In the ling fishing the fisherman may be regarded, if we speak
technically, as a vendor to the merchant. Practically he is a
partner, for the price of his wet fish is in proportion to the
proceeds of the merchant's sales of the cured fish. In the Faroe
fishing the fisherman is more distinctly and formally a partner,
for the agreement signed by the merchant and the crew entitles
him to a share of one-half of the net proceeds of the fishing. The
question to be answered is, whether the principle of the Truck
Acts extends to these two occupations, so as to justify the State
in laying down such rules as shall prevent the fisherman in either
case from taking part of his earnings, although they are not wages,
otherwise than in current coin; and if that be so, what practical
difficulties stand in the way of applying the principle. It is
difficult to read the evidence without arriving at the conclusion,
that if it is right to protect the skilled artisans of Sheffield and
Birmingham, and the highly paid miners of Lanarkshire and
South Wales, from receiving their wages in goods, it is also right
to require the fish-curer of Shetland to give money instead of
goods to his fishermen. By whatever name we may call the
earnings of the latter, there is not such a difference in the positions
of the two classes as to justify us in applying to them different
rules of law. Both are labouring men; for the Shetlander's
possession of a small allotment of third-rate land does not elevate
above the condition of a peasant.
If we apply to the Shetlander the legal distinctions which occur
in the existing law, he differs but little from some of the protected
crafts in England. He engages to fish the curer, and to give him
the produce of his labour at the current price, just as a collier
contracts to put out coal at a certain rate per ton. If the law is to
protect from truck the man who agrees to be paid not directly for
his labour, but for the result of his labour, the Shetland ling fisher
may be held to fall within that principle. There is, indeed, this
distinction, that his remuneration depends on the price eventually
obtained for the produce of his labour, so that he takes the risk of
the market. The amount of his earnings is affected both by his
success in catching fish and by the fluctuations of the market. The
collier, on the other hand, works for wages fixed at a certain rate,
and the only element of uncertainty is the quantity of his out-put.
The fisherman certainly works upon the co-operative principle at
present; and in considering any legislative change, it may be
desirable to avoid interfering with this principle of the present
system, and unintentionally leading to the substitution of fixed
wages.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST LEGISLATIVE INTERFERENCE TO ENFORCE
SHORT PAYMENTS
It is maintained on various grounds that the provisions
suggested for the prevention of truck in other trades cannot
be advantageously applied to fishing. Most of the merchants
are averse to short pays, and I cannot say that the fishermen
themselves are in general desirous to have them introduced.
I endeavoured to ascertain from the witnesses examined
whether there is any insuperable obstacle to the introduction
of ready-money payments for fish.