_PFC Richard B. Anderson was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor
for sacrificing his life when he threw himself upon a live Japanese
hand grenade, in order to protect his fellow Marines._]
[Illustration: _1stLt John V. Power, after being seriously wounded
attacking one pillbox, held his hand over his wound and went on to
attack a second one. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 307689
]
[Illustration: _Pvt Richard K. Sorenson saved the lives of five Marines
by throwing himself on a Japanese grenade which was thrown into the
shell crater they occupied. He was awarded the Medal of Honor and later
recovered from his terrible wounds._
Marine Corps Historical Collection
]
The successful battle for both ends of Kwajalein Atoll had been
concluded, and a series of conclusions were drawn from it. Japanese
deaths reached a total of 8,122, some 27 times the number of Americans
killed. The relatively small scale of U.S. casualties gave Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz the ready forces he needed to push forward rapidly
with plans for further action: first, one more atoll in the Marshalls,
and then quickly on to the vital Mariana Islands, the linchpin of
Japan’s inner line of defense. Kwajalein would provide the air base
from which the B-29 bombers would conduct their raids on the Marianas,
and the Army 7th Infantry Division and the 4th Marine Division would
play key roles in those future operations.
Tactically, there were a variety of innovations in the twin battles
at Kwajalein, and these would continue to prove valuable in the
future. There was the first use of Navy underwater demolition teams;
the first use of DUKWs in combat; the first use of command ships with
special communications equipment to control the battle; the first use
of airplanes to control naval gunfire; and the first use of armored
amphibian tractors (LVTAs). In addition, the two battles saw the debut
of new units designed to facilitate crucial communications during
combat. These were the Joint Assault Signal Companies. The official
Marine history of the Marshalls campaign described their complex
responsibilities:
The primary mission of this unit was to coordinate all supporting
fires available to a Marine division during an amphibious
operation. In order to carry out this function, the company
was divided into Shore and Beach Party Communications Teams,
Air Liaison Parties, and Shore Fire Control Parties.... During
training, the various teams were attached to the regiments and
battalions of the division. Thus each assault battalion could
become familiar with its shore and beach party, air liaison, and
fire control teams.
Another new element was the way rockets were used. This was a
centuries-old technique of bombardment, but in the Marshalls the 4th
Marine Division was the first American division to use rockets mounted
on jeeps, pick-up trucks, and Navy gunboats in combat.
One other Marine resource was unique: the use of Navajo Indian “code
talkers” in battle. They proved a perfect foil for the Japanese ability
in previous battles to understand Marine voice-to-voice communications
and Morse Code. To prevent this a group of Navajo Indians had been
recruited and trained in special code words they could use in combat.
When they were talking in the Navajo’s exotic language, no Japanese
would ever decipher the message! At Roi-Namur their walkie-talkie
portable radios carried the urgent instructions back and forth between
ship and shore, as well as between higher echelons and subordinate
units, and did it so quickly that previous delays of up to 12 hours
(intercepting, transmitting, and deciphering messages) were eliminated.
Finally, the two battles for Kwajalein Atoll proved incontestably the
effectiveness of prolonged and massive preinvasion naval gunfire and
aerial bombing. The U.S. planes and warships had so thoroughly scoured
not only the target islands, but also the other Japanese air bases in
the Marshalls, that not a single Japanese plane was able to attack the
American surface forces in the campaign.
[Illustration: