It had been the practice of the Argeians, seemingly on more than

one previous occasion,[675] when an invading Lacedæmonian army was

approaching their territory, to meet them by a solemn message,

intimating that it was the time of some festival (the Karneian, or

other) held sacred by both parties, and warning them not to violate

the frontier during the holy truce. This was in point of fact nothing

better than a fraud; for the notice was sent, not at the moment when

the Karneian festival (or other, as the case might be) ought to come

on according to the due course of seasons, but at any time when it

might serve the purpose of arresting a Lacedæmonian invasion. But

though the duplicity of the Argeians was thus manifest, so strong

were the pious scruples of the Spartan king, that he could hardly

make up his mind to disregard the warning. Moreover, in the existing

confusion of the calendar, there was always room for some uncertainty

as to the question, which was the true Karneian moon; no Dorian

state having any right to fix it imperatively for the others, as the

Eleians fixed the Olympic truce, and the Corinthians the Isthmian.

It was with a view to satisfy his conscience on this subject that

Agesipolis now went to Olympia, and put the question to the oracle

of Zeus,—whether he might with a safe religious conscience refuse

to accept the holy truce, if the Argeians should now tender it. The

oracle, habitually dexterous in meeting a specific question with a

general reply, informed him, that he might with a safe conscience

decline a truce demanded wrongfully and for underhand purposes.[676]

This was accepted by Agesipolis as a satisfactory affirmative.

Nevertheless, to make assurance doubly sure, he went directly

forward to Delphi, to put the same question to Apollo. As it would

have been truly embarrassing, however, if the two holy replies had

turned out such as to contradict each other, he availed himself of

the _præjudicium_ which he had already received at Olympia, and

submitted the question to Apollo at Delphi in this form: “Is thine

opinion on the question of the holy truce, the same as that of thy

father (Zeus)?” “Most decidedly the same,” replied the god. Such

double warranty, though the appeal was so drawn up as scarcely to

leave to Apollo freedom of speech,[677] enabled Agesipolis to return

with full confidence to Phlius, where his army was already mustered;

and to march immediately into the Argeian territory by the road of

Nemea. Being met on the frontier by two heralds with wreaths and in

solemn attire, who warned him that it was a season of holy truce,

he informed them that the gods authorized his disobedience to their

summons, and marched on into the Argeian plain.

[675] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 3. Οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ

δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, ~ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν~, ἐστεφανωμένους

δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς.

[676] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2. Ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίπολις—ἐλθὼν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν

καὶ χρηστηριαζόμενος, ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ὁσίως ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῷ,

μὴ δεχομένῳ τὰς σπονδὰς τῶν Ἀργείων· ~ὅτι οὐχ ὁπότε καθήκοι

ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότε ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε

ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας~. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἐπεσήμαινεν αὐτῷ, ὅσιον εἶναι μὴ

δεχομένῳ σπονδὰς ἀδίκως ἐπιφερομένας. Ἐκεῖθεν δ᾽ εὐθὺς πορευθεὶς

εἰς Δελφοὺς, ἐπήρετο αὖ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, εἰ κἀκείνῳ δοκοίῃ περὶ τῶν

σπονδῶν, καθάπερ τῷ πατρί. Ὁ δ᾽ ἀπεκρίνατο, ~καὶ μάλα κατὰ ταὐτά~.

I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning of

the words ὑποφέρειν τοὺς μῆνας,—upon which Schneider has a

long and not very instructive note, adopting an untenable

hypothesis of Dodwell, that the Argeians on this occasion

appealed to the sanctity of the Isthmian truce; which is not

countenanced by anything in Xenophon, and which it belonged to

the Corinthians to announce, not to the Argeians. The plural

τοὺς μῆνας indicates (as Weiske and Manso understand it) that

the Argeians sometimes put forward the name of one festival,

sometimes of another. We may be pretty sure that the Karneian

festival was one of them; but what the others were, we cannot

tell. It is very probable that there were several festivals

of common obligation either among all the Dorians, or between

Sparta and Argos—πατρῴους τινας σπονδὰς ἐκ παλαιοῦ καθεστώσας

τοῖς Δωριεῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,—to use the language of Pausanias

(iii, 5, 6). The language of Xenophon implies that the demand

made by the Argeians, for observance of the Holy Truce, was in

itself rightful, or rather, that it would have been rightful at

a different season; but that they put themselves in the wrong by

making it at an improper season and for a fraudulent political

purpose.

For some remarks on other fraudulent manœuvres of the Argeians,

respecting the season of the Karneian truce, see Vol. VII. of

this History, Ch. lvi, p. 66. The compound verb ~ὑποφέρειν~

τοὺς μῆνας seems to imply the _underhand purpose_ with which

the Argeians preferred their demand of the truce. What were the

previous occasions on which they had preferred a similar demand,

we are not informed. Two years before, Agesilaus had invaded

and laid waste Argos; perhaps they may have tried, but without

success, to arrest his march by a similar pious fraud.

It is to this proceeding, perhaps, that Andokides alludes (Or.

iii, De Pace, s. 27), where he says that the Argeians, though

strenuous in insisting that Athens should help them to carry on

the war for the possession of Corinth against the Lacedæmonians,

had nevertheless made a separate peace with the latter, covering

their own Argeian territory from invasion—αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἰδίᾳ εἰρήνην

ποιησάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὐ παρέχουσιν ἐμπολεμεῖν. Of this obscure

passage I can give no better explanation.

[677] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 23. Ἡγήσιππος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπηρώτα

τὸν θεόν, κεχρημένος πρότερον Ὀλυμπιᾶσιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ,

ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, ~ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν~.

A similar story about the manner of putting the question to

Apollo at Delphi, after it had already been put to Zeus at

Dodona, is told about Agesilaus on another occasion (Plutarch,

Apophth. Lacon. p. 208 F.).

It happened that on the first evening after he had crossed the

border, the supper and the consequent libation having been just

concluded, an earthquake occurred; or, to translate the Greek phrase,

“the god (Poseidon) shook.” To all Greeks, and to Lacedæmonians

especially, this was a solemn event, and the personal companions of

Agesipolis immediately began to sing the pæan in honor of Poseidon;

the general impression among the soldiers being, that he would give

orders for quitting the territory immediately, as Agis had acted in

the invasion of Elis a few years before. Perhaps Agesipolis would

have done the same here, construing the earthquake as a warning that

he had done wrong, in neglecting the summons of the heralds,—had

he not been fortified by the recent oracles. He now replied, that

if the earthquake had occurred before he crossed the frontier, he

should have considered it as a prohibition; but as it came after his

crossing, he looked upon it as an encouragement to go forward.

So fully had the Argeians counted on the success of their warning

transmitted by the heralds, that they had made little preparation

for defence. Their dismay and confusion were very great; their

property was still outlying, not yet removed into secure places, so

that Agesipolis found much both to destroy and to appropriate. He

carried his ravages even to the gates of the city, piquing himself on

advancing a little farther than Agesilaus had gone in his invasion

two years before. He was at last driven to retreat by the terror

of a flash of lightning in his camp, which killed several persons.

And a project which he had formed, of erecting a permanent fort on

the Argeian frontier, was abandoned in consequence of unfavorable

sacrifices.[678]

[678] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 7; Pausan. iii, 5, 6.

It rather seems, by the language of these two writers, that they

look upon the menacing signs, by which Agesipolis was induced

to depart, as marks of some displeasure of the gods against his

expedition.

Besides these transactions in and near the isthmus of Corinth, the

war between Sparta and her enemies was prosecuted during the same

years both in the islands and on the coast of Asia Minor; though our

information is so imperfect that we can scarcely trace the thread of

events. The defeat near Knidus (394 B.C.),—the triumphant maritime

force of Pharnabazus and Konon at the Isthmus of Corinth in the

ensuing year (393 B.C.),—the restoration of the Athenian Long Walls

and fortified port,—and the activity of Konon with the fleet among

the islands,[679]—so alarmed the Spartans with the idea of a second

Athenian maritime empire, that they made every effort to detach the

Persian force from the side of their enemies.

[679] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12. Compare Isokrates, Or. vii,

(Areopag.) s. 13. ἁπάσης γὰρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν

ὑποπεσούσης καὶ μετὰ τὴν Κόνωνος ναυμαχίαν καὶ μετὰ τὴν Τιμοθέου

στρατηγίαν, etc. This oration, however, was composed a long while

after the events (about B.C. 353—see Mr. Clinton’s Fast. H.,

in that year); and Isokrates exaggerates; mistaking the break-up

of the Lacedæmonian empire for a resumption of the Athenian.

Demosthenes also (cont. Leptin. c. 16, p. 477) confounds the

same two ideas, and even the Athenian vote of thanks to Konon,

perpetuated on a commemorative column, countenanced the same

impression,—ἐπειδὴ Κόνων ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους, etc.

The Spartan Antalkidas, a dexterous, winning and artful man,[680]

not unlike Lysander, was sent as envoy to Tiribazus (392 B.C.);

whom we now find as satrap of Ionia in the room of Tithraustes,

after having been satrap of Armenia during the retreat of the Ten

Thousand. As Tiribazus was newly arrived in Asia Minor, he had not

acquired that personal enmity against the Spartans, which the active

hostilities of Derkyllidas and Agesilaus had inspired to Pharnabazus

and other Persians. Moreover, jealousy between neighboring satraps

was an ordinary feeling, which Antalkidas now hoped to turn to the

advantage of Sparta. To counteract his projects, envoys were also

sent to Tiribazus, by the confederate enemies of Sparta, Athens,

Thebes, Corinth, and Argos; and Konon, as the envoy of Athens, was

incautiously despatched among the number. On the part of Sparta,

Antalkidas offered, first, to abandon to the king of Persia all

the Greeks on the continent of Asia; next, as to all the other

Greeks, insular as well as continental, he required nothing more

than absolute autonomy for each separate city, great and small.[681]

The Persian king (he said) could neither desire anything more for

himself, nor have any motive for continuing the war against Sparta,

when he should once be placed in possession of all the towns on

the Asiatic coast, and when he should find both Sparta and Athens

rendered incapable of annoying him, through the autonomy and disunion

of the Hellenic world. But to neither of the two propositions of

Antalkidas would Athens, Thebes, or Argos, accede. As to the first,

they repudiated the disgrace of thus formally abandoning the Asiatic

Greeks;[682] as to the second proposition, guaranteeing autonomy

to every distinct city of Greece, they would admit it only under

special reserves, which it did not suit the purpose of Antalkidas

to grant. In truth the proposition went to break up (and was framed

with that view) both the Bœotian confederacy under the presidency

of Thebes, and the union between Argos and Corinth; while it also

deprived Athens of the chance of recovering Lemnos, Imbros, and

Skyros,[683]—islands which had been possessed and recognized by her

since the first commencement of the confederacy of Delos; indeed the

two former, even from the time of Miltiades the conqueror of Marathon.

[680] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

[681] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12-14.

[682] Diodor. xiv, 110. He affirms that these cities strongly

objected to this concession, five years afterwards, when the

peace of Antalkidas was actually concluded; but that they were

forced to give up their scruples and accept the peace including

the concession, because they had not force to resist Persia and

Sparta acting in hearty alliance.

Hence we may infer with certainty, that they also objected to

it during the earlier discussions, when it was first broached

by Antalkidas; and that their objections to it were in part the

cause why the discussions reported in the text broke off without

result.

It is true that Athens, during her desperate struggles in the

last years of the Peloponnesian war, had consented to this

concession, and even to greater, without doing herself any good

(Thucyd. viii, 56). But she was not now placed in circumstances

so imperious as to force her to be equally yielding.

Plato, in the Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245), asserts that all the

allies of Athens—Bœotians, Corinthians, Argeians, etc., were

willing to surrender the Asiatic Greeks at the requisition of

Artaxerxes; but that the Athenians alone resolutely stood out,

and were in consequence left without any allies. The latter

part of this assertion, as to the isolation of Athens from her

allies, is certainly not true; nor do I believe that the allies

took essentially different views from Athens on the point.

The Menexenus, eloquent and complimentary to Athens, must be

followed cautiously as to matters of fact. Plato goes the length

of denying that the Athenians subscribed the convention of

Antalkidas. Aristeides (Panathen. p. 172) says that they were

forced to subscribe it, because all their allies abandoned them.

[683] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 15.

Here commences a new era in the policy of Sparta. That she should

abnegate all pretension to maritime empire, is noway difficult to

understand—seeing that it had already been irrevocably overthrown

by the defeat of Knidus. Nor can we wonder that she should abandon

the Greeks on the Asiatic continent to Persian sway; since this

was nothing more than she had already consented to do in her

conventions with Tissaphernes and Cyrus during the latter years of

the Peloponnesian war,[684]—and consented, let us add, not under

any of that stringent necessity which at the same time pressed upon

Athens, but simply with a view to the maximum of victory over an

enemy already enfeebled. The events which followed the close of that

war (recounted in a former chapter) had indeed induced her to alter

her determination, and again to espouse their cause. But the real

novelty now first exhibited in her policy, is, the full development

of what had before existed in manifest tendency,—hostility against

all the partial land-confederacies of Greece, disguised under the

plausible demand of universal autonomy for every town, great or

small. How this autonomy was construed and carried into act, we

shall see hereafter; at present, we have only to note the first

proclamation of it by Antalkidas in the name of Sparta.

[684] See a striking passage in the Or. xii, (Panathen.) of

Isokrates, s. 110.

On this occasion, indeed, his mission came to nothing, from the

peremptory opposition of Athens and the others. But he was fortunate

enough to gain the approbation and confidence of Tiribazus; who saw

so clearly how much both propositions tended to promote the interests

and power of Persia, that he resolved to go up in person to court,

and prevail on Artaxerxes to act in concert with Sparta. Though not

daring to support Antalkidas openly, Tiribazus secretly gave him

money to reinforce the Spartan fleet. He at the same time rendered

to Sparta the more signal service of arresting and detaining Konon,

pretending that the latter was acting contrary to the interests of

the king.[685] This arrest was a gross act of perfidy, since Konon

not only commanded respect in his character of envoy,—but had been

acting with the full confidence, and almost under the orders, of

Pharnabazus. But the removal of an officer of so much ability,—the

only man who possessed the confidence of Pharnabazus,—was the most

fatal of all impediments to the naval renovation of Athens. It was

fortunate that Konon had had time to rebuild the Long Walls, before

his means of action were thus abruptly intercepted. Respecting his

subsequent fate, there exist contradictory stories. According to

one, he was put to death by the Persians in prison; according to

another, he found means to escape and again took refuge with Evagoras

in Cyprus, in which island he afterwards died of sickness.[686]

The latter story appears undoubtedly to be the true one. But it is

certain that he never afterwards had the means of performing any

public service, and that his career was cut short by this treacherous

detention, just at the moment when its promise was the most splendid

for his country.

[685] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16; Diodor. xiv, 85.

[686] Lysias, Or. xix, (De Bon. Aristoph.) s. 41, 42, 44;

Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 5; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s.

180.

Tiribazus, on going up to the Persian court, teems to have been

detained there for the purpose of concerting measures against

Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus, whose revolt from Persia was

now on the point of breaking out. But the Persian court could not

yet be prevailed upon to show any countenance to the propositions

of Sparta or of Antalkidas. On the contrary, Struthas, who was sent

down to Ionia as temporary substitute for Tiribazus, full of anxiety

to avenge the ravages of Agesilaus, acted with vigorous hostility

against the Lacedæmonians, and manifested friendly dispositions

towards Athens.

Thimbron (of whom we have before heard as first taking the command

of the Cyreian army in Asia Minor, after their return from Thrace)

received orders again to act as head of the Lacedæmonian forces in

Asia against Struthas. The new commander, with an army estimated

by Diodorus at eight thousand men,[687] marched from Ephesus into

the interior, and began his devastation of the territory dependent

on Persia. But his previous command, though he was personally

amiable,[688] had been irregular and disorderly, and it was soon

observed that the same defects were now yet more prominent,

aggravated by too liberal indulgence in convivial pleasures.

Aware of his rash, contemptuous, and improvident mode of attack,

Struthas laid a snare for him by sending a detachment of cavalry

to menace the camp, just when Thimbron had concluded his morning

meal in company with the flute-player Thersander,—the latter not

merely an excellent musician, but possessed of a full measure of

Spartan courage. Starting from his tent at the news, Thimbron,

with Thersander, waited only to collect the few troops immediately

at hand, without even leaving any orders for the remainder, and

hastened to repel the assailants; who gave way easily, and seduced

him into a pursuit. Presently Struthas himself, appearing with a

numerous and well-arrayed body of cavalry, charged with vigor the

disorderly detachment of Thimbron. Both that general and Thersander,

bravely fighting, fell among the first; while the army, deprived

of their commander as well as ill-prepared for a battle, made but

an ineffective resistance. They were broken, warmly pursued, and

the greater number slain. A few who contrived to escape the active

Persian cavalry, found shelter in the neighboring cities.[689]

[687] Diodor. xiv. 99.

[688] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 22. Ἦν δὲ οὗτος ἁνὴρ (Diphridas)

~εὔχαρίς τε οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Θίμβρωνος~, μᾶλλόν τε συντεταγμένος,

καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος, στρατηγός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ

σώματος ἡδοναὶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ, πρὸς ᾧ εἴη ἔργῳ, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν.

[689] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 18, 19.

This victory of Struthas, gained by the Persian cavalry, displays

a degree of vigor and ability which, fortunately for the Greeks,

was rarely seen in Persian operations. Our scanty information does

not enable us to trace its consequences. We find Diphridas sent out

soon after by the Lacedæmonians, along with the admiral Ekdikus, as

successor of Thimbron to bring together the remnant of the defeated

army, and to protect those cities which had contributed to form it.

Diphridas,—a man with all the popular qualities of his predecessor,

but a better and more careful officer,—is said to have succeeded to

some extent in this difficult mission. Being fortunate enough to take

captive the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, (as Xenophon had

captured Asidates,) he obtained a sufficiently large ransom to enable

him to pay his troops for some time.[690] But it is evident that his

achievements were not considerable, and that the Ionian Greeks on

the continent are now left to make good their position, as they can,

against the satrap at Sardis.

[690] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21, 22.

The forces of Sparta were much required at Rhodes; which island (as

has been mentioned already) had revolted from Sparta about five years

before (a few months anterior to the battle of Knidus), dispossessed

the Lysandrian oligarchy, and established a democratical government.

But since that period, an opposition-party in the island had

gradually risen up, acquired strength, and come into correspondence

with the oligarchical exiles; who on their side warmly solicited

aid from Sparta, representing that Rhodes would otherwise become

thoroughly dependent on Athens. Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians sent

eight triremes across the Ægean under the command of Ekdikus; the

first of their ships of war which had crossed since the defeat of

Knidus.[691] Though the Perso-Athenian naval force in the Ægean had

been either dismissed or paralyzed since the seizure of Konon, yet

the Rhodian government possessed a fleet of about twenty triremes,

besides considerable force of other kinds; so that Ekdikus could

not even land on the island, but was compelled to halt at Knidus.

Fortunately, Teleutias the Lacedæmonian was now in the Corinthian

Gulf with a fleet of twelve triremes, which were no longer required

there; since Agesilaus and he had captured Lechæum a few months

before, and destroyed the maritime force of the Corinthians in those

waters. He was now directed to sail with his squadron out of the

Corinthian Gulf across to Asia, to supersede Ekdikus, and take the

command of the whole fleet for operations off Rhodes. On passing by

Samos, he persuaded the inhabitants to embrace the cause of Sparta,

and to furnish him with a few ships; after which he went onward to

Knidus, where, superseding Ekdikus, he found himself at the head

of twenty-seven triremes.[692] In his way from Knidus to Rhodes,

he accidentally fell in with the Athenian admiral Philokrates,

conducting ten triremes to Cyprus to the aid of Evagoras in his

struggle against the Persians. He was fortunate enough to carry

them all as prisoners into Knidus, where he sold the whole booty,

and then proceeded with his fleet, thus augmented to thirty-seven

sail, to Rhodes. Here he established a fortified post, enabling

the oligarchical party to carry on an active civil war. But he was

defeated in a battle,—his enemies being decidedly the stronger force

in the island, and masters of all the cities.[693]

[691] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.

[692] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 23.

Diodorus (xiv, 97) agrees in this number of twenty-seven

triremes, and in the fact of aid having been obtained from Samos,

which island was persuaded to detach itself from Athens. But

he recounts the circumstances in a very different manner. He

represents the oligarchical party in Rhodes as having risen in

insurrection, and become masters of the island; he does not name

Teleutias, but Eudokimus (Ekdikus?), Diphilus (Diphridas?), and

Philodikus, as commanders.

The statement of Xenophon deserves the greater credence, in my

judgment. His means of information, as well as his interest,

about Teleutias (the brother of Agesilaus) were considerable.

[693] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 24-26.

Although the three ancient Rhodian cities (Lindus, Ialysus,

and Kameirus) had coalesced (see Diodor. xiii, 75) a few years

before into the great city of Rhodes, afterwards so powerful and

celebrated,—yet they still continued to exist, and apparently as

fortified places. For Xenophon speaks of the democrats in Rhodes

as ~τάς τε πόλεις~ ἔχοντας, etc.

Whether the Philokrates here named as _Philokrates son of

Ephialtes_, is the same person as the Philokrates accused in the

Thirtieth oration of Lysias—cannot be certainly made out. It is

possible enough that there might be two contemporary Athenians

bearing this name, which would explain the circumstance that

Xenophon here names the father Ephialtes—a practice occasional

with him, but not common.

The alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, in his contention against

Artaxerxes, was at this moment an unfortunate and perplexing

circumstance for Athens, since she was relying upon Persian aid

against Sparta, and since Sparta was bidding against her for it.

But the alliance was one which she could not lightly throw off.

For Evagoras had not only harbored Konon with the remnant of the

Athenian fleet after the disaster of Ægospotami, but had earned

a grant of citizenship and the honor of a statue at Athens, as a

strenuous auxiliary in procuring that Persian aid which gained

the battle of Knidus, and as a personal combatant in that battle,

before the commencement of his dissension with Artaxerxes.[694] It

would have been every way advantageous to Athens at this moment to

decline assisting Evagoras, since (not to mention the probability

of offending the Persian court) she had more than enough to employ

all her maritime force nearer home and for purposes more essential

to herself. Yet in spite of these very serious considerations of

prudence, the paramount feelings of prior obligation and gratitude,

enforced by influential citizens who had formed connections in

Cyprus, determined the Athenians to identify themselves with his

gallant struggles[695] (of which I shall speak more fully presently).

So little was fickleness, or instability, or the easy oblivion of

past feelings, a part of their real nature,—though historians have

commonly denounced it as among their prominent qualities.

[694] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 67, 68, 82; Epistola

Philippi ap. Demosthen. Orat. p. 161, c. 4.

[695] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristoph.) s. 27-44.

The capture of their squadron under Philokrates, however, and the

consequent increase of the Lacedæmonian naval force at Rhodes,

compelled the Athenians to postpone further aid to Evagoras, and

to arm forty triremes under Thrasybulus for the Asiatic coast; no

inconsiderable effort, when we recollect that four years before

there was scarcely a single trireme in Peiræus, and not even a

wall of defence around the place. Though sent immediately for the

assistance of Rhodes, Thrasybulus judged it expedient to go first

to the Hellespont; probably from extreme want of money to pay his

men. Derkyllidas was still in occupation of Abydos, yet there was no

Lacedæmonian fleet in the strait; so that Thrasybulus was enabled to

extend the alliances of Athens both on the European and the Asiatic

side,—the latter being under the friendly satrap, Pharnabazus.

Reconciling the two Thracian princes, Seuthes and Amadokus, whom he

found at war, he brought both of them into amicable relations with

Athens, and then moved forward to Byzantium. That city was already in

alliance with Athens; but on the arrival of Thrasybulus, the alliance

was still further cemented by the change of its government into a

democracy. Having established friendship with the opposite city of

Chalkêdon, and being thus master of the Bosphorus, he sold the tithe

of the commercial ships sailing out of the Euxine;[696] leaving

doubtless an adequate force to exact it. This was a striking evidence

of revived Athenian maritime power, which seems also to have been

now extended more or less to Samothrace, Thasus, and the coast of

Thrace.[697]

[696] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 25-27.

Polybius (iv, 38-47) gives instructive remarks and information

about the importance of Byzantium and its very peculiar position,

in the ancient world,—as well as about the dues charged on the

merchant vessels going into, or coming out of, the Euxine,—and

the manner in which these dues pressed upon general trade.

[697] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 7.

From Byzantium, Thrasybulus sailed to Mitylênê, which was already

in friendship with Athens,—though Methymna and the other cities in

the island were still maintained by a force under the Lacedæmonian

harmost, Therimachus. With the aid of the Mitylenæans, and of the

exiles from other Lesbian cities, Thrasybulus marched to the borders

of Methymna, where he was met by Therimachus; who had also brought

together his utmost force, but was now completely defeated and slain.

The Athenians thus became masters of Antissa and Eresus, where they

were enabled to levy a valuable contribution, as well as to plunder

the refractory territory of Methymna. Nevertheless, Thrasybulus, in

spite of farther help from Chios and Mitylênê, still thought himself

not in a situation to go to Rhodes with advantage. Perhaps he was

not sure of pay in advance, and the presence of unpaid troops in an

exhausted island might be a doubtful benefit. Accordingly, he sailed

from Lesbos along the western and southern coast of Asia Minor,

levying contributions at Halikarnassus[698] and other places, until

he came to Aspendus in Pamphylia; where he also obtained money and

was about to depart with it, when some misdeeds committed by his

soldiers so exasperated the inhabitants, that they attacked him by

night unprepared in his tent, and slew him.[699]

[698] Lysias, Or. xxviii, cont. Erg. s. 1-20.

[699] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 28-30; Diodor. xiv, 94.

The latter states that Thrasybulus lost twenty-three triremes by

a storm near Lesbos,—which Xenophon does not notice, and which

seems improbable.

Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than to any one else, Athens

owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise, generous, and

harmonious working, after renovation. Even the philo-Laconian and

oligarchical Xenophon bestows upon him a marked and unaffected

eulogy.[700] His devoted patriotism in commencing and prosecuting the

struggle against the Thirty, at a time when they not only were at

the height of their power, but had plausible ground for calculating

on the full auxiliary strength of Sparta, deserves high admiration.

But the feature which stands yet more eminent in his character,—a

feature infinitely rare in the Grecian character, generally,—is,

that the energy of a successful leader was combined with complete

absence both of vindictive antipathies for the past, and of

overbearing ambition for himself. Content to live himself as a simple

citizen under the restored democracy, he taught his countrymen to

forgive an oligarchical party from whom they had suffered atrocious

wrongs, and set the example himself of acquiescing, in the loss of

his own large property. The generosity of such a proceeding ought

not to count for less, because it was at the same time dictated by

the highest political prudence. We find in an oration of Lysias

against Ergokles (a citizen who served in the Athenian fleet on

this last expedition), in which the latter is accused of gross

peculation,—insinuations against Thrasybulus, of having countenanced

the delinquency, though coupled with praise of his general character.

Even the words as they now stand are so vague as to carry little

evidence; but when we reflect that the oration was spoken after the

death of Thrasybulus, they are entitled to no weight at all.[701]

[700] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31. Καὶ Θρασύβουλος μὲν δὴ, μάλα δοκῶν

ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

[701] Lysias, cont. Ergo. Or. xxviii, s. 9.

Ergokles is charged in this oration with gross abuse of power,

oppression towards allies and citizens of Athens, and peculation

for his own profit, during the course of the expedition of

Thrasybulus; who is indirectly accused of conniving at such

misconduct. It appears that the Athenians, as soon as they

were informed that Thrasybulus had established the toll in the

Bosphorus, passed a decree that an account should be sent home

of all moneys exacted from the various cities, and that the

colleagues of Thrasybulus should come home to go through the

audit (s. 5); implying (so far as we can understand what is thus

briefly noticed) that Thrasybulus himself should _not_ be obliged

to come home, but might stay on his Hellespontine or Asiatic

command. Ergokles, however, probably one of these colleagues,

resented this decree as an insult, and advised Thrasybulus to

seize Byzantium, to retain the fleet, and to marry the daughter

of the Thracian prince Seuthes. It is also affirmed in the

oration that the fleet had come home in very bad condition (s.

2-4), and that the money, levied with so much criminal abuse, had

been either squandered or fraudulently appropriated.

We learn from another oration that Ergokles was condemned to

death. His property was confiscated, and was said to amount to

thirty talents, though he had been poor before the expedition;

but nothing like that amount was discovered after the sentence of

confiscation (Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Philokrat. s. 3).

The Athenians sent Agyrrhius to succeed Thrasybulus. After the

death of the latter, we may conclude that the fleet went to Rhodes,

its original destination,—though Xenophon does not expressly say

so,—the rather, as neither Teleutias nor any subsequent Lacedæmonian

commander appears to have become master of the island, in spite of

the considerable force which they had there assembled.[702] The

Lacedæmonians, however, on their side, being also much in want of

money, Teleutias was obliged (in the same manner as the Athenians),

to move from island to island, levying contributions as he could.[703]

[702] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31.

[703] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 2.

When the news of the successful proceedings of Thrasybulus at

Byzantium and the Hellespont, again establishing a toll for the

profit of Athens, reached Sparta, it excited so much anxiety, that

Anaxibius, having great influence with the ephors of the time,

prevailed on them to send him out as harmost to Abydos, in the room

of Derkyllidas, who had now been in that post for several years.

Having been the officer originally employed to procure the revolt

of the place from Athens (in 411 B.C.),[704] Derkyllidas had since

rendered service not less essential in preserving it to Sparta,

during the extensive desertion which followed the battle of Knidus.

But it was supposed that he ought to have checked the aggressive

plans of Thrasybulus; moreover, Anaxibius promised, if a small force

were entrusted to him, to put down effectually the newly-revived

Athenian influence. He was supposed to know well, those regions in

which he had once already been admiral, at the moment when Xenophon

and the Cyreian army first returned; the harshness, treachery, and

corruption, which he displayed in his dealing with that gallant

body of men, have been already recounted in a former chapter.[705]

With three triremes, and funds for the pay of a thousand mercenary

troops, Anaxibius accordingly went to Abydos. He began his operations

with considerable vigor, both against Athens and Pharnabazus. While

he armed a land-force, which he employed in making incursions on

the neighboring cities in the territory of that satrap,—he at the

same time reinforced his little squadron by three triremes out of

the harbor of Abydos, so that he became strong enough to seize the

merchant vessels passing along the Hellespont to Athens or to her

allies.[706] The force which Thrasybulus had left at Byzantium to

secure the strait revenues, was thus inadequate to its object without

farther addition.

[704] Thucyd. viii, 61; compare Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 24.

[705] See above, Chapter lxxi, p. 156 of the present volume.

[706] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 32, 83.

Fortunately, Iphikrates was at this moment disengaged at Athens,

having recently returned from Corinth with his body of peltasts, for

whom doubtless employment was wanted. He was accordingly sent with

twelve hundred peltasts and eight triremes, to combat Anaxibius in

the Hellespont; which now became again the scene of conflict, as it

had been in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war; the Athenians

from the European side, the Lacedæmonians from the Asiatic. At first

the warfare consisted of desultory privateering, and money-levying

excursions, on both sides.[707] But at length, the watchful genius

of Iphikrates discovered opportunity for a successful stratagem.

Anaxibius, having just drawn the town of Antandrus into his alliance,

had marched thither for the purpose of leaving a garrison in it,

with his Lacedæmonian and mercenary forces, as well as two hundred

hoplites from Abydos itself. His way lay across the mountainous

region of Ida, southward to the coast of the gulf of Adramyttium.

Accordingly, Iphikrates, foreseeing that he would speedily return,

crossed over in the night from the Chersonese, and planted himself

in ambush on the line of return march; at a point where it traversed

the desert and mountainous extremities of the Abydene territory, near

the gold mines of Kremastê. The triremes which carried him across

were ordered to sail up the strait on the next day, in order that

Anaxibius must be apprised of it, and might suppose Iphikrates to be

employed on his ordinary money-levying excursion.

[707] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 35, 36. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λῃστὰς

διαπέμποντες ἐπολέμουν ἀλλήλοις ... Ὅπως δοκοίη, ὥσπερ εἰώθει,

ἐπ᾽ ἀργυρολογίαν ἐπαναπεπλευκέναι.

The stratagem was completely successful. Anaxibius returned on the

next day, without the least suspicion of any enemy at hand, marching

in careless order and with long-stretched files, as well from the

narrowness of the mountain path as from the circumstance that he

was in the friendly territory of Abydos. Not expecting to fight, he

had unfortunately either omitted the morning sacrifice, or taken

no pains to ascertain that the victims were favorable; so Xenophon

informs us,[708] with that constant regard to the divine judgments

and divine warnings which pervades both the Hellenica and the

Anabasis. Iphikrates having suffered the Abydenes who were in the

van to pass, suddenly sprang from his ambush, to assault Anaxibius

with the Lacedæmonians and the mercenaries, as they descended the

mountain-pass into the plain of Kremastê. His appearance struck

terror and confusion into the whole army; unprepared in its

disorderly array for stedfast resistance,—even if the minds of

the soldiers had been ever so well strung,—against well-trained

peltasts, who were sure to prevail over hoplites not in steady

rank. To Anaxibius himself, the truth stood plain at once. Defeat

was inevitable, and there remained no other resource for him except

to die like a brave man. Accordingly, desiring his shield-bearer

to hand to him his shield, he said to those around him,—“Friends,

my honor commands me to die here; but do you hasten away, and save

yourselves, before the enemy close with us.” Such order was hardly

required to determine his panic-stricken troops, who fled with one

accord towards Abydos; while Anaxibius himself awaited firmly the

approach of the enemy, and fell gallantly fighting on the spot.

No less than twelve Spartan harmosts, those who had been expelled

from their various governments by the defeat of Knidus, and who had

remained ever since under Derkyllidas at Abydos, stood with the like

courage and shared his fate. Such disdain of life hardly surprises

us in conspicuous Spartan citizens, to whom preservation by flight

was “no true preservation” (in the language of Xenophon),[709] but

simply prolongation of life under intolerable disgrace at home. But

what deserves greater remark is, that the youth to whom Anaxibius

was tenderly attached and who was his constant companion, could not

endure to leave him, stayed fighting by his side, and perished by the

same honorable death.[710] So strong was the mutual devotion which

this relation between persons of the male sex inspired in the ancient

Greek mind. With these exceptions, no one else made any attempt to

stand. All fled, and were pursued by Iphikrates as far as the gates

of Abydos, with the slaughter of fifty out of the two hundred Abydene

hoplites, and two hundred of the remaining troops.

[708] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 36. Ὁ Ἀναξίβιος ἀπεπορεύετο, ὡς μὲν

ἐλέγετο, ~οὐδὲ τῶν ἱερῶν γεγενημένων αὐτῷ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ~, ἀλλὰ

καταφρονήσας, ὅτι διὰ φιλίας τε ἐπορεύετο καὶ ἐς πόλιν φιλίαν,

καὶ ὅτι ἤκουε τῶν ἀπαντώντων, τὸν Ἰφικράτην ἀναπεπλευκέναι τῆς

ἐπὶ Προικοννήσου, ἀμελέστερον ἐπορεύετο.

[709] See the remarks a few pages back, upon the defeat and

destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora by Iphikrates, near Lechæum,

page 350.

[710] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39. Καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ μέντοι αὐτῷ

παρέμεινε, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τῶν συνεληλυθότων ἐκ τῶν

πόλεων ἁρμοστήρων ὡς δώδεκα μαχόμενοι συναπέθανον· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι

φεύγοντες ἔπιπτον.

This well-planned and successful exploit, while it added to the

reputation of Iphikrates, rendered the Athenians again masters of the

Bosphorus and the Hellespont, ensuring both the levy of the dues and

the transit of their trading vessels. But while the Athenians were

thus carrying on naval war at Rhodes and the Hellespont, they began

to experience annoyance nearer home, from Ægina.

That island (within sight as the eyesore of Peiræus, as Perikles was

wont to call it) had been occupied fifty years before by a population

eminently hostile to Athens, afterwards conquered and expelled by

her,—at last again captured in the new abode which they had obtained

in Laconia,—and put to death by her order. During the Peloponnesian

war, Ægina had been tenanted by Athenian citizens as outsettlers

or kleruchs; all of whom had been driven in after the battle of

Ægospotami. The island was then restored by Lysander to the remnant

of the former population,—as many of them at least as he could find.

These new Æginetans, though doubtless animated by associations highly

unfavorable to Athens, had nevertheless remained not only at peace,

but also in reciprocal commerce, with her, until a considerable time

after the battle of Knidus and the rebuilding of her Long Walls. And

so they would have continued, of their own accord,—since they could

gain but little, and were likely to lose all the security of their

traffic, by her hostility,—had they not been forced to commence

the war by Eteonikus, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the island;[711]

one amidst many examples of the manner in which the smaller Grecian

states were dragged into war, without any motive of their own, by the

ambition of the greater,—by Sparta as well as by Athens.[712] With

the concurrence of the ephors, Eteonikus authorized and encouraged

all Æginetans to fit out privateers for depredation on Attica; which

aggression the Athenians resented, after suffering considerable

inconvenience by sending a force of ten triremes to block up Ægina

from the sea, with a body of hoplites under Pamphilus to construct

and occupy a permanent fort in the island. This squadron, however,

was soon driven off (though Pamphilus still continued to occupy the

fort) by Teleutias, who came to Ægina on hearing of the blockade;

having been engaged, with the fleet which he commanded at Rhodes,

in an expedition among the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying

contributions. He seems to have been now at the term of his year of

command, and while he was at Ægina, his successor, Hierax, arrived

from Sparta, on his way to Rhodes, to supersede him. The fleet was,

accordingly, handed over to Hierax at Ægina, while Teleutias went

directly home to Sparta. So remarkable was his popularity among the

seamen, that numbers of them accompanied him down to the water-edge,

testifying their regret and attachment by crowning him with wreaths,

or pressing his hand. Some, who came down too late, when he was

already under weigh, cast their wreaths on the sea, uttering prayers

for his health and happiness.[713]

[711] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 1. ὢν δὲ ~πάλιν~ ὁ Ἐτεόνικος ἐν τῇ

Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ ἐπιμιξίᾳ χρωμένων τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον τῶν Αἰγινητῶν

πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἐπεὶ φανερῶς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπολεμεῖτο

ὁ πόλεμος, ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις, ἐφίησι ληΐζεσθαι τὸν

βουλόμενον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς.

The meaning of the word πάλιν here is not easy to determine, since

(as Schneider remarks) not a word had been said before about the

presence of Eteonikus at Ægina. Perhaps we may explain it by

supposing that Eteonikus found the Æginetans reluctant to engage in

the war, and that he did not like to involve them in it without

first going to Sparta to consult the ephors. It was on _coming

back_ to Ægina (πάλιν) from Sparta, after having obtained the

consent of the ephors (ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις), that he issued

the letters of marque.

Schneider’s note explains τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον incorrectly, in my

judgment.

[712] Compare Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 8; Thucyd. iii, 13. The old

Æginetan antipathy against Athens, when thus again instigated,

continued for a considerable time. A year or two afterwards, when

the philosopher Plato was taken to Ægina to be sold as a slave,

it was death to any Athenian to land in the island (Aristides,

Or. xlvi, p. 384; p. 306 Dindorf; Diogenes Laërt. iii, 19;

Plutarch. Dion. c. 5).

[713] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 3. Ὁ δὲ Τελευτίας, μακαριώτατα δὴ

ἀπέπλευσεν οἴκαδε, etc.

This description of the scene at the departure of Teleutias (for

whom, as well as for his brother Agesilaus, Xenophon always

manifests a marked sympathy) is extremely interesting. The

reflection, too, with which Xenophon follows it up, deserves

notice,—“I know well that in these incidents I am not recounting

any outlay of money, or danger incurred, or memorable stratagem.

But by Zeus, it _does_ seem to me worth a man’s while to reflect,

by what sort of conduct Teleutias created such dispositions in

his soldiers. This is a true man’s achievement, more precious

than any outlay or any danger.”

What Xenophon here glances at in the case of Teleutias, is the

scheme worked out in detail in the romance of the Cyropædia (τὸ

ἐθελοντῶν ἄρχειν—the exercising command in such manner as to

have willing and obedient subjects)—and touched upon indirectly

in various of his other compositions,—the Hiero, the Œconomicus,

and portions of the Memorabilia. The _idéal_ of government, as

it presented itself to Xenophon, was the paternal despotism, or

something like it.

Hierax, while carrying back to Rhodes the remaining fleet which

Teleutias had brought from that island, left his subordinate Gorgôpas

as harmost at Ægina with twelve triremes; a force which protected

the island completely, and caused the fortified post occupied by

the Athenians under Pamphilus to be itself blocked up, insomuch

that after an interval of four months, a special decree was passed

at Athens to send a numerous squadron and fetch away the garrison.

As the Æginetan privateers, aided by the squadron of Gorgôpas, now

recommenced their annoyances against Attica, thirteen Athenian

triremes were put in equipment under Eunomus as a guard-squadron

against Ægina. But Gorgôpas and his squadron were now for the time

withdrawn, to escort Antalkidas, the new Lacedæmonian admiral sent

to Asia chiefly for the purpose of again negotiating with Tiribazus.

On returning back, after landing Antalkidas at Ephesus, Gorgôpas

fell in with Eunomus, whose pursuit, however, he escaped, landing at

Ægina just before sunset. The Athenian admiral, after watching for a

short time until he saw the Lacedæmonian seamen out of their vessels

and ashore, departed as it grew dark to Attica, carrying a light to

prevent his ships from parting company. But Gorgôpas, causing his men

to take a hasty meal, immediately reëmbarked and pursued; keeping

on the track by means of the light, and taking care not to betray

himself either by the noise of oars or by the chant of the Keleustês.

Eunomus had no suspicion of the accompanying enemy. Just after he

had touched land near cape Zostêr in Attica, when his men were in

the act of disembarking, Gorgôpas gave signal by trumpet to attack.

After a short action by moonlight, four of the Athenian squadrons

were captured, and carried off to Ægina; with the remainder, Eunomus

escaped to Peiræus.[714]

[714] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 6-10.

This victory, rendering both Gorgôpas and the Æginetans confident,

laid them open to a stratagem skilfully planned by the Athenian

Chabrias. That officer, who seems to have been dismissed from Corinth

as Iphikrates had been before him, was now about to conduct a force

of ten triremes and eight hundred peltasts to the aid of Evagoras;

to whom the Athenians were thus paying their debt of gratitude,

though they could ill-spare any of their forces from home. Chabrias,

passing over from Peiræus at night, landed without being perceived

in a desert place of the coast of Ægina, and planted himself in

ambush with his peltasts at some little distance inland of the

Herakleion or temple of Hêraklês, amidst hollow ground suitable for

concealment. He had before made agreement with another squadron

and a body of hoplites under Demænetus; who arrived at daybreak and

landed at Ægina at a point called Tripyrgia, about two miles distant

from the Herakleion, but farther removed from the city. As soon as

their arrival became known, Gorgôpas hastened out of the city to

repel them, with all the troops he could collect, Æginetans as well

as marines out of the ships of war,—and eight Spartans who happened

to be his companions in the island. In their march from the city to

attack the new comers, they had to pass near the Herakleion, and

therefore near the troops in ambush; who, as soon as Gorgôpas and

those about him had gone by, rose up suddenly and attacked them in

the rear. The stratagem succeeded not less completely than that of

Iphikrates at Abydos against Anaxibius. Gorgôpas and the Spartans

near him were slain, the rest were defeated, and compelled to flee

with considerable loss back to the city.[715]

[715] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 12, 13.

After this brilliant success, Chabrias pursued his voyage to Cyprus,

and matters appeared so secure on the side of Ægina, that Demænetus

also was sent to the Hellespont to reinforce Iphikrates. For some

time indeed, the Lacedæmonian ships at Ægina did nothing. Eteonikus,

who was sent as successor to Gorgôpas,[716] could neither persuade

nor constrain the seamen to go aboard, since he had no funds,

while their pay was in arrears; so that Athens with her coast and

her trading-vessels remained altogether unmolested. At length the

Lacedæmonians were obliged to send again to Ægina Teleutias, the most

popular and best-beloved of all their commanders, whom the seamen

welcomed with the utmost delight. Addressing them under the influence

of this first impression, immediately after he had offered sacrifice,

he told them plainly that he had brought with him no money, but that

he had come to put them in the way of procuring it; that he should

himself touch nothing until they were amply provided, and should

require of them to bear no more hardship or fatigue than he went

through himself; that the power and prosperity of Sparta had all

been purchased by willingly braving danger, as well as toil, in the

cause of duty; that it became valiant men to seek their pay, not by

cringing to any one, but by their own swords at the cost of enemies.

And he engaged to find them the means of doing this, provided they

would now again manifest the excellent qualities which he knew them

by experience to possess.[717]

[716] So we may conclude from Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 13; Demænetus is

found at the Hellespont v, 1, 26.

[717] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 14-17.

This address completely won over the seamen, who received it with

shouts of applause; desiring Teleutias to give his orders forthwith,

and promising ready obedience. “Well, (said he), now go and get your

suppers, as you were intending to do; and then come immediately on

shipboard, bringing with you provisions for one day. Advance me thus

much out of your own means, that we may, by the will of the gods,

make an opportune voyage.”[718]

[718] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18. Ἄγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, δειπνήσατε μὲν,

ἅπερ καὶ ὡς ἐμέλλετε· προπαράσχετε δέ μοι μιᾶς ἡμέρας σῖτον·

ἔπειτα δὲ ἥκετε ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς αὔτικα μάλα, ὅπως πλεύσωμεν, ἔνθα

θεὸς ἐθέλει, ἐν καιρῷ ἀφιξόμενοι.

Schneider doubts whether the words προπαράσχετε δέ μοι are

correct. But they seem to me to bear a very pertinent meaning.

Teleutias had no money; yet it was necessary for his purpose

that the seamen should come furnished with one day’s provision

beforehand. Accordingly he is obliged to ask _them_ to get

provision for themselves, or to _lend it_, as it were, _to him_;

though they were already so dissatisfied from not having received

their pay.

In spite of the eminent popularity of Teleutias, the men would

probably have refused to go on board, had he told them beforehand

his intention of sailing with his twelve triremes straight into the

harbor of Peiræus. At first sight, the enterprise seemed insane,

for there were triremes in it more than sufficient to overwhelm

him. But he calculated on finding them all unprepared, with seamen

as well as officers in their lodgings ashore, so that he could not

only strike terror and do damage, but even realize half an hour’s

plunder before preparations could be made to resist him. Such was

the security which now reigned there, especially since the death of

Gorgôpas, that no one dreamt of an attack. The harbor was open, as

it had been forty years before, when Brasidas (in the third year of

the Peloponnesian war) attempted the like enterprise from the port of

Megara.[719] Even then, at the maximum of the Athenian naval power,

it was an enterprise possible, simply because every one considered it

to be impossible; and it only failed because the assailants became

terrified, and flinched in the execution.

A little after dark, Teleutias quitted the harbor of Ægina, without

telling any one whither he was going. Rowing leisurely, and allowing

his men alternate repose on their oars, he found himself before

morning within half a mile of Peiræus, where he waited until day was

just dawning, and then led his squadron straight into the harbor.

Everything turned out as he expected; there was not the least idea

of being attacked, nor the least preparation for defence. Not a

single trireme was manned or in fighting condition, but several were

moored without their crews, together with merchant-vessels, loaded

as well as empty. Teleutias directed the captains of his squadron

to drive against the triremes, and disable them; but by no means

to damage the beaks of their own ships by trying to disable the

merchant-ships. Even at that early hour, many Athenians were abroad,

and the arrival of the unexpected assailants struck every one with

surprise and consternation. Loud and vague cries transmitted the news

through all Peiræus, and from Peiræus up to Athens, where it was

believed that their harbor was actually taken. Every man having run

home for his arms, the whole force of the city rushed impetuously

down thither, with one accord,—hoplites as well as horsemen. But

before such succors could arrive, Teleutias had full time to do

considerable mischief. His seamen boarded the larger merchant-ships,

seizing both the men and the portable goods which they found aboard.

Some even jumped ashore on the quay (called the Deigma), laid hands

on the tradesmen, ship-masters, and pilots, whom they saw near, and

carried them away captive. Various smaller vessels with their entire

cargoes were also towed away; and even three or four triremes. With

all these Teleutias sailed safely out of Peiræus, sending some of

his squadron to escort the prizes to Ægina, while he himself with

the remainder sailed southward along the coast. As he was seen to

come out of Peiræus, his triremes were mistaken for Athenian, and

excited no alarm; so that he thus captured several fishing-boats,

and passage-boats coming with passengers from the islands to

Athens,—together with some merchantmen carrying corn and other

goods, at Sunium. All were carried safely into Ægina.[720]

[719] Thucyd. ii, 94.

[720] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18-22.

The enterprise of Teleutias, thus admirably concerted and executed

without the loss of a man, procured for him a plentiful booty, of

which, probably not the least valuable portion consisted in the men

seized as captives. When sold at Ægina, it yielded so large a return

that he was enabled to pay down at once a month’s pay to his seamen;

who became more attached to him than ever, and kept the triremes

in animated and active service under his orders.[721] Admonished

by painful experience, indeed, the Athenians were now, doubtless,

careful both in guarding and in closing Peiræus; as they had become

forty years before after the unsuccessful attack of Brasidas. But in

spite of the utmost vigilance, they suffered an extent of damage from

the indefatigable Teleutias, and from the Æginetan privateers, quite

sufficient to make them weary of the war.[722]

[721] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 24.

[722] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 29.

Even ten years after this, however, when the Lacedæmonian harmost

Sphodrias marched from Thespiæ by night to surprise Peiræus, it

was without gates on the land-side—ἀπύλωτος—or at least without

any such gates as would resist an assault (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 20).

We cannot doubt, indeed, that the prosecution of the war must have

been a heavy financial burthen upon the Athenians, from 395 B.C.

downward to 387 B.C. How they made good the cost, without any

contributory allies, or any foreign support, except what Konon

obtained during one year from Pharnabazus,—we are not informed.

On the revival of the democracy in 403 B.C., the poverty of the

city, both public and private, had been very great, owing to the

long previous war, ending with the loss of all Athenian property

abroad. At a period about three years afterwards, it seems that the

Athenians were in arrears, not merely for the tribute-money which

they then owed to Sparta as her subject allies, but also for debts

due to the Bœotians on account of damage done; that they were too

poor to perform in full the religious sacrifices prescribed for the

year, and were obliged to omit some even of the more ancient; that

the docks as well as the walls were in sad want of repair.[723] Even

the pay to those citizens who attended the public assemblies and

sat as dikasts in the dikasteries,—pay essential to the working of

the democracy,—was restored only by degrees; beginning first at one

obolus, and not restored to three oboli, at which it had stood before

the capture, until after an interval of some years.[724] It was at

this time too that the Theôric Board, or Paymasters for the general

expenses of public worship and sacrifice, was first established; and

when we read how much the Athenians were embarrassed for the means

of celebrating the prescribed sacrifices, there was, probably, great

necessity for the formation of some such office. The disbursements

connected with this object had been effected, before 403 B.C., not

by any special Board, but by the Hellenotamiæ, or treasurers of the

tribute collected from the allies, who were not renewed after 403

B.C. as the Athenian empire had ceased to exist.[725] A portion of

the money disbursed by the Theôric Board for the religious festivals,

was employed in the distribution of two oboli per head, called the

diobely, to all present citizens, and actually received by all,—not

merely by the poor, but by persons in easy circumstances also.[726]

This distribution was made at several festivals, having originally

begun at the Dionysia, for the purpose of enabling the citizens to

obtain places at the theatrical representations in honor of Dionysus;

but we do not know either the number of the festivals, or the amount

of the total sum. It was, in principle, a natural corollary of the

religious idea connected with the festival; not simply because the

comfort and recreation of each citizen, individually taken, was

promoted by his being enabled to attend the festival,—but because the

collective effect of the ceremony, in honoring and propitiating the

god, was believed to depend in part upon a multitudinous attendance

and lively manifestations.[727] Gradually, however, this distribution

of Theôric or festival-money came to be pushed to an abusive and

mischievous excess, which is brought before our notice forty years

afterwards, during the political career of Demosthenes. Until that

time, we have no materials for speaking of it; and what I here notice

is simply the first creation of the Theôric Board.

[723] Lysias, Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomachum, s. 21-30.

I trust this Oration so far as the matter of fact, that in the

preceding year, some ancient sacrifices had been omitted from

state-poverty; but the manner in which the speaker makes this

fact tell against Nikomachus, may or may not be just.

[724] Aristophan. Ecclesias. 300-310.

[725] See the Inscription No. 147, in Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt.

Græcor.—Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, ii, 7, p. 179, 180,

Eng. transl.—and Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc. s. 77, p. 320.

[726] Demosthenes, Philippic. iv, p. 141, s. 43; Demosth. Orat.

xliv, cont. Leocharem, p. 1091, s. 48.

[727] It is common to represent the festivals at Athens as

if they were so many stratagems for feeding poor citizens at

the public expense. But the primitive idea and sentiment of

the Grecian religious festival—the satisfaction to the god

dependent upon multitudinous spectators sympathizing and enjoying

themselves together (ἄμμιγα πάντας)—is much anterior to the

development of democracy at Athens. See the old oracles in

Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 531, s. 66; Homer, Hymn. Apollin.

147; K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstlich. Alterthümer der Griechen,

s. 8.

The means of Athens for prosecuting the war, and for paying her

troops sent as well to Bœotia as to Corinth, must have been derived

mainly from direct assessments on property, called eisphoræ. And

some such assessments we find alluded to generally as having taken

place during these years; though we know no details either as to

frequency or amount.[728] But the restitution of the Long Walls and

of the fortifications of Peiræus by Konon, was an assistance not less

valuable to the finances of Athens than to her political power. That

excellent harbor, commodious as a mercantile centre, and now again

safe for the residence of metics and the importations of merchants,

became speedily a scene of animated commerce, as we have seen it

when surprised by Teleutias. The number of metics, or free resident

non-citizens, became also again large, as it had been before the time

of her reverses, and including a number of miscellaneous non-Hellenic

persons, from Lydia, Phrygia, and Syria.[729] Both the port-duties,

and the value of fixed property at Athens, was thus augmented so as

in part to countervail the costs of war. Nevertheless these costs,

continued from year to year, and combined with the damage done by

Æginetan privateers, were seriously felt, and contributed to dispose

the Athenians to peace.

[728] See such direct assessments on property alluded to in

various speeches of Lysias, Orat. xix. De Bonis Aristoph. s. 31,

45, 63; Orat. xxvii. cont. Epikratem, s. 11; Orat. xxix. cont.

Philokrat. s. 14.

Boeckh (in his Public Econ. of Athens, iv, 4, p. 493, Engl.

transl., which passage stands unaltered in the second edition

of the German original recently published, p. 642) affirms that

a proposition for the assessment of a direct property-tax of

one-fortieth, or two and a half per cent., was made about this

time by a citizen named Euripides, who announced it as intended

to produce five hundred talents; that the proposition was at

first enthusiastically welcomed by the Athenians, and procured

for its author unbounded popularity; but that he was presently

cried down and disgraced, because on farther examination the

measure proved unsatisfactory and empty talk.

Sievers also (Geschichte von Griech. bis zur Schlacht von

Mantineia, pp. 100, 101) adopts the same view as Boeckh, that

this was a real proposition of a property tax of two and a half

per cent., made by Euripides. After having alleged that the

Athenians in these times supplied their treasury by the most

unscrupulous injustice in confiscating the property of rich

citizens,—referring as proof to passages in the orators, none of

which establishes his conclusion,—Sievers goes on to say,—“But

that these violences did not suffice, is shown by the fact that

the people caught with greedy impatience at other measures. Thus

a new scheme of finance, which however was presently discovered

to be insufficient or inapplicable, excited at first the most

extravagant joy.” He adds in a note: “The scheme proceeded from

Euripides; it was a property-tax of two and a half per cent. See

Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. 823; Boeckh, Staatshaush. ii, p. 27.”

In my judgment, the assertion here made by Boeckh and Sievers

rests upon no sufficient ground. The passage of Aristophanes does

not warrant us in concluding anything at all about a proposition

for a property-tax. It is as follows:—

Τὸ δ᾽ ἔναγχος οὐχ ἅπαντες ἡμεῖς ὤμνυμεν

Τάλαντ᾽ ἔσεσθαι πεντακόσια τῇ πόλει

Τῆς τεσσαρακοστῆς, ἣν ἐπόρισ᾽ Εὐριπίδης;

Κεὐθὺς κατεχρύσου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην·

Ὅτε δὴ δ᾽ ἀνασκοπουμένοις ἐφαίνετο

Ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ οὐκ ἤρκεσεν,

Πάλιν κατεπίττου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην.

What this “new financial scheme” (so Sievers properly calls

it) was, which the poet here alludes to,—we have no means of

determining. But I venture to express my decided conviction

that it cannot have been a property-tax. The terms in which it

is described forbid that supposition. It was a scheme which

seemed at first sight exceedingly promising and gainful to

the city, and procured for its author very great popularity;

but which, on farther examination, proved to be mere empty

boasting (ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος) How can this be said about any

motion for a property-tax? That any financier should ever have

gained extraordinary popularity by proposing a property-tax, is

altogether inconceivable. And a proposition to raise the immense

sum of five hundred talents (which Schömann estimates as the

probable aggregate charge of the whole peace-establishment of

Athens, Antiq. Jur. Public. Græc. s. 73, p. 313) at one blow by

an assessment upon property! It would be as much as any financier

could do to bear up against the tremendous _unpopularity_ of such

a proposition; and to induce the assembly even to listen to him,

were the necessity ever so pressing. How odious are propositions

for direct taxation, we may know without recurring to the

specific evidence respecting Athens; but if any man requires such

specific evidence, he may find it abundantly in the Philippics

and Olynthiacs of Demosthenes. On one occasion (De Symmoriis,

Or. xiv. s. 33, p. 185) that orator alludes to a proposition for

raising five hundred talents by direct property-tax as something

extravagant, which the Athenians would not endure to hear

mentioned.

Moreover,—unpopularity apart,—the motion for a property-tax

could scarcely procure credit for a financier, because it is of

all ideas the most simple and obvious. Any man can suggest such a

scheme. But to pass for an acceptable financier, you must propose

some measure which promises gain to the state without such

undisguised pressure upon individuals.

Lastly, there is nothing _delusive_ in a property-tax,—nothing

which looks gainful at first sight, and then turns out on farther

examination (ἀνασκοπουμένοις) to be false or uncertain. It may,

indeed, be more or less evaded; but this can only be known after

it has been assessed, and when payment is actually called for.

Upon these grounds I maintain that the τεσσαρακοστὴ proposed by

Euripides was not a property-tax. What it was I do not pretend

to say; but τεσσαρακοστὴ may have many other meanings; it might

mean a duty of two and a half per cent. upon imports or exports,

or upon the produce of the mines of Laureion; or it might mean

a cheap coinage or base money, something in the nature of the

Chian τεσσαρακοσταί (Thucyd. viii, 100). All that the passage

really teaches us is, that some financial proposition was made by

Euripides which at first seemed likely to be lucrative, but would

not stand an attentive examination. It is not even certain that

Euripides promised a receipt of five hundred talents; this sum is

only given to us as a comic exaggeration of that which foolish

men at first fancied. Boeckh in more than one place reasons

(erroneously, in my judgment) as if this five hundred talents was

a real and trustworthy estimate, and equal to two and a half per

cent. upon the taxable property of the Athenians. He says (iv,

8, p. 520, Engl. transl.) that “Euripides assumed as the basis

of his proposal for levying a property-tax, a taxable capital

of twenty thousand talents,”—and that “his proposition of

one-fortieth was _calculated_ to produce five hundred talents.”

No such conclusion can be fairly drawn from Aristophanes.

Again, Boeckh infers from another passage in the same play

of the same author, that a small direct property-tax of one

five-hundredth part had been recently imposed. After a speech

from one of the old women, calling upon a young man to follow

her, he replies (v. 1006):—

Ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μοὔστίν, εἰ μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν

Τὴν πεντακοσιόστην κατέθηκας τῇ πόλει.

Boeckh himself admits (iv, 8, p. 520) that this passage is

very obscure, and so I think every one will find it. Tyrwhitt

was so perplexed by it that he altered ἐμῶν into ἐτῶν. Without

presuming to assign the meaning of the passage, I merely contend

that it cannot be held to justify the affirmation, as a matter

of historical fact, that a property-tax of one-five-hundredth

had been levied at Athens, shortly before the representation of

Ekklesiazusæ.

I cannot refrain here from noticing another inference drawn by

Sievers from a third passage in this same play,—the Ekklesiazusæ

(Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende des Pelop. Kriegs bis zur

Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 101.) He says,—“How melancholy is the

picture of Athenian popular life, which is presented to us by the

Ekklesiazusæ and the second Plutus, ten or twelve years after the

restoration of the democracy! What an _impressive seriousness_

(welch ein erschütternder Ernst) is expressed in the speech of

Praxagora!” (v. 174 _seqq._).

I confess that I find neither seriousness, nor genuine and

trustworthy coloring, in this speech of Praxagora. It was a

comic case made out for the purpose of showing that the women

were more fit to govern Athens than the men, and setting forth

the alleged follies of the men in terms of broad and general

disparagement. The whole play is, throughout, thorough farce

and full of Aristophanic humor. And it is surely preposterous

to treat what is put into the mouth of Praxagora, the leading

feminine character, as if it were historical evidence as to the

actual condition or management of Athens. Let any one follow the

speech of Praxagora into the proposition of reform which she is

made to submit, and he will then see the absurdity of citing

her discourse as if it were an harangue in Thucydides. History

is indeed strangely transformed by thus turning comic wit into

serious matter of evidence; and no history has suffered so much

from the proceeding as that of Athens.

[729] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 1, 19-24: compare vii, 1, 3, 4; Xenoph.

De Vectigalibus, chapters i, ii, iii, etc.; Xenoph. De Repub.

Athen. i, 17.

In the Hellespont also, their prospects were not only on the decline,

but had become seriously menacing. After going from Ægina to Ephesus

in the preceding year, and sending back Gorgôpas with the Æginetan

squadron, Antalkidas had placed the remainder of his fleet under his

secretary, Nikolochus, with orders to proceed to the Hellespont for

the relief of Abydos. He himself landed, and repaired to Tiribazus,

by whom he was conducted up to the court of Susa. Here he renewed

the propositions for the pacification of Greece,—on principles of

universal autonomy, abandoning all the Asiatic Greeks as subject

absolutely to the Persian king,—which he had tried in vain to carry

through two years before. Though the Spartans generally were odious

to Artaxerxes, Antalkidas behaved with so much dexterity[730] as to

gain the royal favor personally, while all the influence of Tiribazus

was employed to second his political views. At length they succeeded

in prevailing upon the king formally to adopt the peace, and to

proclaim war against any Greeks who should refuse to accede to it,

empowering the Spartans to enforce it everywhere as his allies and

under his sanction. In order to remove one who would have proved a

great impediment to this measure, the king was farther induced to

invite the satrap Pharnabazus up to court, and to honor him with his

daughter in marriage; leaving the satrapy of Daskylium under the

temporary administration of Ariobarzanes, a personal friend and guest

of Antalkidas.[731] Thus armed against all contingencies, Antalkidas

and Tiribazus returned from Susa to the coast of Asia Minor in the

spring of 387 B.C., not only bearing the formal diploma ratified by

the king’s seal, but commanding ample means to carry it into effect;

since, in addition to the full forces of Persia, twenty additional

triremes were on their way from Syracuse and the Greco-Italian towns,

sent by the despot Dionysius to the aid of the Lacedæmonians.[732]

[730] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

[731] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28.

[732] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 25-27.

On reaching the coast, Antalkidas found Nikolochus with his fleet

of twenty-five sail blocked up in Abydos by the Athenians under

Iphikrates; who with thirty-two sail were occupying the European side

of the Hellespont. He immediately repaired to Abydos by land, and

took an early opportunity of stealing out by night with his fleet

up the strait towards the Propontis; spreading the rumor that he

was about to attack Chalkêdon, in concert with a party in the town.

But he stopped at Perkôtê, and lay hid in that harbor until he saw

the Athenian fleet (which had gone in pursuit of him upon the false

scent laid out) pass by towards Prokonnêsus. The strait being now

clear, Antalkidas sailed down it again to meet the Syracusan and

Italian ships, whom he safely joined. Such junction, with a view to

which his recent manœuvre had been devised, rendered him more than a

match for his enemies. He had further the good fortune to capture a

detached Athenian squadron of eight triremes, which Thrasybulus (a

second Athenian citizen of that name) was conducting from Thrace to

join the main Athenian fleet in the Hellespont. Lastly, additional

reinforcements also reached Antalkidas from the zealous aid of

Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes, insomuch that he found himself at the

head of no less than eighty triremes, besides a still greater number

which were under preparation in the various ports of Ionia.[733]

[733] Diodor. xv, 2. These triremes were employed in the ensuing

year for the prosecution of the war against Evagoras.

Such a fleet, the greatest which had been seen in the Hellespont

since the battle of Ægospotami, was so much superior to anything

which could be brought to meet it, and indicated so strongly the

full force of Persia operating in the interests of Sparta,—that the

Athenians began to fear a repetition of the same calamitous suffering

which they had already undergone from Lysander. A portion of such

hardship they at once began to taste. Not a single merchant-ship

reached them from the Euxine, all being seized and detained by

Antalkidas; so that their main supply of imported corn was thus cut

off. Moreover, in the present encouraging state of affairs, the

Æginetan privateers became doubly active in harassing the coasting

trade of Attica; and this combination, of actual hardship with

prospective alarm, created a paramount anxiety at Athens to terminate

the war. Without Athens, the other allies would have no chance of

success through their own forces; while the Argeians also, hitherto

the most obstinate, had become on their own account desirous of

peace, being afraid of repeated Lacedæmonian invasions of their

territory. That Sparta should press for a peace, when the terms of it

were suggested by herself, is not wonderful. Even to her, triumphant

as her position now seemed, the war was a heavy burden.[734]

[734] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28, 29.

Such was the general state of feeling in the Grecian world, when

Tiribazus summoned the contending parties into his presence, probably

at Sardis, to hear the terms of the convention which had just come

down from Susa. He produced the original edict, and having first

publicly exhibited the regal seal, read aloud as follows:—

“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the

islands of Klazomenæ and Cyprus, shall belong to him. He thinks it

just also, to leave all the other Hellenic cities autonomous, both

small and great,—except Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which are to

belong to Athens, as they did originally. Should any parties refuse

to accept this peace, I will make war upon them, along with those who

are of the same mind, by land as well as by sea, with ships and with

money.”[735]

[735] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 31.

In this document there is the same introduction of the first

person immediately following the third, as in the correspondence

between Pausanias and Xerxes (Thucyd. i, 128, 129).

Instructions were given to all the deputies to report the terms of

this edict to their respective cities, and to meet again at Sparta

for acceptance or rejection. When the time of meeting arrived,[736]

all the cities, in spite of their repugnance to the abandonment

of the Asiatic Greeks, and partly also to the second condition,

nevertheless felt themselves overruled by superior force, and gave

a reluctant consent. On taking the oaths, however, the Thebans

tried indirectly to make good an exception in their own case, by

claiming to take the oath not only on behalf of themselves, but on

behalf of the Bœotian cities generally; a demand which Agesilaus in

the name of Sparta repudiated, as virtually cancelling that item

in the pacification whereby the small cities were pronounced to be

autonomous as well as the great. When the Theban deputy replied that

he could not relinquish his claim without fresh instructions from

home, Agesilaus desired him to go at once and consult his countrymen.

“You may tell them (said he) that if they do not comply, they will be

shut out from the treaty.”

[736] Diodor. xiv, 110.

It was with much delight that Agesilaus pronounced this peremptory

sentence, which placed Thebes in so humiliating a dilemma. Antipathy

towards the Thebans was one of his strongest sentiments, and he

exulted in the hope that they would persist in their refusal so

that he would thus be enabled to bring an overwhelming force to

crush their isolated city. So eagerly did he thirst for the expected

triumph, that immediately on the departure of the Theban deputies,

and before their answer could possibly have been obtained, he

procured the consent of the ephors, offered the border-sacrifice,

and led the Spartan force out as far as Tegea. From that city he not

only despatched messengers in all directions to hasten the arrival of

the Periœki, but also sent forth the officers called xenâgi to the

cities of the Peloponnesian allies, to muster and bring together the

respective contingents. But in spite of all injunctions to despatch,

his wishes were disappointed. Before he started from Tegea, the

Theban deputies returned with the intimation that they were prepared

to take the oath for Thebes alone, recognizing the other Bœotian

cities as autonomous. Agesilaus and the Spartans were thus obliged

to be satisfied with the minor triumph, in itself very serious and

considerable, of having degraded Thebes from her federal headship,

and isolated her from the Bœotian cities.[737]

[737] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 32, 33.

The unmeasured and impatient miso-Theban bitterness of Agesilaus,

attested here by his friend and panegyrist, deserves especial notice;

for it will be found to explain much of the misconduct of Sparta and

her officers during the ensuing years.

There yet remained one compliance for Agesilaus to exact. The Argeian

auxiliaries were not yet withdrawn from Corinth; and the Corinthian

government might probably think that the terms of the peace, leaving

their city autonomous, permitted them to retain or dismiss these

auxiliaries at their own discretion. But it was not so that Agesilaus

construed the peace; and his construction, right or wrong, was backed

by the power of enforcement. He sent to inform both Argeians and

Corinthians, that if the auxiliaries were not withdrawn, he would

march his army forthwith into both territories. No resistance could

be offered to his peremptory mandate. The Argeians retired from

Corinth; and the vehement philo-Argeian Corinthians,—especially

those who had been concerned in the massacre at the festival of the

Eukleia,—retired at the same time into voluntary exile, thinking

themselves no longer safe in the town. They found a home partly

at Argos, partly at Athens,[738] where they were most hospitably

received. Those Corinthians who had before been in exile, and who,

in concert with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Lechæum and Sikyon,

had been engaged in bitter hostility against their countrymen in

Corinth,—were immediately readmitted into the city. According to

Xenophon, their readmission was pronounced by the spontaneous voice

of the Corinthian citizens.[739] But we shall be more correct in

affirming, that it was procured by the same intimidating summons from

Agesilaus which had extorted the dismissal of the Argeians.[740]

The restoration of the exiles from Lechæum on the present occasion

was no more voluntary than that of the Athenian exiles had been

eighteen years before, at the Peloponnesian war,—or than that of the

Phliasian exiles was, two or three years afterwards.[741]

[738] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 13, p.

473.

[739] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34. Οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πολῖται ἕκοντες

κατεδέχοντο τοὺς πρόσθεν φεύγοντας.

[740] Such is in fact the version of the story in Xenophon’s

Encomium upon Agesilaus (ii, 21), where it is made a matter of

honor to the latter, that he would not consent to peace, except

with a compulsory clause (ἠνάγκασε) that the Corinthian and

Theban exiles should be restored. The Corinthian exiles had been

actively coöperating with Agesilaus against Corinth. Of Theban

exiles we have heard nothing; but it is very probable that there

were several serving with Agesilaus,—and also pretty certain

that he would insist upon their restoration.

[741] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 8.