WAR FINANCE AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN--I

_November_, 1917

Financial Conditions in August, 1914--No Scheme prepared to meet the

Possibility of War--A Short Struggle expected--The Importance of

Finance as a Weapon--Labour's Example--The Economic Problem of

War--The Advantages of Direct Taxation--The Government follows the

Path of Least Resistance--The Effect of Currency Inflation.

A legend current in the City says that the Imperial War Committee, or

whatever was the august body entrusted with the task of thinking out

war problems beforehand, had done its work with regard to the Army and

Navy, transport and provision, and everything else that we should want

for the war, and were going on to the question of finance next week,

when the war intervened. Whatever may be the truth of this story, the

events of the war confirm the opinion that if it was not true it ought

to have been. We are continually accused of not having been ready for

the war; but, in fact, we were quite ready to do everything that we

had promised to do with regard to military and naval operations. Our

Navy was ready in its place in the fighting line, and the dispatch

with which our Expeditionary Force was collected from all parts of the

kingdom, and shipped across to France, was a miracle of efficiency and

practical organisation. It is true that we had not got an Army on a

Continental scale, but it was no part of our contract that we should

have one. The fighting on land was in those days expected to be done

by our Allies, assisted by a small British force on the left flank of

the French Army. That British force was duly there, and circumstances

which were quite unforeseen made it necessary for us to undertake a

task which was no part of our original programme and create an Army

on a Continental scale, in addition to doing everything that we had

promised beforehand to a much greater extent than was in the bargain.

But in finance there was no evidence that any thought-out policy had

been arrived at in order to make the best possible use of the nation's

economic resources for the war when it came. The acute crisis in the

City which occurred in August, 1914, was a minor matter which hardly

affected the subsequent history of our war finance except by giving

dangerous evidence of the ease by which financial problems can be

apparently surmounted by the simple method of creating banking

credits. That crisis merely arose from the fact that we were so

strong financially, and had so great a hold upon the finance of other

countries in the world, that when we decided, owing to stress of war,

to leave off lending to foreigners and to call in loans that we had

made by way of accepting and bill-discounting arrangements, the whole

machinery of exchange broke down because from all over the world the

market in exchange went one way. Everybody wanted to buy bills on

London, and there were no bills to be had.

There was also the internal problem which arose because some of the

public and some of the banks took to the evil practice of hoarding

gold just at the wrong moment, and consequently there was no available

supply of legal tender currency except in the shape of Bank of England

notes, the smallest denomination of which is £5. It is known that our

bankers had long before pointed out to the Treasury that if ever a

banking crisis arose there would, or might be, this demand for a paper

currency of smaller denominations than £5; this suggestion got into a

pigeon-hole at the Treasury and was deep under the dust of Whitehall

by the time experience proved how big a gap in our financial armour

had been made by its neglect. If the £1 notes, with which we are now

so familiar, had been ready when the war broke out, or, still better,

if the Bank of England had been empowered and instructed to have an

issue of its own £1 notes ready, it may at least be contended that the

moratorium, which was so bad a financial beginning of the war, might

have been avoided.

But this opening crisis was a short-lived matter, and was promptly

dealt with, thanks to the energy and courage of Mr Lloyd George, who

was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and saw that things had to be

done quickly, and took the advice of the City as to what had to be

done. The measures then employed erred, if at all, on the side of

doing too much, which was certainly a mistake in the right direction

if in any. What is much more evident is the fact that not only had

there been no attempt to provide against just such a jolt to our

financial machine as took place when the war began, but that, quite

apart from the financial machinery of the City, no reasoned and

thought-out attention had been given to the great problems of

governmental finance which war on such a scale brought with it. There

is, of course, the excuse that nobody expected the war to be on this

scale, or to last so long. The general view was that the struggle

would be over in a few months, and must certainly be so if for no

other reason because the economic strain would be so great that the

nations of Europe could not stand it for a long time. On the other

hand, we must remember that Lord Kitchener, whom most men then

regarded as representing all that was most trustworthy in military

opinion, made arrangements from the beginning on the assumption that

the war might last for three years. So, while some excuse may be made

for our lack of financial foresight, it does seem to have been the

duty of those whose business it is to manage our finances to have

thought out a complete scheme to be adopted in case of war if at any

time we should be involved in one on a European scale. Instead of

which, not only would it appear that no such endeavour had been made

by our Treasury experts before the war, but that no such endeavour

has ever been made by them since the war began. All through the

war's history many of the country's mistakes have been based on the

encouraging conviction that the war would be over in the next six

months. This conviction is still cherished to this day, and there can

be no doubt that if those who cherish it hold on to it long enough

they will come right some day.

But if delusions of this kind may be fairly excused in the man in

the street, they do not seem to be any excuse for those who are

responsible for our finance for their total lack of a thought-out

scheme at the beginning of the war, and their total failure to produce

one as the war went on. We have financed the war by haphazard methods,

limping along the line of least resistance. We are continuing to do

so, and we may do so to the end, though there are now growing signs of

an impatience both among the property-owning classes and others of

the system by which we are financing the war by piling up debt and

manufacturing banking credits.

The objections to the policy on the part of the "haves" and the "have

nots" are, of course, different, but as they both converge to the

same point, namely, to the reform of our system of war finance, it is

possible that they may in time have the effect of shaking even the

confidence of our politicians and officials in the haphazard and

slipshod methods which would long ago have produced financial disaster

if it had not been for the great financial strength of the country.

Finance is an enormously important weapon in the hands of our rulers

for gliding the economic activities of the people. This is so even in

peace time to a certain extent, though the revenue then collected is

so small an item in the total national income that it counts for much

less than in war, when the power that the Government can wield by

its policy in taxation and borrowing might have been all-powerful in

keeping the nation on the right lines in the matter of spending and

keeping down the cost of the war, and in maintaining our financial

staying power to a far greater extent than has actually been done.

It is easy, as they say on the Stock Exchange, to job backwards, and

it is also easy, and perhaps rather unprofitable, to hazard opinions

about what would have happened if things had been otherwise.

Nevertheless, when we look back on the spirit of the country as it was

in those early days of the war, when the violation of Belgium had sent

a chivalrous thrill through the hearts of all classes in the country,

when we all recognised that we were faced with the greatest crisis

in our history, that our country and the future of civilisation were

about to be tested by the severest strain ever applied to them, that

the life and fortune of the individual did not count, but that the

war and victory were the only interests that any one had a right to

consider--when one remembers all these things, and the use that a wise

financial policy might have made of them, it is impossible to avoid

the conclusion that the history of the war in this country and its

social and political effects might have been something much finer,

much cleaner and more noble if only the weapons of finance had been

more boldly and wisely used. It is not a good thing to indulge in

high-falutin' on this subject. It is absurd to suppose that the war

suddenly turned us all into plaster saints at the beginning, and that

we might have continued so to the end if the State had dealt with our

money in a proper way. But without setting up any such idealistic

arguments as these, looking back on those early days of the war, one

can still remember the thrill of earnestness and of eagerness for

self-sacrifice which has since then given way lamentably to war

profiteering, war strikes, and a general struggle among many classes

of the community to make as much as possible out of the war, merely

because our financial leaders have never really put the country's

financial problem properly before the country.

We were not plaster saints, but we were either Idealistic and perhaps

foolish people who attached great importance to the freedom and

security of small nations and all those items in the programme of

idealistic Radicalism, or else we were good, red-hot, true-blue

Jingoes with a hearty hatred for Germany, and enjoyed the thought that

the big fight which we had long foreseen between the two countries was

at last going to be fought out. Or, again, we were just commonplace

people who did not much believe in idealistic Radicalism or

anti-German bitterness, but saw that the whole future of our country

was at stake, and were prepared to do anything for it. A fine example

was set us in those days by the Trade Union leaders. The industrial

world was seething with discontent. The Suffragettes in London and the

Carsonites in Ireland had shown us how much could be done by appeals

to physical force in a lazy-minded community; and hints of industrial

revolution, with great organised strikes, which were going to tie up

the transport industry of the country were in the air. And then, when

the war came, the Labour leaders said, "No strikes until the war is

over. Our country comes first."

This was the lead given to the country by those down at the bottom,

who had the least to lose, and whose patriotism during the course of

the war has frequently been questioned. At the top the financial and

property-owning classes, having been saved by Mr Lloyd George's able

adroitness from a bad crisis in the City, were entirely tame, and

would have suffered anything in the way of taxation or financial

conscription if the need for it had been properly put before them.

It is almost amusing to remember now that in those early days of the

war the shareholders in Home Railway companies were thought lucky. The

Government were taking the railways over, and were guaranteeing that

their proprietors should receive the same dividends as they had had

before the war. Such was the view in financial and property-owning

circles of results of war that, so far from any expectation of the

huge profits which war has put into the pockets of certain classes,

they were only too thankful if they could be assured that their gross

incomes were not going to be reduced.

Such was the spirit with which the Government of that day had to

deal. A spirit in all classes earnestly patriotic, and so thoroughly

frightened of the economic consequences of the war that it would have

been ready to face any sacrifices that the Government had asked of it.

How, then, would the Government have dealt with this spirit if it had

taken the trouble really to think out the problem of war finance on

a long view instead of proceeding along a haphazard line, adjusting

peace methods to war without any consideration as to their adequacy?

If the problem had been really thought out beforehand the Government

must have seen clearly that the real economic problem in war-time is

not merely a question of raising money, since that can at any time

be done easily by means of a printing-press, but of diverting the

industrial energy of the nation from peace to war purposes, that is

to say, transferring from the enjoyment of the individual citizen

the goods and services that used to contribute to his comfort and

amusement, and turning them over to the provision of the things needed

for the war. War's needs can only be met out of the current production

of the world as it is at present. All the warring powers begin a

war with certain accumulated war stores consisting of battleships,

ammunition, guns and all other forms of war material. Apart from these

stores with which they begin, the whole work of providing the armies

with the fighting materials that they require, and the food and

clothes that they consume, has to be done during the course of the

war, that is to say, out of the current production of the moment.

Therefore the real economic problem that any Government has to face in

war-time is that of inducing its citizens to reduce their purchase of

goods and services, that is to say, to spend less, so that all

the things required for the Army and Navy may be obtained by the

Government. It is true that some of the goods and services required

for carrying on war can be obtained from foreign countries by any

belligerent which is able to communicate with them freely. In that

case the current production of the foreigner can be called in to help.

But this can only be done if the warring country is able to ship goods

to the foreigner in payment for what it buys, or if it is able to

obtain a loan from the foreigner, or some other foreign country, in

order to pay for its purchases abroad, or again, if, as in our case,

it holds a large accumulation of securities which foreign countries

are prepared to take in exchange for goods that they send for the

purposes of the war. By these two last-named processes, raising money

abroad, and selling securities to foreign nations, the warring country

impoverishes itself for the future. When it borrows abroad it pledges

itself to export goods and services in future to meet interest and

sinking fund on the money so raised, so getting no goods and services

in return. When it ships its accumulated wealth in the form of

securities it gives up for the future any claim to goods and services

from the debtor country which used to come to it to meet interest and

redemption. It is only by shipping goods in return for goods imported

for the war that a country can keep its financial staying-power on an

even keel.

Thus the problem which a statesman who had thought out the economics

of war beforehand would have recognised as the keystone of his policy,

would have been that of diverting the activities of the country from

providing itself with comforts and amusements to turning out goods

required for war, and of doing so with the least possible friction,

the least possible alteration in the economic equilibrium of the

country, and, above all, with the least possible cost to the national

finances. We arrive at the true aspect of this problem more easily if

we leave out the question of money altogether and think of it in units

of energy. When a nation goes to war it means to say that it has to

apply so many units of energy to the business of fighting, and to

provide the fighters with all that they need. If at the beginning

of the war its utmost capacity of output was, to mention merely a

fanciful figure, a thousand million units of energy, and if it was

clear that the fighting forces of the country would need for their

proper maintenance five hundred million units of energy, then it is

clear that the nation's ordinary consumption of goods and services

would have to be reduced to the extent of five hundred millions of

units of energy, which would have to be applied to the war, that is,

assuming that its possible output remained the same.

In other words, the spending power of the citizens of the country

had to be reduced so that the industrial energy that used to go into

meeting their wants might be made available for the purposes of

fighting forces. Now what was the straightest, simplest and cleanest

way of bringing about this reduction in buying power on the part of

the ordinary citizen which has been shown to be necessary for the

purposes of war finance? Clearly the best way of doing it is by

taxation equitably imposed. When the State taxes, it says in effect

to the citizens, "Your country needs certain goods and services, you

therefore will have to go without those goods and services, and the

simplest way to make you do this is to take away your money and so

ration your buying power. Whatever is needed for the Army and Navy

will be taken away from you by taxation, and the result of this will

be that, instead of your indulging in comforts and luxuries, to the

extent of the war's needs the Government will use your money for

paying for what is needed for the Army and Navy."

If such a policy had been carried out the cost of the war to the

community would have been enormously cheapened. There need have been

no general rise in prices because there would have been no increase

in demand for goods and services. Anything that the Government

spent would have been counter-balanced by decreased spending by the

individual; any work that the Government needed for the war would have

been counter-balanced by a reduction in demand for work on the part

of individual citizens. There would have been no multiplication of

currency owing to enormous credits raised by the Government; there

would have been merely a transfer of buying power from individuals to

the State. The process would have been gradual, there need have been

no acute dislocation, but as the cost of the war increased, that is to

say, as the Government needed more and more goods and services for its

prosecution, the community would gradually have shed one after another

the extravagances on which it spent so many hundreds of millions in

days before the war. As it shed these extravagances the labour

and energy needed to produce them would have been automatically

transferred to the service of the war, or to the production of

necessaries of life. By this simple process of monetary rationing all

the frantic appeals for economy, and most of the complicated, tangled

problems raised by such matters as Food Control or National Service

would have been avoided.

But, it may be contended, this is setting up an ideal so absurdly

too high that you cannot expect any modern nation to rise up to it.

Perhaps this is true, though I am not at all sure that if we had had a

really bold and far-sighted Finance Minister at the beginning of the

war he might not have persuaded the nation to tackle its war problem

on this exalted line. At least it can be claimed that our financial

rulers might have looked into the history of the matter and seen what

our ancestors had done in big wars in this matter of paying for war

costs out of taxation, with the determination to do at least as well

as they did, and perhaps rather better, owing to the overwhelming

scale of modern financial problems. If they had done so they would

have found that both in the Napoleonic and the Crimean wars we paid

for nearly half the cost of the war out of revenue as they went on,

whereas in the present war the proportion that we are paying by

taxation, instead of being 47 per cent., as it was when our sturdy

ancestors fought against Napoleon, is less than 20 per cent.[1]

Why has this been so? Partly, no doubt, owing to the slackness and

cowardice of our politicians, and the apathy of the overworked

officials, who have been too busy with the details of finance to think

the problem out on a large scale. But it is chiefly, I think, because

our system of taxation, though probably the best in the world,

involves so many inequities that it cannot be applied on a really

large scale without producing a discontent which might have had

serious consequences on our conduct of the war.

[Footnote 1: See _Economist_, August 4, 1917, p. 151.]

It is not possible nowadays, now that the working classes are

conscious of their strength, to apply taxation to ordinary articles

of general consumption with anything like the ruthlessness which in

former days produced such widespread misery. Indirect taxation of this

kind carries with it this inherent weakness that its burden falls most

heavily on those who are least able to bear it, consequently it is

bound to break in the hand of those who attempt to apply it with

anything like vigour to a community which is prepared to stand up for

fair treatment. A tax on bread or salt obviously hits the wage-earner

at 30s. a week infinitely harder than it hits the millionaire, and so

the country would not tolerate taxes on bread or salt. Direct taxes,

such as Income Tax and Death Duties, have this enormous advantage,

that they can really be regulated so as to press with continually

increasing severity upon those who are best able to bear them.

Unfortunately our Income Tax is still so unjustly imposed that it was

clearly impossible to make full use of it without its being first

reformed. That two men, each earning £1000 a year, should pay the same

Income Tax, in spite of one having a wife and five children, while

the other is a careless bachelor, is such a blot upon this otherwise

excellent tax that it is generally agreed that the present rate of 5s.

is as high as it can be made to go unless some reform is introduced

into its incidence. The need for its reform is made the excuse for a

sparing use of the tax, and we have been on several occasions assured

that, as soon as the war is over, this reform will be set about.

In the meantime the Government falls back on funding about 80 per

cent. of its requirements of the war on a system of borrowing. In

so far as the money subscribed to its loans is money that is being

genuinely saved by investors this process has exactly the same effect

as taxation, that is to say, somebody goes without goods and services

and hands over his power to buy them to the State to be used for the

war. Borrowing of this kind consequently does everything that is

needed for the solution of the immediate war problem, and the only

objection to it is that it leaves later on the difficulties involved

by raising taxes when the war is over, and economic problems are

much more complicated in times of peace than in war, for meeting the

interest and redemption of debt. But, in fact, it is well known that

by no means all that the Government has borrowed for war purposes has

been provided in this way. Much of the money that the Government has

obtained for war purposes has been got not out of genuine savings

of investors, but by arrangements of various kinds with the banking

machinery of the country, or by the simple use of the printing-press,

with the result that the Government has provided itself with an

enormous mass of new currency which has not been taken out of anybody

else's pocket, but has been manufactured by or for the Government.

The consequence of the profligate use of this dishonest process is

that general rise in prices, which is in effect an indirect tax on the

necessaries of life, involving all the injustice and ill-feeling which

arises from such a measure. It is inevitable that the working classes,

finding themselves subjected to a rise in prices, the cause of which

they do not understand, but the result of which they see to be a great

decrease in the buying power of their wages, should believe that they

are being exploited by profiteers, that the rich classes are growing

richer at their expense out of the war, and that they and the country

are being bled by a set of unpatriotic capitalist blood-suckers. It

is also natural that the property-owning classes, who find themselves

paying an Income Tax which they regard as extortionate, should

consider that the working classes by their continuous demands for

higher wages to meet higher cost of living, are trying to exploit

the country in their own interests in a time of national crisis, and

displaying a most unedifying spirit. The social result of this evil

policy of inflation, in embittering class against class, is a matter

which it is difficult to exaggerate. Some people think that it was

inevitable. This is too wide a question to be entered into now, but

at least it must be contended that if it is inevitable the extent to

which it is being practised might have been very greatly diminished.

Do we mean to go on to the end of the war with this muddling policy of

bad finance? If we still insist on believing that the war cannot last

another six months, and there is therefore no need to pull ourselves

up short financially and put things in order, then we certainly shall

do so. But we should surely recognise that there is at least a chance

that the war may go on for years, that if so our present financial

methods will leave us with a burden of debt which is appalling to

consider, and that in any case, whether the war lasts another six

months or another six years, a reform of our financial methods is long

overdue, is inevitable some time, and will pay us better the sooner it

is set about.

War-Time Financial Problems · 第 14 / 53 题