperception and attention, and ought not to

forget the psychology of humor and curiosity, of instincts and

emotions. For us the essential point is that here too the experimental

psychological method alone is able to lead from mere chance

arrangements founded on personal taste to the systematic construction

which secures with the greatest possible certainty the greatest

possible mental effect in the service of the economic purpose.

The problems of the storekeeper who arranges his windows, however,

overlap the problems of the manufacturer who prepares his goods for

the world-market, and who must from the start take care that the outer

appearance of his goods stimulate the readiness to buy. In factories

in which these questions have been carefully considered, the

psychological elements have always been found to be the most

influential, but often the most puzzling. I received material from a

number of industrial plants which sold the same article in a variety

of packings. The material which was sent to me included all kinds of

soaps and candies, writing-papers and breakfast foods, and other

articles which are handled by the retailer, the sale of which depends

upon the inclination and caprice of the customer in the store. For

every one of these objects a number of external covers and labels were

sent and with them a confidential report with details about their

relative success. For instance, a certain kind of chocolate was sold

under 12 different labels. One of them was highly successful in the

whole country, and one other had made the same article entirely

unsaleable. The other 10 could be graded between these extremes. In

all 12 cases the covers were decorated with pictures of women with a

scenic background. As long as only æsthetic values were considered,

all were on nearly the same level, and æsthetically skilled observers

repeatedly expressed their preference for some of the unsuccessful

pictures over some of the successful ones. But as soon as an internal

relation was formed between the pictures and the chocolate, in the one

case a mental harmony resulted which had strong suggestive power, in

the other case a certain unrest and inner disturbance which

necessarily had an inhibiting influence. The picture which was

unsuccessful with the sweets would perhaps have been eminently

successful for tobacco. From such elementary starting-points, the

laboratory experiment might proceed systematically into spheres of

economic life hitherto untouched by scientific methods. The psychology

of the influence of external forms on the conscious reactions of the

masses is so far usually considered only when, as often happens, the

most fundamental demands are violated; for instance, when objects

which are to give the impression of ease are painted in colors which

give a heavy, clumsy appearance, or _vice versa_, when book-bindings

are lettered in archaic type which makes the reading of the title

impossible for a passer-by, and in many similar antipsychological

absurdities which any stroll through the streets of a modern city

forces on us.

XXII

EXPERIMENTS WITH REFERENCE TO ILLEGAL IMITATION

It is perhaps not without interest to turn into a by-path at this

point of our road. All the illustrations which we have picked out so

far have referred to strictly economic conditions. But we ought not to

forget that these economic problems of commerce and industry are

everywhere in contact with legal interests as well. In order to

indicate the manifoldness of problems accessible to the experimental

method, we may discuss our last question, the question of packing and

of labels, in this legal relation too. All the packings, covers,

labels, trademarks, and names by which the manufacturer tries to

stimulate the attention, the imagination, and the suggestibility of

the customer may easily draw a large part of their psychological

effectiveness from without, as soon as they imitate the appearance of

articles which are well introduced and favored in the market. If the

public is familiar with and favorably inclined toward an article on

account of its inner values or on account of its being much

advertised, a similar name or a similar packing may offer efficient

help to a rival article. The law of course protects the label and the

deceiving imitation can be prosecuted. But no law can determine by

general conceptions the exact point at which the similarity becomes

legally unallowable. This creates a situation which has given rise to

endless difficulties in practical life.

If everything were forbidden which by its similarity to an accredited

article might lead to a possible confusion in the mind of the quite

careless and inattentive customer, any article once in the market

would have a monopoly in its line. As soon as a typewriter or an

automobile or a pencil or a mineral water existed, no second kind

could have access to the market, as with a high degree of carelessness

one economic rival may be taken for another, even if the new

typewriter or the new pencil has a new form and color and name. On the

other side, the purchaser could never have a feeling of security if

imitations were considered as still legally justifiable when the

difference is so small that it needs an intense mental effort and

careful examination of details to notice it.

The result is that the jurisdiction fluctuates between these two

extremes in a most alarming way, and this seems to hold true in all

countries. In theory: "There is substantial agreement that

infringement occurs when the marks, names, labels, or packings of one

trader resemble those of another sufficiently to make it probable that

ordinary purchasers, exercising no more care than such persons usually

do in purchasing the article in question, will be deceived." But it

depends upon the trade experts and the judges to give meaning to such

a statement in the particular case, as the amount of care which

purchasers usually exercise can be understood very differently.

Sometimes the customer is expected to proceed with an attention which

is most subtly adjusted to the finest differences, and sometimes it is

taken for granted that he is unable to notice even strong variations.

It is clear that this uncertainty which disturbs the whole trade

cannot be eliminated as long as the psychological background has not

been systematically studied. Mere talking about the attention of the

customer, and his ability to decide and select, and of his

observations and his habits in the spirit of popular common-sense

psychology, can never secure exact standards and definite demarcation

lines. The question is important not only where imitations of morally

doubtful character are in the market. Even the most honest

manufacturer is in a certain sense obliged to imitate his

predecessors, as they have directed the taste and habits of the

public in particular directions, and as the product of his company

would suffer unnecessarily if he were to disregard this psychical

attitude of the prospective customers. The economic legal situation

accordingly suggests the question whether it would not be possible to

devise methods for an exact measurement of the permissible similarity,

and this demand for exactitude naturally points to the methods of the

psychological experiment. E.S. Rogers, Esq., of Chicago, who has

thoroughly discussed the legal aspect of the problem,[53] first turned

my attention to the psychological difficulty involved.

When I approached the question in the Harvard psychological

laboratory, it was clear to me that the degree of attention and

carefulness which the court may presuppose on the part of the customer

can never be determined by the psychologist and his experimental

methods. It would be meaningless, if we tried to discover by

experiments a particular degree of similarity which every one ought to

recognize or a particular degree of attention which would be

sufficient for protection against fraud. Such degrees must always

remain dependent upon arbitrary decision. They are not settled by

natural conditions, but are entirely dependent upon social agreement.

A decision outside of the realm of psychology must fix upon a

particular degree in the scale of various similarity values as the

limit which is not to be passed. The aim of the psychologist can be

only to construct such a scale by which decisions may be made

comparable and by which standards may become possible. The experiment

cannot deduce from the study of mental phenomena what degrees of

similarity ought to be still admissible, but it may be able to develop

methods by which different degrees of similarity can be discriminated

and by which a certain similarity value once selected can always be

found again with objective certainty. After many fruitless efforts I

settled on the following form of experiments, which I hope may bring

us nearer to the attainment of the purpose.

A group of objects is observed for a definite time and after a

definite interval another group of objects is offered for comparison.

This second group is identical with the first in all but one of the

objects, and this is replaced by a similar one. The question is how

often this substitution will be noticed by the observers. I may give

in detail a characterization of the set of experiments in which we are

at present engaged. We are working with picture postal cards, using

many hundred cards of different kinds, but for each one we have one

or several similar cards. As postal cards are generally manufactured

in sets, it is not difficult to purchase pairs of pictures with any

degree of similarity. Two cards with Christmas trees, or two with

Easter eggs, or two with football players, or two with forest

landscapes, and so on, may differ all the way from a slight variation

of color or a hardly noticeable change in the position of details to

variations which keep the same motive or the same general arrangement,

but after all make the card strikingly different. The first step is to

determine for each pair the degree of similarity, on a percentage

basis. To overcome mere arbitrariness, we ask thirty to forty educated

persons to express the similarity value, calling identical postal

cards 100 per cent and two postal cards as different as a colored

flower piece and a black picture of a street scene O. The average

value of these judgments is then considered as expressing the

objective degree of similarity between the two pictures of a pair.

After securing such standard values, we carry on the experiments in

the following form. Six different postal cards, for instance, are seen

on a black background through the opening of a shutter which is closed

after 5 seconds. The six may be made up of a landscape, a building, a

head, a genre scene, and so forth. After 20 seconds the same group of

postal cards is shown once more, except that one is replaced by a

similar one, instead of one church another church building, or instead

of a vase with roses a vase with pinks. If the substituted picture has

the average similarity value of 80 per cent and we make the experiment

with 10 persons, the substitution may be discovered by 7 persons and

remain unnoticed by 3. We can now easily vary every one of the factors

involved. If instead of 6 cards, we take 10, it may be that only 4 out

of 10 persons, instead of 7, will discover the substitution, while if

we take 4 cards instead of 6, perhaps 9 persons out of 10 will

recognize the difference under these otherwise equal conditions. Only

an especially careless observer will overlook it. But instead of

changing the number of objects, we may change the periods of exposure.

If we show the 6 cards only for 2 seconds instead of 5 seconds, the

number of those who recognize the difference may sink from 7 to 5 or

4, and if we make the time considerably longer, we shall of course

reach a point where all 10 will recognize the substitution. The same

holds true of the shortening or lengthening of the time-interval

between the two presentations. The third variable factor is the

similarity itself. If instead of one church, not another church, but a

theatre or a skyscraper is shown, that is, if the similarity value of

80 per cent sinks down to a similarity of 60 per cent or 50 per cent,

the number of those who recognize the substitution will again become

larger; if, on the other hand, the substituted card shows the same

church, only from a slightly different angle, bringing the similarity

value up to 90 per cent or 95 per cent, the number of observers who

recognize the substitution may sink to 2 or 3. To make the experiments

reliable, it is also necessary frequently to mix in cases in which no

substitution at all is introduced.

If these experiments are varied sufficiently and a large mass of

material brought together, we must be able to secure definite formulæ.

We may find that if the critical card appears among 6 cards, is shown

for 5 seconds, and the group is again exposed after 20 seconds, 80 per

cent of the subjects will recognize the substitution of a similar

card, if the degree of similarity is 30 per cent, but only 60 per cent

will recognize it if the degree of similarity is 70 per cent, and only

30 per cent will recognize it if the degree of similarity is 90 per

cent. These are entirely fictitious figures and are only to indicate

the principle. If such an exact formula were definitely discovered, we

should still be unable to say from mere psychological reasoning what

similarity value is legally permissible. If the rules against

infringement are interpreted in a very rigorous spirit, it may seem

desirable to prohibit imitations which are as little similar as those

postal cards which were graded as 40 per cent in our similarity scale,

and if the interpretation is a loose one, it may appear permissible to

have imitations on the market which are as strongly similar as our

postal cards graded at 80 per cent in our similarity scale. All this

would have to be left to the lawmakers and to the judges. But what we

would have gained is this. We could say: if our object exposed for 5

seconds in a group of 6 other objects is replaced after an interval of

20 seconds by an imitation and this change is recognized by 8 persons

among 10, the degree of similarity is 30 per cent and if it is

recognized by 3 out of 10 subjects, the degree of similarity is 90 per

cent. In short, from any percentage of subjects who under these

conditions discovered the substitution, we could determine the degree

of similarity, independent of any individual arbitrariness. If such

methods were accepted by the trade and the courts, it would only be

necessary, to agree on the percentage of similarity which ought to be

permitted, and all uncertainty would disappear. There would be no

wrangling of opposing interests; it would be possible to find out

whether the permitted limit were overstepped or not with an

exactitude similar to that with which the weight or the chemical

constitution of a trade commodity is examined. Certainly the

experiment establishes here conditions which are very different from

those of practical life. The customer who wants to buy a particular

picture postal card which he saw once before and to whom the salesman

offers a similar one, suggesting that it is the same, is facing only

one card and not a group of six. But in practical life the card which

be has seen was not observed with the definite intention of keeping

the memory picture in mind, and months may have passed since it was

seen. The memory picture which the customer has in his consciousness

when he seeks the particular card is much weakened by this

circumstance too. We secure this weakening artificially by the

arrangement of the experiment in placing the card in a group of six or

ten and exposing them for a few seconds only. The force of attention

and the corresponding memory-value are by this distribution diminished

in a definite degree in the case of every single card.

The investigation must include a careful study of the size of the

groups, of the time-relations, of the percentage of correct answers,

all under the point of view of greatest fitness for practical

application. In the Harvard laboratory the research has been carried

on partly with such picture material, partly with word material, and

partly with concrete objects.[54] Whatever the details of the outcome

may be, we hope that the work will lead to results which may, indeed,

make such a psychotechnical use possible. Its principles and formulæ

might easily be adjusted to any marketable material. As a matter of

course, if in future the courts were ever to accept such

psychological, experimental methods, it would be intolerable

dilettantism if such experiments were carried on by lawyers and

district attorneys. It is as true of this economic legal question as

of many other legal psychological problems that its introduction into

the courtroom can become desirable only when psychological experts are

engaged and called in the same way as chemical or medical experts are

invited to the court. On the other hand, there is surely not the

slightest desire on the part of psychologists to be dragged into

humiliating performances like those which not only handwriting

experts, but even psychiatric specialists have had to undergo

repeatedly in sensational court trials. The day for the expert

activity in the courtroom will came for the psychologist only when the

country has attached the expert to the court and has eliminated the

expert retained by the plaintiff or the defendant. But this general

practical question as to the position of the psychologist in the

courtroom and as to the need of a psychological laboratory in

connection with the courts would lead us too far aside.

XXIII

BUYING AND SELLING

The effects which we have studied so far were produced by inanimate

objects, posters or displays, advertisements or labels and packings.

The economic psychotechnics of the future will surely study with

similar methods the effects of the living commercial agencies.

Experiments will trace the exact effects which the salesman or

customer may produce. But here not even a modest beginning can be

discovered, and it would be difficult to mention a single example of

experimental research. The desired psychological influences of the

salesman are not quite dissimilar to those of the printed means of

propaganda. Here, too, it is essential to turn the attention of the

customer to different points, to awaken a vivid favorable impression,

to emphasize the advantages of the goods, to throw full light on them,

and finally to influence the will-decision either by convincing

arguments or by persuasion and suggestion. In either case the point is

to enhance the impulse to buy and to suppress the opposing ideas. Yet

every one of these factors, when it starts from a man and not from a

thing or paper, changes its form. The influence becomes narrower, it

is directed toward a smaller number of persons; but, on the other

hand, it gains just by the new possibility of individualization. The

salesman in the store or the commercial traveler adjusts himself to

the wishes, reactions, and replies of the buyer. Above all, when it

becomes necessary to direct the attention to the decisive points, the

personal agent has the possibility of developing the whole process

through a series of stages so that the attention slowly becomes

focused on one definite point. The salesman observes at first only the

general limits of the interest of the customer as far as it is

indicated by his reactions, but slowly he can find out in this whole

field the region of strongest desires. As soon as he has discovered

this narrower region in which the prospects of success seem to be

greatest, he can systematically eliminate everything which distracts

and scatters the attention. He can discover whether the psyche of the

individual with whom he is dealing can be influenced more strongly by

logical arguments or by suggestion, and how far he may calculate on

the pleasure instincts, on the excitement of emotions, on the impulse

to imitate, on the natural vanity, on the desire for saving, and on

the longing for luxury. In every one of these directions the whole

play of human suggestion may be helpful. The voice may win or destroy

confidence, the statement may by its firmness overcome counter-motives

or by its uncertainty reinforce them. Even hand or arm movements by

their motor suggestion may focus the desires of the customers, while

unskillful, erratic movements may scatter the attention and lead to an

inner oscillation of the will to buy.

At every one of these points the psychological experiment may find a

foothold, and only through such methodological study can the haphazard

proceedings of the commercial world be transformed into really

economic schemes. Indeed, it seems nothing but chance that just this

field is controlled by chance alone. The enormous social interplay of

energies which are discharged in the selling and buying of the

millions becomes utterly planless as soon as salesman and customer

come into contact, and this tremendous waste of energy cannot appear

desirable for any possible interest of civilization. The time alone

which is wasted by useless psychophysical operations in front of and

behind the counter represents a gigantic part of the national budget.

Even the complaints about the long working day of the salesgirls might

be eliminated from the debit account of the national ledger, if the

commercial companies could study the psychical processes in selling

and buying with the same carefulness with which they analyze all

details in preparing the stock and fixing the prices. In the army or

in the fire department, in the railroad service, and even in the

factory, all necessary activities are so arranged that as far as

possible the greatest achievement is secured by the smallest amount of

energy. But when the hundreds of millions of customers in the

civilized world want to satisfy their economic demands in the stores,

the whole dissolves into a flood of talk, because no one has taken the

trouble to examine scientifically the psychotechnics of selling and to

put it on a firm psychological foundation.

The idea of scientific management must be extended from the industrial

concerns to the commercial establishments. The questioning and

answering, the showing and replacing of the goods, the demonstrating

and suggesting by the salesmen, must be brought into an economic

system which saves time and energy, as has been tried with the laborer

in the factory. Wherever economic processes are carried out with

superfluous, haphazard movements, the national resources have to

suffer a loss. The single individual can never find the ideal form of

motion and the ideal process by mere instinct. A systematic

investigation is needed to determine the way to the greatest saving

of energy, and the result ought to be made a binding rule for every

apprentice. How the smallest influences grow by summation may be

illustrated by the experience of a large department store, in which

the expense for delivery of the articles sold was felt as too large an

item in the budget. The hundreds of saleswomen therefore received the

order after every sale of moderate-sized articles not to ask, as

before, "May we send it to you?" but instead, "Will you take it with

you?" Probably none of the many thousand daily customers observed the

difference, the more as it was indifferent to most of them whether

they took the little package home themselves or not. In cases in which

it was inconvenient, they would anyhow oppose the suggestion and

insist that the purchase be sent to them. Yet it is claimed that this

hardly noticeable suggestion led to a considerable saving in the

following year, distinctly felt in the budget of the whole

establishment.

We must not forget, however, that the process of buying deserves the

same psychological interest as that of selling. If psychotechnics is

to be put into the service of a valuable economic task, the goal

cannot possibly be to devise schemes by which the customer may easily

be trapped. The purpose of science cannot be to help any one to sell

articles to a man who does not need them and who would regret the

purchase after quiet thought. The applied psychologist should help the

prospective buyer no less, and must protect him so that his true

intention may become realized in the economic process. Otherwise

through his suggestibility, the determining idea of his goal might

fade in his consciousness and the appeal to his vanity or to his

instincts might awaken an anti-economic desire which he would be too

weak to inhibit. The salesman must know how to use arguments and

suggestions and how to make them effective,[55] but the customer too

must know how to see through a misleading argument and how to resist

mere suggestion.

The postulate that the psychical factors in commercial life are to be

carefully regarded is repeated in more complex form in the wholesale

business and in the stock exchange. It is a perfectly justified and

consistent thought which recently led a large credit bureau to an

effort to base its information on psychological analysis. It is well

known that there are bureaus in which the ledger experiences of a

large circle of companies in the same commercial line are collected,

tabulated, and recorded, thus affording an automatic review of the

occurrences, focusing early attention on doubtful accounts and

pointing out weaknesses in the customers' conditions, as they

develop, as well as evidences of prosperity. The ledger experience

which a single company has with all its customers is tabulated without

revealing its identity to the associates, who get reports containing

it, and the many combined ledgers become a valuable guide. Yet all

such methods can show only actual movements in the market, and cannot

allow the prospects of future development to be determined, simply

because they cannot take into account the personal equations. Only an

acquaintance with the character and the temperament, the intelligence

and the habits, the energy and the weakness, of the head of a firm can

tell us whether the company, even with satisfactory resources, may go

down, or whether, even though embarrassed, it may hold out. The

psychological pioneer, therefore, aims not only toward an exchange of

ledger accounts, but toward a real psychological diagnosis and

prognosis. If a member of a firm is personally known to some scores of

business men who have had commercial dealings with him, and each one

of them, without disclosing his identity to any one but the central

bureau, sends to it a statement of personal impressions, a composite

picture of the mental physiognomy can be worked out. Of course all

this has been often done in the terms of popular psychology and in a

haphazard, amateurish way. The new plan is to arrange the questions

systematically under the point of view of scientific descriptive

psychology. Regular psychograms, in which the probability of a

particular kind of behavior is to be determined in an exact percentage

calculation, are to replace the traditional vagueness, as soon as a

sufficient number of reliable answers have been tabulated.

Commercial life as a whole finds its contact with psychology, of

course, not only in the problem of how to secure the best mental

effect. Those other questions which we have discussed essentially with

reference to factory life and industrial concerns, namely, how the

best man and the best work are to be secured, recur in the circle of

commercial endeavors. It seems, indeed, most desirable to devise

psychological tests by which the ability to be a successful salesman

or saleswoman may be determined at an early stage. The lamentable

shifting of the employees in all commercial spheres, with its

injurious social consequences, would then be unnecessary, and both

employers and employees would profit. Moreover, like the selection of

the men, the means of securing the most satisfactory work from them,

has also so far been left entirely to common sense. Commercial work

stands under an abundance of varying conditions, and each may have

influences the isolated effects of which are not known, because they

have not been studied in that systematic form which only the

experiment can establish. The popular literature on this whole group

of subjects is extensive, and in its expansion corresponds to the

widespread demand for real information and advice to the salesman. But

hardly any part of the literature in the borderland regions of

economics is so disappointing in its vagueness, emptiness, and

helplessness. Experimental psychology has nothing with which to

replace it to-day, but it can at least show the direction from which

decisive help may be expected in future.

XXIV

THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY

Here we may stop. From those elementary questions concerning the

mental effects, the path would quickly lead to questions of gravest

importance. What is the mental effect which the economic labor

produces in the laborer himself? How do economic movements influence

the mind of the community? How far do non-economic factors produce

effects on the psychical mechanism of the economic agents? But it

would be idle to claim to-day for exact psychology, with its methods

of causal thought, regions in which so far popular psychology, with

its methods of purposive thought, is still sovereign. Our aim

certainly was not to review the totality of possible problems related

to economic efficiency, but merely to demonstrate the principles and

the methods of experimental economic psychology by a few

characteristic illustrations. As all the examples which we selected

were chosen only in order to make clear the characteristic point of

view of psychotechnics, it is unimportant whether the particular

results will stand the test of further experimental investigations,

or will have to be modified by new researches. What is needed to-day

is not to distribute the results so far reached as if they were parts

of a definite knowledge, but only to emphasize that the little which

has been accomplished should encourage continuous effort. To stimulate

such further work is the only purpose of this sketch.

This further work will have to be a work of coöperation. The nature of

this problem demands a relatively large number of persons for the

experimental treatment. With most experimental researches in our

psychological laboratories, the number of the subjects experimented on

is not so important as the number of experiments made with a few

well-trained participants. But with the questions of applied

psychology the number of persons plays a much more significant rôle,

as the individual differences become of greatest importance. The same

problems ought therefore to be studied in various places, so that the

results may be exchanged and compared. Moreover, these psychological

economic investigations naturally lead beyond the possibilities of the

university laboratories. To a certain degree this was true of other

parts of applied psychology as well. Educational and medical

experimental psychology could not reach their fullest productivity

until the experiment was systematically carried into the schoolroom

and the psychiatric clinic. But the classroom and the hospital are

relatively accessible places for the scientific worker, as both are

anyhow conducted under a scientific point of view. The teacher and the

physician can easily learn to perform valuable experiments with school

children or with patients. This favorable condition is lacking in the

workshop and the factory, in the banks and the markets. The academic

psychologist will be able to undertake work there only with a very

disturbing expenditure of time and only under exceptional conditions.

If such experiments, for instance, with laborers in a factory or

employees of a railway are to advance beyond the faint first efforts

of to-day and are really to become serviceable to the cultural

progress of our time with effective completeness, they ought not to

remain an accidental appendix to the theoretical laboratories. Either

the universities must create special laboratories for applied

psychology or independent research institutes must be founded which

attack the new concrete problems under the point of view of national

political economy. Experimental workshops could be created which are

really adjusted to the special practical needs and to which a

sufficiently large number of persons could be drawn for the

systematic researches. The ideal solution for the United States would

be a governmental bureau for applied psychology, with special

reference to the psychology of commerce and industry, similar to the

model agricultural stations all over the land under the Department of

Agriculture.

Only when such a broad foundation has been secured will the time be

ripe to carry the method systematically into the daily work. The aim

will never be for real experimental researches to be performed by the

foreman in the workshop or by the superintendent in the factory. But

slowly a certain acknowledged system of rules and prescriptions may be

worked out which may be used as patterns, and which will not

presuppose any scientific knowledge, any more than an understanding of

the principles of electricity is necessary for one who uses the

telephone. But besides the rigid rules which any one may apply,

particular prescriptions will be needed fitting the special situation.

This leads to the demand for the large establishments to appoint

professionally trained psychologists who will devote their services to

the psychological problems of the special industrial plant. There are

many factories that have scores of scientifically trained chemists or

physicists at work, but who would consider it an unproductive luxury

to appoint a scientifically schooled experimental psychologist to

their staff. And yet his observations and researches might become

economically the most important factor. Similar expectations might be

justified for the large department stores and especially for the big

transportation companies. In smaller dimensions the same real needs

exist in the ordinary workshop and store. It is obvious that the

professional consulting psychologist would satisfy these needs most

directly, and if such a new group of engineers were to enter into

industrial life, very soon a further specialization might be expected.

Some of these psychological engineers would devote themselves to the

problems of vocational selection and appointment; others would

specialize on questions of advertisement and display and propaganda; a

third group on problems of fatigue, efficiency, and recreation; a

fourth on the psychological demands for the arrangement of the

machines; and every day would give rise to new divisions. Such a

well-schooled specialist, if he spent a few hours in a workshop or a

few days in a factory, could submit propositions which might refer

exclusively to the psychological factors and yet which might be more

important for the earning and the profit of the establishment than the

mere buying of new machines or the mere increase in the number of

laborers.

No one can deny that such a transition must be burdened with difficult

complications and even with dangers; and still less will any one doubt

that it may be caricatured. One who demands that a chauffeur or a

motorman of an electric railway be examined as to his psychical

abilities by systematic psychological methods, so that accidents may

be avoided, does not necessarily demand that a congressman or a

cabinet minister or a candidate for marriage be tested too by

psychological laboratory experiments, as the witty ones have proposed.

And one who believes that the work in the factory ought to be studied

with reference to the smallest possible expenditure of psychical

impulses is not convinced that the same experimental methods will be

necessary for the functions of eating and drinking and love-making, as

has been suggested.

And if it is true that difficulties and discomforts are to be feared

during the transition period, they should be more than outweighed by

the splendid betterments to be hoped for. We must not forget that the

increase of industrial efficiency by future psychological adaptation

and by improvement of the psychophysical conditions is not only in the

interest of the employers, but still more of the employees; their

working time can be reduced, their wages increased, their level of

life raised. And above all, still more important than the naked

commercial profit on both sides, is the cultural gain which will come

to the total economic life of the nation, as soon as every one can be

brought to the place where his best energies may be unfolded and his

greatest personal satisfaction secured. The economic experimental

psychology offers no more inspiring idea than this adjustment of work

and psyche by which mental dissatisfaction in the work, mental

depression and discouragement, may be replaced in our social community

by overflowing joy and perfect inner harmony.

THE END

NOTES

[1] The fullest account of the modern studies on individual

differences is to be found in: William Stern: Die differentielle

Psychologie in ihren methodischen Grundlagen. (Leipzig, 1911.)

[2] The practical applications of psychology in education, law, and

medicine, I have discussed in detail in the books: Münsterberg:

Psychology and the Teacher. (New York, 1910.) Münsterberg: On the

Witness Stand. (New York, 1908.) (English edition under the title:

Psychology and Crime.) Münsterberg: Psychotherapy (New York, 1909.)

[3] Frank Parsons: Choosing a Vocation. (Boston, 1909.)

[4] M. Bloomfield: The Vocational Guidance of Youth. (Boston, 1911.)

[5] Vocations for Boys. (Issued by the Vocation Bureau of Boston.

1912.) Vocations for Boston Girls. (Issued by the Girls' Trade

Education League. 1911.) Bulletins of Vocation Series. (Issued by the

Women's Educational and Industrial Union. 1911.)

[6] F.W. Taylor: The Principles of Scientific Management. (New York,

1911.) H.L. Gantt: Work, Wages, and Profits. (New York, 1912.) And the

books of Emerson, Gilbreth, Goldmark, etc., to be mentioned later.

[7] H. Emerson: Efficiency as a Basis for Operation and Wages. (New

York, 1912, p. 107.)

[8] H. Emerson: The Twelve Principles of Efficiency. (New York, 1912,

p. 176.)

[9] H Emerson: The Twelve Principles, p. 156.

[10] H. Emerson: The Twelve Principles, p. 177.

[11] F.W. Taylor: The Principles of Scientific Management, pp. 86-97.

[12] The experiments are being conducted and will be published by Mr.

J.W. Bridges.

[13] Investigation of Telephone Companies: Bureau of Labor.

(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910.)

[14] Ries: Beiträge zur Methodik der Intelligenzprüfung. (Zeitschrift

für Psychologie, 1910, vol. 56.)

[15] For a survey of a large number of such tests and bibliography,

compare: G.M. Whipple: Manual of Mental and Physical Tests.

(Baltimore, 1911.)

[16] F.L. Wells: The Relation of Practice to Individual Differences.

(American Journal of Psychology, 1912, vol. 23, pp. 75-88.)

[17] M. Bernays: Auslese und Anpassung der Arbeiterschaft der

geschlossenen Grossindustrie, dargestellt an den Verhältnissen der

Gladbacher Spinnerei und Weberei. (Leipzig, 1910, p. 337.)

[18] H.C. McComas: Some Types of Attention. (Psychological Review

Monographs, vol. 13, 3, 1911.)

[19] Max Weber: Zur Psychophysik der industriellen Arbeit. (Archiv für

Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 1908 and 1909, vols. 27 and 28.)

[20] Bryan and Harter: Studies in the Telegraphic Language.

(Psychological Review, vol. 4.)

[21] W.F. Book: The Psychology of Skill. (University of Montana,

Publications in Psychology, 1910.)

[22] H. Münsterberg: Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie. (Book

iv, 1892.)

[23] A.J. Culler: Interference and Adaptability. (Archives of

Psychology, 1912.)

[24] The experiments are being conducted and will be published by Mr.

L.W. Kline.

[25] Adolf Gerson: Die physiologischen Grundlagen der Arbeitsteilung.

(Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, 1907.)

[26] Karl Bücher: Arbeit und Rhythmus. (Fourth Edition, Leipzig, 1909,

p. 438.)

[27] Frank G. Gilbreth: Motion Study. (New York, 1911.)

[28] Taylor: The Principles of Scientific Management. (New York, 1911,

p. 71.)

[29] The experiments are being conducted and will be published by Mr.

E.R. Riesen.

[30] R. Herbertz: Zur Psychologie des Maschinenschreibens.

(Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie, 1908, vol. 2, p. 551.)

[31] C.L. Vaughan: The Moter Power of Complexity. (Harvard

Psychological Studies, vol. 2, 1906, p. 527.)

[32] G.M. Stratton: Some Experiments in the Perception of the

Movement, Color, and Direction of Lights. (Psychological Review

Monographs, vol. 10, 1908.)

[33] The experiments are being conducted and will be published by Miss

L.M. Seeley.

[34] H. Münsterberg: Beiträge sur experimentellen Psychologie. (Book

iv, 1892.)

[35] R.S. Woodworth: Accuracy of Voluntary Movement. (Psychological

Review Monographs, vol. 8, 1899.)

[36] B.A. Lenfest: The Accuracy of Linear Movement. (Harvard

Psychological Studies, vol. 2, 1906.)

[37] Ranschburg: Ueber die Bedeutung der Ähnlichkeit beim Erlernen,

Behalten und bei der Reproduktion. (Journal für Psychologie und

Neurologie, vol. 6.) Ranschburg: Zeitschrift für Psychologie und

Physiologie der Sinnesorgane. (Vol. 80, 1902.)

[38] H. Kleinknecht: The Interference of Optical Stimuli. (Harvard

Psychological Studies, vol. 2, 1906.)

[39] The experiments are being conducted and will be published by Miss

O.E. Martin.

[40] Henry P. Kendall: Unsystematized, Systematized, and Scientific

Management. (In Addresses and Discussions at the Conference on

Scientific Management held at Dartmouth College, 1912.)

[41] Ernst Abbé: Gesammelte Abhandlungen. (Jena, 1908, vol. 3, p.

206.)

[42] A full survey of the problem and its literature is contained in:

Josephine Goldmark: Fatigue and Efficiency. (New York, 1912.)

[43] F.W. Taylor: The Principles of Scientific Management. (New York,

1911, p. 58.)

[44] W. Hellpach: Die geopsychischen Erscheinungen, Wetter, Klima und

Landschaft und ihr Einfluss auf das Seelenleben (Leipzig, 1911 p.

176-212.)

[45] Aschaffenburg: Praktische Arbeit unter Alkoholwirkung

(Psychologische Arbeiten--Kraepelin, vol 1, 1906.)

[46] Hildebrand Die Beeinflussung der Willenskraft durch den Alkohol

(Königsberg, 1910.)

[47] For the scientific facts concerning alcohol and bibliography

compare Hugo Hoppe: Die Tatsachen über den Alkohol (Munich, 1912.)

[48] H.L. Hollingworth: The Influence of Caffein on Mental and Motor

Efficiency. (New York, 1912.)

[49] Levenstein: Die Arbeiterfrage. (Munich, 1912.)

[50] W.D. Scott: The Psychology of Advertising. (Boston, 1908, p.

166.)

[51] D. Starch: Psychology of Preferred Positions. (Judicious

Advertising, New York, November, 1909.)

[52] C.T. Burnett: The Estimation of Number. (Harvard Psychological

Studies, vol. 2, p. 349.)

[53] E.S. Rogers: The Unwary Purchaser: A Study in the Psychology of

Trade Mark Infringement. (Michigan Law Review, vol. 8, 1910.)

[54] The experiments are being conducted and will be published by Mr.

G.A. Feingold.

[55] W.D. Scott: Influencing Men in Business. (New York, 1911.)

INDEX

Abstinence, 230.

Accidents, 63, 66, 76, 213, 224.

Adjustment, 35, 158.

Advertisement, 255.

Alcohol, 225, 227.

Analysis, 47, 123.

Apperception, 266.

Applied psychology, 5, 10, 15, 304.

Appointment, 116.

Apprentice, 145.

Arguments, 295.

Art, 273.

Artificial track, 71.

Association, 105, 156.

Attention, 21, 66, 101, 106, 135, 197, 206, 284.

Attitude, 68, 75.

Beauty, 272, 278.

Beginner, 182.

Buying, 294.

Caffein, 232.

Capitalism, 143.

Card test, 87.

Choice of vocation, 32, 34.

Color blindness, 30, 57.

Complication, 84.

Concentration, 136.

Confession, 18.

Consciousness, 247.

Conservation, 38.

Consulting psychologist, 307.

Conversation, 208.

Counting, 175.

Correlation, 134.

Court, 292.

Credit bureau, 299.

Criminal, 14.

Customer, 298.

Decision, 85, 94.

Discrimination, 74.

Display, 272.

Dispositions, 27, 125, 170.

Distraction, 206.

Distribution, 276.

Disturbances, 210.

Division of labor, 28, 51, 191.

Dynamogenic, 173.

Economics, 19, 243, 250.

Educational psychology, 11.

Efficiency, 50, 144, 158, 180, 190, 223, 225.

Effort, 161.

Electric railway, 63, 69, 180.

Energy, 175.

Entertainment, 233.

Ergograph, 149.

Exactitude, 186.

Examinations, 29.

Excitability, 226.

Experimental psychology, 4, 57, 251.

Expert, 292.

Factory, 122, 191, 212, 233, 279, 306.

Failure, 35.

Fatigue, 63, 180, 192, 206, 211, 218.

Feeling, 147, 157, 253.

Fitness, 53, 60, 116.

Foresight, 64.

Grading, 103, 107.

Groups, 129.

Habits, 150, 182.

Handwriting, 134.

History, 248.

Household, 177.

Illusions, 277.

Imagination, 66.

Imitation, 236, 282.

Inclination, 126.

Individual differences, 8, 10, 28, 82, 125, 129, 199, 222.

Industrial experiments, 67.

Industry, 59, 160, 191.

Inhibition, 84, 162, 176, 203.

Injuries, 213.

Intelligence, 102.

Interest, 194.

Interference, 154.

Interruption, 183.

Intuition, 53.

Jurisdiction, 283.

Labels, 279, 282.

Labor legislation, 63.

Learning, 141, 147.

Legal psychology, 14, 282.

Localization of sound, 95.

Locomotives, 176.

Logic, 248.

Machine, 160, 162.

Mason, 164.

Meaning, 247.

Medical psychology, 12.

Memory, 101, 147, 171, 226, 227, 259.

Methods, 148.

Mills, 117.

Miniature models, 67.

Monotony, 190, 198.

Motormen, 63, 74.

Movement, 145, 161, 169, 180, 185.

Muscles, 160.

Nationality, 130.

Nervous disease, 13.

Newspaper, 259.

Noise, 173.

Number, 275.

Numerical results, 77.

Optics, 277.

Organization, 154.

Packing, 282.

Pauses, 214.

Pedagogy, 11, 146.

Personality, 112.

Position, 269.

Postal cards, 286.

Prejudices, 133.

Psychiatry, 12.

Psychological laboratories, 5, 45, 257, 304.

Psychophysical law, 252.

Psychotechnics, 17.

Qualities, 27.

Questionnaires, 43.

Race, 130.

Rapidity, 187.

Reaction-time, 54, 65.

Recognition, 268.

Repetition, 148, 162, 192, 262.

Rest, 217.

Rhythm, 162, 187.

Salesman, 294.

Satisfaction, 248.

Saving, 165, 184.

School, 128, 146, 219.

Scientific management, 49, 159, 164, 168, 297.

Selection, 51.

Self-knowledge, 30, 44.

Self-observation, 45.

Selling, 294.

Sewing, 178.

Sex, 132.

Shifting, 118.

Ship models, 67.

Ship service, 83.

Shoveling, 166.

Signals, 176.

Similarity, 283, 286.

Size, 261.

Sleep, 224.

Social influences, 221.

Speed, 169, 233.

Subdivision, 22.

Suggestion, 274, 295.

Task, 237.

Technical sciences, 17.

Technique, 158, 161.

Telegraphy, 150.

Telephone Service, 97.

Temperature, 223.

Tests, 76, 80, 105, 111.

Trade Unions, 50.

Training, 125, 141, 150.

Type-setting, 124.

Typewriting, 151, 170.

Uncertainty, 284.

Unfitness, 31.

Uniformity, 193. 199.

Values, 245.

Visibility, 172.

Vividness, 261.

Vocation, 32, 40, 58.

Vocational counselor, 41.

Vocational guidance, 37, 48.

Wages, 127, 165, 195, 235.

Waste, 38, 145, 160.

Will-impulse, 149, 227.

Witness, 14.

Women, 132, 161.

Working-day, 212, 296.