"In republics, it is a fundamental principle, that the majority govern,
and that the minority comply with the general voice. How contrary,
then, to republican principles, how humiliating, is our present
situation! A single State can rise up, and put a veto upon the most
important public measures. We have seen this actually take place; a
single State has controlled the general voice of the Union; a minority,
a very small minority, has governed us. So far is this from being
consistent with republican principles, that it is, in effect, the worst
species of monarchy.
"Hence we see how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle. No
man pretends the contrary. We all see and feel this necessity. The only
question is, Shall it be a coercion of law, or a coercion of arms?
There is no other possible alternative. Where will those who oppose a
coercion of law come out? Where will they end? A necessary consequence
of their principles is a war of the States one against another. I am
for coercion by law; that coercion which acts only upon delinquent
individuals. This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign
bodies, States, in their political capacity. No coercion is applicable
to such bodies, but that of an armed force. If we should attempt to
execute the laws of the Union by sending an armed force against a
delinquent State, it would involve the good and bad, the innocent and
guilty, in the same calamity. But this legal coercion singles out the
guilty individual, and punishes him for breaking the laws of the Union."
Indeed, Sir, if we look to all contemporary history, to the numbers of
the Federalist, to the debates in the conventions, to the publications
of friends and foes, they all agree, that a change had been made from a
confederacy of States to a different system; they all agree, that the
Convention had formed a Constitution for a national government. With
this result some were satisfied, and some were dissatisfied; but all
admitted that the thing had been done. In none of these various
productions and publications did any one intimate that the new
Constitution was but another compact between States in their sovereign
capacities. I do not find such an opinion advanced in a single
instance. Everywhere, the people were told that the old Confederation
was to be abandoned, and a new system to be tried; that a proper
government was proposed, to be founded in the name of the people, and
to have a regular organization of its own. Everywhere, the people were
told that it was to be a government with direct powers to make laws
over individuals, and to lay taxes and imposts without the consent of
the States. Everywhere, it was understood to be a popular Constitution.
It came to the people for their adoption, and was to rest on the same
deep foundation as the State constitutions themselves. Its most
distinguished advocates, who had been themselves members of the
Convention, declared that the very object of submitting the
Constitution to the people was, to preclude the possibility of its
being regarded as a mere compact. "However gross a heresy," say the
writers of the Federalist, "it may be to maintain that a party to a
_compact_ has a right to revoke that _compact_, the doctrine itself has
had respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature
proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national
government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The
fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE
CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE."
Such is the language, Sir, addressed to the people, while they yet had
the Constitution under consideration. The powers conferred on the new
government were perfectly well understood to be conferred, not by any
State, or the people of any State, but by the people of the United
States. Virginia is more explicit, perhaps, in this particular, than
any other State. Her convention, assembled to ratify the Constitution,
"in the name and behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make
known, that the powers granted under the Constitution, _being derived
from the people of the United States_, may be resumed by them whenever
the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression."
Is this language which describes the formation of a compact between
States? or language describing the grant of powers to a new government,
by the whole people of the United States?
Among all the other ratifications, there is not one which speaks of the
Constitution as a compact between States. Those of Massachusetts and
New Hampshire express the transaction, in my opinion, with sufficient
accuracy. They recognize the Divine goodness "in affording THE PEOPLE
OF THE UNITED STATES an opportunity of entering into an explicit and
solemn compact with each other _by assenting to and ratifying a new
Constitution_." You will observe, Sir, that it is the PEOPLE, and not
the States, who have entered into this compact; and it is the PEOPLE of
all the United States. These conventions, by this form of expression,
meant merely to say, that the people of the United States had, by the
blessing of Providence, enjoyed the opportunity of establishing a new
Constitution, _founded in the consent of the people_. This consent of
the people has been called, by European writers, the _social compact_;
and, in conformity to this common mode of expression, these conventions
speak of that assent, on which the new Constitution was to rest, as an
explicit and solemn compact, not which the States had entered into with
each other, but which the _people_ of the United States had entered
into.
Finally, Sir, how can any man get over the words of the Constitution
itself?--"WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH
THIS CONSTITUTION." These words must cease to be a part of the
Constitution, they must be obliterated from the parchment on which they
are written, before any human ingenuity or human argument can remove
the popular basis on which that Constitution rests, and turn the
instrument into a mere compact between sovereign States.
The second proposition, Sir, which I propose to maintain, is, that no
State authority can dissolve the relations subsisting between the
government of the United States and individuals; that nothing can
dissolve these relations but revolution; and that, therefore, there can
be no such thing as _secession_ without revolution. All this follows,
as it seems to me, as a just consequence, if it be first proved that
the Constitution of the United States is a government proper, owing
protection to individuals, and entitled to their obedience.
The people, Sir, in every State, live under two governments. They owe
obedience to both. These governments, though distinct, are not adverse.
Each has its separate sphere, and its peculiar powers and duties. It is
not a contest between two sovereigns for the same power, like the wars
of the rival houses of England; nor is it a dispute between a
government _de facto_ and a government _de jure_. It is the case of a
division of powers between two governments, made by the people, to whom
both are responsible. Neither can dispense with the duty which
individuals owe to the other; neither can call itself master of the
other; the people are masters of both. This division of power, it is
true, is in a great measure unknown in Europe. It is the peculiar
system of America; and, though new and singular, it is not
incomprehensible. The State constitutions are established by the people
of the States. This Constitution is established by the people of all
the States. How, then, can a State secede? How can a State undo what
the whole people have done? How can she absolve her citizens from their
obedience to the laws of the United States? How can she annul their
obligations and oaths? How can the members of her legislature renounce
their own oaths? Sir, secession, as a revolutionary right, is
intelligible; as a right to be proclaimed in the midst of civil
commotions, and asserted at the head of armies, I can understand it.
But as a practical right, existing under the Constitution, and in
conformity with its provisions, it seems to me to be nothing but a
plain absurdity; for it supposes resistance to government, under the
authority of government itself; it supposes dismemberment, without
violating the principles of union; it supposes opposition to law,
without crime; it supposes the violation of oaths, without
responsibility; it supposes the total overthrow of government, without
revolution. The Constitution, Sir, regards itself as perpetual and
immortal. It seeks to establish a union among the people of the States,
which shall last through all time. Or, if the common fate of things
human must be expected at some period to happen to it, yet that
catastrophe is not anticipated.
The instrument contains ample provisions for its amendment, at all
times; none for its abandonment at any time. It declares that new
States may come into the Union, but it does not declare that old States
may go out. The Union is not a temporary partnership of States. It is
the association of the people, under a constitution of government,
uniting their power, joining together their highest interests,
cementing their present enjoyments, and blending, in one indivisible
mass, all their hopes for the future. Whatsoever is steadfast in just
political principles; whatsoever is permanent in the structure of human
society; whatsoever there is which can derive an enduring character
from being founded on deep-laid principles of constitutional liberty
and on the broad foundations of the public will,--all these unite to
entitle this instrument to be regarded as a permanent constitution of
government.
In the next place, Mr. President, I contend that there is a supreme law
of the land, consisting of the Constitution, acts of Congress passed in
pursuance of it, and the public treaties. This will not be denied,
because such are the very words of the Constitution. But I contend,
further, that it rightfully belongs to Congress, and to the courts of
the United States, to settle the construction of this supreme law, in
doubtful cases. This is denied; and here arises the great practical
question, _Who is to construe finally the Constitution of the United
States_? We all agree that the Constitution is the supreme law; but who
shall interpret that law? In our system of the division of powers
between different governments, controversies will necessarily sometimes
arise, respecting the extent of the powers of each. Who shall decide
these controversies? Does it rest with the general government, in all
or any of its departments, to exercise the office of final interpreter?
Or may each of the States, as well as the general government, claim
this right of ultimate decision? The practical result of this whole
debate turns on this point. The gentleman contends that each State may
judge for itself of any alleged violation of the Constitution, and may
finally decide for itself, and may execute its own decisions by its own
power. All the recent proceedings in South Carolina are founded on this
claim of right. Her convention has pronounced the revenue laws of the
United States unconstitutional; and this decision she does not allow
any authority of the United States to overrule or reverse. Of course
she rejects the authority of Congress, because the very object of the
ordinance is to reverse the decision of Congress; and she rejects, too,
the authority of the courts of the United States, because she expressly
prohibits all appeal to those courts. It is in order to sustain this
asserted right of being her own judge, that she pronounces the
Constitution of the United States to be but a compact, to which she is
a party, and a sovereign party. If this be established, then the
inference is supposed to follow, that, being sovereign, there is no
power to control her decision; and her own judgment on her own compact
is, and must be, conclusive.
I have already endeavored, Sir, to point out the practical consequences
of this doctrine, and to show how utterly inconsistent it is with all
ideas of regular government, and how soon its adoption would involve
the whole country in revolution and absolute anarchy. I hope it is easy
now to show, Sir, that a doctrine bringing such consequences with it is
not well founded; that it has nothing to stand on but theory and
assumption; and that it is refuted by plain and express constitutional
provisions. I think the government of the United States does possess,
in its appropriate departments, the authority of final decision on
questions of disputed power. I think it possesses this authority, both
by necessary implication and by express grant.
It will not be denied, Sir, that this authority naturally belongs to
all governments. They all exercise it from necessity, and as a
consequence of the exercise of other powers. The State governments
themselves possess it, except in that class of questions which may
arise between them and the general government, and in regard to which
they have surrendered it, as well by the nature of the case as by clear
constitutional provisions. In other and ordinary cases, whether a
particular law be in conformity to the constitution of the State is a
question which the State legislature or the State judiciary must
determine. We all know that these questions arise daily in the State
governments, and are decided by those governments; and I know no
government which does not exercise a similar power.
Upon general principles, then, the government of the United States
possesses this authority; and this would hardly be denied were it not
that there are other governments. But since there are State
governments, and since these, like other governments, ordinarily
construe their own powers, if the government of the United States
construes its own powers also, which construction is to prevail in the
case of opposite constructions? And again, as in the case now actually
before us, the State governments may undertake, not only to construe
their own powers, but to decide directly on the extent of the powers of
Congress. Congress has passed a law as being within its just powers;
South Carolina denies that this law is within its just powers, and
insists that she has the right so to decide this point, and that her
decision is final. How are these questions to be settled?
In my opinion, Sir, even if the Constitution of the United States had
made no express provision for such cases, it would yet be difficult to
maintain, that, in a Constitution existing over four-and-twenty States,
with equal authority over all, one could claim a right of construing it
for the whole. This would seem a manifest impropriety; indeed, an
absurdity. If the Constitution is a government existing over all the
States, though with limited powers, it necessarily follows, that, to
the extent of those powers, it must be supreme. If it be not superior
to the authority of a particular State, it is not a national
government. But as it is a government, as it has a legislative power of
its own, and a judicial power coextensive with the legislative, the
inference is irresistible that this government, thus created _by_ the
whole and _for_ the whole, must have an authority superior to that of
the particular government of any one part. Congress is the legislature
of all the people of the United States; the judiciary of the general
government is the judiciary of all the people of the United States. To
hold, therefore, that this legislature and this judiciary are
subordinate in authority to the legislature and judiciary of a single
State, is doing violence to all common sense, and overturning all
established principles. Congress must judge of the extent of its own
powers so often as it is called on to exercise them, or it cannot act
at all; and it must also act independent of State control, or it cannot
act at all.
The right of State interposition strikes at the very foundation of the
legislative power of Congress. It possesses no effective legislative
power, if such right of State interposition exists; because it can pass
no law not subject to abrogation. It cannot make laws for the Union, if
any part of the Union may pronounce its enactments void and of no
effect. Its forms of legislation would be an idle ceremony, if, after
all, any one of four-and-twenty States might bid defiance to its
authority. Without express provision in the Constitution, therefore,
Sir, this whole question is necessarily decided by those provisions
which create a legislative power and a judicial power. If these exist
in a government intended for the whole, the inevitable consequence is,
that the laws of this legislative power and the decisions of this
judicial power must be binding on and over the whole. No man can form
the conception of a government existing over four-and-twenty States,
with a regular legislative and judicial power, and of the existence at
the same time of an authority, residing elsewhere, to resist, at
pleasure or discretion, the enactments and the decisions of such a
government. I maintain, therefore, Sir, that, from the nature of the
case, and as an inference wholly unavoidable, the acts of Congress and
the decisions of the national courts must be of higher authority than
State laws and State decisions. If this be not so, there is, there can
be, no general government.
But, Mr. President, the Constitution has not left this cardinal point
without full and explicit provisions. First, as to the authority of
Congress. Having enumerated the specific powers conferred on Congress,
the Constitution adds, as a distinct and substantive clause, the
following, viz.: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or
in any department or officer thereof." If this means anything, it means
that Congress may judge of the true extent and just interpretation of
the specific powers granted to it, and may judge also of what is
necessary and proper for executing those powers. If Congress is to
judge of what is necessary for the execution of its powers, it must, of
necessity, judge of the extent and interpretation of those powers.
And in regard, Sir, to the judiciary, the Constitution is still more
express and emphatic. It declares that the judicial power shall extend
to all _cases_ in law or equity arising under the Constitution, laws of
the United States, and treaties; that there shall be _one_ Supreme
Court, and that this Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of
all these cases, subject to such exceptions as Congress may make. It is
impossible to escape from the generality of these words. If a case
arises under the Constitution, that is, if a case arises depending on
the construction of the Constitution, the judicial power of the United
States extends to it. It reaches _the case, the question_; it attaches
the power of the national judicature to the _case_ itself, in whatever
court it may arise or exist; and in this _case_ the Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction over all courts whatever. No language could
provide with more effect and precision than is here done, for
subjecting constitutional questions to the ultimate decision of the
Supreme Court. And, Sir, this is exactly what the Convention found it
necessary to provide for, and intended to provide for. It is, too,
exactly what the people were universally told was done when they
adopted the Constitution. One of the first resolutions adopted by the
Convention was in these words, viz.: "That the jurisdiction of the
national judiciary shall extend to cases which respect _the collection
of the national revenue_, and questions which involve the national
peace and harmony." Now, Sir, this either had no sensible meaning at
all, or else it meant that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary
should extend to these questions, _with a paramount authority_. It is
not to be supposed that the Convention intended that the power of the
national judiciary should extend to these questions, and that the power
of the judicatures of the States should also extend to them, _with
equal power of final decision_. This would be to defeat the whole
object of the provision. There were thirteen judicatures already in
existence. The evil complained of, or the danger to be guarded against,
was contradiction and repugnance in the decisions of these judicatures.
If the framers of the Constitution meant to create a fourteenth, and
yet not to give it power to revise and control the decisions of the
existing thirteen, then they only intended to augment the existing evil
and the apprehended danger by increasing still further the chances of
discordant judgments. Why, Sir, has it become a settled axiom in
politics that every government must have a judicial power coextensive
with its legislative power? Certainly, there is only this reason,
namely, that the laws may receive a uniform interpretation and a
uniform execution. This object cannot be otherwise attained. A statute
is what it is judicially interpreted to be; and if it be construed one
way in New Hampshire, and another way in Georgia, there is no uniform
law. One supreme court, with appellate and final jurisdiction, is the
natural and only adequate means, in any government, to secure this
uniformity. The Convention saw all this clearly; and the resolution
which I have quoted, never afterwards rescinded, passed through various
modifications, till it finally received the form which the article now
bears in the Constitution.
It is undeniably true, then, that the framers of the Constitution
intended to create a national judicial power, which should be paramount
on national subjects. And after the Constitution was framed, and while
the whole country was engaged in discussing its merits, one of its most
distinguished advocates, Mr. Madison, told the people that it _was
true, that, in controversies relating to the boundary between the two
jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide is to be
established under the general government_. Mr. Martin, who had been a
member of the Convention, asserted the same thing to be the legislature
of Maryland, and urged it as a reason for rejecting the Constitution.
Mr. Pinckney, himself also a leading member of the Convention, declared
it to the people of South Carolina. Everywhere it was admitted, by
friends and foes, that this power was in the Constitution. By some it
was thought dangerous, by most it was thought necessary; but by all it
was agreed to be a power actually contained in the instrument. The
Convention saw the absolute necessity of some control in the national
government over State laws. Different modes of establishing this
control were suggested and considered. At one time, it was proposed
that the laws of the States should, from time to time, be laid before
Congress, and that Congress should possess a negative over them. But
this was thought inexpedient and inadmissible; and in its place, and
expressly as a substitute for it, the existing provision was
introduced; that is to say, a provision by which the federal courts
should have authority to overrule such State laws as might be in
manifest contravention of the Constitution. The writers of the
Federalist, in explaining the Constitution, while it was yet pending
before the people, and still unadopted, give this account of the matter
in terms, and assign this reason for the article as it now stands. By
this provision Congress escaped the necessity of any revision of State
laws, left the whole sphere of State legislation quite untouched, and
yet obtained a security against any infringement of the constitutional
power of the general government. Indeed, Sir, allow me to ask again, if
the national judiciary was not to exercise a power of revision on
constitutional questions over the judicatures of the States, why was
any national judicature erected at all? Can any man give a sensible
reason for having a judicial power in this government, unless it be for
the sake of maintaining a uniformity of decision on questions arising
under the Constitution and laws of Congress, and insuring its
execution? And does not this very idea of uniformity necessarily imply
that the construction given by the national courts is to be the
prevailing construction? How else, Sir, is it possible that uniformity
can be preserved?
Gentlemen appear to me, Sir, to look at but one side of the question.
They regard only the supposed danger of trusting a government with the
interpretation of its own powers. But will they view the question in
its other aspect? Will they show us how it is possible for a government
to get along with four-and-twenty interpreters of its laws and powers?
Gentlemen argue, too, as if, in these cases, the State would be always
right, and the general government always wrong. But suppose the
reverse,--suppose the State wrong (and, since they differ, some of them
must be wrong),--are the most important and essential operations of the
government to be embarrassed and arrested, because one State holds the
contrary opinion? Mr. President, every argument which refers the
constitutionality of acts of Congress to State decision appeals from
the majority to the minority; it appeals from the common interest to a
particular interest; from the counsels of all to the counsel of one;
and endeavors to supersede the judgment of the whole by the judgment of
a part.
I think it is clear, Sir, that the Constitution, by express provision,
by definite and unequivocal words, as well as by necessary implication,
has constituted the Supreme Court of the United States the appellate
tribunal in all cases of a constitutional nature which assume the shape
of a suit, in law or equity. And I think I cannot do better than to
leave this part of the subject by reading the remarks made upon it in
the convention of Connecticut, by Mr. Ellsworth; a gentleman, Sir, who
has left behind him, on the records of the government of his country,
proofs of the clearest intelligence and the deepest sagacity, as well
as of the utmost purity and integrity of character. "This
Constitution," says he, "defines the extent of the powers of the
general government. If the general legislature should, at any time,
overleap their limits, the judicial department is a constitutional
check. If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law
which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the
judiciary power, the national judges, who, to secure their
impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to be void.
On the other hand, if the States go beyond their limits, if they make a
law which is a usurpation upon the general government, the law is void;
and upright, independent judges will declare it to be so." Nor did this
remain merely matter of private opinion. In the very first session of
the first Congress, with all these well-known objects, both of the
Convention and the people, full and fresh in his mind, Mr. Ellsworth,
as is generally understood, reported the bill for the organization of
the judicial department, and in that bill made provision for the
exercise of this appellate power of the Supreme Court, in all the
proper cases, in whatsoever court arising; and this appellate power has
now been exercised for more than forty years, without interruption, and
without doubt.
As to the cases, Sir, which do not come before the courts, those
political questions which terminate with the enactments of Congress, it
is of necessity that these should be ultimately decided by Congress
itself. Like other legislatures, it must be trusted with this power.
The members of Congress are chosen by the people, and they are
answerable to the people; like other public agents, they are bound by
oath to support the Constitution. These are the securities that they
will not violate their duty, nor transcend their powers. They are the
same securities that prevail in other popular governments; nor is it
easy to see how grants of power can be more safely guarded, without
rendering them nugatory. If the case cannot come before the courts, and
if Congress be not trusted with its decision, who shall decide it? The
gentleman says, each State is to decide it for herself. If so, then, as
I have already urged, what is law in one State is not law in another.
Or, if the resistance of one State compels an entire repeal of the law,
then a minority, and that a small one, governs the whole country.
Sir, those who espouse the doctrines of nullification reject, as it
seems to me, the first great principle of all republican liberty; that
is, that the majority _must_ govern. In matters of common concern, the
judgment of a majority _must_ stand as the judgment of the whole. This
is a law imposed on us by the absolute necessity of the case; and if we
do not act upon it, there is no possibility of maintaining any
government but despotism. We hear loud and repeated denunciations
against what is called _majority government_. It is declared, with much
warmth, that a majority government cannot be maintained in the United
States. What, then, do gentlemen wish? Do they wish to establish a
_minority_ government? Do they wish to subject the will of the many to
the will of the few? The honorable gentleman from South Carolina has
spoken of absolute majorities and majorities concurrent; language
wholly unknown to our Constitution, and to which it is not easy to
affix definite ideas. As far as I understand it, it would teach us that
the absolute majority may be found in Congress, but the majority
concurrent must be looked for in the States; that is to say, Sir,
stripping the matter of this novelty of phrase, that the dissent of one
or more States, as States, renders void the decision of a majority of
Congress, so far as that State is concerned. And so this doctrine,
running but a short career, like other dogmas of the day, terminates in
nullification.
If this vehement invective against _majorities_ meant no more than
that, in the construction of government, it is wise to provide checks
and balances, so that there should be various limitations on the power
of the mere majority, it would only mean what the Constitution of the
United States has already abundantly provided. It is full of such
checks and balances. In its very organization, it adopts a broad and
most effective principle in restraint of the power of mere majorities.
A majority of the people elects the House of Representatives, but it
does not elect the Senate. The Senate is elected by the States, each
State having, in this respect, an equal power. No law, therefore, can
pass, without the assent of the representatives of the people, and a
majority of the representatives of the States also. A majority of the
representatives of the people must concur, and a majority of the States
must concur, in every act of Congress; and the President is elected on
a plan compounded of both these principles. But having composed one
house of representatives chosen by the people in each State, according
to their numbers, and the other of an equal number of members from
every State, whether larger or smaller, the Constitution gives to
majorities in these houses thus constituted the full and entire power
of passing laws, subject always to the constitutional restrictions and
to the approval of the President. To subject them to any other power is
clear usurpation. The majority of one house may be controlled by the
majority of the other; and both may be restrained by the President's
negative. These are checks and balances provided by the Constitution,
existing in the government itself, and wisely intended to secure
deliberation and caution in legislative proceedings. But to resist the
will of the majority in both houses, thus constitutionally exercised;
to insist on the lawfulness of interposition by an extraneous power; to
claim the right of defeating the will of Congress, by setting up
against it the will of a single State,--is neither more nor less, as it
strikes me, than a plain attempt to overthrow the government. The
constituted authorities of the United States are no longer a
government, if they be not masters of their own will; they are no
longer a government, if an external power may arrest their proceedings;
they are no longer a government, if acts passed by both houses, and
approved by the President, may be nullified by State vetoes or State
ordinances. Does any one suppose it could make any difference, as to
the binding authority of an act of Congress, and of the duty of a State
to respect it, whether it passed by a mere majority of both houses, or
by three fourths of each, or the unanimous vote of each? Within the
limits and restrictions of the Constitution, the government of the
United States, like all other popular governments, acts by majorities.
It can act no otherwise. Whoever, therefore, denounces the government
of majorities, denounces the government of his own country, and
denounces all free governments. And whoever would restrain these
majorities, while acting within their constitutional limits, by an
external power, whatever he may intend, asserts principles which, if
adopted, can lead to nothing else than the destruction of the
government itself.
Does not the gentleman perceive, Sir, how his argument against
majorities might here be retorted upon him? Does he not see how
cogently he might be asked, whether it be the character of
nullification to practise what it preaches? Look to South Carolina, at
the present moment. How far are the rights of minorities there
respected? I confess, sir, I have not known, in peaceable times, the
power of the majority carried with a higher hand, or upheld with more
relentless disregard of the rights, feelings, and principles of the
minority;--a minority embracing, as the gentleman himself will admit, a
large portion of the worth and respectability of the state;--a minority
comprehending in its numbers men who have been associated with him, and
with us, in these halls of legislation; men who have served their
country at home and honored it abroad; men who would cheerfully lay
down their lives for their native state, in any cause which they could
regard as the cause of honor and duty; men above fear, and above
reproach, whose deepest grief and distress spring from the conviction,
that the present proceedings of the state must ultimately reflect
discredit upon her. How is this minority, how are these men, regarded?
They are enthralled and disfranchised by ordinances and acts of
legislation; subjected to tests and oaths incompatible, as they
conscientiously think, with oaths already taken, and obligations
already assumed; they are proscribed and denounced as recreants to duty
and patriotism, and slaves to a foreign power. Both the spirit which
pursues them, and the positive measures which emanate from that spirit,
are harsh and proscriptive beyond all precedent within my knowledge,
except in periods of professed revolution.
It is not, sir, one would think, for those who approve these
proceedings to complain of the power of majorities.
Mr. President, all popular governments rest on two principles, or two
assumptions:--
First, That there is so far a common interest among those over whom the
government extends, as that it may provide for the defence, protection,
and good government of the whole, without injustice or oppression to
parts; and
Secondly, That the representatives of the people, and especially the
people themselves, are secure against general corruption, and may be
trusted, therefore, with the exercise of power.
Whoever argues against these principles argues against the
practicability of all free governments. And whoever admits these, must
admit, or cannot deny, that power is as safe in the hands of Congress
as in those of other representative bodies. Congress is not
irresponsible. Its members are agents of the people, elected by them,
answerable to them, and liable to be displaced or superseded, at their
pleasure; and they possess as fair a claim to the confidence of the
people, while they continue to deserve it, as any other public
political agents.
If, then, Sir, the manifest intention of the Convention, and the
contemporary admission of both friends and foes, prove anything; if the
plain text of the instrument itself, as well as the necessary
implication from other provisions, prove anything; if the early
legislation of Congress, the course of judicial decisions, acquiesced
in by all the States for forty years, prove any thing,--then it is
proved that there is a supreme law, and a final interpreter.
My fourth and last proposition, Mr. President, was, that any attempt by
a State to abrogate or nullify acts of Congress is a usurpation on the
powers of the general government and on the equal rights of other
States, a violation of the Constitution, and a proceeding essentially
revolutionary. This is undoubtedly true, if the preceding propositions
be regarded as proved. If the government of the United States be
trusted with the duty, in any department, of declaring the extent of
its own powers, then a State ordinance, or act of legislation,
authorizing resistance to an act of Congress, on the alleged ground of
its unconstitutionality, is manifestly a usurpation upon its powers. If
the States have equal rights in matters concerning the whole, then for
one State to set up her judgment against the judgment of the rest, and
to insist on executing that judgment by force, is also a manifest
usurpation on the rights of other States. If the Constitution of the
United States be a government proper, with authority to pass laws, and
to give them a uniform interpretation and execution, then the
interposition of a State, to enforce her own construction, and to
resist, as to herself, that law which binds the other States, is a
violation of the Constitution.
If that be revolutionary which arrests the legislative, executive, and
judicial power of government, dispenses with existing oaths and
obligations of obedience, and elevates another power to supreme
dominion, then nullification is revolutionary. Or if that be
revolutionary the natural tendency and practical effect of which are to
break the Union into fragments, to sever all connection among the
people of the respective States, and to prostrate this general
government in the dust, then nullification is revolutionary.
Nullification, Sir, is as distinctly revolutionary as secession; but I
cannot say that the revolution which it seeks is one of so respectable
a character. Secession would, it is true, abandon the Constitution
altogether; but then it would profess to abandon it. Whatever other
inconsistencies it might run into, one, at least, it would avoid. It
would not belong to a government, while it rejected its authority. It
would not repel the burden, and continue to enjoy the benefits. It
would not aid in passing laws which others are to obey, and yet reject
their authority as to itself. It would not undertake to reconcile
obedience to public authority with an asserted right of command over
that same authority. It would not be in the government, and above the
government, at the same time. But though secession may be a more
respectable mode of attaining the object than nullification, it is not
more truly revolutionary. Each, and both, resist the constitutional
authorities; each, and both, would sever the Union and subvert the
government.
Mr. President, having detained the Senate so long already, I will not
now examine at length the ordinance and laws of South Carolina. These
papers are well drawn for their purpose. Their authors understood their
own objects. They are called a peaceable remedy, and we have been told
that South Carolina, after all, intends nothing but a lawsuit. A very
few words, Sir, will show the nature of this peaceable remedy, and of
the lawsuit which South Carolina contemplates.
In the first place, the ordinance declares the law of last July, and
all other laws of the United States laying duties, to be absolutely
null and void, and makes it unlawful for the constituted authorities of
the United States to enforce the payment of such duties. It is
therefore, Sir, an indictable offence, at this moment, in South
Carolina, for any person to be concerned in collecting revenue under
the laws of the United States. It being declared, by what is considered
a fundamental law of the State, unlawful to collect these duties, an
indictment lies, of course, against any one concerned in such
collection; and he is, on general principles, liable to be punished by
fine and imprisonment. The terms, it is true, are, that it is unlawful
"to enforce the payment of duties"; but every custom-house officer
enforces payment while he detains the goods in order to obtain such
payment. The ordinance, therefore, reaches everybody concerned in the
collection of the duties.
This is the first step in the prosecution of the peaceable remedy. The
second is more decisive. By the act commonly called _replevin_ law, any
person whose goods are seized or detained by the collector for the
payment of duties may sue out a writ of replevin, and, by virtue of
that writ, the goods are to be restored to him. A writ of replevin is a
writ which the sheriff is bound to execute, and for the execution of
which he is bound to employ force, if necessary. He may call out the
_posse_, and must do so, if resistance be made. This _posse_ may be
armed or unarmed. It may come forth with military array, and under the
lead of military men. Whatever number of troops may be assembled in
Charleston, they may be summoned, with the governor, or
commander-in-chief, at their head, to come in aid of the sheriff. It is
evident, then, Sir, that the whole military power of the State is to be
employed, if necessary, in dispossessing the custom-house officers, and
in seizing and holding the goods, without paying the duties. This is
the second step in the peaceable remedy.
Sir, whatever pretences may be set up to the contrary, this is the
direct application of force, and of military force. It is unlawful, in
itself, to replevy goods in the custody of the collectors. But this
unlawful act is to be done, and it is to be done by force. Here is a
plain interposition, by physical force, to resist the laws of the
Union. The legal mode of collecting duties is to detain the goods till
such duties are paid or secured. But force comes, and overpowers the
collector and his assistants, and takes away the goods, leaving the
duties unpaid. There cannot be a clearer case of forcible resistance to
law. And it is provided that the goods thus seized shall be held
against any attempt to retake them, by the same force which seized them.
Having thus dispossessed the officers of the government of the goods,
without payment of duties, and seized and secured them by the strong
arm of the State, only one thing more remains to be done, and that is,
to cut off all possibility of legal redress; and that, too, is
accomplished, or thought to be accomplished. The ordinance declares,
_that all judicial proceedings founded on the revenue laws_ (including,
of course, proceedings in the courts of the United States), _shall be
null and void_. This nullifies the judicial power of the United States.
Then comes the test-oath act. This requires all State judges and jurors
in the State courts to swear that they will execute the ordinance, and
all acts of the legislature passed in pursuance thereof. The ordinance
declares, that no appeal shall be allowed from the decision of the
State courts to the Supreme Court of the United States; and the
replevin act makes it an indictable offence for any clerk to furnish a
copy of the record, for the purpose of such appeal.
The two principal provisions on which South Carolina relies, to resist
the laws of the United States, and nullify the authority of this
government, are, therefore, these:--
1. A forcible seizure of goods, before duties are paid or secured, by
the power of the State, civil and military.
2. The taking away, by the most effectual means in her power, of all
legal redress in the courts of the United States; the confining of
judicial proceedings to her own State tribunals; and the compelling of
her judges and jurors of these her own courts to take an oath,
beforehand, that they will decide all cases according to the ordinance,
and the acts passed under it; that is, that they will decide the cause
one way. They do not swear to _try_ it, on its own merits; they only
swear to _decide_ it as nullification requires.
The character, Sir, of these provisions defies comment. Their object is
as plain as their means are extraordinary. They propose direct
resistance, by the whole power of the State, to laws of Congress, and
cut off, by methods deemed adequate, any redress by legal and judicial
authority. They arrest legislation, defy the executive, and banish the
judicial power of this government. They authorize and command acts to
be done, and done by force, both of numbers and of arms, which, if
done, and done by force, are clearly acts of rebellion and treason.
Such, Sir, are the laws of South Carolina; such, Sir, is the peaceable
remedy of nullification. Has not nullification reached, Sir, even thus
early, that point of direct and forcible resistance to law to which I
intimated, three years ago, it plainly tended?
And now, Mr. President, what is the reason for passing laws like these?
What are the oppressions experienced under the Union, calling for
measures which thus threaten to sever and destroy it? What invasions of
public liberty, what ruin to private happiness, what long list of
rights violated, or wrongs unredressed, is to justify to the country,
to posterity, and to the world, this assault upon the free Constitution
of the United States, this great and glorious work of our fathers? At
this very moment, Sir, the whole land smiles in peace, and rejoices in
plenty. A general and a high prosperity pervades the country; and,
judging by the common standard, by increase of population and wealth,
or judging by the opinions of that portion of her people not embarked
in these dangerous and desperate measures, this prosperity overspreads
South Carolina herself.
Thus happy at home, our country, at the same time, holds high the
character of her institutions, her power, her rapid growth, and her
future destiny, in the eyes of all foreign states. One danger only
creates hesitation; one doubt only exists, to darken the otherwise
unclouded brightness of that aspect which she exhibits to the view and
to the admiration of the world. Need I say, that that doubt respects
the permanency of our Union? and need I say, that that doubt is now
caused, more than any thing else, by these very proceedings of South
Carolina? Sir, all Europe is, at this moment, beholding us, and looking
for the issue of this controversy; those who hate free institutions,
with malignant hope; those who love them, with deep anxiety and
shivering fear.
The cause, then, Sir, the cause! Let the world know the cause which has
thus induced one State of the Union to bid defiance to the power of the
whole, and openly to talk secession. Sir, the world will scarcely
believe that this whole controversy, and all the desperate measures
which its support requires, have no other foundation than a difference
of opinion upon a provision of the Constitution, between a majority of
the people of South Carolina, on one side, and a vast majority of the
whole people of the United States, on the other. It will not credit the
fact, it will not admit the possibility, that, in an enlightened age,
in a free, popular republic, under a constitution where the people
govern, as they must always govern under such systems, by majorities,
at a time of unprecedented prosperity, without practical oppression,
without evils such as may not only be pretended, but felt and
experienced,--evils not slight or temporary, but deep, permanent, and
intolerable,--a single State should rush into conflict with all the
rest, attempt to put down the power of the Union by her own laws, and
to support those laws by her military power, and thus break up and
destroy the world's last hope. And well the world may be incredulous.
We, who see and hear it, can ourselves hardly yet believe it. Even
after all that had preceded it this ordinance struck the country with
amazement. It was incredible and inconceivable that South Carolina
should plunge headlong into resistance to the laws on a matter of
opinion and on a question in which the preponderance of opinion, both
of the present day and of all past time, was so overwhelmingly against
her. The ordinance declares that Congress has exceeded its just power
by laying duties on imports, intended for the protection of
manufactures. This is the opinion of South Carolina; and on the
strength of that opinion she nullifies the laws. Yet has the rest of
the country no right to its opinion also? Is one State to sit sole
arbitress? She maintains that those laws are plain, deliberate, and
palpable violations of the Constitution; that she has a sovereign right
to decide this matter; and that, having so decided, she is authorized
to resist their execution by her own sovereign power; and she declares
that she will resist it, though such resistance should shatter the
Union into atoms.
Mr. President, I do not intend to discuss the propriety of these laws
at large; but I will ask, How are they shown to be thus plainly and
palpably unconstitutional? Have they no countenance at all in the
Constitution itself? Are they quite new in the history of the
government? Are they a sudden and violent usurpation on the rights of
the States? Sir, what will the civilized world say, what will posterity
say, when they learn that similar laws have existed from the very
foundation of the government, that for thirty years the power was never
questioned, and that no State in the Union has more freely and
unequivocally admitted it than South Carolina herself?
To lay and collect duties and imposts is an _express power_ granted by
the Constitution to Congress. It is, also, an _exclusive power_; for
the Constitution as expressly prohibits all the States from exercising
it themselves. This express and exclusive power is unlimited in the
terms of the grant, but is attended with two specific restrictions:
first, that all duties and imposts shall be equal in all the States;
second, that no duties shall be laid on exports. The power, then, being
granted, and being attended with these two restrictions, and no more,
who is to impose a third restriction on the general words of the grant?
If the power to lay duties, as known among all other nations, and as
known in all our history, and as it was perfectly understood when the
Constitution was adopted, includes a right of discriminating while
exercising the power, and of laying some duties heavier and some
lighter, for the sake of encouraging our own domestic products, what
authority is there for giving to the words used in the Constitution a
new, narrow, and unusual meaning? All the limitations which the
Constitution intended, it has expressed; and what it has left
unrestricted is as much a part of its will as the restraints which it
has imposed.
But these laws, it is said, are unconstitutional on account of the
_motive_. How, Sir, can a law be examined on any such ground? How is
the motive to be ascertained? One house, or one member, may have one
motive; the other house, or another member, another. One motive may
operate to-day, and another to-morrow. Upon any such mode of reasoning
as this, one law might be unconstitutional now, and another law, in
exactly the same words, perfectly constitutional next year. Besides,
articles may not only be taxed for the purpose of protecting home
products, but other articles may be left free, for the same purpose and
with the same motive. A law, therefore, would become unconstitutional
from what it omitted, as well as from what it contained. Mr. President,
it is a settled principle, acknowledged in all legislative halls,
recognized before all tribunals, sanctioned by the general sense and
understanding of mankind, that there can be no inquiry into the motives
of those who pass laws, for the purpose of determining on their
validity. If the law be within the fair meaning of the words in the
grant of the power, its authority must be admitted until it is
repealed. This rule, everywhere acknowledged, everywhere admitted, is
so universal and so completely without exception, that even an
allegation of fraud, in the majority of a legislature, is not allowed
as a ground to set aside a law.
But, Sir, is it true that the motive for these laws is such as is
stated? I think not. The great object of all these laws is,
unquestionably, revenue. If there were no occasion for revenue, the
laws would not have been passed; and it is notorious that almost the
entire revenue of the country is derived from them. And as yet we have
collected none too much revenue. The treasury has not been more reduced
for many years than it is at the present moment. All that South
Carolina can say is, that, in passing the laws which she now undertakes
to nullify, _particular imparted articles were taxed, from a regard to
the protection of certain articles of domestic manufacture, higher than
they would have been had no such regard been entertained_. And she
insists, that, according to the Constitution, no such discrimination
can be allowed; that duties should be laid for revenue, and revenue
only; and that it is unlawful to have reference, in any case, to
protection. In other words, she denies the power of DISCRIMINATION. She
does not, and cannot, complain of excessive taxation; on the contrary,
she professes to be willing to pay any amount for revenue, merely as
revenue; and up to the present moment there is no surplus of revenue.
Her grievance, then, that plain and palpable violation of the
Constitution which she insists has taken place, is simply the exercise
of the power of DISCRIMINATION. Now, Sir, is the exercise of this power
of discrimination plainly and palpably unconstitutional?
I have already said, the power to lay duties is given by the
Constitution in broad and general terms. There is also conferred on
Congress the whole power of regulating commerce, in another distinct
provision. Is it clear and palpable, Sir, can any man say it is a case
beyond doubt, that, under these two powers, Congress may not justly
_discriminate_, in laying duties, _for the purpose of countervailing
the policy of foreign nations, or of favoring our own home
productions?_ Sir, what ought to conclude this question for ever, as it
would seem to me, is, that the regulation of commerce and the
imposition of duties are, in all commercial nations, powers avowedly
and constantly exercised for this very end. That undeniable truth ought
to settle the question; because the Constitution ought to be
considered, when it uses well-known language, as using it in its
well-known sense. But it is equally undeniable, that it has been, from
the very first, fully believed that this power of discrimination was
conferred on Congress; and the Constitution was itself recommended,
urged upon the people, and enthusiastically insisted on in some of the
States, for that very reason. Not that, at that time, the country was
extensively engaged in manufactures, especially of the kinds now
existing. But the trades and crafts of the seaport towns, the business
of the artisans and manual laborers,--those employments, the work in
which supplies so great a portion of the daily wants of all
classes,--all these looked to the new Constitution as a source of
relief from the severe distress which followed the war. It would, Sir,
be unpardonable, at so late an hour, to go into details on this point;
but the truth is as I have stated. The papers of the day, the
resolutions of public meetings, the debates in the conventions, all
that we open our eyes upon in the history of the times, prove it.
Sir, the honorable gentleman from South Carolina has referred to two
incidents connected with the proceedings of the Convention at
Philadelphia, which he thinks are evidence to show that the power of
protecting manufactures by laying duties, and by commercial
regulations, was not intended to be given to Congress. The first is, as
he says, that a power to protect manufactures was expressly proposed,
but not granted. I think, Sir, the gentleman is quite mistaken in
relation to this part of the proceedings of the Convention. The whole
history of the occurrence to which he alludes is simply this. Towards
the conclusion of the Convention, after the provisions of the
Constitution had been mainly agreed upon, after the power to lay duties
and the power to regulate commerce had both been granted, a long list
of propositions was made and referred to the committee, containing
various miscellaneous powers, some or all of which it was thought might
be properly vested in Congress. Among these was a power to establish a
university; to grant charters of incorporation; to regulate
stage-coaches on the post-roads; and also the power to which the
gentleman refers, and which is expressed in these words: "To establish
public institutions, rewards, and immunities, for the promotion of
agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures." The committee made no
report on this or various other propositions in the same list. But the
only inference from this omission is, that neither the committee nor
the Convention thought it proper to authorize Congress "to establish
public institutions, rewards, and immunities," for the promotion of
manufactures, and other interests. The Convention supposed it had done
enough,--at any rate, it had done all it intended,--when it had given
to Congress, in general terms, the power to lay imposts and the power
to regulate trade. It is not to be argued, from its omission to give
more, that it meant to take back what it had already given. It had
given the impost power; it had given the regulation of trade; and it
did not deem it necessary to give the further and distinct power of
establishing public institutions.
The other fact, Sir, on which the gentleman relies, is the declaration
of Mr. Martin to the legislature of Maryland. The gentleman supposes
Mr. Martin to have urged against the Constitution, that it did not
contain the power of protection. But if the gentleman will look again
at what Mr. Martin said, he will find, I think, that what Mr. Martin
complained of was, that the Constitution, by its prohibitions on the
States, had taken away from the States themselves the power of
protecting their own manufactures by duties on imports. This is
undoubtedly true; but I find no expression of Mr. Martin intimating
that the Constitution had not conferred on Congress the same power
which it had thus taken from the States.
But, Sir, let us go to the first Congress; let us look in upon this and
the other house, at the first session of their organization.
We see, in both houses, men distinguished among the framers, friends,
and advocates of the Constitution. We see in both, those who had drawn,
discussed, and matured the instrument in the Convention, explained and
defended it before the people, and were now elected members of
Congress, to put the new government into motion, and to carry the
powers of the Constitution into beneficial execution. At the head of
the government was WASHINGTON himself, who had been President of the
Convention; and in his cabinet were others most thoroughly acquainted
with the history of the Constitution, and distinguished for the part
taken in its discussion. If these persons were not acquainted with the
meaning of the Constitution, if they did not undergo stand the work of
their own hands, who can understand it, or who shall now interpret it
to us?
Sir, the volume which records the proceedings and debates of the first
session of the House of Representatives lies before me. I open it, and
I find that, having provided for the administration of the necessary
oaths, the very first measure proposed for consideration is, the laying
of imposts; and in the very first committee of the whole into which the
House of Representatives ever resolved itself, on this its earliest
subject, and in this its very first debate, the duty of so laying the
imposts as to encourage manufactures was advanced and enlarged upon by
almost every speaker, and doubted or denied by none. The first
gentleman who suggests this as the clear duty of Congress, and as an
object necessary to be attended to, is Mr. Fitzsimons, of Pennsylvania;
the second, Mr. White, of Virginia; the third, Mr. Tucker, of South
Carolina.
But the great leader, Sir, on this occasion, was Mr. Madison. Was _he_
likely to know the intentions of the Convention and the people? Was
_he_ likely to understand the Constitution? At the second sitting of
the committee, Mr. Madison explained his own opinions of the duty of
Congress, fully and explicitly. I must not detain you, Sir, with more
than a few short extracts from these opinions, but they are such as are
clear, intelligible, and decisive. "The States," says he, "that are
most advanced in population, and ripe for manufacturers, ought to have
their particular interest attended to, in some degree. While these
States retained the power of making regulations of trade, they had the
power to cherish such institutions. By adopting the present
Constitution, they have thrown the exercise of this power into other
hands; they must have done this with an expectation that those
interests would not be neglected here." In another report of the same
speech, Mr. Madison is represented as using still stronger language; as
saying that, the Constitution having taken this power away from the
States and conferred it on Congress, it would be a _fraud_ on the
States and on the people were Congress to refuse to exercise it.
Mr. Madison argues, Sir, on this early and interesting occasion, very
justly and liberally, in favor of the general principles of
unrestricted commerce. But he argues, also, with equal force and
clearness, for certain important exceptions to these general
principles. The first, Sir, respects those manufactures which had been
brought forward under encouragement by the State governments. "It would
be cruel," says Mr. Madison, "to neglect them, and to divert their
industry into other channels; for it is not possible for the hand of
man to shift from one employment to another without being injured by
the change." Again: "There may be some manufactures which, being once
formed, can advance towards perfection without any adventitious aid;
while others, for want of the fostering hand of government, will be
unable to go on at all. Legislative provision, therefore, will be
necessary to collect the proper objects for this purpose; and this will
form another exception to my general principle." And again: "The next
exception that occurs is one on which great stress is laid by some
well-informed men, and this with great plausibility; that each nation
should have, within itself, the means of defence, independent of
foreign supplies; that, in whatever relates to the operations of war,
no State ought to depend upon a precarious supply from any part of the
world. There may be some truth in this remark; and therefore it is
proper for legislative attention."
In the same debate, Sir, Mr. Burk, from South Carolina, supported a
duty on hemp, for the express purpose of encouraging its growth on the
strong lands of South Carolina. "Cotton," he said, "was also in
contemplation among them, and, if good seed could be procured, he hoped
might succeed." Afterwards, Sir, the cotton was obtained, its culture
was protected, and it did succeed. Mr. Smith, a very distinguished
member from the same state, observed: "It has been said, and justly,
that the States which adopted this Constitution expected its
administration would be conducted with a favorable hand. The
manufacturing States wished the encouragement of manufactures, the
maritime States the encouragement of shipbuilding, and the agricultural
States the encouragement of agriculture."
Sir, I will detain the Senate by reading no more extracts from these
debates. I have already shown a majority of the members of South
Carolina, in this very first session, acknowledging this power of
protection, voting for its exercise, and proposing its extension to
their own products. Similar propositions came from Virginia; and,
indeed, Sir, in the whole debate, at whatever page you open the volume,
you find the power admitted, and you find it applied to the protection
of particular articles, or not applied, according to the discretion of
Congress. No man denied the power, no man doubted it; the only
questions were, in regard to the several articles proposed to be taxed,
whether they were fit subjects for protection, and what the amount of
that protection ought to be. Will gentlemen, Sir, now answer the
argument drawn from these proceedings of the first Congress? Will they
undertake to deny that that Congress did act on the avowed principle of
protection? Or, if they admit it, will they tell us how those who
framed the Constitution fell, thus early, into this great mistake about
its meaning? Will they tell us how it should happen that they had so
soon forgotten their own sentiments and their own purposes? I confess I
have seen no answer to this argument, nor any respectable attempt to
answer it. And, Sir, how did this debate terminate? What law was
passed? There it stands, Sir, among the statutes, the second law in the
book. It has a _preamble_, and that preamble expressly recites, that
the duties which it imposes are laid "for the support of government,
for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and _the
encouragement and protection of manufactures_." Until, Sir, this early
legislation, thus coeval with the Constitution itself, thus full and
explicit, can be explained away, no man can doubt of the meaning of
that instrument in this respect.
Mr. President, this power of _discrimination_, thus admitted, avowed,
and practised upon in the first revenue act, has never been denied or
doubted until within a few years past. It was not at all doubted in
1816, when it became necessary to adjust the revenue to a state of
peace. On the contrary, the power was then exercised, not without
opposition as to its expediency, but, as far as I remember or have
understood, without the slightest opposition founded on any supposed
want of constitutional authority. Certainly, South Carolina did not
doubt it. The tariff of 1816 was introduced, carried through, and
established, under the lead of South Carolina. Even the minimum policy
is of South Carolina origin. The honorable gentleman himself supported,
and ably supported, the tariff of 1816. He has informed us, Sir, that
his speech on that occasion was sudden and off-hand, he being called up
by the request of a friend. I am sure the gentleman so remembers it,
and that it was so; but there is, nevertheless, much method,
arrangement, and clear exposition in that extempore speech. It is very
able, very, very much to the point, and very decisive. And in another
speech, delivered two months earlier, on the proposition to repeal the
internal taxes, the honorable gentleman had touched the same subject,
and had declared "_that a certain encouragement ought to be extended at
least to our woollen and cotton manufactures_." I do not quote these
speeches, Sir, for the purpose of showing that the honorable gentleman
has changed his opinion: my object is other and higher. I do it for the
sake of saying that that cannot be so plainly and palpably
unconstitutional as to warrant resistance to law, nullification, and
revolution, which the honorable gentleman and his friends have
heretofore agreed to and acted upon without doubt and without
hesitation. Sir, it is no answer to say that the tariff of 1816 was a
revenue bill. So are they all revenue bills. The point is, and the
truth is, that the tariff of 1816, like the rest, _did discriminate_;
it did distinguish one article from another; it did lay duties for
protection. Look to the case of coarse cottons under the minimum
calculation: the duty on these was from sixty to eighty per cent.
Something beside revenue, certainly, was intended in this; and, in
fact, the law cut up our whole commerce with India in that article.
It is, Sir, only within a few years that Carolina has denied the
constitutionality of these protective laws. The gentleman himself has
narrated to us the true history of her proceedings on this point. He
says, that, after the passing of the law of 1828, despairing then of
being able to abolish the system of protection, political men went
forth among the people, and set up the doctrine that the system was
unconstitutional. "_And the people_," says the honorable gentleman,
"_received the doctrine_." This, I believe, is true, Sir. The people
did then receive the doctrine; they had never entertained it before.
Down to that period, the constitutionality of these laws had been no
more doubted in South Carolina than elsewhere. And I suspect it is
true, Sir, and I deem it a great misfortune, that, to the present
moment, a great portion of the people of the State have never yet seen
more than one side of the argument. I believe that thousands of honest
men are involved in scenes now passing, led away by one-sided views of
the question, and following their leaders by the impulses of an
unlimited confidence. Depend upon it, Sir, if we can avoid the shock of
arms, a day for reconsideration and reflection will come; truth and
reason will act with their accustomed force, and the public opinion of
South Carolina will be restored to its usual constitutional and
patriotic tone.
But, Sir, I hold South Carolina to her ancient, her cool, her
uninfluenced, her deliberate opinions. I hold her to her own
admissions, nay, to her own claims and pretensions, in 1789, in the
first Congress, and to her acknowledgments and avowed sentiments
through a long series of succeeding years. I hold her to the principles
on which she led Congress to act in 1816; or, if she have changed her
own opinions, I claim some respect for those who still retain the same
opinions. I say she is precluded from asserting that doctrines, which
she has herself so long and so ably sustained, are plain, palpable, and
dangerous violations of the Constitution. Mr. President, if the friends
of nullification should be able to propagate their opinions, and give
them practical effect, they would, in my judgment, prove themselves the
most skilful "architects of ruin," the most effectual extinguishers of
high-raised expectation, the greatest blasters of human hopes, that any
age has produced. They would stand up to proclaim, in tones which would
pierce the ears of half the human race, that the last great experiment
of representative government had failed. They would send forth sounds,
at the hearing of which the doctrine of the divine right of kings would
feel, even in its grave, a returning sensation of vitality and
resuscitation. Millions of eyes, of those who now feed their inherent
love of liberty on the success of the American example, would turn away
from beholding our dismemberment, and find no place on earth whereon to
rest their gratified sight. Amidst the incantations and orgies of
nullification, secession, disunion, and revolution, would be celebrated
the funeral rites of constitutional and republican liberty.
But, Sir, if the government do its duty, if it act with firmness and
with moderation, these opinions cannot prevail. Be assured, Sir, be
assured, that, among the political sentiments of this people, the love
of union is still uppermost. They will stand fast by the Constitution,
and by those who defend it. I rely on no temporary expedients, on no
political combination; but I rely on the true American feeling, the
genuine patriotism of the people, and the imperative decision of the
public voice. Disorder and confusion, indeed, may arise; scenes of
commotion and contest are threatened, and perhaps may come. With my
whole heart, I pray for the continuance of the domestic peace and quiet
of the country.
I desire, most ardently, the restoration of affection and harmony to
all its parts. I desire that every citizen of the whole country may
look to this government with no other sentiments than those of grateful
respect and attachment. But I cannot yield even to kind feelings the
cause of the Constitution, the true glory of the country, and the great
trust which we hold in our hands for succeeding ages. If the
Constitution cannot be maintained without meeting these scenes of
commotion and contest, however unwelcome, they must come. We cannot, we
must not, we dare not, omit to do that which, in our judgment, the
safety of the Union requires. Not regardless of consequences, we must
yet meet consequences; seeing the hazards which surround the discharge
of public duty, it must yet be discharged. For myself, Sir, I shun no
responsibility justly devolving on me, here or elsewhere, in attempting
to maintain the cause. I am bound to it by indissoluble ties of
affection and duty, and I shall cheerfully partake in its fortunes and
its fate. I am ready to perform my own appropriate part, whenever and
wherever the occasion may call on me, and to take my chance among those
upon whom blows may fall first and fall thickest. I shall exert every
faculty I possess in aiding to prevent the Constitution from being
nullified, destroyed, or impaired; and even should I see it fall, I
will still, with a voice feeble, perhaps, but earnest as ever issued
from human lips, and with fidelity and zeal which nothing shall
extinguish, call on the PEOPLE to come to its rescue. [2]