MOUNTED CHARGES IN SOUTH AFRICA
From time to time in recent chapters I have noticed cases where the
Boers showed unusual boldness in pressing on horseback, where the nature
of the ground permitted, into decisive rifle-range, sometimes firing
from the saddle as they came, and sometimes actually mingling with our
men. I have noted similar cases of bold mounted aggression in our men,
though without saddle-fire. I purpose now to treat the subject as a
whole, taking the Boers first.
Faint symptoms of this were observable as early as Graspan (November,
1899). Sannah’s Post (March, 1900) was the first occasion, I believe,
where they rode into close quarters in the course of pressing a
rear-guard. The same tactics appear again in November of the same year
at Komati River and elsewhere in the Eastern Transvaal at the dawn of
the Boer renaissance, if we may so term the burst of offensive vigour
which signalized the end of 1900. They are not much in evidence in the
height of that outbreak, because the Boer offence took the form mainly
of attacks (often by night) on fortified posts, where they were neither
necessary nor feasible; but signs of increased boldness in submitting
horses to rifle-fire are visible in all the fights of that period. From
the middle of 1901 onwards, when combats in the open field were the
rule, this tendency took shape in a definite system of tactics.
Curiously enough, these tactics, on their aggressive side, were confined
mainly, though not wholly, to the Transvaal. The Free Staters used the
semi-aggressive or “penetrating” charge freely enough, in order to
escape from drives, but rarely in direct offence. This may have been due
to the influence of De Wet, who nearly always preferred stalking to
rushing. From the point of view of instruction, however, both types are
equally interesting. They differed only in object, not in method.
On March 22, 1901, at Geduld, in the Western Transvaal, three squadrons
of the Imperial Light Horse, under Colonel Briggs, of the King’s Dragoon
Guards, were engaged in a reconnaissance, when, with very little warning
and to the blank astonishment of all who witnessed the scene, several
hundreds of De la Rey’s Boers, under the young General Kemp, in good
order, and firing from the saddle, galloped down upon the extended
skirmishing line of two squadrons. Our men just had time to mount,
retire to a flank, and receive the support of the third squadron, when
the enemy swept over the vacated position, swerved, and disappeared.
This appears to have been a sort of rehearsal for future occasions. The
charge inflicted no loss, but it is also significant that it incurred no
loss. It was not repeated, though the Imperial Light Horse were followed
back for several miles to their camp with vehement attacks, which they
repelled with great coolness and gallantry. This may be noted as an
excellent example of a steady retirement under difficult circumstances
(_Times_ History, vol. v., p. 224).
Twice on later occasions, at Reitz (October, 1901) and at Tigerkloof
Spruit (December 18, 1901), the Imperial Light Horse had to sustain
something in the nature of real mounted charges, in the first case of a
serious character. They repelled them well (_Times_ History, vol. v.,
pp. 393 and 428–431).
Two months after Geduld, at Vlakfontein[52] (May 30, 1901), operating
against a column of all arms under General Dixon, Kemp used the same
tactics with deadly effect, this time employing stratagem to heighten
surprise. A rear-guard of 150 Yeomanry, 100 Infantry, and 2 guns, was
beginning a retirement towards camp. While feinting against other
portions of the columns, Kemp concentrated several hundred men against
this rear-guard. The Boers, having fired the grass to windward, in order
to mask their approach and bewilder their foes, burst through and rode
down the Yeomanry screen, cut to pieces the company of Infantry, and the
gun detachments, and took possession of the guns. No less than 150 of
our men fell killed or wounded in a very short space of time, while the
Boer losses were slight. There was a prompt and vigorous counter-attack
by the rest of the column, which the Boers scarcely waited to receive,
and the guns were recaptured. But the balance of success was with Kemp.
Our column was crippled and Dixon had to retreat by a forced night march
to his base.
-----
Footnote 52:
_Times_ History, vol. v., pp. 281–284.
-----
Let us note certain points, some of general, some of local interest:
1. The Yeomanry engaged on this occasion were inexperienced troops—the
Infantry and gunners, veterans.
2. The Boers, for the most part, remained in the saddle and fired from
it, until they reached close quarters. The terrain, which was open and
unobstructed, permitted this. After dismounting, some dropped the rein
altogether, and some advanced firing, with the rein over the arm. The
same plan was adopted in most of the subsequent charges.
3. There was no “shock,” nor any idea of shock in this or any other
instance of the charge. The lean, undersized Boer ponies were incapable
of it. Shock is incompatible with the destructive use of the rifle, and
this was a massacre with the rifle, short, sharp, and murderous. Even if
it had been possible for a body of steel-armed horsemen using shock
formation to reach close quarters under similar circumstances—and such a
thing was never done or attempted in the whole course of the war—their
destructive power would not be a tithe of that possessed by mounted
riflemen, and their exposure to retaliation infinitely greater. Think of
the physical incidents of the two types of charge, remembering that
shock requires the steel-armed horsemen to remain on horseback, bursting
through the enemy at the first onset, and doing what damage they can _en
route_, and rallying from their disarray at some more or less distant
point for a second charge. Think of the opportunities for retaliation if
a spark of spirit lives in the defence: and the Infantry and gunners in
this case were as firm as rocks.
But, even in making this imaginary contrast—for neither South Africa nor
Manchuria provides any historical contrast—beware of assuming too much.
The Boers had first to drive back and overthrow an extended skirmishing
screen of mounted troops. They could not have done this in dense
formation. Nor could steel-armed Cavalry have done it. Beware, then, of
assuming that these latter, in virtue of their hybrid character, could
effect a tactical transformation in the midst of a rapid, loose action,
where each second was of importance, and close up for shock at the
psychological moment. This is not even practised in peace manœuvres.
It was never done in war, and never will be done in war, not so much
from the purely mechanical difficulties as from the sudden and total
change of spirit required. Wrangel, whom I have quoted before on this
point, is right.[53] The modern horseman cannot serve two masters so
different as the rifle and the steel weapon. He must serve one
faithfully or fail towards both. We profess to secure “thorough
efficiency” in both, an unattainable ideal.
-----
Footnote 53:
_Vide supra_, p. 41.
-----
4. _Fire from the Saddle._—This, for the most part, was unaimed or but
roughly aimed, and probably did but little damage to the stationary part
of the defence, though the Yeomanry, who had 60 casualties out of 150
men, must have lost appreciably in the course of their rout from more or
less aimed saddle-fire. But the moral effect, in this case, and in all
cases, was the best justification of the practice. Contrast the “terror”
of cold steel, which has so little reality in actual war. Here was the
moral effect of a really terrible weapon, materializing, before the
phase of contact, in bullets which sang over or impinged among the
defence, confusing aim and sighting.
In regard to the purely physical effect, note, especially for future
reference, the opening for aimed or unaimed saddle-fire against horses,
whether in the course of a pursuit of mounted men like the pursuit of
the screen at Vlakfontein, or against groups of “held” horses in rear of
a position, when a few chance bullets may cause a stampede.
5. _Formation._—We have no special details as to Vlakfontein, but I
infer from the narratives that the Boers charged in a very rough line
with fairly wide intervals. Second and third lines were a later
development. Formations, intervals, speed, points for dismounting, etc.,
were dictated, and always must be dictated, by local circumstances. They
admit of no rigid rules.
To resume our historical survey, we find the Boers of the Eastern
Transvaal charging again under Viljoen at Mooifontein (May 25, 1901),
against a convoy column, very ably and steadily handled by Colonel
Gallwey. Though Viljoen’s attacks failed, it is to be noted that he
suffered little loss.
Then comes a long gap of four months, during which the drought of the
South African winter compelled the Boers to remain for the most part on
the defensive. At the end of September, 1901, with the first spring
grass, Botha took the field for the raid on Natal to which I have
already alluded. His first contact with British troops came at Blood
River Poort (September 17), near the Natal frontier, and 100 miles from
his starting-point in the Eastern Transvaal. Here by a skilful stratagem
he decoyed into an exposed position[54] a body of 300 mounted riflemen,
and then, charging down on their flank in one lightning stroke, put out
of action nearly 50 men, captured 3 guns, and forced a general surrender
within ten minutes. Curiously enough, our own force, when the calamity
happened, had just attempted something in the nature of a charge, in
order to overwhelm the small Boer detachment which was acting as
decoy—not a charge “home,” but a rapid ride over open ground into close
range. They had just dismounted to open fire when Botha fell on them.
The incident shows how useless mere audacity and dash are, unless
founded on careful reconnaissance.
-----
Footnote 54:
This is probably the explanation of what happened. See _Times_
History, vol. v., pp. 339–340.
-----
We paid dearly for the hesitations and delays which marked our attempts
to envelop Botha on his long and perilous return journey from Natal. He
had held from the first, and maintained to the last, a moral ascendency
which took effect at the end of October (a fortnight after his return),
in one of the most remarkable Boer successes of the guerilla war, and in
one of the chief examples of the charge. This was at Bakenlaagte on
October 30, 1901.[55] At this time Colonel Benson was operating
independently in the midst of the “high veld” of the Eastern Transvaal.
His vigorous night raids upon laagers (alluded to in the previous
chapter) had exasperated the burghers to the last degree. Long on the
look-out for vengeance, they seized upon Botha’s return to make an
appeal to him for co-operation. Botha, at the moment, was seventy miles
away to the east. By forced marching, rapid and thoroughly screened, he
appeared on the field of Bakenlaagte at exactly the right moment,
bringing a reinforcement whose strength must be regarded as doubtful,
but which, at the utmost, did not exceed 500.[56] Probably the whole
Boer force on the field was about 1,000. Benson’s total strength was
1,600 riflemen, of whom 650 were Infantry, and 6 guns.
-----
Footnote 55:
_Times_ History, vol. v., pp. 360–376.
Footnote 56:
This was our own Intelligence estimate. General Botha, in a recent
visit to London, informed me that to the best of his recollection he
brought no more than 250.
-----
The tactical and topographical conditions were closely similar to those
of Vlakfontein. At 2 p.m. a rear-guard of 380 mounted riflemen (this
time seasoned soldiers of the regular Mounted Infantry, Scottish Horse,
etc.), a company of Infantry, and 2 guns, were retiring towards camp.
Other mounted detachments and guns were still out on the flanks. The
main body of Infantry were either in camp or on their way to it. The
weather was wet and misty, the terrain open and undulating. While
demonstrating vigorously all round the perimeter of defence, Botha
ordered a charge against the rear-guard. The Boers, shouting and firing
from the saddle, swept over a mile and a half of ground, overwhelming
the company of Infantry, catching and capturing the rearmost, or
“covering” sections of mounted riflemen, and stopped just short of the
crest of an elevation, afterwards known as Gun Hill, where the guns and
the remainder of the mounted riflemen had hurriedly taken post. Here the
Boers flung themselves from their ponies, and engaged our men at close
quarters (barely thirty yards distance) on foot. The resistance they met
with was magnificent. The defending force had to be almost literally
exterminated before the hill was won and the guns captured.
This action reveals in a pointed way the gulf which divides _arme
blanche_ charges from rifle charges. In the former you must charge
_home_, at all costs, and whatever the nature of the ground. There is no
place in the _arme blanche_ scheme for an assault like that at
Bakenlaagte, where the Boers, with instinctive dexterity and rapidity,
converted themselves in a flash from horsemen into footmen at the right
place and moment, using the dead ground at the foot of Gun Hill for the
protection of their horses during the fire-fight. When the charge began
I do not suppose that one of them knew under what conditions of ground
it would end. The ridge was of gentle gradient and of unobstructed
surface, but, supposing that it had been of a sharp gradient and
encumbered with boulders, these conditions would have made but little
difference to the efficacy of the foot-attack, and might very well have
assisted it. To an _arme blanche_ charge they would have been fatal.
(_Cf._ the Dronfield incident, p. 113.) The same principle will hold
good in every sort of future war, and particularly in European wars,
where open, undulating plains like those of the “high veld” are
extremely rare. To one opportunity for an _arme blanche_ charge there
will be a hundred for rifle charges.
An intermediate example of charging, which illustrates this point about
ground, was given at the small, but sad episode of Tafel Kop in the Free
State (December 20, 1901), where the crest of the hill on which our
troops (90 men and 3 guns) were posted, was in fact steep,
boulder-strewn, and impracticable for horses.[57]
-----
Footnote 57:
_Times_ History, vol. v., pp. 423–427.
-----
The Eastern Transvaalers are found charging again with damaging effect
in the actions of Holland (December 19, 1901), and Bank Kop (January 4,
1902).[58] The latter was the case of a counter-charge under
circumstances very similar to those of Blood River Poort. Their last
exploit of this nature was on April 1, 1902, at Boschman’s Kop, the only
occasion, I think, during the guerilla war where regular Cavalry (though
unequipped with steel weapons) were concerned. The regiment, 312 strong,
with 40 National Scouts, in the course of a night raid, stumbled upon a
concentration of about 800 Boers (I cannot guarantee the numbers, but
give the maximum estimate), who had gathered together to discuss the
question of peace. The surprise for the moment was complete, and the
Boers scattered in all directions; but rallied later in considerable
force and engaged the Cavalry, who had retired to a position about a
mile away. The attack was vehement, with frequent charges into close
range, which were repelled with equal gallantry. At last the Cavalry
flank was turned, and our men had to retire. As long as defensible
positions were available the retreat was steady and methodical, but the
last few miles to camp were a dead-level plain, over which pursuers and
pursued rode as hard as they could, until reinforcements and Artillery
fire from the British camp checked the Boers. In the whole affair, which
was galling, but not in the least discreditable to the Cavalry, they had
seventy-seven casualties, and there is no question that a considerable
number of men succumbed to saddle-fire during the pursuit whom no steel
weapon could have reached. The complaint, it is said, was raised by some
of those present that they had been crippled by the removal of their
swords, and that if they had carried them the result would have been
different. The regiment had only recently arrived in South Africa:
otherwise the mere hint of such a complaint would make one despair of
reform. During something like a year and three-quarters of war the
Cavalry had had countless opportunities—if they existed—of showing the
superior value of the _arme blanche_ in first producing and then taking
advantage of circumstances tactically similar to these. The point is,
that it was impossible to force the Boers to accept combat on the terms
required by steel. It was the rifle which settled the nature of combats.
The Boers had conducted the original fire-fight in loose formation, and
they pursued in loose “swarm” formation. Consider the futility of our
endeavouring, at any phase, to mass into shock formation, with nothing
whatever upon which to exert shock, only to present a helplessly
vulnerable target. If we did not form close shock formation, we
abandoned, as I have repeatedly pointed out, the whole _raison d’être_
of the steel weapon. Individual swordsmen, separated by wide intervals,
are outmatched by capable riflemen, mounted or dismounted. It is a cruel
injustice to our Cavalry to teach them otherwise.
-----
Footnote 58:
_Ibid._, pp. 455–458.
-----
De la Rey’s district, the Western Transvaal, may be considered as having
been the true birthplace of the charge, and it was here, during the last
period of the war, that it reached its highest development. At
Kleinfontein[59] (October 24, 1901) Kemp galloped down upon the centre
of a column on the march, threw the convoy into confusion, and captured
a dozen waggons, then whirled down upon the rear-guard, and inflicted
severe loss upon it, taking temporary possession of two guns, which, for
lack of teams, the burghers were unable to remove. The remnants of our
men made a splendid resistance, and reinforcements eventually drove the
Boers off. In this action we find the first mention of the use of
successive lines of horsemen for charging.
-----
Footnote 59:
_Times_ History, vol. v., pp. 383–384.
-----
At Yzer Spruit (February 25, 1902) De la Rey ambuscaded and captured
entire a convoy-column, using the mounted charge freely at the crisis of
the action; and ten days later, at the sad disaster of Tweebosch (March
7, 1902), the same General (using three successive charging lines)
routed Methuen’s mounted troops, who in this case were of a very
heterogeneous and unstable kind, and forced a general surrender of the
column. In the stirring action of Boschbult (March 31, 1902), the defeat
of part of our flank screen by a determined Boer charge caused for a
short time an exceedingly critical situation. Later in the day, when
Cookson’s force was concentrated and entrenched, Liebenberg led a plucky
charge against some farm-buildings adequately held by riflemen. This was
a daring departure from the rules governing such attacks, and Liebenberg
paid for it in a sharp repulse.[60]
-----
Footnote 60:
_Times_ History, vol. v.: Yzer Spruit, pp. 498–500; Tweebosch, pp.
501–508; Boschbult, pp. 520–522.
-----
But the most dramatic and interesting of the Boer charges was reserved
for the last important action of the war, that of Roodewal (April 11,
1902). It failed, but the cause, manner, and results of its failure are
full of instruction. I wish I had space to recount the episode in full;
but I can only sketch what happened, and ask the reader to refer for a
full account to chapter xix. (section iv.) of the fifth volume of the
_Times_ History.
One of our great mobile driving lines of the latest model, organized in
three divisions, each about 4,000 strong, under the command of General
Ian Hamilton, was sweeping on an immense front across the Western
Transvaal. On the early morning of April 10, the right division, under
Colonel Kekewich, about 4,000 strong and composed of two columns under
Colonels Grenfell and Von Donop, was changing ground to the right (or
west) in accordance with orders to widen the front of the driving line
prior to the day’s operations. The columns were still in closed-up route
formation, Von Donop’s leading, Grenfell’s following, with an advanced
screen of 280 mounted riflemen thrown out to the front. Terrain, a
level, open plain rising almost imperceptibly for about two miles to a
gentle elevation on the farm-lands of Roodewal. Kemp had concentrated in
the course of the night behind this elevation, and at about 7.30 a.m.
was sighted, by our foremost scouts, marching parallel. Whether, when
the action first began, he knew of the massed British columns, is not
clear. Probably he did not. There is ground for the view that he had
mistaken our advanced mounted screen for the flank of a driving line
already fully deployed for the day’s drive in the manner then customary,
and had resolved to roll up part of this supposed line by a
flank-charge.
However this may be, he deployed and put into motion a number of men
variously estimated from 1,000 to 1,500, who, in widely extended order,
trotted slowly forward in two very long, arc-shaped lines. As they
approached our advanced scouts, they broke into a canter, and began to
fire from the saddle. Our screen and the pompom with it retired hastily
upon the main body, some forty men being caught and overpowered. The
crest of Roodewal once topped, the main British forces, in column of
route about a mile and a half away, became visible to the Boers and the
Boers to them. Grenfell executed a hurried but fairly orderly deployment
to meet the attack, which was directed mainly against his column. The
South African Constabulary, Scottish Horse and Yeomanry—about 1,200
mounted men in all—were thrown out in a rough defensive line. Von Donop
was slower in deployment, but had to meet only the northerly part of the
Boer line, which split off and attempted a wider and more normal and
deliberate attack. The centre and right—estimated roughly at 800
men—closed in, corrected the convexity of their line with wonderful
precision, and with the brave Commandant Potgieter at their head,
charged straight upon Grenfell. In an episode lasting so few minutes,
and crammed with such breathless excitement, it is impossible to
ascertain relative strength, positions, and formations with positive
accuracy; but it may be taken as fairly correct to say that when the
charge reached a point 600 yards from the British front, it was exposed
to the fire of some 1,500 rifles and 6 guns, and that the Boer
formation—at any rate, in portions of the line—was now very close—some
say almost solid, or “knee to knee”—and from two to four deep. The pace
at this stage, we infer, was the best the small Boer ponies could ever
attain to, and that amounted to little more than the canter of a Cavalry
horse. The plain would not have sheltered a mouse, and it was a clear
day with a bright sun. Under these conditions it would have been strange
if the charge had not been checked, high and wild as much of our fire
was. It faltered appreciably within 300 yards, and stumbled on in
fragments to within 100 yards. Potgieter was shot dead only 70 yards
from our line.
The significant thing was not the failure of this piece of brilliant
recklessness, but that it came so near success, and met with so little
punishment. The Boers retired without disorder, carrying some of their
wounded with them, and leaving on the field fifty dead and thirty badly
wounded men. Our own losses, besides prisoners taken from the advanced
screen, were seven killed and fifty-six wounded, mainly by fire from the
saddle, and from those figures the reader may judge of the moral effect
of this form of fire, coupled with the spectacle of the charge, in
baulking the aim of the defence. It is safe to say that one casualty
inflicted in this way has as much moral effect as three inflicted by men
on foot. But in the physical sphere there was another important effect
of saddle-fire. Grenfell’s column lost, partly from this cause, no less
than 150 horses. Many more stampeded. In other words, the column for the
time being was demobilized, and deprived of any possibility of a
counter-stroke, though a more fruitful opportunity for a counter-stroke
can scarcely be imagined.[61] The weak points in this charge are
apparent. The cardinal factor—surprise—high as it was, was not high
enough to counteract the vulnerability due to comparatively low speed,
in good light, over a bare plain; and the excessively close formation
aggravated this vulnerability. Formation, of course, admits of no
dogmatic rules. There is no insuperable objection to a dense line, if
the surprise is great enough to justify it, and if, when close quarters
are reached, the line is not so dense as to strike too small an area or
impede that free use of the rifle on foot which is the object of the
charge.
-----
Footnote 61:
An hour and a half later a general pursuit was begun by all three
divisions. It went on for eighteen miles, and resulted in the capture
of three guns and thirty burghers.
-----
It is never easy to picture an _arme blanche_ charge in direct analogy
to any given rifle charge, because the _arme blanche_ never creates for
itself the opportunities which the rifle creates; but so far as we can
picture an analogy at Roodewal, the advantage is overwhelmingly on the
side of the rifle. Saddle-fire, with its power of demobilizing the
defence long before contact, is a decisive advantage. But would an _arme
blanche_ charge ever have taken place? It is very doubtful. “Cavalry
Training” appears to make provision for a charge over a distance as
great as 1,800 yards, but that is for a shock charge against “Cavalry,”
who are assumed to be in their saddles (pp. 125–128). What of a charge
against Infantry? In the ten lines devoted to that subject (p. 129)
there is a very natural silence on this and many other points. But were
these men of Grenfell’s to be regarded as Cavalry or Infantry? They had
horses, deployed with them and dismounted from them. Suppose them
Cavalry (in the Cavalry sense) who at the last moment declined to engage
in the conventional “shock duel,” and, having brought the charge to a
standstill by rifle-fire, and having retained their full mobility owing
to the absence of hostile saddle-fire, retaliated with a counter-stroke?
But that is not the only perplexity. How were the leaders of the shock
charge to know in advance which course the defending troops would take?
They must decide before starting, for there is no provision in “Cavalry
Training” for changing while in rapid movement from dense shock
formation to the “extended formation” recommended for a charge upon
“Infantry.” If a charge is not a steel-charge they are bound by the
rules of “Dismounted Action,” under which heading, of course, this rifle
charge of the Boers would have to be included. One of these rules is
that extra ammunition is to be served out when such action is
contemplated. Another point: Whichever formation, dense or extended, was
adopted at the outset, Grenfell’s advanced scouting screen, whose inrush
was accountable for a good deal of wild firing in the defence, would
have had little to fear against horsemen using only a steel weapon. They
had only to transform themselves into “Infantry,” and let the storm blow
over. Acting as skilfully as the Boers at Poplar Grove and many other
actions, they would have stopped the charge altogether. For the rest,
whatever the weapon relied on in the charge, the vulnerability of the
surface exposed was the same and the chance of obtaining contact, judged
on a purely physical estimate, no better or worse. On possibilities
after hypothetical contact I need scarcely again enlarge. There would
have been nothing in the firing-line on which to exert true shock, and
palpably men who are doomed to stay in the saddle and execute
complicated and difficult “rallies” are worse off than riflemen on foot.
The latter, taught not to fear cold steel, and acting as directed in
“Infantry Training,” are in the superior position. My argument is not
academical. It is based on the living facts of modern war.
Such were the principal examples on the Boer side of the mounted charge.
But they do not exhaust the list. There were numerous cases—in the Free
State especially (as I remarked above)—of charges for the purpose of
piercing driving lines or block-house lines, interesting, if only for
the light they throw on the effect of fire upon horsemen in rapid
movement. Nor must it ever be forgotten that, in the parlance of mounted
riflemen, the “charge” is only a relative term, which does not
necessarily imply contact. The more rapid the tactical approach, by a
more daring use of the horse, the greater the approximation to the fully
developed charge.
These incidents have received far too little attention. Cavalry writers
have generally ignored them, or alluded to them in terms of
indifference, as curious phenomena in a class of war which scarcely
concerns Cavalry. Mr. Goldman, in the 1909 edition of his translation of
Von Bernhardi’s “Cavalry in Future Wars,” in the course of a gentle
rebuke to his author for venturing to admire these charges, disposes of
them in a footnote as the work of mere “Mounted Infantry,” and reveals
his imperfect acquaintance with the facts by speaking of the “_one or
two occasions_” on which Boers “brought about a decision by rifle-fire
from their horses” (p. 56). He adds, with unconscious irony, that “he
can recall no instance where they actually charged—_i.e._, endeavoured
to decide the action by _shock_.” Those few words, embodied in their
complacent little footnote, supply a complete revelation of the mental
attitude of the _arme blanche_ advocates towards the tactics of mounted
riflemen. Names are everything, results nothing. Attach the label,
“Mounted Infantry,” and that disposes of the charges, Boer and British,
such as they were, and, since they did not involve “shock,” what were
they, after all? It is true that throughout the whole war there was not
one solitary instance of “shock” in Mr. Goldman’s implied (and, in this
single case, perfectly correct) interpretation of that term. But what
matter? In his view, the Boers never gave the Cavalry a chance of
“discharging Cavalry duties.” Was I wrong in suggesting that the _arme
blanche_ theory dwells in a mental shrine, sacrosanct, unapproachable by
argument?
Of a diametrically opposite character, and no less harmful than this
contemptuous indifference, is the idea—often enough expressed by those
who have never studied them—that these charges were non-military
exploits, comparable only to the onslaughts of wild dervishes, a blend
of fanaticism and luck, and no model for sensible, serious soldiers. In
spite of the fact that saddle-fire is officially enjoined at this moment
for “picked men” of the Mounted Infantry, I have heard it spoken of as
though it were on a par with the beating of tom-toms, the throwing of
stones or poisoned arrows and such unsoldierly pranks. For ignorance of
this sort no condemnation can be too strong. Even fanatics may teach us
lessons. But the Boers were no more fanatics than the American troopers
of Forrest and Morgan. They were shrewd, sober, white men, valuing their
lives, parsimonious of their ammunition, for fresh supplies of which
during the guerilla war they had no domestic resources, and by no means
inclined to extravagance or foolhardiness. Their charges demanded not
only dash, but high tactical discipline, a sure instinct for ground and
skilled preparatory scouting. Fire from the saddle requires good
horsemanship and great manual skill. If these be symptoms of fanaticism,
the more fanatics we have in our army, the better.
And what were the results of these charges upon the progress of the war?
Whether for their tactical lessons we dismiss them in footnotes or study
them seriously, let us remember that they, like other aggressive Boer
exploits, cost us many lives, many guns, many prisoners, and an amount
of treasure at which we can only dimly conjecture—probably scores of
millions of pounds.[62] Sannah’s Post in March, 1900, changed the whole
outlook of the Free Staters. To Vlakfontein, coupled with the night
attack at Wilmansrust, can be definitely traced the decision of the
joint Council of War (held on June 20, 1901), to continue hostilities
throughout the winter of that year. But for Bakenlaagte, the
Transvaalers, always the most inclined to peace, might have forced their
will on the sister state, while De la Rey’s successes in the early
months of 1902 imperilled gravely the hopes of peace. Had the Roodewal
charge, made during the progress of negotiations, succeeded, there might
well have been a delay of several more months.
-----
Footnote 62:
Between May, 1901, and April, 1902, nine principal charging actions
cost us 2,500 casualties and prisoners and 18 guns. The war cost about
5½ millions a month.
-----
We on our side never succeeded in carrying the charging principle to the
point to which the Boer veterans carried it. Saddle-fire was not, I
think, in any instance practised. But in aggressive tactical vigour all
our mounted men made remarkable strides during the guerilla war, in
spite of the somewhat deadening effect of the driving system. The rifle
was the inspiration. There was only one instance of an _arme blanche_
charge during that period of the guerilla war in which the Cavalry
carried steel weapons. This was at Welgevonden (February 12, 1901), in
the course of French’s great drive in the Eastern Transvaal, when
Colonel Rimington’s Inniskilling Dragoons got home among a Boer
rear-guard, and disposed of some twenty Boers by death, wounds, or
capture.[63] With this exception, every success we obtained was due to
the dashing use of horse and rifle in combination. I have already
mentioned the cases of Victoria Nek and Bothaville. Wildfontein (March
24, 1901) was an excellent example of an energetic galloping pursuit,
leading to the capture of guns, waggons, and a good many Boers.
Roodekraal (February 3, 1902) led to similar results, and was
distinguished by several genuine mounted charges of the Boer type, in
which New Zealanders and Queenslanders, under Colonel Garratt, took
part.[64] The systematized night-raids described in the previous chapter
generally ended in something of the nature of a charge, in widely
extended order, upon the Boer laager. Other small raids, pursuits and
encounters, in which our men learnt to ride more boldly into
rifle-range, were innumerable.
-----
Footnote 63:
_Times_ History, vol. v., p. 173.
Footnote 64:
_Times_ History, vol. v., p. 226, Wildfontein; p. 475, Roodekraal.
-----
As I have often pointed out, this bold riding into a fire-zone is the
principle which lies at the back of the charge. It is a question of
tactical mobility, pure and simple. How far the ride can be carried
rests on local circumstances, on the degree of surprise, on the nature
of the ground to be traversed, on the quality of the enemy’s troops, on
their tactical disposition, and on the character of their defences, if
any. But the whole scheme of offensive tactics is one; the object,
however attained, is always the same—to use the horse as the means of
closing with the enemy as effectively as possible and as quickly as
possible. Infantry, without the horse, pursue the same object. They move
more slowly, but present less vulnerable surface. The horseman’s problem
is to neutralize greater vulnerability by greater speed and a larger
measure of surprise. If we review the war as a whole, we cannot escape
the conclusion that until the last year of hostilities the vulnerability
of horses in rapid movement was exaggerated by both sides, and the
effect produced upon the sighting, aim, fire-discipline, and equanimity
of the defence underestimated. In our own case the error was aggravated
by the fact that we came to the field possessing the tradition of a
mounted charge, but in an obsolete form, inspired by the wrong weapon,
and incapable of being associated with the right weapon—the rifle. This
tradition was destroyed, and never adequately replaced. Outside the
charmed circle of the Cavalry it was often too readily assumed that a
principle had been discredited, not merely the false application of a
right principle. Inside the Cavalry, whatever the various impressions of
the time, the net official result now is to regard the tradition of
shock as intact, and its failure in South Africa as a negligible
incident of an “abnormal” war. The Boers started the war with no
tradition, with a strong prejudice, indeed, against the exposure of the
horse and an exaggerated reliance on the spade for passive defence and
on stalking for offence. Their discipline, moreover, was not good enough
for a form of tactics requiring exceptional discipline. Circumstances,
moral and military, drove them to develop tactical discipline, and with
it a charging tradition, and they attained it in a perfectly healthy,
normal way. Our mounted men, Cavalry included, in so far as they
approached the Boer standard, worked on the same lines of natural
evolution.
Perhaps I ought to say one word more in regard to one of the strangest
of the many paradoxical arguments which the defence of the _arme
blanche_ has evoked. I mean the complaint which I commented on _à
propos_ of Boschman’s Kop—that the Cavalry were deprived of steel
weapons just when the Boers were developing the charge, the assumption
being, presumably, that but for this modification of armament the
Cavalry would then for the first time have developed equally effective,
if not more effective, _arme blanche_ charging tactics of their own. I
have never seen this view put forward in general terms by any high
Cavalry authority, or, indeed, by any Cavalryman; but it figures among
the nebulous popular arguments upon which the _arme blanche_ thrives,
and it sometimes finds accidental public expression. In July, 1909, an
anonymous correspondent of the _Times_ propounded it as a final and
crushing answer to those who ventured to see something instructive and
important in the Boer charges. Now, in the first place, the view is in
conflict with the facts. The Boers began to charge long before the steel
weapons were discarded. They charged at Sannah’s Post as early as March,
1900, and within view of the Cavalry engaged in that action. They
charged mounted riflemen and attacked Cavalry with great pertinacity in
the Eastern Transvaal during October, 1900; and although no body of
Cavalry was, so far as I know, itself charged on horseback by Boers
during the year 1901, the steel weapon outlived the period of
Vlakfontein, and had not, I think, been more than partly abolished at
the period of Bakenlaagte. But dates are not material. The discouraging
feature of the argument is its total failure to grasp the real nature
and origin of the rifle charge, the elementary physical and moral
principles which distinguish it in tactical form, and, above all, in
tactical spirit, from the shock charge. And behind it, I am afraid, we
recognize an echo of Mr. Goldman’s complaint that the Boers, owing to
fear of the steel, declined to “give battle” with Cavalry on “open
ground.” I cannot pause now to discuss that.[65]
-----
Footnote 65:
“With French in South Africa,” p. 423. _Vide infra_, p. 285.
-----
We need not exaggerate, as assuredly we must not minimize, the
importance of the mounted charges in South Africa. We must allow for the
fact that the Boers for the most part were veterans in the mounted
rifleman’s art, and that the men against whom they were matched never
reached the same degree of excellence. What we should do is to grasp the
principle, and apply it to the training of our mounted troops,
especially to our professional troops, who are competent to learn
anything to which they apply their minds and wills. Shock, at any rate,
is gone. South Africa gave it its death-blow, and Manchuria, as I shall
show later, buried it for ever. The rifle charge, whether on foot,
mounted, or in any intermediate stage up to direct riding into contact,
remains as a proved, tangible fact. Since 1870 and up to the present day
(1910) shock has been pure theory.