* * * * *
EXTRACTS No. VI.
[Here twelve pages or more of the objector's manuscript are omitted,
as the nature of his arguments will pretty fully appear in the reply;
and as he has been obliged to rescind the ground he had taken, it is
not expedient to publish his remarks. That the reader may see a little
of the manner, however, in which he has given up his part of the
argument, the following is inserted.]
"Speaking however on the evidences of revelation, you have stated some
things worthy of serious consideration; which if correct, and I cannot
say but they are, give me considerable satisfaction; and are very
grateful to my feelings. 'It' (faith) say you 'does not require all
_possibility_ to be taken into the account: this would seem to go
beyond the limits of faith and enter into the regions of certainty.'
"According to this doctrine, I may yet, perhaps, be considered a
believer in divine revelation, and of course in Christianity. If 'all
possibility' is not required, then certainly some _doubts_, some
_possibility_ of failure, may be admited without destroying the
consistency of the Christian faith.
"Here as it respects the argument, you have seemingly forclosed every
thing which I shall say by way of objection; at least, you have
anticipated all my arguments on this subject. For evidences and
circumstances calculated to raise _doubts_ in the mind; and shewing
the _possibility_ of uncertainty, are all the arguments which I have
expected to produce in this case. But it may not be improper to
inquire how much uncertainty, or _possibility_ of uncertainty, may I
admit in my calculation without destroying the Christian faith? That
there are evidences in favor of divine revelation, and, which would
support it, if there were nothing to counterbalance their testimony,
is a proposition which I admit, and which I think cannot be disputed.
Hence I conceive it must be admitted that there is a _possibility_, at
least, of its being true.--But after all, if the weight of evidence in
the mind of any one should preponderate against it, I doubt whether
such an one could consistently be called a believer in divine
revelation.
"You have suggested that in disproving the religion of Jesus Christ, I
should disprove all religion; as there can be no choice between this
and any other; for if this can be proved false all may be proved false
&c. or words to that effect. In this I hardly know how to understand
you. So far as the religion of Christ consists in 'feeding the hungry,
clothing the naked, and keeping himself unspotted from the world,' I
admit, that 'in disproving the religion of Christ,' I should 'disprove
all religion:' that is to say, in other words, so far as the religion
of Christ is not founded on revelation, but on the relation and
dependence existing between man and man, to disprove it would disprove
all religion: but if the religion of Jesus Christ consists purely and
exclusively in believing in a future state of existence, then
disproving it would not disprove all religion. A man may be what the
poet calls 'the noblest work of God' i.e. 'an honest man,' and attend
to all the duties embraced in that religion which St. James calls
'pure and undefiled before God and the father,' and yet have no
_opinion_, that is, no settled opinion, in regard to a future state.
If a man has religion enough to be a good husband, a good neighbor, a
good citizen, and can rationably enjoy all the blessings which
appertain to this life, of what consequence is it to him, or to any
one else, what he believes in regard to a future state? This is a
question worthy of serious consideration.
"The denial of revelation, much less to doubt its truth, does not
render it necessary that I should do what you have proposed; neither
is it my disposition to destroy if I could the peace even of an
individual. Hence, I have no wish to 'demonstrate that there is no sun
in a cloudy day;' but only to prove that clouds and darkness are as
necessary to the well being of man as clear sunshine. Neither would I
be the bearer of the 'joyless tidings that there is no clear sky in
the heavens;' but only to query whether our portion of 'clear sky' is
not that which reflects upon the earth; and that only during the short
period of our lives? Who has a right to complain, if our blessings are
circumscribed to our sphere of action? Must we enjoy nothing, because
more is not allotted to our share? It is very probable there may be
millions of other suns, enlightening other worlds, and systems of
worlds, giving life, light and warmth to rational beings like
ourselves, exceeding all imagination in number; and yet, have little
of the blessings of those heavenly luminaries that falls to our
enjoyment! They merly form a beautiful canopy over our heads. It is
true, their greatest use to us may be that of which we are mostly
ignorant; in balancing systems &c. but yet we must have some knowledge
of those benefits, before me can feel grateful for them. Dost thou
wish to visit them? Dost thou desire to know more concerning them than
thou canst know in this state? Calm and deliberate reason would say
unto the, 'Be content, O vain man! with thine own lot, and not try to
soar above thy proper station!'
"The above is not designed as a reflection; it is only what I take to
myself.
"You have proposed what I conceive you think is the only alternative
to which I must flee, when I give up the truth of divine revelation.
But may I not stop to inquire whether there is not some medium between
the two extremes which you have mentioned? Must I believe that there
was no such man as Jesus, or if there were, that he was an impostor;
or else believe all that is stated concerning him? Must I also believe
the same of the apostles or else believe them impeccable? May not even
good men be honestly deceived? and being deceived, honestly lead
others into an error?--That honest men do not bear 'testimony to
falshood,' I admit; neither could such a principle be justified even
under a 'pretence of doing good;' yet I will not undertake to say that
no such _pious frauds_ have ever been practiced in the world, and even
among professed christians; and how soon it was practiced after the
days of the apostles, and whether or not by some even in their day,
would be very difficult now to determine. Neither is it necessary I
should say any thing more upon the subject, as you admit this
principle 'has been practised upon by a wicked priesthood for ages!'
"In remarking on my fourth proposition, which I added to the _three_
which you had proposed, you say, 'I will not be too positive that I
rightly apprehend your meaning on this subject, but as you propose to
allow my three propositions, and as you make no attempt to do away my
reasoning, especially on my last,' &c. Here permit me to observe, I am
well persuaded you did not fully understand me, whatever you did
yourself, on this subject. You will perceive, sir, both by my fourth
number, and also by my fifth, that my answer to your _three
propositions_ was not completed. Probably if you had waited for the
whole of my answer you would have understood me much better, and also
would have seen the use and propriety of my fourth proposition.
"I think, as you will perceive by my fifth number that even honest men
may be mistaken. And if so, it is very important to know whether the
apostles judged only from outward circumstances, or whether they had
some internal evidence, called _inspiration_, by which they always
knew the truth of the things whereof they affirmed. This was the
object of my fourth proposition.
"That you did not fully understand me appears by your saying, 'If it
be allowed that my propositions are true, then you _consent_ to the
validity of the apostles' testimony respecting a future state.' If
this could be allowed, it might then be admitted, that in this
argument it makes no difference how the apostles come by their
'knowledge of futurity.'--But I did not know, neither do I now
perceive, that my admitting the apostles to be honest men makes it
necessary also to admit the validity of their 'testimony respecting a
future state;' unless it can be shown that honest men are never
mistaken respecting the things whereof they affirm. I admit the
'_honesty_' of my good friend, in the above quoted proposition; but I
can hardly be willing, purely on this account, to '_consent_' to its
truth.
"As it respects an inheritance given in a WILL, &c. I have some doubts
whether reason always carries things as far as you would wish to carry
this metaphor to make it a parallel. Reason sometimes moves in a small
circle; and that too without being unreasonable. If the benefit is
said to have been absolutely made, and reason is informed of the fact,
it has a right to take it for granted, that the donor had the property
to give, and that it is not given to the injury of any one else. But
yet he consults his own interest, and that only, when he says, 'this
is very important to me, if true, yet I doubt, yea I have reasons for
not believing it true.' Would any one say that such a man talketh
unreasonably?
"You have called on me to prove 'that no revelation was needed;' and
have acknowledged, 'that if none was necessary, a being of infinite
wisdom would make none.' And at the same time you have argued very
pathetically indeed to prove the necessity of a revelation; that is,
if that can be called argument which grows out of a man's own
feelings: A man, however, of different feelings might bring forward
arguments equally energetic, and perhaps equally conclusive, but
diametrically opposite.
"I know not what evidence you wish, or what evidence would be
accepted, to prove that a revelation is not necessary. Even if such
were the fact, it appears to me to be hardly susceptible of proof. It
may be no more difficult, however, than it is to prove that a
revelation is true. I presume that nothing short of a _revelation_
would convince you that a _revelation_ is not necessary! For who but
God can know what either is, or is not necessary for God to make
known?
"But if arguments drawn from our feelings are admissible, hear, for
once, the voice of simple nature, proclaiming in her simplicity by
every thing which exists either in or around you, that a revelation is
neither necessary nor useful. That every thing which can be enjoyed in
life can be enjoyed equally as well, and often better, without either
its knowledge or belief. That every duty, either to God or man, can be
performed as well, and with the same beneficial effect. And finally
that man may be brought, without either the aid, knowledge, or belief
of revelation, not only to be reconciled to his conditions and station
in life, but also to curtail all his _anxious_ desires to which he not
only _believes_ but _knows_ there is a natural possibility of
obtaining.
"If one could be brought who would solemnly testify to the truth of
the above paragraph, would you believe his testimony? I presume not.
But why not? Will you say it is impossible it should be true? No one
can know this for a certainty, except those whose misfortune it is, if
it be a misfortune not to believe in a future state of existence. If
such there are, however, and yet their lives are exactly correct,
their examples in society equally good, and their enjoyments
apparently equally as great as other men, why should you doubt their
testimony? Would you say they were _bad men_?--could you say they were
_dishonest men_?--and if _honest_, according to your argument, why not
believe them? I can see no inducement that any one could have to deny
a revelation, if he believes it true; but I can see a very great
inducement for mankind to maintain the reality of a revelation,
although at the same time they may doubt its truth.
"If you doubt whether the human mind can be brought to such a state as
has been mentioned above, it is only for the want of proper evidence;
the fact, however, is susceptible of proof. Yea, it can be more than
proved; _the happy unbeliever_ in idle tales, but believing in eternal
principles, knows it for a certainty. I do not mean that he knows for
a certainty, that there is no revelation, but he knows for a certainty
that a belief in revelation is not absolutely necessary to a happy
life. Now, if such characters exists, will you receive their own
testimony in support of the above fact? If not, it will be of no use
to produce them.
"In order to make a proper estimation of virtue, we should take into
consideration the motives and inducements a person has to be virtuous.
The virtue of some men seems to be predicated on the following
principles; on the consideration that they are going to heaven and
happiness in another world, while others, whom they conceive not so
good as themselves are going to hell, a place of never ending
torments. On this ground they can be very _pious_ also, and do a great
deal for religion. At the same time they will tell you, as many have,
if they believed all were to be alike happy in another world, they
would then stick at no crimes to obtain their object, but would
indulge themselves in all manner of gratifications, &c. Such virtue,
however, I conclude does not stand very high in your estimation. No;
but you would be virtuous on a more noble scale; so long as you can
believe that you shall have an eternal existence with God, in a happy
conscious identity, you are willing every body else should enjoy the
same blessing; on supposition that this is true, or as you can believe
it, you are for doing all the good in your power, and at the same time
taking all the comfort you can in doing it. You are trying to make
every one believe what you believe, that they may enjoy what you
enjoy. But the moment this faith, and this hope of yours is gone, your
virtue is gone with it; you can now do nothing, and of course enjoy
nothing!
"Now compare this virtue with the virtue of one whom the christian
world would call an infidel! One whose faith, and of course, hope,
does not extend beyond what he knows has been the lot of some, and, as
far as circumstances will admit, may be his own; and yet he is always
faithful in the discharge of whatever appears to be his duty, always
enjoys life, whether in prosperity or adversity, and is always, so far
as it respects circumstances over which he has no control, reconciled
and contented with his lot. He knows his life is uncertain, and
although he has no real faith or well grounded hope beyond the present
state of existence, yet the thought gives him neither anxiety nor
concern. His only object is to do good; to enjoy life while it lasts,
to cultivate and improve human nature for the benefit of posterity; to
bear the evils and misfortunes of life with fortitude, and to be
unfeignedly thankful for all the happiness of which he is made
susceptible. Therefore whether his life be for a day, or for eternity,
it matters not, because, for the present, it is all the same to him:
his duties are the same, and his enjoyments are the same. O how happy!
How inexpressibly happy, is such a state as this!
"While others are feasting their fruitful imaginations with the idle
and visionary dreams of fanaticism; with a kind of chimerical heaven
of which they know _nothing_, as to its certainty: this man is in
heaven already: dwelling in love, he 'dwelleth in God, and God in
him.'
"Do you not wish, my brother, that you could find such a character
among Christians? But Christianity does not afford such a character,
in _full_, nor is it possible that it ever should. Such a character,
however, there may be, and when the world, or any considerable part of
them can receive his testimony, he may make his appearance.
"You seem to think it may be successfully argued 'that the moral and
religious state of man really required a divine revelation.' This
argument, if I understand you, grows out of the ardent desires of man;
which, it is admitted, would be pretty conclusive if it could be made
to appear that the desires of man are never fruitless. Man, it is
true, rationally desires happiness; for this is essential to his moral
existence; yet, may he not, through ignorance, or from some other
cause, suppose things essential to his happiness, which, in fact, are
not essential, and therefore ardently desire them? But does it
necessarily follow that the particular things desired in such cases
are absolutely necessary? and therefore will absolutely be granted? I
believe not.--And if he may be thus deceived in any one thing, why may
he not be deceived in the supposed necessity of a divine revelation?
It is believed that a perfect reconciliation to the present state of
man; to what he is, with the prospect only of what he yet may be in
this life, without either the hope or the fear of a future existence,
would be infinitely better than any thing which has yet been produced
by a belief in divine revelation; especially any further than a
revelation is conducive to this end; and if a revelation ever was
necessary, it was necessary only to reconcile man to his present state
of existence. But if man can be equally reconciled without the
_knowledge_, or, what amounts to the same thing, without the _belief_
of divine revelation, then the end of such a revelation is obtained.
"It seems to be expedient that I should say a few more words,
'respecting the apostles' stating no more than what was substantially
true.'
"I hope, however, we shall not lose sight of the main subject in
debate, by criticising on words. I say _main subject_ here, as I think
there will be no occasion of saying any thing more on the subject of
the _languages_ in relation to the arts and sciences.
"I am not disposed to think, sir, that you have designedly wrested the
meaning of my words; nor that you are unwilling to receive my meaning
when it is fully understood; and yet, having once explained on this
subject, I am unable to account for your remarks.
"After my informing you that you had misconstrued me, and also stating
my meaning, as I supposed, more explicitly, you have informed me that
if your first construction was not my meaning, it seems that I must
have meant the reverse of it, which, I must aver, is as foreign from
my meaning as your first construction! For neither your former nor
latter construction was in my mind when I wrote the sentence to which
I allude: but a different idea from either of your constructions was
in my mind, and was what I meant to state; which idea, as I conceive,
is as fairly expressed by my words, and is a more just construction of
them, taking into consideration the sentence which follows, than
either of the ideas which you have expressed as their meaning.
"Permit me therefore to state again, that whatever might have been my
opinion respecting the writings of the apostles, I did not mean to
suggest, and much less to affirm in that sentence 'that they stated
that which is not true!'--Neither did I mean to acknowledge in that
sentence that they had stated 'no more' than what is true, at least in
_substance_; but I did mean this, and this only, that admitting those
things were true, all would admit that the design of the apostles was
nothing _more_ than to state the truth of those things in _substance_;
because all would acknowledge that they were not careful to be correct
as to every _minutiae_. But as this makes nothing either for or
against the main point, I wish to add no more respecting it, than
simply to remark, that even if the apostles had gone on the opposite
extreme of what I meant I should not think them 'deserving of _no
credit_.' Supposing they had descended into _minutiae_, and related,
to an exact nicety, every particular circumstance (which is exactly
the reverse of what I mean to state), would they on this account have
been deserving of _no credit_? I think not. Considering the time,
however, which had elapsed after the facts are said to have taken
place, before a history of them was given in writing, I think the
evangelists are entitled to _more credit_, on the whole, than what
they would have been if their testimony had borne the complexion last
mentioned.
"To close this letter, which perhaps is already too long, I would here
acknowledge that as I have expressed doubts in the subject of divine
revelation, you have a right to hear my reasons for doubting. These I
promised to give you (as I thought) at the close of my fourth number.
You have informed me, verbally, that I promised to give you my
_doubts_ only. If I did so, it was only a slip of the pen, to which I
am too prone; it was my _reasons for doubting_, which I meant to have
promised you; and in my next I shall endeavor to fulfil that promise.
"Yours, &c.