surrender of Athens. After the capture of Samos, he came home in
triumph, in the autumn of 404 B.C. (Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9). He
was at home, or serving in Attica, in the beginning of 403 B.C.
(Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30).
Now when Lysander came home at the end of 404 B.C., it was his
triumphant return; it was not a recall provoked by complaints of
Pharnabazus. Yet there can have been no other return before the
restoration of the democracy at Athens.
The recall of Lysander must have been the termination, not of
this command, but of a subsequent command. Moreover, it seems
to me necessary, in order to make room for the facts stated
respecting Lysander as well as about the dekarchies, that we
should suppose him to have been again sent out (after his quarrel
with Pausanias in Attica) in 403 B.C., to command in Asia. This
is nowhere positively stated, but I find nothing to contradict
it, and I see no other way of making room for the facts stated
about Lysander.
It is to be noted that Diodorus has a decided error in chronology
as to the date of the restoration of the Athenian democracy. He
places it in 401 B.C. (Diod. xiv, 33), two years later than its
real date, which is 403 B.C.; thus lengthening by two years the
interval between the surrender of Athens and the reëstablishment
of the democracy. Plutarch also seems to have conceived that
interval as much longer than it really was.
[350] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25.
[351] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.
The position of the Asiatic Greeks, along the coast of Ionia, Æolis,
and the Hellespont, became very peculiar after the triumph of Sparta
at Ægospotami. I have already recounted how, immediately after the
great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the Persian king had
renewed his grasp upon those cities, from which the vigorous hand of
Athens had kept him excluded for more than fifty years; how Sparta,
bidding for his aid, had consented by three formal conventions to
surrender them to him, while her commissioner Lichas even reproved
the Milesians for their aversion to this bargain; how Athens also,
in the days of her weakness, competing for the same advantage, had
expressed her willingness to pay the same price for it.[352] After
the battle of Ægospotami, this convention was carried into effect;
though seemingly not without disputes between the satrap Pharnabazus
on one side, and Lysander and Derkyllidas on the other.[353] The
latter was Lacedæmonian harmost at Abydos, which town, so important
as a station on the Hellespont, the Lacedæmonians seem still to have
retained. But Pharnabazus and his subordinates acquired more complete
command of the Hellespontine Æolis and of the Troad, than ever they
had enjoyed before, both along the coast and in the interior.[354]
[352] Thucyd. viii, 5, 18-37, 56-58, 84.
[353] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 19, 20; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9.
[354] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.
Another element, however, soon became operative. The condition of
the Greek cities on the coast of Ionia, though according to Persian
regulations they belonged to the satrapy of Tissaphernes, was now
materially determined,—first, by the competing claims of Cyrus, who
wished to take them away from him, and tried to get such transfer
ordered at court,—next, by the aspirations of that young prince to
the Persian throne. As Cyrus rested his hope of success on Grecian
coöperation, it was highly important to him to render himself
popular among the Greeks, especially on his own side of the Ægean.
Partly his own manifestations of just and conciliatory temper,
partly the bad name and known perfidy of Tissaphernes, induced the
Grecian cities with one accord to revolt from the latter. All threw
themselves into the arms of Cyrus, except Miletus, where Tissaphernes
interposed in time, slew the leaders of the intended revolt, and
banished many of their partisans. Cyrus, receiving the exiles with
distinguished favor, levied an army to besiege Miletus and procure
their restoration; while he at the same time threw strong Grecian
garrisons into the other cities to protect them against attack.[355]
[355] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 8.
This local quarrel was, however, soon merged in the more
comprehensive dispute respecting the Persian succession. Both parties
were found on the field of Kunaxa; Cyrus with the Greek soldiers
and Milesian exiles on one side,—Tissaphernes on the other. How
that attempt, upon which so much hinged in the future history both
of Asia Minor and of Greece, terminated, I have already recounted.
Probably the impression brought back by the Lacedæmonian fleet which
left Cyrus on the coast of Syria, after he had surmounted the most
difficult country without any resistance, was highly favorable to
his success. So much the more painful would be the disappointment
among the Ionian Greeks when the news of his death was afterwards
brought; so much the greater their alarm, when Tissaphernes, having
relinquished the pursuit of the Ten Thousand Greeks at the moment
when they entered the mountains of Karduchia, came down as victor to
the seaboard; more powerful than ever,—rewarded[356] by the Great
King, for the services which he had rendered against Cyrus, with
all the territory which had been governed by the latter, as well
as with the title of commander-in-chief over all the neighboring
satraps,—and prepared not only to reconquer, but to punish, the
revolted maritime cities. He began by attacking Kymê;[357] ravaging
the territory, with great loss to the citizens, and exacting from
them a still larger contribution, when the approach of winter
rendered it inconvenient to besiege their city.
[356] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 19; ii, 4, 8; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3;
iii, 3, 13.
[357] Diodor. xiv, 35.
In such a state of apprehension, these cities sent to Sparta, as the
great imperial power of Greece, to entreat her protection against
the aggravated slavery impending over them.[358] The Lacedæmonians
had nothing farther to expect from the king of Persia, with whom
they had already broken the peace by lending aid to Cyrus. Moreover,
the fame of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were now coming home along
the Euxine towards Byzantium, had become diffused throughout Greece,
inspiring signal contempt for Persian military efficiency, and hopes
of enrichment by war against the Asiatic satraps. Accordingly, the
Spartan ephors were induced to comply with the petition of their
Asiatic countrymen, and to send over to Asia Thimbron at the head
of a considerable force: two thousand Neodamodes (or Helots who had
been enfranchised) and four thousand Peloponnesians heavy-armed,
accompanied by three hundred Athenian horsemen, out of the number of
those who had been adherents of the Thirty, four years before; an
aid granted by Athens at the special request of Thimbron. Arriving
in Asia during the winter of 400-399 B.C., Thimbron was reinforced
in the spring of 399 B.C. by the Cyreian army, who were brought
across from Thrace as described in my last chapter, and taken into
Lacedæmonian pay. With this large force he became more than a
match for the satraps, even on the plains where they could employ
their numerous cavalry. The petty Grecian princes of Pergamus and
Teuthrania, holding that territory by ancient grants from Xerxes to
their ancestors, joined their troops to his, contributing much to
enrich Xenophon at the moment of his departure from the Cyreians.
Yet Thimbron achieved nothing worthy of so large an army. He not
only miscarried in the siege of Larissa, but was even unable to
maintain order among his own soldiers, who pillaged indiscriminately
both friends and foes.[359] Such loud complaints were transmitted to
Sparta of his irregularities and inefficiency, that the ephors first
sent him order to march into Karia, where Tissaphernes resided,—and
next, before that order was executed, despatched Derkyllidas to
supersede him; seemingly in the winter 399-398 B.C. Thimbron on
returning to Sparta was fined and banished.[360]
[358] Diodor. _ut sup._
[359] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5-8; Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 8-16.
[360] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Diodor. xiv, 38.
It is highly probable that the Cyreian soldiers, though excellent in
the field, yet having been disappointed of reward for the prodigious
toils which they had gone through in their long march, and having
been kept on short allowance in Thrace, as well as cheated by
Seuthes,—were greedy, unscrupulous, and hard to be restrained, in
the matter of pillage; especially as Xenophon, their most influential
general, had now left them. Their conduct greatly improved under
Derkyllidas. And though such improvement was doubtless owing partly
to the superiority of the latter over Thimbron, yet it seems also
partly ascribable to the fact that Xenophon, after a few months of
residence at Athens, accompanied him to Asia, and resumed the command
of his old comrades.[361]
[361] There is no positive testimony to this; yet such is my
belief, as I have stated at the close of the last chapter. It
is certain that Xenophon was serving under Agesilaus in Asia
three years after this time; the only matter left for conjecture
is, at what precise moment he went out the second time. The
marked improvement in the Cyreian soldiers, is one reason for
the statement in the text; another reason is, the great detail
with which the military operations of Derkyllidas are described,
rendering it probable that the narrative is from an eye-witness.
Derkyllidas was a man of so much resource and cunning, as to have
acquired the surname of Sisyphus.[362] He had served throughout all
the concluding years of the war, and had been harmost at Abydus
during the naval command of Lysander, who condemned him, on the
complaint of Pharnabazus, to the disgrace of public exposure with
his shield on his arm;[363] this was (I presume) a disgrace, because
an officer of rank always had his shield carried for him by an
attendant, except in the actual encounter of battle. Having never
forgiven Pharnabazus for thus dishonoring him, Derkyllidas now took
advantage of a misunderstanding between that satrap and Tissaphernes,
to make a truce with the latter, and conduct his army, eight thousand
strong, into the territory of the former.[364] The mountainous region
of Ida generally known as the Troad,—inhabited by a population
of Æolic Greeks (who had gradually Hellenized the indigenous
inhabitants), and therefore known as the Æolis of Pharnabazus,—was
laid open to him by a recent event, important in itself as well as
instructive to read.
[362] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Ephorus, ap. Athenæ. xi, p. 500.
[363] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9. ἐστάθη τὴν ἀσπίδα ἔχων.
[364] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10; iii, 2, 28.
The entire Persian empire was parcelled into so many satrapies;
each satrap being bound to send a fixed amount of annual tribute,
and to hold a certain amount of military force ready, for the court
at Susa. Provided he was punctual in fulfilling these obligations,
little inquiry was made as to his other proceedings, unless in the
rare case of his maltreating some individual Persian of high rank. In
like manner, it appears, each satrapy was divided into sub-satrapies
or districts; each of these held by a deputy, who paid to the
satrap a fixed tribute and maintained for him a certain military
force,—having liberty to govern in other respects as he pleased.
Besides the tribute, however, presents of undefined amount were of
constant occurrence, both from the satrap to the king, and from the
deputy to the satrap. Nevertheless, enough was extorted from the
people (we need hardly add), to leave an ample profit both to the one
and to the other.[365]
[365] See the description of the satrapy of Cyrus (Xenoph. Anab.
i, 9, 19, 21, 22). In the main, this division and subdivision of
the entire empire into revenue-districts, each held by a nominee
responsible for payment of the rent or tribute, to the government
or to some higher officer of the government—is the system
prevalent throughout a large portion of Asia to the present day.
This region, called Æolis, had been entrusted by Pharnabazus to a
native of Dardanus named Zênis, who, after holding the post for some
time and giving full satisfaction, died of illness, leaving a widow
with a son and daughter still minors. The satrap was on the point
of giving the district to another person, when Mania, the widow of
Zênis, herself a native of Dardanus, preferred her petition to be
allowed to succeed her husband. Visiting Pharnabazus with money
in hand, sufficient not only to satisfy himself, but also to gain
over his mistresses and his ministers,[366]—she said to him,—“My
husband was faithful to you, and paid his tribute so regularly as to
obtain your thanks. If I serve you no worse than he, why should you
name any other deputy? If I fail in giving you satisfaction, you can
always remove me, and give the place to another.” Pharnabazus granted
her petition, and had no cause to repent it. Mania was regular in
her payment of tribute,—frequent in bringing him presents,—and
splendid, beyond any of his other deputies, in her manner of
receiving him whenever he visited the district.
[366] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10. Ἀναζεύξασα τὸν στόλον, καὶ χρήματα
λαβοῦσα, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ Φαρναβάζῳ δοῦναι, καὶ ταῖς παλλακίσιν
αὐτοῦ χαρίσασθαι καὶ τοῖς δυναμένοις μάλιστα παρὰ Φαρναβάζῳ,
ἐπορεύετο.
Her chief residence was at Skêpsis, Gergis, and Kebrên,—inland
towns, strong both by position and by fortification, amidst the
mountainous region once belonging to the Teukri Gergithes. It was
here too that she kept her treasures, which, partly left by her
husband, partly accumulated by herself, had gradually reached an
enormous sum. But her district also reached down to the coast,
comprising among other towns the classical name of Ilium, and
probably her own native city, the neighboring Dardanus. She
maintained, besides, a large military force of Grecian mercenaries
in regular pay and excellent condition, which she employed both
as garrison for each of her dependent towns, and as means for
conquest in the neighborhood. She had thus reduced the maritime
towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, in the southern part of
the Troad; commanding her troops in person, sitting in her chariot
to witness the attack, and rewarding every one who distinguished
himself. Moreover, when Pharnabazus undertook an expedition against
the predatory Mysians or Pisidians, she accompanied him, and her
military force formed so much the best part of his army, that he
paid her the highest compliments, and sometimes condescended to ask
her advice.[367] So, when Xerxes invaded Greece, Artemisia, queen of
Halikarnassus, not only furnished ships among the best appointed in
his fleet, and fought bravely at Salamis, but also, when he chose to
call a council, stood alone, in daring to give him sound opinions
contrary to his own leanings; opinions which, fortunately for the
Grecian world, he could bring himself only to tolerate, not to
follow.[368]
[367] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 15.
[368] Herod. viii, 69.
Under an energetic woman like Mania, thus victorious and
well-provided, Æolis was the most defensible part of the satrapy of
Pharnabazus, and might probably have defied Derkyllidas, had not a
domestic traitor put an end to her life. Her son-in-law, Meidias,
a Greek of Skêpsis, with whom she lived on terms of intimate
confidence—“though she was scrupulously mistrustful of every one
else, as it is proper for a despot to be,”[369]—was so inflamed by
his own ambition and by the suggestions of evil counsellors, who
told him it was a shame that a woman should thus be ruler while
he was only a private man, that he strangled her in her chamber.
Following up his nefarious scheme, he also assassinated her son, a
beautiful youth of seventeen. He succeeded in getting possession of
the three strongest places in the district, Kebrên, Skêpsis, and
Gergis, together with the accumulated treasure of Mania; but the
commanders in the other towns refused obedience to his summons, until
they should receive orders from Pharnabazus. To that satrap Meidias
instantly sent envoys, bearing ample presents, with a petition that
the satrap would grant to him the district which had been enjoyed by
Mania. Pharnabazus, repudiating the presents, sent an indignant reply
to Meidias,—“Keep them until I come to seize them, and seize you,
too, along with them. I would not consent to live, if I were not to
avenge the death of Mania.”[370]
[369] Such is the emphatic language of Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 1,
14)—Μειδίας, θυγατρὸς ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς ὢν, ἀναπτερωθεὶς ὑπό τινων, ὡς
αἰσχρὸν εἴη, γυναῖκα μὲν ἄρχειν, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἰδιώτην εἶναι, ~τοὺς
μὲν ἄλλους μάλα φυλαττομένης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τυραννίδι προσήκει~,
ἐκείνῳ δὲ πιστευούσης καὶ ἀσπαζομένης, ὥσπερ ἂν γυνὴ γαμβρὸν
ἀσπάζοιτο,—εἰσελθὼν ἀποπνῖξαι αὐτὴν λέγεται.
For the illustration of this habitual insecurity in which the
Grecian despot lived, see the dialogue of Xenophon called
Hieron (i, 12; ii, 8-10; vii, 10). He particularly dwells upon
the multitude of family crimes which stained the houses of the
Grecian despots; murders by fathers, sons, brothers, wives, etc.
(iii, 8).
[370] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.
At that critical moment, prior to the coming of the satrap,
Derkyllidas presented himself with his army, and found Æolis
almost defenceless. The three recent conquests of Mania,—Larissa,
Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, surrendered to him as soon as he appeared;
while the garrisons of Ilium and some other places, who had taken
special service under Mania, and found themselves worse off now
that they had lost her, accepted his invitation to renounce Persian
dependence, declare themselves allies of Sparta, and hold their
cities for him. He thus became master of most part of the district,
with the exception of Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis, which he was
anxious to secure before the arrival of Pharnabazus. On arriving
before Kebrên, however, in spite of this necessity for haste, he
remained inactive for four days,[371] because the sacrifices were
unpropitious; while a rash, subordinate officer, hazarding an
unwarranted attack during this interval, was repulsed and wounded.
The sacrifices at length became favorable, and Derkyllidas was
rewarded for his patience. The garrison, affected by the example
of those at Ilium and the other towns, disobeyed their commander,
who tried to earn the satrap’s favor by holding out and assuring to
him this very strong place. Sending out heralds to proclaim that
they would go with Greeks and not with Persians, they admitted the
Lacedæmonians at once within the gates. Having thus fortunately
captured, and duly secured this important town, Derkyllidas marched
against Skêpsis and Gergis, the former of which was held by Meidias
himself; who, dreading the arrival of Pharnabazus, and mistrusting
the citizens within, thought it best to open negotiations with
Derkyllidas. He sent to solicit a conference, demanding hostages
for his safety. When he came forth from the town, and demanded from
the Lacedæmonian commander on what terms alliance would be granted
to him, the latter replied,—“On condition that the citizens shall
be left free and autonomous;” at the same time marching on, without
waiting either for acquiescence or refusal, straight up to the
gates of the town. Meidias, taken by surprise, in the power of the
assailants, and aware that the citizens were unfriendly to him, was
obliged to give orders that the gates should be opened; so that
Derkyllidas found himself by this manœuvre in possession of the
strongest place in the district without either loss or delay,—to the
great delight of the Skepsians themselves.[372]
[371] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 18; Diodor. xiv, 38.
The reader will remark here how Xenophon shapes the narrative
in such a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a general of
obeying the warnings furnished by the sacrifice,—either for
action or for inaction. I have already noticed (in my preceding
chapters) how often he does this in the Anabasis.
Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in
Thucydides.
[372] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 20-23.
Derkyllidas, having ascended the acropolis of Skêpsis to offer a
sacrifice of thanks to Athênê, the great patron goddess of Ilium
and most of the Teukrian towns,—caused the garrison of Meidias
to evacuate the town forthwith, and consigned it to the citizens
themselves, exhorting them to conduct their political affairs as
became Greeks and freemen. This proceeding, which reminds us of
Brasidas in contrast with Lysander, was not less politic than
generous; since Derkyllidas could hardly hope to hold an inland
town in the midst of the Persian satrapy except by the attachments
of the citizens themselves. He then marched away to Gergis, still
conducting along with him Meidias, who urgently entreated to be
allowed to retain that town, the last of his remaining fortresses.
Without giving any decided answer, Derkyllidas took him by his
side, and marched with him at the head of his army, arrayed only in
double file, so as to carry the appearance of peace, to the foot
of the lofty towers of Gergis. The garrison on the walls, seeing
Meidias along with him, allowed him to approach without discharging
a single missile. “Now, Meidias (said he), order the gates to be
opened, and show me the way in, to the temple of Athênê, in order
that I may there offer sacrifice.” Again Meidias was forced, from
fear of being at once seized as a prisoner, to give the order; and
the Lacedæmonian forces found themselves in possession of the town.
Derkyllidas, distributing his troops around the walls, in order to
make sure of his conquest, ascended to the acropolis to offer his
intended sacrifice; after which he proceeded to dictate the fate
of Meidias, whom he divested of his character of prince and of his
military force,—incorporating the latter in the Lacedæmonian army.
He then called upon Meidias to specify all his paternal property,
and restored to him the whole of what he claimed as such, though the
bystanders protested against the statement given in as a flagrant
exaggeration. But he laid hands on all the property, and all the
treasures of Mania,—and caused her house, which Meidias had taken
for himself, to be put under seal,—as lawful prey; since Mania had
belonged to Pharnabazus,[373] against whom the Lacedæmonians were
making war. On coming out after examining and verifying the contents
of the house, he said to his officers, “Now, my friends, we have here
already worked out pay for the whole army, eight thousand men, for
nearly a year. Whatever we acquire besides, shall come to you also.”
He well knew the favorable effect which this intelligence would
produce upon the temper, as well as upon the discipline, of the
army—especially upon the Cyreians, who had tasted the discomfort of
irregular pay and poverty.
[373] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 26. Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, Μανία δὲ τίνος ἦν;
Οἱ δὲ πάντες εἶπον, ὅτι Φαρναβάζου. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνης, ἔφη,
Φαρναβάζου; Μάλιστα, ἔφασαν. Ἡμέτερ᾽ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ κρατοῦμεν·
πολέμιος γὰρ ἡμῖν Φαρνάβαζος.
Two points are remarkable here. 1. The manner in which Mania,
the administratrix of a large district, with a prodigious
treasure and a large army in pay, is treated as _belonging_ to
Pharnabazus—as the servant or slave of Pharnabazus. 2. The
distinction here taken between public property and private
property, in reference to the laws of war and the rights of the
conqueror. Derkyllidas lays claim to that which had belonged to
Mania (or to Pharnabazus); but _not_ to that which had belonged
to Meidias.
According to the modern rules of international law, this
distinction is one allowed and respected, everywhere except
at sea. But in the ancient world, it by no means stood out so
clearly or prominently; and the observance of it here deserves
notice.
“And where am I to live?” asked Meidias, who found himself turned
out of the house of Mania. “In your rightful place of abode, to be
sure (replied Derkyllidas); in your native town Skêpsis, and in
your paternal house.[374]” What became of the assassin afterwards,
we do not hear. But it is satisfactory to find that he did not reap
the anticipated reward of his crime; the fruits of which were an
important advantage to Derkyllidas and his army,—and a still more
important blessing to the Greek cities which had been governed by
Mania,—enfranchisement and autonomy.
[374] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 28.
Thus finishes the interesting narrative about Mania, Meidias, and
Derkyllidas. The abundance of detail, and the dramatic manner, in
which Xenophon has worked it out, impress me with a belief that
he was actually present at the scene.
This rapid, easy, and skilfully managed exploit,—the capture of nine
towns in eight days,—is all which Xenophon mentions as achieved
by Derkyllidas during the summer. Having acquired pay for so many
months, perhaps the soldiers may have been disposed to rest until
it was spent. But as winter approached, it became necessary to find
winter quarters, without incurring the reproach which had fallen upon
Thimbron of consuming the substance of allies. Fearing, however, that
if he changed his position, Pharnabazus would employ the numerous
Persian cavalry to harass the Grecian cities, he tendered a truce,
which the latter willingly accepted. For the occupation of Æolis by
the Lacedæmonian general was a sort of watch-post (like Dekeleia to
Athens,) exposing the whole of Phrygia near the Propontis (in which
was Daskylium the residence of Pharnabazus) to constant attack.[375]
Derkyllidas accordingly only marched through Phrygia, to take up his
winter quarters in Bithynia, the north-western corner of Asia Minor,
between the Propontis and the Euxine; the same territory through
which Xenophon and the Ten Thousand had marched, on their road from
Kalpê to Chalkêdon. He procured abundant provisions and booty,
slaves as well as cattle, by plundering the Bithynian villages; not
without occasional losses on his own side, by the carelessness of
marauding parties.[376]
[375] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 1. νομίζων τὴν Αἰολίδα ἐπιτετειχίσθαι
τῇ ἑαυτοῦ οἰκήσει Φρυγίᾳ.
The word ἐπιτειχίζειν is capital and significant, in Grecian
warfare.
[376] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 2-5.
One of these losses was of considerable magnitude. Derkyllidas had
obtained from Seuthes in European Thrace (the same prince of whom
Xenophon had so much reason to complain) a reinforcement of three
hundred cavalry and two hundred peltasts,—Odrysian Thracians. These
Odrysians established themselves in a separate camp, nearly two miles
and a half from Derkyllidas, which they surrounded with a palisade
about man’s height. Being indefatigable plunderers, they prevailed
upon Derkyllidas to send them a guard of two hundred hoplites,
for the purpose of guarding their separate camp with the booty
accumulated within it. Presently the camp became richly stocked,
especially with Bithynian captives. The hostile Bithynians, however,
watching their opportunity when the Odrysians were out marauding,
suddenly attacked at daybreak the two hundred Grecian hoplites in
the camp. Shooting at them over the palisade with darts and arrows,
they killed and wounded some, while the Greeks with their spears
were utterly helpless, and could only reach their enemies by pulling
up the palisade and charging out upon them; but the light-armed
assailants, easily evading the charge of warriors with shield and
spear, turned round upon them when they began to retire, and slew
several before they could get back. In each successive sally the same
phenomena recurred, until at length all the Greeks were overpowered
and slain, except fifteen of them, who charged through the Bithynians
in the first sally, and marched onward to join Derkyllidas, instead
of returning with their comrades to the palisade. Derkyllidas lost no
time in sending a reinforcement, which, however, came too late, and
found only the naked bodies of the slain. The victorious Bithynians
carried away all their own captives.[377]
[377] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 4.
At the beginning of spring the Spartan general returned to Lampsakus,
where he found Arakus and two other Spartans, just arrived out as
commissioners sent by the ephors. Arakus came with instructions to
prolong the command of Derkyllidas for another year; as well as to
communicate the satisfaction of the ephors with the Cyreian army,
in consequence of the great improvement in their conduct, compared
with the year of Thimbron. He accordingly assembled the soldiers,
and addressed them in a mingled strain of praise and admonition;
expressing his hope that they would continue the forbearance which
they had now begun to practise towards all Asiatic allies. The
commander of the Cyreians (probably Xenophon himself), in his reply,
availed himself of the occasion to pay a compliment to Derkyllidas.
“We (said he) are the same men now as we were in the previous year;
but we are under a different general; you need not look farther
for the explanation.[378]” Without denying the superiority of
Derkyllidas over his predecessor, we may remark that the abundant
wealth of Mania, thrown into his hands by accident (though he showed
great ability in turning the accident to account), was an auxiliary
circumstance, not less unexpected than weighty, for ensuring the good
behavior of the soldiers.
[378] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 6, 7.
Morus supposes (I think, with much probability) that ὁ τῶν
Κυρείων προεστηκὼς here means Xenophon himself.
_He_ could not with propriety advert to the fact that he himself
had not been with the army during the year of Thimbron.
It was among the farther instructions of Arakus to visit all the
principal Asiatic Greeks, and report their condition at Sparta;
and Derkyllidas was pleased to see them entering on this survey
at a moment when they would find the cities in undisturbed peace
and tranquillity.[379] So long as the truce continued both with
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, these cities were secure from
aggression, and paid no tribute; the land-force of Derkyllidas
affording to them a protection[380] analogous to that which had
been conferred by Athens and her powerful fleet, during the interval
between the formation of the Confederacy of Delos and the Athenian
catastrophe at Syracuse. At the same time, during the truce, the
army had neither occupation nor subsistence. To keep it together and
near at hand, yet without living at the cost of friends, was the
problem. It was accordingly with great satisfaction that Derkyllidas
noticed an intimation accidentally dropped by Arakus. Some envoys
(the latter said) were now at Sparta from the Thracian Chersonesus
(the long tongue of land bordering westward on the Hellespont),
soliciting aid against their marauding Thracian neighbors. That
fertile peninsula, first hellenized a century and a half before by
the Athenian Miltiades, had been a favorite resort for Athenian
citizens, many of whom had acquired property there during the naval
power of Athens. The battle of Ægospotami dispossessed and drove
home these proprietors, at the same time depriving the peninsula
of its protection against the Thracians. It now contained eleven
distinct cities, of which Sestos was the most important; and its
inhabitants combined to send envoys to Sparta, entreating the ephors
to send out a force for the purpose of building a wall across the
isthmus from Kardia to Paktyê; in recompense for which (they said)
there was fertile land enough open to as many settlers as chose to
come, with coast and harbors for export close at hand. Miltiades, on
first going out to the Chersonese, had secured it by constructing a
cross-wall on the same spot, which had since become neglected during
the period of Persian supremacy; Perikles had afterwards sent fresh
colonists, and caused the wall to be repaired. But it seems to have
been unnecessary while the Athenian empire was in full vigor,—since
the Thracian princes had been generally either conciliated, or kept
off, by Athens, even without any such bulwark.[381] Informed that
the request of the Chersonesites had been favorably listened to at
Sparta, Derkyllidas resolved to execute their project with his own
army. Having prolonged his truce with Pharnabazus, he crossed the
Hellespont into Europe, and employed his army during the whole summer
in constructing this cross-wall, about four and a quarter miles in
length. The work was distributed in portions to different sections of
the army, competition being excited by rewards for the most rapid and
workmanlike execution; while the Chersonesites were glad to provide
pay and subsistence for the army, during an operation which provided
security for all the eleven cities, and gave additional value to
their lands and harbors. Numerous settlers seem to have now come in,
under Lacedæmonian auspices,—who were again disturbed, wholly or
partially, when the Lacedæmonian maritime empire was broken up a few
years afterwards.[382]
[379] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 9. ἔπεμψεν αὐτοὺς ἀπ᾽ ~Ἐφέσου~ διὰ
τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ἡδόμενος ὅτι ἔμελλον ὄψεσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν
εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας. I cannot but think that we ought
here to read ἐπ᾽ Ἐφέσου, not ἀπ᾽ Ἐφέσου; or else ἀπὸ Λαμψάκου.
It was at Lampsakus that this interview and conversation between
Derkyllidas and the commissioners took place. The commissioners
were to be sent from Lampsakus to Ephesus through the Grecian
cities.
The expression ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας has reference to
the foreign relations of the cities, and to their exemption from
annoyance by Persian arms,—without implying any internal freedom
or good condition. There were Lacedæmonian harmosts in most of
them, and dekarchies half broken up or modified in many; see the
subsequent passages (iii, 2, 20; iii, 4, 7; iv, 8, 1)
[380] Compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 5.
[381] Herodot. vi, 36; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 19; Isokrates, Or.
v, (Philipp.) s. 7.
[382] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 10; iv, 8, 5. Diodor. xiv, 38.
On returning to Asia in the autumn, after the completion of this
work, which had kept his army usefully employed and amply provided
during six months, Derkyllidas undertook the siege of Artaneus, a
strong post (on the continental coast eastward of Mitylênê) occupied
by some Chian exiles, whom the Lacedæmonian admiral Kratesippidas
had lent corrupt aid in expelling from their native island a few
years before.[383] These men, living by predatory expeditions against
Chios and Ionia, were so well supplied with provisions that it cost
Derkyllidas a blockade of eight months before he could reduce it. He
placed in it a strong garrison well supplied, that it might serve him
as a retreat in case of need,—under an Achæan named Drako, whose
name remained long terrible from his ravages on the neighboring plain
of Mysia.[384]
[383] Diodor. xiii, 65.
[384] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 11; Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s.
167.
Derkyllidas next proceeded to Ephesus, where orders presently reached
him from the ephors, directing him to march into Karia and attack
Tissaphernes. The temporary truce which had hitherto provisionally
kept off Persian soldiers and tribute-gatherers from the Asiatic
Greeks, was now renounced by mutual consent. These Greeks had sent
envoys to Sparta, assuring the ephors that Tissaphernes would be
constrained to renounce formally the sovereign rights of Persia,
and grant to them full autonomy, if his residence in Karia were
vigorously attacked. Accordingly Derkyllidas marched southward
across the Mæander into Karia, while the Lacedæmonian fleet under
Pharax coöperated along the shore. At the same time Tissaphernes,
on his side, had received reinforcements from Susa, together with
the appointment of generalissimo over all the Persian force in Asia
Minor; upon which Pharnabazus (who had gone up to court in the
interval to concert more vigorous means of prosecuting the war, but
had now returned)[385] joined him in Karia, prepared to commence
vigorous operations for the expulsion of Derkyllidas and his army.
Having properly garrisoned the strong places, the two satraps crossed
the Mæander at the head of a powerful Grecian and Karian force, with
numerous Persian cavalry, to attack the Ionian cities. As soon as
he heard this news, Derkyllidas came back with his army from Karia,
to cover the towns menaced. Having recrossed the Mæander, he was
marching with his army in disorder, not suspecting the enemy to be
near, when on a sudden he came upon their scouts, planted on some
sepulchral monuments in the road. He also sent some scouts up to
the neighboring monuments and towers, who apprised him that the two
satraps, with their joint force in good order, were planted here to
intercept him. He immediately gave orders for his hoplites to form
in battle array of eight deep, with the peltasts, and his handful
of horsemen, on each flank. But such was the alarm caused among his
troops by this surprise, that none could be relied upon except the
Cyreians and the Peloponnesians. Of the insular and Ionian hoplites,
from Priênê and other cities, some actually hid their arms in the
thick standing corn, and fled; others, who took their places in
the line, manifested dispositions which left little hope that they
would stand a charge; so that the Persians had the opportunity of
fighting a battle not merely with superiority of number, but also
with advantage of position and circumstances. Pharnabazus was anxious
to attack without delay. But Tissaphernes, who recollected well the
valor of the Cyreian troops, and concluded that all the remaining
Greeks were like them, forbade it; sending forward heralds to demand
a conference. As they approached, Derkyllidas, surrounding himself
with a body-guard of the finest and best-equipped soldiers,[386]
advanced to the front of the line to meet them; saying that he,
for his part, was prepared to fight,—but since a conference was
demanded, he had no objection to grant it, provided hostages were
exchanged. This having been assented to, and a place named for
conference on the ensuing day, both armies were simultaneously
withdrawn; the Persians to Tralles, the Greeks to Leukophrys,
celebrated for its temple of Artemis Leukophryne.[387]
[385] Diodor. xiv, 39.
[386] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 18.
In the Anabasis (ii, 3, 3) Xenophon mentions the like care
on the part of Klearchus, to have the best armed and most
imposing soldiers around him, when he went to his interview with
Tissaphernes.
Xenophon gladly avails himself of the opportunity, to pay an
indirect compliment to the Cyreian army.
[387] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 19; Diodor. xiv, 39.
This backwardness on the part of Tissaphernes even at a time when he
was encouraged by a brother satrap braver than himself, occasioned
to the Persians the loss of a very promising moment, and rescued the
Grecian army out of a position of much peril. It helps to explain
to us the escape of the Cyreians, and the manner in which they were
allowed to cross rivers and pass over the most difficult ground
without any serious opposition; while at the same time it tended to
confirm in the Greek mind the same impressions of Persian imbecility
as that escape so forcibly suggested.
The conference, as might be expected, ended in nothing.
Derkyllidas required on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks complete
autonomy,—exemption from Persian interference and tribute; while the
two satraps on their side insisted that the Lacedæmonian army should
be withdrawn from Asia, and the Lacedæmonian harmosts from all the
Greco-Asiatic cities. An armistice was concluded, to allow time for
reference to the authorities at home; thus replacing matters in the
condition in which they had been at the beginning of the year.[388]
[388] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20.
Shortly after the conclusion of this truce, Agesilaus, king of
Sparta, arrived with a large force, and the war in all respects began
to assume larger proportions,—of which more in the next chapter.
But it was not in Asia alone that Sparta had been engaged in war. The
prostration of the Athenian power had removed that common bond of
hatred and alarm which attached the allies to her headship; while her
subsequent conduct had given positive offence, and had even excited
against herself the same fear of unmeasured imperial ambition which
had before run so powerfully against Athens. She had appropriated
to herself nearly the whole of the Athenian maritime empire, with
a tribute scarcely inferior, if at all inferior, in amount. How
far the total of one thousand talents was actually realised during
each successive year, we are not in a condition to say; but such
was the assessment imposed and the scheme laid down by Sparta for
her maritime dependencies,—enforced too by omnipresent instruments
of rapacity and oppression, decemvirs and harmosts, such as Athens
had never paralleled. When we add to this great maritime empire
the prodigious ascendency on land which Sparta had enjoyed before,
we shall find a total of material power far superior to that which
Athens had enjoyed, even in her day of greatest exaltation, prior to
the truce of 445 B.C.
This was not all. From the general dulness of character pervading
Spartan citizens, the full resources of the state were hardly ever
put forth. Her habitual short-comings at the moment of action are
keenly criticised by her own friends, in contrast with the ardor and
forwardness which animated her enemies. But at and after the battle
of Ægospotami, the entire management of Spartan foreign affairs
was found in the hands of Lysander; a man not only exempt from the
inertia usual in his countrymen, but of the most unwearied activity
and grasping ambition, as well for his country as for himself. Under
his direction the immense advantages which Sparta enjoyed from her
new position were at once systematized and turned to the fullest
account. Now there was enough in the new ascendency of Sparta, had
it been ever so modestly handled, to spread apprehension through the
Grecian world. But apprehension became redoubled, when it was seen
that her ascendency was organized and likely to be worked by her
most aggressive leader for the purposes of an insatiable ambition.
Fortunately for the Grecian world, indeed, the power of Sparta did
not long continue to be thus absolutely wielded by Lysander, whose
arrogance and overweening position raised enemies against him at
home. Yet the first impressions received by the allies respecting
Spartan empire, were derived from his proceedings and his plans
of dominion, manifested with ostentatious insolence; and such
impressions continued, even after the influence of Lysander himself
had been much abated by the counterworking rivalry of Pausanias and
others.
While Sparta separately had thus gained so much by the close of the
war, not one of her allies had received the smallest remuneration or
compensation, except such as might be considered to be involved in
the destruction of a formidable enemy. Even the pecuniary result
or residue which Lysander had brought home with him (four hundred
and seventy talents remaining out of the advances made by Cyrus),
together with the booty acquired at Dekeleia, was all detained by
the Lacedæmonians themselves. Thebes and Corinth indeed presented
demands, in which the other allies did not (probably durst not) join,
to be allowed to share. But though all the efforts and sufferings
of the war had fallen upon these allies no less than upon Sparta,
the demands were refused, and almost resented as insults.[389] Hence
there arose among the allies not merely a fear of the grasping
dominion, but a hatred of the monopolizing rapacity, of Sparta.
Of this new feeling, an early manifestation, alike glaring and
important, was made by the Thebans and Corinthians, when they refused
to join Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus and the Athenian
exiles in Peiræus,[390]—less than a year after the surrender of
Athens, the enemy whom these two cities had hated with such extreme
bitterness down to the very moment of surrender. Even Arcadians and
Achæans too, habitually obedient as they were to Lacedæmon, keenly
felt the different way in which she treated them, as compared with
the previous years of war, when she had been forced to keep alive
their zeal against the common enemy.[391]
[389] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 27; Justin,
v, 10.
[390] Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30.
[391] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 12. Κορινθίους δὲ καὶ Ἄρκαδας καὶ
Ἀχαίους τί φῶμεν; οἱ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸς ὑμᾶς (it is the Theban
envoys who are addressing the public assembly at Athens) πολέμῳ
~μάλα λιπαρούμενοι ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων~ (the Lacedæmonians), πάντων καὶ
πόνων καὶ κινδύνων καὶ δαπανημάτων μετεῖχον· ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔπραξαν
ἃ ἐβούλοντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ποίας ἢ ἀρχῆς ἢ τιμῆς ἢ ποίων
χρημάτων μεταδεδώκασιν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εἱλώτας ἁρμοστὰς
καθιστάναι, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ἐλευθέρων ὄντων, ἐπεὶ εὐτύχησαν,
δεσπόται ἀναπεφῄνασιν.
The Lacedæmonians were however strong enough not merely to despise
this growing alienation of their allies, but even to take revenge
upon such of the Peloponnesians as had incurred their displeasure.
Among these stood conspicuous the Eleians; now under a government
called democratical, of which the leading man was Thrasydæus,—a
man who had lent considerable aid in 404 B.C. to Thrasybulus and
the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. The Eleians, in the year 420 B.C.,
had been engaged in a controversy with Sparta,—had employed their
privileges as administrators of the Olympic festival to exclude
her from attendance on that occasion,—and had subsequently been in
arms against her along with Argos and Mantineia. To these grounds of
quarrel, now of rather ancient date, had been added afterwards, a
refusal to furnish aid in the war against Athens since the resumption
of hostilities in 414 B.C., and a recent exclusion of king Agis,
who had come in person to offer sacrifice and consult the oracle
of Zeus Olympius; such exclusion being grounded on the fact that
he was about to pray for victory in the war then pending against
Athens, contrary to the ancient canon of the Olympic temple, which
admitted no sacrifice or consultation respecting hostilities of Greek
against Greek.[392] These were considered by Sparta as affronts;
and the season was now favorable for resenting them, as well as
for chastising and humbling Elis.[393] Accordingly Sparta sent an
embassy, requiring the Eleians to make good the unpaid arrears
of the quota assessed upon them for the cost of the war against
Athens; and farther,—to relinquish their authority over their
dependent townships or Periœki, leaving the latter autonomous.[394]
Of these dependencies there were several, no one very considerable
individually, in the region called Triphylia, south of the river
Alpheus, and north of the Neda. One of them was Lepreum, the autonomy
of which the Lacedæmonians had vindicated against Elis in 420 B.C.,
though during the subsequent period it had again become subject.
[392] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 22.
Τούτων δ᾽ ὕστερον, καὶ Ἄγιδος πεμφθέντος θῦσαι τῷ Διῒ κατὰ
μαντείαν τινὰ, ἐκώλυον οἱ Ἠλεῖοι μὴ προσεύχεσθαι νίκην πολέμου,
λέγοντες, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἴη οὕτω νόμιμον, μὴ χρηστηριάζεσθαι
τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλήνων πολέμῳ· ὥστε ἄθυτος ἀπῆλθεν.
This canon seems not unnatural, for one of the greatest
Pan-hellenic temples and establishments. Yet it was not
constantly observed at Olympia (compare another example—Xen.
Hellen. iv, 7, 2); nor yet at Delphi, which was not less
Pan-hellenic than Olympia (see Thucyd. i, 118). We are therefore
led to imagine that it was a canon which the Eleians invoked only
when they were prompted by some special sentiment or aversion.
[393] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23. Ἐκ τούτων οὖν πάντων ὀργιζομένοις,
ἔδοξε τοῖς ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ~σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς~.
[394] Diodorus (xiv, 17) mentions this demand for the arrears;
which appears very probable. It is not directly noticed by
Xenophon, who however mentions (see the passage cited in the note
of page preceding) the general assessment levied by Sparta upon
all her Peloponnesian allies during the war.
The Eleians refused compliance with the demand thus sent, alleging
that their dependent cities were held by the right of conquest.
They even retorted upon the Lacedæmonians the charge of enslaving
Greeks;[395] upon which Agis marched with an army to invade their
territory, entering it from the north side where it joined Achaia.
Hardly had he crossed the frontier river Larissus and begun his
ravages, when an earthquake occurred. Such an event, usually
construed in Greece as a divine warning, acted on this occasion so
strongly on the religious susceptibilities of Agis, that he not only
withdrew from the Eleian territory, but disbanded his army. His
retreat gave so much additional courage to the Eleians, that they
sent envoys and tried to establish alliances among those cities which
they knew to be alienated from Sparta. Not even Thebes and Corinth,
however, could be induced to assist them; nor did they obtain any
other aid except one thousand men from Ætolia.
[395] Diodor. xiv, 17.
Diodorus introduces in these transactions King Pausanias, not
King Agis, as the acting person.
Pausanias states (iii, 8, 2) that the Eleians, in returning a
negative answer to the requisition of Sparta, added that they
would enfranchise their Periœki, when they saw Sparta enfranchise
her own. This answer appears to me highly improbable, under the
existing circumstances of Sparta and her relations to the other
Grecian states. Allusion to the relations between Sparta and her
Periœki was a novelty, even in 371 B.C., at the congress which
preceded the battle of Leuktra.
In the next summer Agis undertook a second expedition, accompanied
on this occasion by all the allies of Sparta; even by the Athenians,
now enrolled upon the list. Thebes and Corinth alone stood aloof. On
this occasion he approached from the opposite or southern side, that
of the territory once called Messenia; passing through Aulon, and
crossing the river Neda. He marched through Triphylia to the river
Alpheius, which he crossed, and then proceeded to Olympia, where he
consummated the sacrifice from which the Eleians had before excluded
him. In his march he was joined by the inhabitants of Lepreum,
Makistus, and other dependent towns, which now threw off their
subjection to Elis. Thus reinforced, Agis proceeded onward towards
the city of Elis, through a productive country under flourishing
agriculture, enriched by the crowds and sacrifices at the neighboring
Olympic temple, and for a long period unassailed. After attacking,
not very vigorously, the half-fortified city,—and being repelled
by the Ætolian auxiliaries,—he marched onward to the harbor called
Kyllênê, still plundering the territory. So ample was the stock of
slaves, cattle, and rural wealth generally, that his troops not only
acquired riches for themselves by plunder, but were also joined by
many Arcadian and Achæan volunteers, who crowded in to partake of the
golden harvest.[396]
[396] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23, 26; Diodor. xiv, 17.
The opposition or wealthy oligarchical party in Elis availed
themselves of this juncture to take arms against the government;
hoping to get possession of the city, and to maintain themselves in
power by the aid of Sparta. Xenias their leader, a man of immense
wealth, with several of his adherents, rushed out armed, and assailed
the government-house, in which it appears that Thrasydæus and his
colleagues had been banqueting. They slew several persons, and among
them one, whom, from great personal resemblance, they mistook for
Thrasydæus. The latter was however at that moment intoxicated, and
asleep in a separate chamber.[397] They then assembled in arms in the
market-place, believing themselves to be masters of the city; while
the people, under the like impression that Thrasydæus was dead, were
too much dismayed to offer resistance. But presently it became known
that he was yet alive; the people crowded to the government-house
“like a swarm of bees,”[398] and arrayed themselves for his
protection as well as under his guidance. Leading them forth at once
to battle, he completely defeated the oligarchical insurgents, and
forced them to flee for protection to the Lacedæmonian army.
[397] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 27; Pausanias, iii, 8, 2; v, 4, 5.
The words of Xenophon are not very clear—Βουλόμενοι δὲ οἱ περὶ
Ξενίαν τὸν λεγόμενον μεδίμνῳ ἀπομετρήσασθαι τὸ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς
ἀργύριον (τὴν πόλιν) δι᾽ αὐτῶν προσχωρῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις,
ἐκπεσόντες ἐξ οἰκίας ξίφη ἔχοντες σφαγὰς ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἄλλους τέ
τινας κτείνουσι, καὶ ὅμοιόν τινα Θρασυδαίῳ ἀποκτείναντες, τῷ τοῦ
δήμου προστάτῃ, ᾤοντο Θρασυδαῖον ἀπεκτονέναι.... Ὁ δὲ Θρασυδαῖος
ἔτι καθεύδων ἐτύγχανεν, οὗπερ ἐμεθύσθη.
Both the words and the narrative are here very obscure. It seems
as if a sentence had dropped out, when we come suddenly upon the
mention of the drunken state of Thrasydæus, without having before
been told of any circumstance either leading to or implying this
condition.
[398] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 28.
Agis presently evacuated the Eleian territory, yet not without
planting a Lacedæmonian harmost and a garrison, together with Xenias
and the oligarchical exiles, at Epitalium, a little way south of
the river Alpheius. Occupying this fort (analogous to Dekeleia in
Attica), they spread ravage and ruin all around throughout the autumn
and winter, to such a degree, that in the early spring, Thrasydæus
and the Eleian government were compelled to send to Sparta and
solicit peace. They consented to raze the imperfect fortifications of
their city, so as to leave it quite open. They farther surrendered
their harbor of Kyllênê with their ships of war, and relinquished
all authority over the Triphylian townships, as well as over Lasion,
which was claimed as an Arcadian town.[399] Though they pressed
strenuously their claim to preserve the town of Epeium (between the
Arcadian town of Heræa and the Triphylian town of Makistus), on the
plea that they had bought it from its previous inhabitants at the
price of thirty talents paid down,—the Lacedæmonians, pronouncing
this to be a compulsory bargain imposed upon weaker parties by force,
refused to recognize it. The town was taken away from them, seemingly
without any reimbursement of the purchase money either in part or
in whole. On these terms the Eleians were admitted to peace, and
enrolled again among the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.[400]
[399] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30. There is something perplexing in
Xenophon’s description of the Triphylian townships which the
Eleians surrendered. First, he does not name Lepreum or Makistus,
both of which nevertheless had joined Agis on his invasion,
and were the most important places in Triphylia (iii, 2, 25).
Next, he names Letrini, Amphidoli, and Marganeis, as Triphylian;
which yet were on the north of the Alpheius, and are elsewhere
distinguished from Triphylian. I incline to believe that the
words in his text, καὶ τὰς Τριφυλίδας πόλεις ἀφεῖναι, must be
taken to mean Lepreum and Makistus, perhaps with some other
places which we do not know; but that a καὶ after ἀφεῖναι, has
fallen out of the text, and that the cities, whose names follow,
are to be taken as _not_ Triphylian. Phrixa and Epitalium were
both south, but only just south, of the Alpheius; they were not
on the borders of Triphylia,—and it seems doubtful whether they
were properly Triphylian.
[400] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30; Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iii, 8, 2.
This war between Sparta and Elis reaches over three different
years; it began in the first, occupied the whole of the second,
and was finished in the third. Which years these three were (out
of the seven which separate B.C. 403-396), critics have not been
unanimous.
Following the chronology of Diodorus, who places the beginning of
the war in 402 B.C., I differ from Mr. Clinton, who places it in
401 B.C. (Fasti Hellen. ad ann.), and from Sievers (Geschichte
von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 382), who
places it in 398 B.C.
According to Mr. Clinton’s view, the principal year of the war
would have been 400 B.C., the year of the Olympic festival.
But surely, had such been the fact, the coincidence of war in
the country with the Olympic festival, must have raised so many
complications, and acted so powerfully on the sentiments of all
parties, as to be specifically mentioned. In my judgment, the war
was brought to a close in the early part of 400 B.C., before the
time of the Olympic festival arrived. Probably the Eleians were
anxious, on this very ground, to bring it to a close before the
festival did arrive.
Sievers, in his discussion of the point, admits that the date
assigned by Diodorus to the Eleian war, squares both with the
date which Diodorus gives for the death of Agis, and with
that which Plutarch states about the duration of the reign of
Agesilaus,—better than the chronology which he himself (Sievers)
prefers. He founds his conclusion on Xenophon, Hell. iii, 2, 21.
Τούτων δὲ πραττομένων ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὑπὸ Δερκυλλίδα, Λακεδαιμόνιοι
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι τοῖς Ἠλείοις, etc.
This passage is certainly of some weight; yet I think in the
present case it is not to be pressed with rigid accuracy as to
date. The whole third Book down to these very words, has been
occupied entirely with the course of Asiatic affairs. Not a
single proceeding of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, since
the amnesty at Athens, has yet been mentioned. The command
of Derkyllidas included only the last portion of the Asiatic
exploits, and Xenophon has here loosely referred to it as if it
comprehended the whole. Sievers moreover compresses the whole
Eleian war into one year and a fraction; an interval, shorter, I
think, than that which is implied in the statements of Xenophon.
The time of the Olympic festival seems to have been now approaching,
and the Eleians were probably the more anxious to obtain peace
from Sparta, as they feared to be deprived of their privilege
as superintendents. The Pisatans,—inhabitants of the district
immediately around Olympia,—availed themselves of the Spartan
invasion of Elis to petition for restoration of their original
privilege, as administrators of the temple of Zeus at Olympia with
its great periodical solemnity,—by the dispossession of the Eleians
as usurpers of that privilege. But their request met with no success.
It was true indeed that such right had belonged to the Pisatans in
early days, before the Olympic festival had acquired its actual
Pan-hellenic importance and grandeur; and that the Eleians had only
appropriated it to themselves after conquering the territory of
Pisa. But taking the festival as it then stood, the Pisatans, mere
villagers without any considerable city, were incompetent to do
justice to it, and would have lowered its dignity in the eyes of all
Greece.
Accordingly the Lacedæmonians, on this ground, dismissed the
claimants, and left the superintendence of the Olympic games still in
the hands of the Eleians.[401]
[401] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.
This triumphant dictation of terms to Elis, placed the Lacedæmonians
in a condition of overruling ascendency throughout Peloponnesus, such
as they had never attained before. To complete their victory, they
rooted out all the remnants of their ancient enemies the Messenians,
some of whom had been planted by the Athenians at Naupaktus, others
in the island of Kephallenia. All of this persecuted race were
now expelled, in the hour of Lacedæmonian omnipotence, from the
neighborhood of Peloponnesus, and forced to take shelter, some in
Sicily, others at Kyrênê.[402] We shall in a future chapter have to
commemorate the turn of fortune in their favor.
[402] Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iv, 26, 2. 2