VI

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT PRESUPPOSITIONS VERSUS FICHTE'S THEORY

OF SCIENCE

So far, we have determined the idea of knowledge. This idea is

given immediately in the human consciousness whenever it functions

cognitively. To the "Ego," as the centre [49] of consciousness, are

given immediately external and internal perceptions, as well as its

own existence. The Ego feels impelled to find more in the Given than

it immediately contains. Over against the given world, a second world,

the world of thinking, unfolds itself for the Ego and the Ego unites

these two by realising, of its own free will, the idea of knowledge

which we have determined. This accounts for the fundamental difference

between the way in which in the objects of human consciousness itself

the concept and the Immediately-Given unite to form Reality in its

wholeness, and the way in which their union obtains in the rest of

the world-content. For every other part of the world-content we must

assume that the union of the two factors is original and necessary from

the first, and that it is only for cognition, when cognition begins,

that an artificial separation has supervened, but that cognition

in the end undoes the separation in keeping with the original and

essential unity of the object-world. For consciousness the case is

quite otherwise. Here the union exists only when it is achieved by

the living activity of consciousness itself. With every other kind

of object, the separation of the two factors is significant, not for

the object, but only for knowledge. Their union is here original,

their separation derivative. Cognition effects a separation only

because it must first separate before it can achieve union by its

own methods. But, for consciousness, the Concept and the Given

are originally separate. Union is here derivative, and that is why

cognition has the character which we have described. Just because in

consciousness Idea and Given appear in separation, does the whole of

reality split itself for consciousness into these two factors. And,

again, just because consciousness can bring about the union of the two

factors only by its own activity, can it reach full reality only by

performing the act of cognition. The remaining categories (ideas) would

be necessarily united with the corresponding lands of the Given, even

if they were not taken up into cognition. But the idea of cognition

can be united with the Given which corresponds to it, only by the

activity of consciousness. Real consciousness exists only in realising

itself. With these remarks we believe ourselves to be sufficiently

equipped for laying bare the root-error of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre

and, at the same time, for supplying the key to the understanding

of it. Fichte is among all Kant's successors the one who has felt

most vividly that nothing but a theory of consciousness can supply

the foundation for all the sciences. But he never clearly understood

why this is so. He felt that the act which we have called the second

step in the Theory of Knowledge and which we have formulated as a

postulate, must really be performed by the "Ego." This may be seen,

e.g., from the following passage. "The Theory of Science, then, arises,

as itself a systematic discipline, just as do all possible sciences

in so far as they are systematic, through a certain act of freedom,

the determinate function of which is, more particularly, to make us

conscious of the characteristic activity of intelligence as such. The

result of this free act is that the necessary activity of intelligence,

which in itself already is form, is further taken up as matter into a

fresh form of cognition or consciousness." [50] What does Fichte here

mean by the activity of the "intelligence," when we translate what he

has obscurely felt into clear concepts? Nothing but the realisation

of the idea of knowledge, taking place in consciousness. Had this been

perfectly clear to Fichte, he ought to have expressed his view simply

by saying, "It is the task of the Theory of Science to bring cognition,

in so far as it is still an unreflective activity of the 'Ego,' into

reflective consciousness; it has to show that the realisation of the

idea of cognition in actual fact is a necessary activity of the 'Ego.'"

Fichte tries to determine the activity of the "Ego." He declares

"that the being, the essence of which consists solely in this that

it posits itself as existing, is the Ego as absolute subject." [51]

This positing of the Ego is for Fichte the original, unconditioned

act "which lies at the basis of all the rest of consciousness." [52]

It follows that the Ego, in Fichte's sense, can likewise begin

all its activity only through an absolute fiat of the will. But,

it is impossible for Fichte to supply any sort of content for this

activity which his "Ego" absolutely posits. For, Fichte can name

nothing upon which this activity might direct itself, or by which it

might be determined. His Ego is supposed to perform an act. Yes, but

what is it to do? Fichte failed to define the concept of cognition

which the Ego is to realise, and, in consequence, he struggled

in vain to find any way of advancing from his absolute act to the

detailed determinations of the Ego. Nay, in the end he declares that

the inquiry into the manner of this advance lies outside the scope

of his theory. In his deduction of the idea of cognition he starts

neither from an absolute act of the Ego, nor from one of the Non-Ego,

but from a state of being determined which is, at the same time, an act

of determining. His reason for this is that nothing else either is,

or can be, immediately contained in consciousness. His theory leaves

it wholly vague what determines, in turn, this determination. And it

is this vagueness which drives us on beyond Fichte's theory into the

practical part of the Wissenschaftslehre. [53] But, by this turn Fichte

destroys all knowledge whatsoever. For, the practical activity of the

Ego belongs to quite a different sphere. The postulate which we have

put forward above can, indeed, be realised--so much is clear--only by

a free act of the Ego. But, if this act is to be a cognitive act, the

all-important point is that its voluntary decision should be to realise

the idea of cognition. It is, no doubt, true that the Ego by its own

free will can do many other things as well. But, what matters for the

epistemological foundation of the sciences is not a definition of what

it is for the Ego to be free, but of what it is to know. Fichte has

allowed himself to be too much influenced by his subjective tendency to

present the freedom of human personality in the brightest light. Harms,

in his address on The Philosophy of Fichte (p. 15), rightly remarks,

"His world-view is predominantly and exclusively ethical, and the

same character is exhibited by his Theory of Knowledge." Knowledge

would have absolutely nothing to do, if all spheres of reality were

given in their totality. But, seeing that the Ego, so long as it has

not been, by thinking, inserted into its place in the systematic

whole of the world-picture, exists merely as an immediately-given

something, it is not enough merely to point out what it does. Fichte,

however, believes that all we need to do concerning the Ego is to seek

and find it. "We have to seek and find the absolutely first, wholly

unconditioned principle of all human knowledge. Being absolutely first,

this principle admits neither of proof nor of determination." [54]

We have seen that proof and determination are out of place solely as

applied to the content of Pure Logic. But the Ego is a part of reality,

and this makes it necessary to establish that this or that category is

actually to be found in the Given. Fichte has failed to do this. And

this is the reason why he has given such a mistaken form to his Theory

of Science. Zeller remarks [55] that the logical formulæ by means of

which Fichte seeks to reach the concept of the Ego, do but ill disguise

his predetermined purpose at any price to reach this starting-point for

his theory. This comment applies to the first form (1794) which Fichte

gave to his Wissenschaftslehre. Taking it, then, as established that

Fichte, in keeping with the whole trend of his philosophical thinking,

could not, in fact, rest content with any other starting-point for

knowledge than an absolute and arbitrary act, we have the choice

between only two ways of making this start intelligible. The one

way was to seize upon some one among the empirical activities of

consciousness and to strip off, one by one, all the characteristics

of it which do not follow originally from its essential nature, until

the pure concept of the Ego had been crystallised out. The other way

was to begin, straightway, with the original activity of the Ego,

and to exhibit its nature by introspection and reflection. Fichte

followed the first way at the outset of his philosophical thinking,

but in the course of it he gradually switched over to the other.

Basing himself upon Kant's "synthesis of transcendental apperception,"

Fichte concluded that the whole activity of the Ego in the synthesis

of the matter of experience proceeds according to the forms of the

judgment. To judge is to connect a predicate with a subject--an act of

which the purely formal expression is a = a. This proposition would be

impossible if the x which connects predicate and subject, did not rest

upon a power to affirm unconditionally. For, the proposition does not

mean, "a exists"; it means, "if a exists, then there exists a." Thus,

a is most certainly not affirmed absolutely. Hence, if there is to be

an absolute, unconditionally valid affirmation, there is no alternative

but to declare the act of affirming itself to be absolute. Whereas a

is conditioned, the affirming of a is unconditioned. This affirming

is the act of the Ego which, thus, possesses the power to affirm

absolutely and without conditions. In the proposition, a = a, the one a

is affirmed only on condition of the other being presupposed. Moreover,

the affirming is an act of the Ego. "If a is affirmed in the Ego, it

is affirmed." [56] This connection is possible only on condition that

there is in the Ego something always self-identical, which effects

the transition from the one a to the other. The above-mentioned x

is this self-identical aspect of the Ego. The Ego which affirms the

one a is the same Ego as that which affirms the other a. This is to

say Ego = Ego. But this proposition, expressed in judgment-form, "If

the Ego is, it is," is meaningless. For, the Ego is not affirmed on

condition of another Ego having been presupposed, but it presupposes

itself. In short, the Ego is absolute and unconditioned. The

hypothetical judgment-form which is the form of all judgments,

so long as the absolute Ego is not presupposed, changes for the

Ego into the form of the categorical affirmation of existence, "I

am unconditionally." Fichte has another way of putting this: "the

Ego originally affirms its own existence." [57] Clearly, this whole

deduction is nothing but a sort of elementary school-drill by means of

which Fichte tries to lead his readers to the point at which they will

perceive for themselves the unconditioned activity of the Ego. His aim

is to put clearly before their eyes that fundamental activity of the

Ego in the absence of which there is no such thing as an Ego at all.

Let us now look back, once more, over Fichte's line of thought. On

closer inspection, it becomes obvious that it contains a leap--a leap,

moreover, which throws grave doubts upon the correctness of his theory

of the original act of the Ego. What precisely is it that is absolute

in the affirmation of the Ego? Take the judgment, "If a exists,

then there exists a." The a is affirmed by the Ego. So far there is

no room for doubt. But, though the act is unconditioned, yet the Ego

must affirm something in particular. It cannot affirm an "activity in

general and as such"; it can affirm only a particular, determinate

activity. In short, the affirmation must have a content. But,

it cannot derive this content from itself, for else we should get

nothing but affirmations of acts of affirmation in infinitum. Hence,

there must be something which is realised by this affirming, by

this absolute activity of the Ego. If the Ego does not seize upon

something given in order to affirm it, it can do nothing at all, and,

consequently, it cannot affirm either. This is proved, too, by Fichte's

proposition, "the Ego affirms its own existence." "Existence," here,

is a category. Thus, we are back at our own position: the activity of

the Ego consists in that it affirms, of its own free will, the concepts

and ideas inherent in the Given. If Fichte had not unconsciously

been determined to exhibit the Ego as "existing," he would have

got nowhere at all. If, instead, he had built up the concept of

cognition, he would have reached the true starting-point of the Theory

of Knowledge, viz., "The Ego affirms the act of cognition." Because

Fichte failed to make clear to himself what determines the activity

of the Ego, he fixed simply upon the affirmation of its own existence

as the character of that activity. But, this is at once to restrict

the absolute activity of the Ego. For, if nothing is unconditioned

except the Ego's affirmation of its own existence, then every other

activity of the Ego is conditioned. Moreover, the way is cut off

for passing from the unconditioned to the conditioned. If the Ego is

unconditioned only in the affirmation of its own existence, then at

once there is cut off all possibility of affirming by an original act

anything other than its own existence. Hence, the necessity arises to

assign a ground for all the other activities of the Ego. But Fichte,

as we have seen above, sought for such a ground in vain.

This is the reason why he shifted to the second of the two ways,

indicated above, for the deduction of the Ego. Already in 1797,

in his Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, he recommends

self-observation as the right method for studying the Ego in its

true, original character. "Observe and watch thyself, turn thy

eye away from all that surrounds thee and look into thyself--this

is the first demand which philosophy makes upon its disciple. The

topic of our discourse, is, not anything outside thyself, but thyself

alone." [58] This introduction to the Theory of Science is, in truth,

in one way much superior to the other. For, self-observation does

not make us acquainted with the activity of the Ego one-sidedly in a

fixed direction. It exhibits that activity, not merely as affirming

its own existence, but as striving, in its many-sided development, to

comprehend by thinking the world-content which is immediately-given. To

self-observation, the Ego reveals itself as engaged in building up

its world-picture by the synthesis of the Given with concepts. But,

anyone who has not accompanied us in our line of thought above, and

who, consequently, does not know that the Ego can grasp the whole

content of reality only on condition of applying its Thought-Forms to

the Given, is liable to regard cognition as a mere process of spinning

the world out of the Ego itself. Hence, for Fichte the world-picture

tends increasingly to become a construction of the Ego. He emphasises

more and more that the main point in the Wissenschaftslehre is to

awaken the sense which is able to watch the Ego in this constructing

of its world. He who is able thus to watch stands, for Fichte, on a

higher level of knowledge than he who has eyes only for the finished

construct, the ready-made world. If we fix our eyes only on the world

of objects, we fail to perceive that, but for the creative activity

of the Ego, that world would not exist. If, on the other hand,

we watch the Ego in its constructive activity, we understand the

ground of the finished world-picture. We know how it has come to be

what it is. We understand it as the conclusion for which we have the

premises. The ordinary consciousness sees only what has been affirmed,

what has been determined thus or thus. It lacks the insight into the

premises, into the grounds why an affirmation is just as it is and not

otherwise. To mediate the knowledge of these premises is, according

to Fichte, the task of a wholly new sense. This is expressed most

clearly in the Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. [59]

"My theory presupposes a wholly novel inward sense-organ, by means

of which a new world is given which does not exist for the ordinary

man at all." Or, again, "The world of this novel sense, and thereby

this sense itself, are hereby for the present clearly determined: it

is the world in which we see the premises on which is grounded the

judgment, 'Something exists'; it is the ground of existence which,

just because it is the ground of existence, cannot, in its turn,

be said to be or to be an existence." [60]

But, here, too, Fichte lacks clear insight into the activity of

the Ego. He has never worked his way through to it. That is why his

Wissenschaftslehre could not become what else, from its whole design,

it ought to have become, viz., a Theory of Knowledge as the fundamental

discipline of philosophy. For, after it had once been recognised that

the activity of the Ego must be affirmed by the Ego itself, it was very

easy to think that the activity receives its determination also from

the Ego. But how else can this happen except we assign a content to

the purely formal activity of the Ego? If the Ego is really to import

a content into its activity which, else, is wholly undetermined, then

the nature of that content must also be determined. For, failing this,

it could at best be realised only by some "thing-in-itself" in the Ego,

of which the Ego would be the instrument, but not by the Ego itself. If

Fichte had attempted to furnish this determination, he would have

been led to the concept of cognition which it is the task of the Ego

to realise. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre proves that even the acutest

thinker fails to make fruitful contributions to any philosophical

discussion, unless he lays hold of the correct Thought-Form (category,

idea) which, supplemented by the Given, yields reality. Such a thinker

is like a man who fails to hear the most glorious melodies which are

being played for him, because he has no ear for tunes. If we are to

determine the nature of consciousness, as given, we must be able to

rise to, and make our own, the "idea of consciousness."

At one point Fichte is actually quite close to the true view. He

declares, in the Einleitungen zur Wissenschaftslehre (1797), that

there are two theoretical systems, viz., Dogmatism, for which the Ego

is determined by the objects, and Idealism, for which the objects

are determined by the Ego. Both are, according to him, established

as possible theories of the world; both can be developed into

self-consistent systems. But, if we throw in our lot with Dogmatism,

we must abandon the independence of the Ego and make it dependent on

the "thing-in-itself." If we do not want to do this, we must adopt

Idealism. The philosopher's choice between these two systems is left

by Fichte wholly to the preference of the Ego. But he adds that if

the Ego desires to preserve its independence, it will give up the

belief in external things and surrender itself to Idealism.

But, what Fichte forgot was the consideration that the Ego cannot make

any genuine, well-grounded decision or choice, unless something is

presupposed which helps the Ego to choose. All the Ego's attempts at

determination remain empty and without content, if the Ego does not

find something wholly determinate and full of content, which enables

it to determine the Given, and thereby also to choose between Idealism

and Dogmatism. This "something wholly determinate and full of content"

is, precisely, the world of Thought. And the determination of the

Given by thinking is, precisely, what we call cognition. We may take

Fichte where we please--everywhere we find that his line of thought

at once gets meaning and substance, as soon as we conceive his grey,

empty activity of the Ego to be filled and regulated by what we have

called "the process of cognition."

The fact that the Ego is free to enter into activity out of itself,

makes it possible for it, by free self-determination, to realise the

category of cognition, whereas in the rest of the world all categories

are connected by objective necessity with the Given which corresponds

to them. The investigation of the nature of free self-determination

will be the task of Ethics and Metaphysics, based on our Theory of

Knowledge. These disciplines, too, will have to debate the question

whether the Ego is able to realise other ideas, besides the idea of

cognition. But, that the realisation of the idea of cognition issues

from a free act has been made sufficiently clear in the course of

our discussions above. For, the synthesis, effected by the Ego,

of the Immediately-Given and of the Form of Thought appropriate to

it, which two factors of reality remain otherwise always divorced

from each other in consciousness, can be brought about only by

an act of freedom. Moreover, our arguments throw, in another way,

quite a fresh light on Critical Idealism. To any close student of

Fichte's system it will appear as if Fichte cared for nothing so

much as for the defence of the proposition, that nothing can enter

the Ego from without, that nothing can appear in the Ego which was

not the Ego's own original creation. Now, it is beyond all dispute

that no type of Idealism will ever be able to derive from within

the Ego that form of the world-content which we have called "the

Immediately-Given." For, this form can only be given; it can never

be constructed by thinking. In proof of this, it is enough to reflect

that, even if the whole series of colours were given to us except one,

we should not be able to fill in that one out of the bare Ego. We

can form an image of the most remote countries, though we have never

seen them, provided we have once personally experienced, as given,

the details which go to form the image. We then build up the total

picture, according to the instructions supplied to us, out of the

particular facts which we have ourselves experienced. But we shall

strive in vain to invent out of ourselves even a single perceptual

element which has never appeared within the sphere of what has been

given to us. It is one thing to be merely acquainted with the world;

it is another to have knowledge of its essential nature. This nature,

for all that it is closely identified with the world-content, does

not become clear to us unless we build up reality ourselves out of

the Given and the Forms of Thought. The real "what" of the Given

comes to be affirmed for the Ego only through the Ego itself. The Ego

would have no occasion to affirm the nature of the Given for itself,

if it did not find itself confronted at the outset by the Given in

wholly indeterminate form. Thus, the essential nature of the world

is affirmed, not apart from, but through, the Ego.

The true form of reality is not the first form in which it presents

itself to the Ego, but the last form which it receives through

the activity of the Ego. That first form is, in fact, without any

importance for the objective world and counts only as the basis for

the process of cognition. Hence, it is not the form given to the world

by theory which is subjective, but rather the form in which the world

is originally given to the Ego. If, following Volkelt and others,

we call the given world "experience," our view amounts to saying:

The world-picture presents itself, owing to the constitution of our

consciousness, in subjective form as experience, but science completes

it and makes its true nature manifest.

Our Theory of Knowledge supplies the basis for an Idealism which,

in the true sense of the word, understands itself. It supplies

good grounds for the conviction that thinking brings home to us the

essential nature of the world. Nothing but thinking can exhibit the

relations of the parts of the world-content, be it the relation of

the heat of the sun to the stone which it warms, or the relation of

the Ego to the external world. Thinking alone has the function of

determining all things in their relations to each other.

The objection might still be urged by the followers of Kant, that the

determination, above-described, of the Given holds, after all, only

for the Ego. Our reply must be, consistently with our principles,

that the distinction between Ego and Outer World, too, holds only

within the Given, and that, therefore, it is irrelevant to insist on

the phrase, "for the Ego," in the face of the activity of thinking

which unites all opposites. The Ego, as divorced from the outer world,

disappears completely in the process of thinking out the nature of the

world. Hence it becomes meaningless still to talk of determinations

which hold only for the Ego.