Reasons which have caused mankind to Create for themselves an Invisible
Being which has been commonly Called God.
I.
Those who ignore physical causes have a natural fear born of
doubt. Where there exists a power which to them is dark or unseen, from
thence comes a desire to pretend the existence of invisible Beings,
that is to say their own phantoms which they invoke in adversity, whom
they praise in prosperity, and of whom in the end they make Gods. And
as the visions of men go to extremes, must we be astonished if there
are created an innumerable quantity of Divinities? It is the same
perceptible fear of invisible powers which has been the origin of
Religions, that each forms to his fashion. Many individuals to whom
it was important that mankind should possess such fancies, have not
scrupled to encourage mankind in such beliefs, and they have made it
their law until they have prevailed upon the people to blindly obey
them by the fear of the future.
II.
The Gods having thus been invented, it is easy to imagine that they
resembled man, and who, like them, created everything for some purpose,
for they unanimously agree that God has made nothing except for man,
and reciprocally that man is made only for God. [21] This conclusion
being general, we can see why man has so thoroughly accepted it, and
know for that reason that they have taken occasion to create false
ideas of good and evil, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and
confusion, beauty and deformity--and similar qualities.
III.
It should be agreed that all men are born in profound ignorance, and
that the only thing natural to them is a desire to discover what may be
useful and proper, and evade what may be inexpedient to them. Thence
it follows first, that we believe that to be free it suffices to
feel personally that one can wish and desire without being annoyed
by the causes which dispose us to wish and desire, because we do not
know them. Second, it consequently occurs that men are contented
to do nothing but for one object, that is to say, for that object
which is preferable above all, and that is why they have a desire
only to know the final result of their action, imagining that after
discovering this they have no reason to doubt anything. Now as they
find in and about themselves many means of procuring what they desire:
having, for example, ears to hear, eyes to see, animals to nourish,
a sun to give light, they have formed this reasoning, that there is
nothing in nature which was not made for them, and of which they may
dispose and enjoy. Then reflecting that they did not make this world,
they believe it to be a well-founded proposition to imagine a Supreme
Being who has made it for them such as it is, for after satisfying
themselves that they could not have made it, they conclude that it
was the work of one or several Gods who intended it for the use and
pleasure of man alone. On the other hand, the nature of the Gods
whom man has admitted, being unknown, they have concluded in their
own minds that these Gods susceptible of the same passions as men,
have made the earth only for them, and that man to them was extremely
precious. But as each one has different inclinations it became proper
to adore God according to the humor of each, to attract his blessings
and to cause Him to make all Nature subject to his desires.
IV.
By this method this precedent becomes Superstition, and it is implanted
so that the grossest natures are believed capable of penetrating
the doctrine of final causes as if they had perfect knowledge. Thus
in place of showing that nature has made nothing in vain, they show
that God and Nature dream as well as men, and that they may not be
accused of doubting things, let us see how they have put forth their
false reasoning on this subject.
Experience causing them to see a myriad of inconveniences marring the
pleasure of life, such as storms, earthquakes, sickness, famine and
thirst, they draw the conclusion that nature has not been made for
them alone. They attribute all these evils to the wrath of the Gods,
who are vexed by the offences of man, and they cannot be disabused
of these ideas by the daily instances which should prove to them that
blessings and evils have been always common to the wicked and the good,
and they will not agree to a proposition so plain and perceptible.
The reason for that is, it is more easy to remain in ignorance than
to abolish a belief established for many centuries and introduce
something more probable.
V.
This precedent has caused another, which is the belief that the
judgments of God were incomprehensible, and that for this reason,
the knowledge of truth is beyond the human mind; and mankind would
still dwell in error were it not that mathematics and several other
sciences had destroyed these prejudices.
VI.
By this it may be seen that Nature or God does not propose any end,
and that all final causes are but human fictions. A long lecture is
not necessary since this doctrine takes away from God the perfection
ascribed to him, and this is how it may be proved. If God acted for
a result, either for himself or another, he desires what he has
not, and we must allow that there are times when God has not the
wherewith to act; he has merely desired it and that only creates an
impotent God. To omit nothing that may be applied to this reasoning,
let us oppose it with those of a contrary nature. If, for example,
a stone falls on a person and kills him, it is well known they say,
that the stone fell with the design of killing the man, and that
could only happen by the will of God. If you reply that the wind
caused the stone to drop at the moment the man passed, they will
ask why the man should have passed precisely at the time when the
wind moved the stone. If you say that the wind was so severe that
the sea was also troubled since the day before while there appeared
to be no agitation in the air, and the man having been invited to
dine with a friend, went to keep his appointment. Again they ask,
for the man never got there, why he should be the guest of his friend
at this time more than another, adding questions after questions,
finally avowing that it was but the will of God, (which is a true
"asses bridge") and the cause of this misfortune.
Again when they note the symmetry of the human body, they stand in
admiration and conclude how ignorant they are of the causes of a thing
which to them appears so marvelous, that it is a supernatural work,
in which the causes known to us could have no part.
Thence it comes that those who desire to know the real cause of
supposed miracles and penetrate like true scholars into their natural
causes without amusing themselves with the prejudice of the ignorant,
it happens that the true scholar passes for impious and heretical
by the malice of those whom the vulgar recognize as the expounders
of Nature and of God. These mercenary individuals do not question
the ignorance which holds the people in astonishment, upon whom they
subsist and who preserve their credit.
VII.
Mankind being thus of the ridiculous opinion that all they see is
made for themselves, have made it a religious duty to apply it to
their interest, and of judging the price of things by the profit they
gain. Thence proceed the ideas they have formed of good, and evil, of
order and confusion, of heat and cold, of beauty and ugliness, which
serve to explain to them the nature of things, which in the end are not
what they imagine. Because they pride themselves in having free will
they judge themselves capable of deciding between praise and blame, sin
and merit, calling everything good which redounds to their profit and
which concerns divine worship, and to the contrary denominate as evil
that which agrees with neither. Because the ignorant are not capable
of judging what may be a little abstruse, and having no idea of things
only by the aid of imagination which they consider understanding,
these folk who know not what represents Order in the world believe
all that they imagine. Man being inclined in such a manner that
they think things well or ill ordered as they have the facility or
trouble to conclude when good sense would teach differently. Some
are more pleased to be weary of the means of investigation, being
satisfied to remain as they are, preferring order to confusion, as
if order was another thing than a pure effect of the imagination of
man, so that when it is said that God has made everything in order,
it is recognizing that he has that faculty of imagination as well as
man. If it was not so, perhaps to favor human imagination they pretend
that God created this world in the easiest manner imaginable, although
there are an hundred things far above the force of imagination, and
an infinity which may be thrown into disorder by reason of weakness.
VIII.
For other ideas, they are purely the effect of the same imagination,
which have nothing real, and which are but the different modes
of which this power is capable. For example, if the movement which
objects impress upon the nerves by the means of the eyes is agreeable
to the senses, we say that these objects are beautiful, that odors
are good or bad, that tastes are sweet or bitter, that which we
touch hard or soft, sounds, harsh or agreeable. According as odors,
tastes or sounds strike and penetrate the senses, just so we find
a belief that God is capable of taking pleasure in melody, that the
celestial movements are a harmonious concert, proof evident that each
one believes that things are such as they are imagined, or that the
world is purely imaginary. That is why we should not be surprised if
we rarely found two men of the same opinion, and some who glorify
themselves in doubting everything. For while men have bodies which
resemble each other in many particulars, they differ in some others,
and it should not astonish us that what seems good to one appears bad
to another: what pleases this one displeases the other, from which
we may infer that opinions only differ by fancy, that understanding
passes for little, and to conclude, things which happen every day are
purely the effects of imagination. If one should consult the lights
of understanding of philosophers he would have faith that everybody
would agree to the truth, and that judgments would be more uniform
and reasonable than they are.
IX.
It is then evident that all the reasons of which men are accustomed
to avail themselves when they endeavor to explain Nature, are only
methods of imagination which prove nothing less than they pretend,
and because they have given to these reasons names so real that if
they existed otherwise than in imagination I would not call them
reasonable beings, but purely chimerical, seeing nothing more easy
than to respond to arguments founded on these vulgar notions and
which we oppose as follows.
If it was true that the universe was a chance happening, and a
necessary sequel of divine nature, whence come the imperfections and
faults which we remark? For example, corruption which fills the air
with bad odor, many disagreeable objects, so many disorders, so much
evil, so many crimes and other like occurrences. Nothing is more easy
than to refute these objections, for one cannot judge of the perfection
of ancient existence only by knowing its essence and nature, and we
deceive ourselves in thinking that a thing is more or less perfect,
as it pleases or displeases, is useful or useless to human nature;
and to close the mouths of those who ask why God has not created
all men without exception that they might be guided by the light
of reason, it is enough to say that it was because the material was
not sufficient to give each being the degree of perfection that was
most suitable for him, or to speak more proper, because the laws of
nature were so ample and extensive that they could suffice for the
production of all things of which an infinite understanding is capable.