CHAPTER III.

OF SOME PECULIARITIES OF THE IDEA OF SPACE.

1. SOME of the Ideas which we shall have to examine involve

conceptions of certain relations of objects, as the idea of

Cause and of Likeness; and may appear to be suggested by

experience, enabling us to _abstract_ this general relation

from particular cases. But it will be seen that Space is not

such a general conception of a relation. For we do not speak

of _Spaces_ as we speak of Causes and Likenesses, but of

Space. And when we speak of _spaces_, we understand by the

expression, parts of one and the same identical

everywhere-extended Space. We conceive a universal Space;

which is not made up of these partial spaces as its

component parts, for it would remain if these were taken

away; and these cannot be conceived without presupposing

absolute space. Absolute Space is essentially one; and the

complication which exists in it, and the conception of

various spaces, depends merely upon boundaries. Space must,

therefore, be, as we have said, not a general conception

abstracted from particulars, but a universal mode of

representation, altogether independent of experience.

2. Space is infinite. We represent it to ourselves as an

infinitely great magnitude. Such an idea as that of Likeness

or Cause, is, no doubt, found in an infinite number of

particular cases, and so far includes these cases. But these

ideas do not include an infinite number of cases as parts of

an infinite whole. When we say that all bodies and partial

spaces exist _in_ infinite space, we use an expression which

is not applied in the same sense to any cases except those

of Space and Time. {96}

3. What is here said may appear to be a denial of the real

existence of space. It must be observed, however, that we do

not deny, but distinctly assert, the existence of space as a

real and necessary condition of all objects perceived; and

that we not only allow that objects are seen external to us,

but we found upon the fact of their being so seen, our view

of the nature of space. If, however, it be said that we deny

the reality of space as an object or thing, this is true.

Nor does it appear easy to maintain that space exists as a

thing, when it is considered that this thing is infinite in

all its dimensions; and, moreover, that it is a thing,

which, being nothing in itself, exists only that other

things may exist in it. And those who maintain the real

existence of space, must also maintain the real existence of

time in the same sense. Now two infinite things, thus really

existing, and yet existing only as other things exist in

them, are notions so extravagant that we are driven to some

other mode of explaining the state of the matter.

4. Thus space is not an object of which we perceive the

properties, but a form of our perception; not a thing which

affects our senses, but an idea to which we conform the

impressions of sense. And its peculiarities appear to depend

upon this, that it is not only a form of sensation, but of

_intuition_; that in reference to space, we not only

perceive but _contemplate_ objects. We see objects in space,

side by side, exterior to each other; space, and objects in

so far as they occupy space, have parts exterior to other

parts; and have the whole thus made up by the juxtaposition

of parts. This mode of apprehension belongs only to the

ideas of space and time. Space and Time are made up of

parts, but Cause and Likeness are not apprehended as made up

of parts. And the term _intuition_ (in its rigorous sense)

is applicable only to that mode of contemplation in which we

thus look at objects as made up of parts, and apprehend the

relations of those parts at the same time and by the same

act by which we apprehend the objects themselves.

5. As we have said, space limited by _boundaries_ {97} gives

rise to various conceptions which we have often to consider.

Thus limited, space assumes _form_ or _figure_; and the

variety of conceptions thus brought under our notice is

infinite. We have every possible form of line, straight

line, and curve; and of curves an endless number;--circles,

parabolas, hyperbolas, spirals, helices. We have plane

surfaces of various shapes,--parallelograms, polygons,

ellipses; and we have solid figures,--cubes, cones,

cylinders, spheres, spheroids, and so on. All these have

their various properties, depending on the relations of

their boundaries; and the investigation of their properties

forms the business of the science of Geometry.

6. Space has three dimensions, or directions in which it may

be measured; it cannot have more or fewer. The simplest

measurement is that of a straight line, which has length

alone. A surface has both length and breadth: and solid

space has length, breadth, and thickness or depth. The

origin of such a difference of dimensions will be seen if we

reflect that each portion of space has a boundary, and is

extended both _in_ the direction in which its boundary

extends, and also in a direction _from_ its boundary; for

otherwise it would not be a boundary. A point has no

dimensions. A line has but one dimension,--the distance from

its boundary, or its _length_. A plane, bounded by a

straight line, has the dimension which belongs to this line,

and also has another dimension arising from the distance of

its parts from this boundary line; and this may be called

_breadth_. A solid, bounded by a plane, has the dimensions

which this plane has; and has also a third dimension, which

we may call _height_ or _depth_, as we consider the solid

extended above or below the plane; or _thickness_, if we

omit all consideration of up and down. And no space can have

any dimensions which are not resoluble into these three.

We may now proceed to consider the mode in which the idea of

space is employed in the formation of Geometry.

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History of scientific ideas · 第 3 / 23 章