The Danes have thus long been a racial complex, but the fair

Nordic type predominates on the whole. Denmark's share,

especially in the organizing aspects of the great maritime

movements of post-Roman times, is well known, but Petersson's view

that this occurred during a period of favourable climate and

ice-free coasts in the northern seas helps one to realize the connexion

of that activity with a particular period. The association of

Denmark and Norway in maritime activity was long continued,

and when the latter fell on bad times in the Middle Ages, the

domination of the former became very marked. The political

aspect of the matter is outside our scope, but with the nineteenth

century the weakening of Denmark under German pressure

loosed the bonds, and circumstances gave Norway in the end

a remarkable opportunity. It thus came about that in 1864

Denmark saw the end of her _ancien régime_, and began a new career.

The name of her Bishop Grundtvig stands out in company with

that of Abbé of Jena and a few others in the drab century of

commercial imperialisms. He set out to re-educate the Danish

people in co-operation and simplicity, and, with his high schools

for the development not so much of the technicalities as of the

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amenities of life, he became one of those who builded better than

he knew. The sheer financial success of the new agriculture of

Denmark, thanks to skilled co-operative organization, is an

outstanding phenomenon, however much may be due to the general

increase of prosperity of the stock-raiser in the regions round the

manufacturing centres. Copenhagen has become a centre for

the wholesale marketing of butter, with train ferries and other

communications making links with Esbjerg, with Germany, with

Sweden, and across to the east side of the Baltic. Like Switzerland

and Holland, Denmark contributes in no small measure to the

intellectual life of Europe, partly through the opportunities her

sons find in Berlin and other large centres of the big nations.

Of the first peopling of Norway comparatively little is known,

but the population must have been sparse indeed until man was

fairly well equipped to cope with that region's serious difficulties.

It is a country of ledges along a broken coast, fantastically cut

by fjords which are deep valleys of the edge of a high plateau

modified by ice and then partially submerged under the sea.

The partial submergence has converted outlying hillocks into

a maze of islands, between which and the land there is, for long

distances, a fairly open channel, an old longitudinal valley no

doubt. The men of the fjords are in large measure of the tall,

fair, long-headed Nordic type, but around the seaward ends of

the southern fjords are dark broad-heads, who in this case are

almost beyond doubt settlers from the sea. The physical geography

of Trondhjem Fjord, on land and water, helps to make clear its

special early importance, particularly during a period of good

climate, but the whole of Norway suffered sadly in the fourteenth

century from bad harvests and Hanseatic interference, and from that

time onwards to the nineteenth century Norway's fortunes were low.

As in other lands of ancient poverty (note Finland and Switzerland)

the nineteenth century brought the final merging of the

old aristocracy in the people; the relation with Denmark was

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loosed and a temporary link with Sweden, partly under fear of

Russian Tsarist aggression, did not take deep root in the lives of

the people. Much importance must be attached to the linguistic

and literary revival of which the famous Bjornsen is the central

figure. Meanwhile British Free Trade, and especially the repeal

of the British Navigation Acts (1849), gave the Norse sailor and

shipbuilder a chance, and the country developed a great mercantile

marine, which managed to maintain itself until 1914, in spite of

the advent of the iron ship and steamer. During and since the

war Norway has not managed to keep pace with other mercantile

marines like those of the United States of America and Japan.

Internally, Norway was from far-off times till quite recently

a people of fisher-farmers prizing individual property on the small

cultivable ledges beside the fjords, and leading cattle to summer

pastures on the high grasslands of the great mountain plateau.

The practice of inheritance by the first-born son is traditionally

associated with these little farms so difficult to subdivide, and the

long-continued absences of much of the male part of the population

(fishing) are another feature. The latter fact is said to be

accountable for the unique power of women in Norwegian affairs,

and the women have certainly contributed much to the modern

development of Norway as a pacific, self-reliant democracy. In

the twentieth century there has already been a great growth

of industry based on the hydro-electric power available in such

quantity in the fjords; the chemical industry, including the

preparation of nitrates from atmospheric nitrogen, is a feature.

Since the war the value of Norwegian currency has gone down

with the slackness of shipping and the inability of Germany to

trade as she used to do, but the depreciation is not very great,

and may well right itself if the war-clouds clear. Fish and timber

have long been, and are likely to remain, valuable commercial

assets; the need of imported cereals is a permanent difficulty.

At the back of Norway, on the high mountain plateau, are the

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Lapps, whose seasonal wanderings disregard the international

frontier between Norway and Sweden. Fortunately, therefore,

when Sweden and Norway gave up (in 1905) their artificial and

temporary union, it was mutually agreed, as became enlightened

peoples, that the frontier would be entirely demilitarized. The

separation coincided with a great development of Norway's trade,

based upon the application of hydro-electric power to industry.

The Norwegian people centuries ago seemed to be giving up

their language for Danish, but here, as in so many other countries

(Bohemia, Serbia, Finland, Flanders, Catalonia, and Wales), the

nineteenth century brought a resurgence of local speech, and the

work of Bjornsen and Ibsen gave that speech a literary standard,

and made its literature a power in the modern world, fortunately

with comparatively little development of international antagonism,

for by this time there was no language competing locally with

Norwegian; Danish had retired and Swedish was too far off to

matter seriously, though its pressure was at one time threatened.

The Western Scandinavians of late Viking times spread across

the northern seas to Iceland, Greenland, and 'Wineland', which

has been identified with the New England coast of North America.

The connexion with America was lost, and that with Greenland

almost, if not quite, lost as well, probably in the severities of

climate of the fourteenth century, but that with the Faroes and

Iceland persisted. In this way Iceland has become in some sort

a repository of the Scandinavian past, and thence has spread in

modern times a knowledge and appreciation of the ancient sagas

of the Norse rovers, with elements embedded in them that date

back far beyond Viking times. Icelandic and the literature

embodied in it have thus become an important matter for students

of European tradition and literary history, and the influence

thence exerted on modern Germany, notably through Wagner,

has been far-reaching and many-sided.

Sweden's associations are necessarily very different from those

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of Norway. It is true that the high plateau is fairly sharply

marked off from the rest of Sweden, but the steps down are less

precipitous than on the Norwegian side, and though Sweden has

a Lapp-world as her mystery soil for folk-tale, yet contacts between

Swede and Lapp and Finn do take place and influence type.

The recent beautiful atlas of photographs of Swedish types

illustrates this for that country, but shows that the most

characteristic element, as in Norway, is the tall, fair Nordic type.

It is apparently chiefly since the recovery of the north from the

severities of the fourteenth-century climate that Sweden as a unit

people has shown the most marked activity. A factor in this was

undoubtedly the weakening effect of the great religious schism in

Germany with the opportunities this gave to the France of the

Counter-Reformation and the Bourbons.

Sweden even went through a phase of control of nearly the

whole of the Baltic (_c._ 1660), but this could not be maintained,

though the southern peninsula of Scania has never returned to

its old associations, which date back to prehistoric times, with

Denmark. The rise of Russia brought about the withdrawal

of the Swedish influence from the east side of the Baltic, but the

Finlanders of the south-west include several Swedish-speaking

groups, and 96 per cent. in Aland use that language. The episode

of military glory contributed to the maintenance of a local

aristocracy, which has made Sweden very distinct, socially, from

Norway, though democratization has gone a long way even here,

and no new titles of nobility are created. Her more extensive

lowlands, with possibilities of wheat in the southern half, make

farming a richer matter than it can be in either Norway or

Finland, while timber and good iron ore open up industrial and

commercial possibilities, to which the zone of lakes and its canal

system contribute not a little in the way of transport facilities.

Sweden is thus a relatively rich Baltic land, though many features

are shared in common with the peoples of the other (Finnish,

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Lettish, and German) Baltic coasts, and her natural associations

with Baltic Germany should be understood and appreciated.

Sweden has come through the war with her money at a general

European premium, a distinction she shares with Holland and

Switzerland alone among all the peoples of Europe.

7

_The Peoples on the Eastern Border of

Europe-of-the-Sea_

We have now surveyed the linguistic groups of Romance, Celtic,

and Teutonic speech, and may note that among those of Celtic

speech we find the most marked survivals of antiquity in social

features. Among the Romance- and Teutonic-speaking peoples we find

that there has long been a tendency towards closer accord between

linguistic and political groupings, and that now, with some exceptions

it is true, the political units are also linguistic ones. The

regions of Romance and Teutonic speech are the great regions of

organization of the State; they have a stable scheme of administration

and revenue, a settled legal order, an approach to representative

government based upon a franchise; in short, they are

the regions of the patriotic nation-state. The exceptions have

been noted here and there in the above sketch. Alsace is

Alemannic in speech but French in attachment in many respects.

Switzerland is a unique combination of units belonging to three

language groups. Flanders, or the area of Flemish speech, is

partly in France and partly in Belgium. Flanders and Alsace are

two of the most serious of European problems, and even if they

be mitigated by political foresight, the dangers from them are

not likely to diminish definitively unless the 'nation-state' can

be made to occupy less of the political horizon.

When we turn our attention eastwards from the lands of

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Romance and Teutonic to those of Slavonic and Baltic languages,

we find that, until recently at all events, there was no accord

between the political and the linguistic units, and that, even now,

the accord is fragmentary enough. We find also that in place of

the principle of 'one region, one language', which applies broadly

in the west, there is nearly always a minority language alongside

the majority one. The 1914-18 crisis has shown how very unstable

were the political units of the last fifty years, and the

'nation-state', that is a settled administration worthy of the name of

'state' combined with a social unit based upon tradition, has

only just begun its career in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, in

this eastern part of Europe we find languages of non-European

character in Finland, Esthonia, Hungary, and Turkey, and to

some extent in Bulgaria. This is then the zone of Euro-Asiatic

contacts and interpenetrations, and these contacts have determined

a great deal of the characteristics of the social order in

this part of the Continent.

While the above statement is broadly true, it must, nevertheless,

be stated that history records considerable and persistent, if

partially unsuccessful, efforts to develop the nation-state in those

western Slavonic lands which felt the influence of Rome either

through the Empire or through the Church, while the contagion

of nineteenth-century nationalism has spread far and wide.

During the period of close settlement and fixation of language

and of growth of administration in the west there were periods

of pressure Europewards from Asia, illustrated by the coming

of Szeklers and Magyars, and the formation of the Magyar kingdom

of Hungary, by the advance of the Bulgars, since practically

Slavonized, by the pressure of the Mongols on Russia, and by the

spread of the Turks. The spread of Finn or Finno-Ugrian peoples

westward along the north is probably older, and has been more

gradual and less organized.

Apart from this northern Finn-route and subordinate

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Finn-ways (Perm, Kazan, Samara) to the Volga, the westward roads

have been along the loess, either that of the Polish platform or

that of Wallachia and the Hungarian plain, and the defence of

the west against pressure along these ways gathered chiefly around

Vienna and around Poland (Cracow in earlier times and Warsaw

later on). Austria, as we now know it, was once the Ostmark,

the eastern march or frontier domain of the German-speaking

peoples, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire which has just

collapsed after a long process of decay was the fruition of the

organization that defended Western Europe from Asiatic pressure

on the south-east. It was obviously not a nation-state, for besides

its German and Magyar elements it included under its control

the many Slavonic and partially Slavonic people of the hill frame

around the middle Danube. Its day of greatness coincided with

the holding up and the beginning of retreat of the Turkish

pressure; its subsequent history is one of clever diplomacy aiming

at maintaining a power created for a purpose that was now no

more. The improbability of any renewal of effective pressure

from Asia on the now so highly armed west of Europe did away

with the _raison d'être_ of Vienna as a city of camp and court, and

it will require a higher development of European unity to make

Vienna take its definitive place as the nerve centre of the

Continent's land-communications. For the present, therefore, the

size and magnificence of Vienna seem to lack justification, and

there is manifest distress. A far smaller city would do admirably

for the capital of the small area henceforward to be called Austria,

and the past traditions of Vienna expressed in palaces and luxuries

are hardly what would naturally grow up around a modern railway

centre. When, however, we realize the need for increased

unity of Europe we cannot but feel how valuable the University

Museums and Libraries of Vienna might be were they internationally

developed so as to give Europe a natural culture-centre

second only to Paris. The suggestion to make Vienna the

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capital of the League of Nations revealed an over-emphasis on the

military and diplomatic tradition of Vienna, an aspect of that

city's life which it might be perilous to redevelop.

But as we are concerned with the peoples of Europe rather than

with the states, this slight mention of Vienna must suffice, and

we may proceed to deal with the linguistic groups of Europe east

of the Teutonic and Romance areas in the way in which we have

touched upon those of the west.

The Baltic or Letto-Lithuanian languages have already been

mentioned, and little more need be said save that they have long felt

the double pressure of Teutonic and Slavonic influences and have

absorbed words from both. Apart from them, the languages spoken

are largely of the Slavonic family, and it is frequently said that

the Slavonic languages are less distinct from one another than are

the languages of the Romance and the Teutonic families. They

have been less influenced by written forms than have the latter;

oral tradition has counted for more, and differences have

consequently not become so fixed as farther west. There is a certain

amount of dispute as to the primary home of Slavonic speech,

but it seems increasingly likely that it arose as an adaptation of

older forms of Indo-European languages by the people of the

Carpathian arc and the Polish platform on its north-eastern

flank, and that it spread thence especially in the post-Roman

centuries. Schlüter has found reason to believe in a considerable

movement from the hills to the valleys and plains in those centuries,

and with this we may connect progress of forest clearings and

spread of Slav languages, especially towards Muscovy. Most of

the regions of Slav speech came into touch with Christianity first

of all through Constantinople, but in the case of the more westerly

ones the influence of the Roman Church outweighed that of its

eastern sister before many centuries had passed, and the Roman

principles spread eastward as far as the bounds of what has been

called above 'Europe-of-the-Sea'.

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8

_The Slav-speaking Peoples and the Borders

of the East_

Of the western Slavonic-speaking peoples the Czechs, inhabiting

the hill-girt country of Bohemia, are among the most important.

They were first Christianized by the Eastern Church, but became

Roman Catholic, the early religious centre being at Taus

(Domazlice), at the Bohemian exit of a pass from Bavaria. Later on,

Prague was founded and became the capital, and it should be

noticed that in it, as in many other cities of Slavonic language,

the cathedral is within the castle, typifying association between

religious and political leadership, both being frequently more

western (German) than the rest of the population. It was natural

both that the small, compact, and distinct mass of Czechs should

early attain a sort of national self-consciousness, and that their

country, in spite of its physical separateness, should receive German

immigrants, especially up the Elbe gap. The distinctive personality

of Bohemia is illustrated by the fact that the University

of Prague, founded on the Paris model, was the first University

established beyond the Rhine; it is illustrated also by the fact

that Bohemia at so early a date, under John Huss (_c._ A.D. 1398),

revolted against Papal abuses, and would undoubtedly have become

schismatic had military force not been exerted strongly from

without. Nevertheless Bohemia has not been able to maintain

political independence in the past. After a short period of power

it subsided under Hapsburg influence as Vienna began to gather

Europe around her to defend Christianity. And later on (1620)

the Czechs were subjugated, and the Counter-Reformation and

the Jesuits with their universalist and anti-nationalist ideas

repressed the Slavonic tradition until it broke loose once more

in the revival of Romantic literature and Nationalist feeling

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which was such a feature of the nineteenth century. In that

century the rise of industry brought many more Germans into

North and North-west Bohemia, making that region a sort of

'Ulster', distinct in feeling from the rest of Bohemia, which is

far more agricultural. But the rise of Czech feeling spread

afresh the use of that language in spite of two centuries of

severe repression, and Prague had to develop Czech and German

Universities side by side. The relation of Bohemia to Vienna

politically was also reflected financially; Vienna was until 1918

to a large extent the money centre for Bohemia, while that country

supplied the rest of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with a large

proportion of its needs in manufactured goods. As a result of

the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary, Bohemia has risen

to power again, and has many advantages for the immediate

future in spite of dire need of fertilizers, machinery, and credit.

Her new government is promising well, and stands out in favourable

contrast to those of some of the other countries which have

risen suddenly after the war. Its problems will be that of

arranging for German co-operation and that of devising substitutes for

the old financial links with Vienna.

Between Bohemia and the Carpathians, or more strictly the

Tatra, is a physiographical trough such as so often occurs between

fold-mountains (e.g. Tatra) and old blocks (e.g. Bohemia). It

is occupied by the March (or Morava) river, is called Moravia,

and is known as the Moravian gate, for through it Vienna

communicates north-eastward not only with the Oder basin via

Breslau, but also with the Vistula basin via Cracow. Somewhat

more German than Bohemia the Moravian gate is still mainly

Slavonic, with dialects grading eastwards towards Polish. There

has been some difficulty in settling the limits of Moravia and

Poland, the former having properly been allocated to the Czech,

or better, Czechoslovak, state in the recent treaties. The dispute

centred chiefly upon Děčin

(formerly called Teschen), and was

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solved by the cession to Czechoslovakia of the greater part of

the coalfield and the railway which lies in Czechoslovakia, both

before it enters and after it leaves

Děčin territory. The town

of Děčin itself goes to Poland.

Not only does Czechoslovakia

include Moravia, but it also stretches along the south flank of

the Carpathians through a region of Slovak speech and rural

life right on to the small district where Ruthenian just emerges

west of the Carpathians. Thanks to their different language

these Ruthenians are to have local autonomy under Czechoslovakia.

The new state is thus of considerable size, and includes several

dialects of Slav; it is both agricultural and industrial; it is

keenly patriotic, and disposed, one hears, to split off from the

Roman Church, just as it was so disposed in the Middle Ages.

This state is contrasted to some extent with the majority of the

Slavonic regions, in that, in spite of a large German element,

there is more homogeneity and strength of cultural tradition

throughout the Czech country than there is among many other

Slav-speaking peoples.

Farther east the pressure from the Asiatic grasslands and

plateaux hindered the development of social settled life in the

Middle Ages, when it was progressing farther west, and as a

consequence the population of the towns is often different in tradition

from that of the country. In the rural districts, again, the

culture connexions of the ruling classes have often been different

from those of the simple village folk. The result is that in many

parts there have long been three social strata, often differing in

language, religion, and political association. Upper Silesia has,

in parts, German towns set in Polish country, and though some

of the German element is of fairly recent introduction (and

connected with industrial development), it nevertheless illustrates

the social and political problem.

In the Middle Ages the Jews previously inhabiting the Rhine

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lands found it difficult to fit into western schemes, as we know

from English history, and some moved eastwards (Ashkenazim)

into the Slav lands to form an important element of the

population of the towns, especially in Poland, where their numbers

were increased by Tsarist restrictions on their settlement in

Russia itself. Their language, Yiddish, is generally described as

a modified German dialect written in Hebrew characters and

owing some debt to Hebrew tradition in other respects. As they

have a linguistic and religious entity of their own, and as

inter-marriage with Gentiles has been restricted, it follows that they

form a very distinct block, most difficult to work into any State

organization of a western type. It must therefore be very open

to question whether the recent treaties endeavouring to spread

western state-theory eastwards are the best ways to provide for

the life of the people concerned. A modern state needs towns

and industry; the Jewish element in the towns of East-Central

Europe is enormously important, and cannot be dispensed with

save at great cost, as well as with the greatest injustice, and

yet assimilation of Jew to Gentile in East-Central Europe is

almost out of the question. The development of a nation-state is

necessarily held back when there are such diverse elements, and

League of Nations schemes for protection of minorities offer

a valuable line of progress if they can be realized.

The peoples of Europe · 第 4 / 8 段