_Italian Unity; Victor Emmanuel II; War of 1859; Farini; Cavour;
Correspondence; Poerio on Southern Italy; Sir James Lacaita;
Visit to Turin; The Biographer._
Perhaps only when Italy shall have given proof of her fitness to
hold her own amongst the Powers of Europe will the chain of events
which has led to the accomplishment of Italian Unity be fully
appreciated. True, these events are recent, and require the
mellowness of time to impart to them due historical importance. As
time progresses, however, the story of United Italy will attain
significance; and there is reasonable hope that the new kingdom,
hitherto not too harshly tried, will also attain that healthy
maturity of which its youth has given promise. To forge the links to
bind these discordant States into one, wars, external or internal,
have succeeded each other; but, whilst assigning due weight to
fortune without, it would be ungracious to stint the praise of the
workers from within, whether we regard the mild wisdom of the school
of patriots, whereof Poerio, Settembrini, and Panizzi were examples,
or the reckless valour of more ardent revolutionists, valour which,
it must be granted, was not without its uses when occasion demanded,
and which in its excess was skilfully controlled by one of whom it
were but faint commendation to say that amongst all the records of
eminent statesmen, his superior could not easily be found.
Our observations have shown that Panizzi did not confine his love of
country to that part of Italy wherewith he himself was most
intimately connected. Having achieved his mission in favour of
liberty in the South, we now (1859) find him turning his attention
to the North of the Peninsula. By way of introduction to our account
of his proceedings in this quarter, it may be well to give a short
epitome of the events of the year in question, when the first
foundations of Italian unity may be said to have been laid.
Victor Emmanuel, on succeeding to the throne in consequence of his
father’s abdication, enjoyed the reputation of an experienced and
intrepid soldier, yet was not in other respects a general favourite
with his people. Nor was unpopularity at home the only difficulty in
his way. When, after the fatal day of Novara, he received the crown
from Charles Albert, who resigned it not until he had vainly sought
honourable death in battle, he swore to avenge the wrongs of Italy,
and to uphold the free institutions of his own realm. For this he
had to reckon both with Austria and Naples, who, with unparalleled
effrontery, called upon him to govern his kingdom in such a manner
as should be in conformity with the mode of government in the other
States of the Peninsula. To such a demand the King did not deign to
listen, and his opponents were forced to be content with denouncing
Sardinia as a hot-bed of sedition and revolutionary agitation. In
the beginning of 1859 Victor Emmanuel, who, in his speech to
Parliament, had remarked on the threatening appearance of the
political horizon, commenced preparations for war against Austria.
The circumstances which precipitated the war are too fresh in the
recollection of our readers to be dwelt on here to any length.
Cavour, on the part of Sardinia, was under promise to England to
make no hostile demonstration against Austria. France had declared
that she would aid Sardinia only in the case of the latter being
attacked. The preliminaries to an European Congress were actually
under discussion, when the Emperor of Austria suddenly broke off all
negotiations, and demanded of Sardinia an immediate disarmament, a
summons which was treated by Cavour with contempt. At this juncture,
Austria, with that peculiar aptitude for blundering which has so
characterised her action, sent, in the night of April 28-29, 1859,
her armies across the Ticino, thus affording an occasion of action
whereof the two allies were not slow to avail themselves. The French
troops hastened to cross the Alps. Battle followed battle with
uniform success to the allied arms, when, like a thunderbolt, news
of the Peace of Villafranca fell on Europe. Unexplained at the time,
the reasons for it soon came within the range of tolerably accurate
conjecture. In the first place the eagerness with which people of
the other States in Italy prepared to unite themselves with Sardinia
(which Cavour had foreseen, but which had failed to strike Louis
Napoleon,) was hardly to the taste of the French Emperor. Whatever
were his objects in the war, the unity of Italy was certainly not
one of them. He had employed his army, and thereby diverted his
people; he had gained a satisfactory amount of glory, though perhaps
not so much as his ambition led him to hope for. In his victories,
(though it were hard to apply to them the epithet _Pyrrhic_,) he had
undoubtedly sustained greater loss than his adversary; and he
possibly thought it as well to refrain from following the Austrians
to the strong position to which they had retired, and from whence
not all the armies of Italy, Sardinia, and France united could in
all probability have succeeded in dislodging them. His fortitude and
forbearance were, however, as all know, not without their
substantial reward.
-------
It is ours, not to write history, but simply to supply aid to its
study; and these may, we hope, be afforded, to the reader by the
somewhat varied correspondence of which this chapter will mainly
consist. The several writers quoted are at any rate worth listening
to, and not least among them Luigi Carlo Farini, the Dictator,
well-known as the friend of Mr. Gladstone, a letter from whom (dated
March 18th, 1859) comes first in order on our list:—
“... Times are so serious that my mind is filled with anxious
thoughts. Yesterday the Austrians blew up the bridge at Buffalora.
It is all very well for our friend Hudson to say they will not
attack us, but surely they strike us in our honour by violating
our property with their treaties.
“I should like to see what John Bull would do if they attempted to
mine his house. Even yesterday they expelled from Milan one of our
most esteemed staff-officers, Cav. Incisa. Such acts are committed
daily, but we must console ourselves by seeing how the whole of
Italy is giving a new and great example of unity and strength. Ten
thousand volunteers are coming from all parts of Italy; it is a
crusade; _your_ Modena has sent more than all the other States,
considering its extent (a thing which cannot be seen without
emotion). The stupefied Governments have lost strength. National
rights reign supreme in public opinion. My dear friend, awful
events are at hand. We count much upon your advocating our cause
in England.”
“The noble Neapolitan exiles, for whom the English people so
justly feel, may prove the means of advancing the common cause.
Let them only say that Neapolitan tyranny is not of native, but of
foreign growth, and in order to chastise Bomba, it will be
necessary to chastise Vienna. Let us hope they may say so, for it
is the unvarnished truth.”
That Panizzi rated the strength of Austria and the Quadrilateral at
its proper value, and considered that the Italians were about this
time _in trepidis rebus_, is plain from the following letter to Mr.
Haywood. It bears no date, but evidently must have been written
(from the British Museum) just before the conclusion of the war:—
“These Italian affairs have, as you may suppose, made me feverish.
First of all, I think the Austrians are not quite done for yet,
although I think they will be. Even in these times of wonder I don’t
believe they can have lost Vicenza and Mantua, and if the whole
country is not really up, the King of Piedmont will find these two
very hard bits. That they are yet in the Austrians’ hands I argue
from the fact of Radetzky’s troops retiring in two columns towards
them—what is more, taking with him political prisoners, which shows
he is not quite defeated. Even when Mantua and Piacenza are taken,
there is the pass of Caldiero, fortified in an awful manner, as I
have seen myself, and such fortresses as Legnano, Peschiera, and
Verona, in which fifty thousand men can defy three times the
number.”
“If the Tyrolese are up to the whole of the Venetian territory, the
Austrians may find it awkward, as they are out of favour here, and
they may not have either time or the means of victualling their
forces. But between us I do not very much like the peasants to take
up arms in earnest, even if they join in a popular movement at
first. They must enrol themselves, and that I do not think they will
do. I foresee, therefore, great difficulties, and at all events
great fighting. Yes, and depend upon it the French, if they last as
a republic, or even have a Bonaparte, will interfere. As to myself,
what can I do? I am more than fifty, and not a soldier, and what
they want now are young men ready to shoulder a musket or to
command.”
“In the second place, I am almost certain that the Italians will
differ among themselves (not as to the Austrians, or as to being
dismayed, but as to the form of Government.) The King of Sardinia
had no chance to keep his crown but by acting as he has done, as
they would have proclaimed a republic in Lombardy with the help of
the Swiss, and he would have had a revolution in the same sense at
home. But the spirit of the ‘Giovine Italia’ is at work there, and I
think there will be yet a great deal of trouble before the form of
government is settled. My views you know, and I fear I should have
no one listening to me, and the utmost I could expect would be to be
looked upon as a crazy Angloman. In the third place, I have hardly
any friend alive who would care for me, or on whom I could have
influence. I am a greater stranger in Italy than here.”
Towards the middle of the year, Panizzi himself visited the scene of
action, whence he wrote a graphic account of affairs in the North of
Italy to Mr. Gladstone, in a far more cheerful tone than that of the
last letter quoted:—
“San Maurizio, near Reggio,
September 4th, 1859.
“My dear Sir,—
... I went to Bologna to see the opening of the Assembly
last Thursday, and I hope to give them some good advice as to the
wording of the resolutions which are to be proposed to-morrow,
proclaiming the independence of Romagna. On Thursday I shall go to
Parma again to assist at the opening of their Assembly. I am now
staying with some distant cousins at a villa which Ariosto, who
lived here, had celebrated.
I cannot tell you how gratified I am at what I have seen ever
since I came to this part of Italy, on Monday last. The order and
quiet which prevail everywhere are only equalled by the unanimity
with which every man, woman, and child is determined not to submit
again to the fallen Government. I am happy to see that the
determination is supported by large numbers of volunteers who
flock to enlist: they come not only from the towns but from the
country; and at night, since I have been here, I have heard a
variety of songs in dialect in praise of Garibaldi and his
soldiers, ridiculing the Austrians and the late Duke of Modena, in
very expressive although in not very polite terms. I have seen
persons who are well affected to the Duke—the cousins at whose
house I am staying, and to whose family the Archbishop of Modena
belongs, amongst them—and one and all say that a restoration of
the fallen dynasty would be a great calamity. Here, in fact—at
Parma as well as Bologna—the universal wish is to be united to
Piedmont. The organization of the recruits proceeds with the
greatest rapidity, and the instructors (old soldiers) are struck
by the military qualities displayed by the population. The
Republican and Mazzinian agents are secreted everywhere; still I
think that the only danger to be feared is that if things were to
continue long in this state of suspense, with hardly any
Government in fact, anarchists might cause mischief, although not
triumph ultimately.
Yours, &c., &c.,
A. PANIZZI.”
[Illustration]
“I have just heard that the Austrians, most of them dressed in the
uniform of the Duke of Modena, are gathering their forces to cross
the Po, and come to the right of it.”
Amongst the numerous letters in our possession, written by Count
Cavour to Panizzi, the most important and interesting, and at the
same time the most truly characteristic, both in form and substance,
of the great Statesman, is one dated the 24th of October, 1859. It
was written from Leri, Cavour’s country seat. Thither he had,
immediately after the war, retired for a time from public life, and
with a heavy heart; for the obscurity in terms and apparent
treachery of the Peace of Villafranca, had affected him with a
torturing suspicion that he had been betrayed. It is something of a
tribute to Cavour’s greatness that Rattazzi, who succeeded him, was
fain, in his embarrassment in carrying on the Government, to seek
the counsel of his predecessor, the flame of whose patriotism
(however deeply wounded his own feelings may have been) burnt as
brightly in his retirement as in office, as it needs but the
following letter to show:—
“Leri, October 24th, 1859.
“My dear Panizzi,
Your letter of the 17th inst. was only delivered to me
yesterday, too late for me to answer it then. I hasten to do so
this morning, though I fear that my reply can hardly reach London
before the question of the Congress shall have been decided.
In the present state of affairs, considering the engagements
entered into at Villafranca and to a certain extent confirmed at
Zurich by the Emperor, it appears evident to me that an European
Congress is indispensable. Were there to be no Congress, and were
France to prevent the egress of Central Italy from the provisional
condition by opposing the stipulated fusions, those countries
would be exposed to serious dangers. The eminent men in the
Romagna—and there are many such there—might incite Garibaldi to
attempt an enterprise in the Marches and perhaps even in the
Abruzzi; at Modena the occupation of the trans-Padan Mantuan
territory by Austria—an inevitable consequence of the treaty—might
give rise to lamentable collisions; Tuscany perhaps might be more
patient of an uncertain condition, but even there the intrigues of
the reactionaries supported by the priests would probably be the
cause of serious perturbations. Hence the interests of Italy
absolutely require a Congress, and, if this is plain, England
should participate therein both for her own honour and for our
benefit. Austria will not oppose her intervention, but will accept
her reservations when it is stipulated that nothing is to be said
about the provinces retained under Austrian dominion. It is hard
for us to renounce a plea in favour of unhappy Venice; still we
must repress our deep sympathies for fear of sacrificing the
possible for the desirable.
Austria, relieved of apprehension respecting Venice, ought to
concur in the English maxim that the wishes of the Italians should
be respected. To put this in more diplomatic form it would be
sufficient to say that the Powers undertake not to impose by force
of arms any form of Government on the people of Central Italy.
This is the principle of non-intervention already proclaimed by
the Emperor in his writings and in his speeches. Supported by
France and by England, and perhaps by Russia too, it will soon be
admitted by Austria and accepted by Prussia.
Passing on to the constitution of the Congress, I do not hesitate
to declare for the exclusion of the minor Powers. If only the
Duchies and Tuscany were concerned their intervention would be
advantageous; but as the most difficult—I will say too the most
important question—is that of the Romagna provinces, I fear the
Pope would find vehement defenders in Spain and in Portugal.
The Congress once assembled, there can be no doubt as to the
course of England. She would first of all propose that the wish of
the people legally expressed should receive the sanction of
Europe. Supposing this proposition to be rejected, the next would
be that the people be consulted by means of universal suffrage, to
be verified by the members of the Congress. This proposal would
find support in France, and would probably be accepted. If it were
not, England would have to enter into a negative phase, and to
withstand the proposals of Austria and that of France too. The
Duke of Modena being abandoned by every one, even his own
relations, there will be nothing to oppose but the restoration of
the House of Lorraine in Tuscany, the installation of the Duchess
of Parma at Modena, and the re-establishment of the Papal dominion
in the Romagna provinces.
Such resolutions as these may be resisted, not only on the ground
of the popular rights, but also, and still more efficaciously, in
the interest of the monarchical principle, and with reference to
ideas of order and stability. Unless we wish to see the now
stifled revolution revive, menacing and powerful, it must not be
confronted by feeble Governments without root in the soil,
destitute of both physical and moral force. If we wish to see
thrones respected, we ought not to fill them with despised and
despicable princes, whose very names are in irritating antagonism
to the sentiment—the national sentiment—now dominating in Italy.
If the Grand Duke or his son return to Florence, then, in less
than a month, Tuscany will be the head quarters of Mazzini and of
the belligerent revolution. Perhaps it will be said that the
Duchess or Parma is a strong-minded woman, and is not
unappreciated. However this may be, the so hateful remembrances of
the father could not be effaced, nor could confidence be inspired
in the son. Besides, the system of compensations which some would
wish to apply in favour of this branch of the Bourbon family is in
direct collision with the sentiments and the ideas which now
prevail in Europe. The Modenese would be smitten in their dignity
if they found themselves allotted by way of jointure to the widow
of that rascal, the petty Duke of Parma. Better for them the
restoration of their former Sovereign. In that case they would be
victims of a false principle; but they would not be treated as a
flock of sheep, disposed of as a counterbalance for conditions
deemed onerous by one of the contracting parties.
The Treaty of Vienna is odious enough in many parts; but it is not
so odious as that of Campoformio.
With regard to the Romagna provinces, it will be easy for England
to get the idea of papal reforms scouted. To entertain such an
idea is worse than hateful—it is ridiculous. There is no need to
be either a great statesman or a great theologian to feel
convinced that the Pope not only does not wish but really cannot
consent to serious reforms. So long as he is Pope and King he must
in conscience employ the powers of the King to enforce the decrees
of the Pontiff. The separation of the two authorities is
impossible. The Pope cannot consent to the freedom of instruction,
nor to the freedom of public worship, nor to the freedom of the
press. He cannot tolerate municipal freedom unless this be
understood as an authority of the Town Councils to regulate at
will the public roads and the manner of paving them. The Pope as
Pope will more easily submit to the loss of a province than to the
promulgation of the Napoleonic Civil Code in his States. The Papal
restoration ought to be prevented at every cost: it is not only an
Italian question, but one of European interest. It concerns us,
but it also concerns England, Prussia, even Russia, and all
countries where the development of civilization is an object, for
this requires as an essential condition the absolute separation of
the two Powers. If the Pope should obtain a victory in Italy, the
presumption and the pride of the Cullens and the McHales would
swell beyond bounds, and Europe would be menaced before very long
with the danger of religious struggles similar to those of past
ages. Let everything be given up rather than sacrifice the Romagna
provinces. Their cause is, I say again, the cause of civilization.
If England should succeed in warding off the Austro-French
proposals, let her reproduce those which she originally brought
forward: and if these do not prevail, let her propose the
immediate union of Parma and Carrara with Piedmont, and the
establishment of a Government, provisional but strongly
constituted, to rule over Florence, Modena, and Bologna.
These are my views: take them for what they are worth. Far away
from the turmoil of affairs, and having but slight relations with
the Ministers, I am probably unaware of many things which might
modify my opinion. Still, judging the question of Central Italy
from the data which history in some way impresses upon our minds,
I am strongly of opinion that if England were to follow the part
which I have traced, she would succeed in the object of assuring
the destinies of Central Italy to our advantage and her own glory.
Farewell, my dear friend. Continue the advocacy of our cause
before the noble English nation, and your efforts will not be
fruitless. I say again now what I said to the Chamber and to Italy
in February—the statesmen who have ennobled their career by
accomplishing the emancipation of the negroes will not bear the
condemnation of Italy to eternal slavery.[G]
Most truly yours,
C. CAVOUR.”
The next letter to Mr. Ellice (to whom, as there was no one whom
Panizzi so much loved and respected, he never lost an opportunity of
communicating both the intelligence he received and his own comments
and opinions thereon) is lively and amusing, and contains much
matter within a small compass. The observations on the Rattazzi
Government probably in no wise exaggerate its defects:—
“B. M., October 29th, 1859.
... I can tell you for certain there will be a Congress about
Italy in which England will take part. The Emperor of the French
feels he is in a scrape, and urges England to help him out of it,
and our Government are inclined to help him under certain
conditions, England wanting him in return on some other account.
He has accepted as explicitly as possible England’s terms, and
hitherto he has kept his word to her; if he does not break it, the
Government are quite satisfied that all will go well for Italy.
Indeed, if England and France act together, there is no doubt
their policy must prevail.”
-------
“As to the Italians themselves, there is too much softness in
Piedmont on the part of the Government; the King is the only man
who dares; his Ministers are miserable little bureaucrats. We must
have a change there, and Cavour must come back; and this is what
our Ministers wish. The people of central Italy, who have given
themselves up so heartily to Piedmont, are tired of the prudence
of the King’s Government, which does nothing for them, and there
is great fear that they may break loose, and, taking the matter in
their hands, rush on the Pope’s soldiers or the Rubicon, whom they
will rout to a certainty. The whole of the Umbria and the Marches
will rise at once; they have been quite ready to do so for two
months past, and it is with difficulty they are kept quiet. If
they rise, and the soldiers of central Italy (Garibaldi is to lead
them) rush in, you may be certain that the kingdom of Naples will
be in a flame. Garibaldi with ten thousand men, Romagnuoli, will
conquer the whole kingdom down to Reggio. The proclamations of
Garibaldi, which you will have seen two days ago in the papers,
are ominous. In Italy I did my best to keep him quiet, and so did
other friends; but I now see he is taking the _mord aux dents_,
and no wonder. The King of Sardinia has sent for him, but as he is
no longer in his service it is thought he may, under some pretext
or other, respectfully decline the summons. A revolution at
Naples, or its invasion by Garibaldi, would just now be very
disagreeable to the English Government, as the question of change
of government, both in the kingdom of Naples proper and in Sicily,
might be brought on the tapis, and then you easily foresee a great
imbroglio—greater than any that has hitherto taken place, as far
as English interests are concerned.”
“I understand the ministers are quite united with each other, and
all pleased with Lord Palmerston, of whom Mr. Gibson has spoken to
a friend of mine not long ago. Lord Palmerston and Lord John are
particularly united together; this I know from the latter.
Gladstone, I am also told, runs quite straight. The Court is quite
Austrian, and, were it not for fear of this trio, would probably
try the Tories again. There is a conspiracy of crinolines in
favour of the Duchess of Parma, the Empress of the French, and the
Queen of Spain. The latter wanted to send ten thousand men to
assist the Pope, but France and England have put a veto on that.”
This may be fitly succeeded by two more letters from Panizzi to Mr.
Ellice. To each reader’s judgment and discretion may fairly be left
the decision whether the historical parallel in the second of these
is thoroughly correct, and whether either Elizabeth or Cromwell had
much notion of religious liberalism, or defended Protestantism on
the ground of its being the liberal religion.
“B. M., January 4th, 1860.
“... All the diplomacy in the world will not bring back either
those d—d Dukes or the Pope, and the provinces whence they have
been expelled. If Napoleon sticks to the point of not allowing any
_armed_ intervention in their favour, the legitimate Sovereigns
are dished. But, it is said, he has some interested motive if he
act so. I suppose he has; so much the better if his interests
coincide with the interests and wishes of Italy. It is a pity no
one else has the same interest; but, if no one will do the trick,
even he is welcome. I see that after all he is the only one who
does something for that country. If the Pope and Austrian
influence are done for, what is to come after it is of less
importance. If the European powers will aid and abet Austria in
keeping Venice, and in preventing a united kingdom of North Italy
being formed under Victor Emmanuel, I am sorry for it, but they
cannot complain if Plonplon is preferred by the Italians to the
Austrian and priestly tyranny. Better Austria than the Pope, but
better Plonplon than either. That is the scale.”
“B. M., April 21st, 1860.
“... How could you suppose that I ever could have said that
Elizabeth and Cromwell interfered to support _Catholicism_? My
answer was, and is, this:
“Europe is now in about the same state with respect to politics as
it was in Elizabeth’s and Cromwell’s times as to religion. These
two personages did not follow the policy which is now so much
praised of taking no side with either party, but showing the
greatest indifference to right or wrong. England, I think, has not
reached the lofty station it now occupies, by adopting this
policy; nor will she keep that position by such means.
“In the same manner that Elizabeth and Cromwell took the side of
liberalism in religion (Protestantism) England ought now to take
the side of liberty in politics, and she would thus rise still
higher.
“In 1848 England allowed liberty to be crushed everywhere; she
even allowed Russia to lend an army to Austria to crush an old and
constitutional kingdom. See how the Protestants are now treated
all over the Austrian Empire; how the Jesuitical party is rampant
in Germany and in Ireland; how Europe is crouching to Napoleon. Is
this to the advantage of free Protestant England?
“Now, suppose, instead of proclaiming her determination to keep
aloof (which neither Elizabeth nor Cromwell would have approved)
the Government of Queen Victoria has told Russia and Austria that
if Despots were to join to crush liberty, free governments would
support those who tried to recover their freedom, do you think
England would now be worse off?
“If, instead of cheering Austria on to crush little Piedmont,
whose great crime was to support the principles of civil and
religious liberty, England had stood by those principles as she
ought, do you think Napoleon would now stand as high as he does?
“Austria would never have dared to act as she did, had she not
been encouraged by the then English Government; and the war which
has given Savoy and Nice to France would never have taken place if
England had done something for the cause of freedom. That position
which now Napoleon occupies would have been occupied by England to
her manifest advantage, and to that of mankind.
“When the Protestants were hard pushed at La Rochelle, Elizabeth
did not stand by looking on, nor did her Parliament talk so much
as ours does. When the poor Vaudois were persecuted by the Duke of
Savoy, Cromwell was not so squeamish about non-intervention, but
sent word to Mazarin to make the Duke understand that the
persecution _must_ cease—and it did cease.
“Compare those times with ours, and then laugh, if you can, at my
political notions. When do you return?”
Two months after the date of the last-quoted letter, Panizzi
received an interesting account of Southern Italy from Poerio, which
is subjoined:—
“Turin, June 1st, 1860.
“My dearest Friend,
While I have been waiting for an answer to the letter
which I wrote to you from Florence, new and unexpected events and
new complications have arisen, demanding the prompt and energetic
co-operation of everybody who is devoted to our cause.
Therefore I am forced to have recourse to you as one of those few
who, to a fixed determination of aiding their country, add by
their own personal importance the capacity of doing good upon an
extensive scale.
Palermo has fallen, and the National idea is triumphant throughout
the island.
Of course there are many obstacles to be overcome. Nevertheless
before long that noble region will be irrevocably lost to the
Bourbons, and regained for Italy. But what will become of the
seven millions of Italians who still groan beneath the detestable
tyranny of the Bourbons? It is now said that the Government, in
order to gain time (as it did in 1848) intends putting on the mask
of liberalism, and retains the Count of Syracuse as the principal
actor in this impudent farce. He has a few adherents, and is not
wanting in desire to represent a Louis-Philippe in miniature.
In the meantime the Mazzini set are agitating because they know
that of the whole Italian territory the Southern Provinces of the
peninsula are best adapted to their designs.
Neither are the partisans of Murat standing idle, but are working
effectually in the army with the most seductive promises.
Finally, there is the Subversive (Sanfedista) Party, of the purest
race, who would like to reserve for Naples the fate of Palermo,
and who have decided to put the whole country to fire and pillage.
You see, therefore, that there are four parties, all fairly
strong, and all hostile to the true National Party, which solely
desires the unity of Italy under the constitutional sceptre of
King Victor Emmanuel. Any one who has any experience in political
matters will easily understand that for this National Party to
engage in the struggle with any hope of success it must be
provided with ready means, otherwise the remaining divisions will
pre-occupy the field, and the country, after going through twelve
years of the most cruel despotism, will fall into civil war, and
thence into the most frightful state of anarchy. The danger is
imminent, and the remedy must be prompt. The numbers who have
decided to undertake the enterprise amount to several thousands;
but the pecuniary resources are most limited. Besides, it must be
borne in mind that if delay is disastrous, to enter upon the task
with insufficient means would be still more so, since a failure
would lend strength to a detested Government, which is now
tottering under the weight of its crimes, and which could never
stand against a well-supported effort. In this state of affairs
your political friends, of whom you have so many in that noble
country, ought not to let slip this favourable occasion for
assisting us—an opportunity which cannot again present itself, and
of which others will avail themselves, to the eternal prejudice of
Italy, unless steps be taken in time to prevent it. Nor do I think
that they ought to be influenced by certain restricted views which
several of them wish to put forward.
The only solution of the question is really the _Italy of the
Italians_, which, far from compromising the peace of Europe, would
serve to consolidate it by removing a continued incentive to
foreign ambition. Once decide upon a policy of non-intervention,
and the struggle between the two principles in Italy can neither
be long nor sanguinary.
The liberal party in Europe will then count one more truly
independent state, which will make its principles respected, and
will certainly contribute both to their triumph and to the general
development of civilization.
The Bourbons will be crushed, and to the great benefit of every
one, since their detestable Government is incompatible with
Italian independence. The most disastrous error of the times would
be that of wishing to maintain them on the throne at any cost,
because it would outrage the moral sense of the whole of Italy.
Neither do I see the necessity of supporting and bolstering up a
race which is the very incarnation of perjury. If the Bourbons
were to remain in Naples, even with a fictitious constitution,
they would sooner or later be supplanted by a Napoleonic régime.
Enthusiasm evaporates in time; but if we now follow up this
terrible current which urges the main stream, Italy can be
rendered free and united. If, however, the opportunity is allowed
to pass, dualism, with all its terrible consequences, will be the
result.
A thousand greetings to our friends! I embrace you heartily, and
am ever
Your most affectionate friend,
CARLO POERIO.”
While on the subject of Southern Italy we may remind our readers
that there has been frequent mention made above of a gentleman, who,
as a constant friend and correspondent of Panizzi, and as a
prominent personage in Neapolitan matters, demands some further
notice. Mr., afterwards Sir James Lacaita, was, previously to the
year 1850, legal adviser to the British Legation at Naples. In this
position, by his great official capacity, and by his well-proved
exemplary character, he succeeded in gaining the friendship of Sir
William Temple. He had the further good fortune to make the
acquaintance of Mr. Gladstone, at the house of Lord Leven, who was
spending a winter at Naples. This acquaintance soon ripened into
intimacy, a consequence which was almost a matter of course, for
Lacaita was well fitted to win the confidence and attract the liking
of those who, themselves possessed of merit, could discover and
value merit in others. Endowed with distinguished abilities, and a
master of the English language; in political matters of sound and
matured judgment, and (as will hereafter be seen) of unassailable
honour and integrity; such very exceptional characteristics soon
marked him out for invidious distinction by the partisans of King
Bomba. On the 26th of December, 1850, he was arrested in the street
as a dangerous person and thrown into prison. All his papers were
ordered to be examined in his presence; but, Sir William Temple
having requested the “Attaché” of the Legation, Mr. Fagan, to claim
as many of these as possible in the name of Her Britannic Majesty’s
Government, a large proportion was thereby saved.
A certain note, however, which originated in a mere joke, was
detained, and turned out to be the innocent cause of serious
trouble. Previously to his arrest, Lacaita, in conjunction with Lord
and Lady Leven and their three daughters, had planned a tour for
eight days to La Cava, Salerno and Amalfi. In sportive mood it was
laid down by the “tourists” that no authority of one over the other
was to be recognised amongst the members of this party, and to
distinguish nominally the perfect freedom and equality of the
society, they dubbed themselves the “Republic.” It must have been
with mingled feelings of indignation and gratification that the
police discovered amongst the confiscated papers a note written by
Lady Anne Melville, after the return from the tour, containing the
words, _Will you come to tea, and talk over the grand Republican
days?_ In vain was it explained to the authorities that the note had
no political significance, but the suspicious adjective was merely
playful reference to the little temporary republic of “tourists,”
and to no dangerous revolutionary organisation.
Either lacking a natural sense of humour, or holding jocosity to be
impossible in so grave a matter as anything _Republican_ in the then
state of Italian politics, they altogether rejected this, to them,
fanciful interpretation. The letter was registered (it is still in
the archives of the Criminal Court of Naples), and formed one of the
chief grounds for the charge of sedition and conspiracy brought
against Lacaita.
In the summer of 1860, Cavour, well aware of the negotiations that
were being carried on between England, France and Naples, and
desirous of obtaining some trustworthy person to watch his
interests, and supply him with information—and being, moreover,
unable, for reasons which may be easily understood, to charge his
own Minister, the Marquis d’Azeglio, with the mission—applied to
Lacaita, who, on receiving the message, although laid up with severe
illness, immediately rose from his bed and went straight to Lord
Russell’s house. His Lordship, having an engagement with the
Neapolitan Minister, had given direction that no person whatever
should be admitted. Sir James, however, being intimate with the
family, managed to see his Lordship, and was able there and then to
turn the current of affairs in a totally different direction, and to
prevent the French Ambassador Count Persigny, and his Neapolitan
colleague the Marquis La Greca, from carrying out their plans. Had
it not been for Sir James Lacaita’s prompt and skilful intervention,
England would doubtless have been remitted to the position she had
held in 1848.
Nothing now remained to those whom Lacaita had thus thwarted but to
win him over to the side of Francis II., and this it was thought
might be effected by offering him the post of Minister at the Court
of St. James’s, in the room of Count Ludolf. The chief instrument
employed for the conversion of this dangerous opponent was Signor
Giovanni Manna, the Neapolitan Minister of Finance, who was now at
Paris, whither he had been sent to negotiate a loan. Manna, who was
a personal friend of Lacaita’s, started from Paris in August with
the sole object of persuading him to accept the offer; holding out
as a further inducement to a change of opinion a considerable bonus,
besides a not insignificant salary and the title of Marquis, which
might well be regarded as superseding the inferior rank of
knighthood which had already been conferred upon him.
The unification of Italy was regarded by most politicians of the
time, Lacaita included, as, to say the least of it, a remote
possibility. To the King’s offer, and the numerous advantages
accompanying it, Lacaita simply replied, _This is bribery_. In this
conclusion he was supported by the advice of two distinguished
statesmen, Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Gladstone, and by a letter from
Panizzi (dated Homburg, 23rd of August, 1860), which did not reach
him until a few days after his refusal of the post:—
“... I willingly comply with your request, and frankly give you the
advice which you ask on the point which you truly describe as
delicate and knotty—that is, whether you ought to accept the
appointment as Minister of His Sicilian Majesty at the Court of St.
James’s.
“As Minister of that King you must first of all oppose the
enterprise of Garibaldi, who wishes to unite the whole of Italy
under one sole head, and if that head should be Victor Emmanuel,
you, Sir James Lacaita, would have to support an abominable and
cruel scion of an execrated race against the only Sovereign who has
shown that he is an Italian; in fact, you would have to help in
cutting up Italy. I do not presume to judge those gentlemen who have
undertaken to serve his said Neapolitan Majesty; but they were on
the spot, had served—at least some of them—the dynasty, and perhaps
had not duly considered before they accepted their posts. But are
you, who are free, and in your sober senses, to serve a Bourbon like
him of Naples? Are you to stand by the side of those who proclaimed
martial law?—you to join a Government which now shoots down the
noblest Italians who have liberated Sicily from a detested yoke? No
one _cui sanum sinciput_ can believe that the King of Naples is to
be trusted, when he gives utterance to the sentiments which he now
pretends to profess, and every one who is not bereft of sense knows
and feels that the man is still the faithful and true ally of
Austria, the tool of the harsh stepmother, the blind and abject
slave of the priesthood which has made Rome a sewer. And would you
give your honoured name, your influence, your talents to a man
without affection and without faith like that King? My dear Lacaita,
that name, that influence, those talents belong to Italy and to an
honourable King, not to a schismatic party—not to a perfidious and
treacherous perjurer.
“I use strong expressions: the case justifies them. You may show
this letter of mine to any one you please, and tell what I think
without any reserve whatever!...”
In September, 1860, Panizzi paid another visit to Italy, of which,
and of the condition of affairs in that country, he gave an account
in the two following extracts from letters to Mr. Ellice, written
after his return.
Some remarks on the evil which Garibaldi’s mistaken zeal was likely
to produce on the state of Rome and on the French Emperor are well
worth reading. The “confabulation” with the King at Turin, mentioned
in the first letter, at which Cavour was present, was held in a
stable with great secrecy. Only such passages are given as bear most
directly on the history of the time:—
“B. M., Oct. 5, 1860.
“... I have seen and had long confabulations with the King at Turin,
and with the Emperor at Paris. I can tell you that Garibaldi, who
seemed to have lost his senses, and who was surrounded by a set of
scamps who made a fool and tool of him, honest fellow! will by this
time have made an _amende honorable_, and submitted to the King, or
be put down.
“Be assured that Cavour and the rational party in Italy (that is
ninety-nine per cent. of the population) are not such fools as to
attack Austria. It is owing to the threats of Garibaldi, the French
Emperor having undertaken to preserve from injury or insult the
person of the Pope, that the French garrison at Rome has been
increased. But that garrison will not defend any part of the Papal
territory except what it actually occupies; and should the Pope
leave Rome, as he was on the point of doing ten days ago, the French
will withdraw, and the Sardinian army occupy Rome.
“The note or letter of Lord John to Cavour has _disgusted_ many and
surprised all. I think it was written of his own accord, and perhaps
without the knowledge of his colleagues. He who has been so long a
consistent friend of Italy write such a letter, when the Government
of the King of Sardinia was supposed to be in difficulties, and was
in fact so! Those are the acts which make even the French Emperor
popular, and which, by encouraging the despotic party in Germany,
may kindle a war.... There will be no anarchy in Italy, and the
Emperor Napoleon _may be relied on_.
“Nothing serves more in France than English abuse. Of this I am
certain, and I have most curious proofs. I am also positive that he
is personally a firm friend of England, and that he has more to do
than people suppose to quiet the _Anglophobia_ of the French.... I
had the pleasure of seeing prisoner of war at Turin, that worthy
companion in arms of Monsignor Lamoricière, Monsignor Schmidt, he
who butchered people at Perugia where he was obliged to surrender at
last. It was delightful to see the provoking indifference with which
the Piedmontese looked at him.... Cavour wanted to make a present of
several hundred Irishmen taken prisoners to the English Government,
but the present was respectfully declined....”
“B. M., Oct. 11th, 1860.
“... I am astonished to see the Paris correspondent of _The Times_
allowed to write as he does about the King of Sardinia and his
Minister. His misrepresentations are all directed to disparage them
all and so far favourable to Austria. In to-day’s number that
correspondent, in order to throw discredit on Cavour’s statement,
said that he was not to be believed, as he had asked _Savoy_
although he had promised not to give up any part of the Piedmontese
territory. The King is represented as _swearing_ and _mad_ with rage
whenever the cession of Savoy is mentioned. Now I have spoken to the
King about this transaction, and have most respectfully said things
which were, from their nature, calculated to irritate. The King was
not irritated, he was not in a rage, and did not swear; he spoke
with great moderation, and with great feeling. I was struck with
it....”
Our budget of correspondence, which has been resorted to more
copiously than was at first intended, may be closed, so far as this
chapter is concerned, by a letter from Panizzi to Mr. Gladstone,
which is given in its entirety:—
“British Museum,
November 27th, 1860.
“My dear Sir,
Your letter has filled me with apprehension for poor
Italy, and with gratitude for your warm interest in her cause. I
felt reason daily to mistrust the conduct of my Paris
interlocutor, and I am the more afraid, seeing that you, too, feel
there is reason for mistrust. When the conduct of the fleet at
Gaeta was first known, I wrote to say that it was suspicious, and
at variance with recent professions. My letter went through the
Minister to St. Cloud, and I received from my friend with whom the
correspondence was carried on the enclosed answer, which please
return. Lord P. has seen it, but no one else. I was not satisfied,
and I wrote again to my friend to say so, but he is not in Paris,
and he had to send my last letter from the country to Paris. He
has since written that the Minister would be glad to correspond
chiefly with me; but now he is out, and my communications are
stopped. Nor do I know how I could reach St. Cloud without it
being known to many who ought not to know it. The appointment of
Walewski and that of Flahaut portend no good to Italy and to the
English alliance. If this interference by sea and by land
continue, it is evident that it is intended to allow a civil war
to kindle in Italy, to have a pretext for interfering, not
certainly for the good of the country. Is it possible that the
three Emperors and the supporters of the Pope and of despotism in
Germany have agreed to settle matters to their own advantage,
leaving Prussia, England, and Italy out? Allowing Russia to act as
she thinks best in the East, France on the Rhine and in Italy, and
Austria in the outer provinces of the Turkish Empire, close to
Hungary! It is an extravagant supposition, but the conduct of
France is still more so.
Believe me always,
Yours most sincerely obliged,
A. PANIZZI.”
The author is well aware that nothing short of his long-standing
intimacy with the subject of this “Memoir” could justify the
introduction into the work of anything approaching egotism, unless
it were to illustrate an essential point in the character of which
he is treating; but in writing of the year 1860, recollections crowd
upon the memory which he trusts his readers will excuse him for
committing to paper. In that same year he (then a boy of thirteen)
was sent, under the charge of a Queen’s Messenger, from Naples to a
school in England. Arriving in London, he was most kindly received
by Panizzi, and well remembers his first interview with one who was
thenceforth to be his staunchest friend. Not that this was the first
time that the latter had bestowed his good offices upon the family
of the writer, whose eldest brother, now Major Fagan, owes and
acknowledges a debt of gratitude for the kindness received at his
hands in youthful days, and up to the time of receiving his
Commission and starting for India in 1859.
But pleasant and important as it would be, for some reasons, to
dwell upon many happy reminiscences of uninterrupted intercourse
with a pre-eminent man, the task which is here undertaken leads us
to more serious matters relating to that period, and that yet remain
to occupy the space which should be devoted rather to the
information of our readers than to a recital of personal
recollections.
[Illustration]
[Illustration]