OF SOME PECULIARITIES OF THE IDEA OF TIME.
1. THE Idea of Time, like the Idea of Space, offers to our
notice some characters which do not belong to our
fundamental ideas generally, but which are deserving of
remark. These characters are, in some respects, closely
similar with regard to Time and to Space, while, in other
respects, the peculiarities of these two ideas are widely
different. We shall point out some of these characters.
Time is not a general _abstract_ notion collected from
experience; as, for example, a certain general conception of
the relations of things. For we do not consider particular
_times_ as examples of Time in general, (as we consider
particular causes to be examples of Cause,) but we conceive
all particular times to be parts of a single and endless
Time. This continually-flowing and endless time is what
offers itself to us when we contemplate any series of
occurrences. All actual and possible times exist as Parts,
in this original and general Time. And since all particular
times are considered as derivable from time in general, it
is manifest that the notion of time in general cannot be
derived from the notions of particular times. The notion of
time in general is therefore not a general conception
gathered from experience.
2. Time is infinite. Since all actual and possible times
exist in the general course of time, this general time must
be infinite. All limitation merely divides, and does not
terminate, the extent of absolute time. Time has no
beginning and no end; but the beginning and the end of every
other existence takes place in it.
3. Time, like space, is not only a form of perception, but
of _intuition_. We contemplate events as {135} taking place
_in_ time. We consider its parts as added to one another,
and events as filling a larger or smaller extent of such
parts. The time which any event takes up is the sum of all
such parts, and the relation of the same to time is fully
understood when we can clearly see what portions of time it
occupies, and what it does not. Thus the relation of known
occurrences to time is perceived by intuition; and time is a
form of intuition of the external world.
4. Time is conceived as a quantity of one dimension; it has
great analogy with a line, but none at all with a surface or
solid. Time may be considered as consisting of a series of
instants, which are before and after one another; and they
have no other relation than this, of _before_ and _after_.
Just the same would be the case with a series of points
taken along a line; each would be after those on one side of
it, and before those on another. Indeed the analogy between
time, and space of one dimension, is so close, that the same
terms are applied to both ideas, and we hardly know to which
they originally belong. Times and lines are alike called
_long_ and _short_; we speak of the _beginning_ and _end_ of
a line; of a _point_ of time, and of the _limits_ of a
portion of duration.
5. But, as has been said, there is nothing in time which
corresponds to more than one dimension in space, and hence
nothing which has any obvious analogy with figure. Time
resembles a line indefinitely extended both ways; all
partial times are portions of this line; and no mode of
conceiving time suggests to us a line making any angle with
the original line, or any other combination which might give
rise to figures of any kind. The analogy between time and
space, which in many circumstances is so clear, here
disappears altogether. Spaces of two and of three
dimensions, planes and solids, have nothing to which we can
compare them in the conceptions arising out of time.
6. As figure is a conception solely appropriate to space,
there is also a conception which peculiarly belongs to time,
namely, the conception of recurrence of times similarly
marked; or, as it may be termed, {136} _rhythm_, using this
word in a general sense. The term rhythm is most commonly
used to designate the recurrence of times marked by the
syllables of a verse, or the notes of a melody: but it is
easy to see that the general conception of such a recurrence
does not depend on the mode in which it is impressed upon
the sense. The forms of such recurrence are innumerable.
Thus in such a line as
Quádrupedánte putrém sonitú quatit úngula cámpum,
we have alternately one long or forcible syllable, and two
short or light ones, recurring over and over. In like manner
in our own language, in the line
At the clóse of the dáy when the hámlet is still,
we have two light and one strong syllable repeated four
times over. Such repetition is the essence of versification.
The same kind of rhythm is one of the main elements of
music, with this difference only, that in music the forcible
syllables are made so for the purposes of rhythm by their
length only or principally; for example, if either of the
above lines were imitated by a melody in the most simple and
obvious manner, each strong syllable would occupy exactly
twice as much time as two of the weaker ones. Something very
analogous to such rhythm may be traced in other parts of
poetry and art, which we need not here dwell upon. But in
reference to our present subject, we may remark that by the
introduction of such rhythm, the flow of time, which appears
otherwise so perfectly simple and homogeneous, admits of an
infinite number of varied yet regular modes of progress. All
the kinds of versification which occur in all languages, and
the still more varied forms of recurrence of notes of
different lengths, which are heard in all the varied strains
of melodies, are only examples of such modifications, or
configurations as we may call them, of time. They involve
relations of various portions of time, as figures involve
relations of various portions of space. But yet the analogy
between rhythm and figure is by no means very close; for in
rhythm we have relations of quantity alone in the parts of
time, whereas in figure we have {137} relations not only of
quantity, but of a kind altogether different,--namely, of
position. On the other hand, a _repetition_ of similar
elements, which does not necessarily occur in figures, is
quite essential in order to impress upon us that measured
progress of time of which we here speak. And thus the ideas
of time and space have each its peculiar and exclusive
relations; position and figure belonging only to space,
while repetition and rhythm are appropriate to time.
7. One of the simplest forms of recurrence is _alternation_,
as when we have alternate strong and slight syllables. For
instance,--
Awáke, aríse, or bé for éver fáll'n.
Or without any subordination, as when we reckon numbers, and
call them in succession, _odd_, _even_, _odd_, _even_.
8. But the simplest of all forms of recurrence is that which
has no variety;--in which a series of units, each considered
as exactly similar to the rest, succeed each other; as
_one_, _one_, _one_, and so on. In this case, however, we
are led to consider each unit with reference to all that
have preceded; and thus the series _one_, _one_, _one_, and
so forth, becomes _one_, _two_, _three_, _four_, _five_, and
so on; a series with which all are familiar, and which may
be continued without limit.
We thus collect from that repetition of which time admits,
the conception of _Number_.
9. The relations of position and figure are the subject of
the science of geometry; and are, as we have already said,
traced into a very remarkable and extensive body of truths,
which rests for its foundations on axioms involved in the
Idea of Space. There is, in like manner, a science of great
complexity and extent, which has its foundation in the Idea
of Time. But this science, as it is usually pursued, applies
only to the conception of Number, which is, as we have said,
the simplest result of repetition. This science is
_Theoretical Arithmetic_, or the speculative doctrine of the
properties and relations of numbers; and we must say a few
words concerning the principles which it is requisite to
assume as the basis of this science.
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