P. S. You have noticed, no doubt, in a parenthesis, that I do not
allow your argument on the dissimilarity of divine revelation and
principles of nature to have any force to do away the argument of our
brother, to which you replied. It was evidently not his design to
argue a similarity between the nature of these widely different
subjects, but to show that no greater partiality appears in the divine
wisdom, in not discovering the truths of revelation in all ages, to
all nations and in all languages, than in its not leading the human
mind to the discovery of electricity or any other of the laws of
nature in the same manner. Will you endeavour to maintain that the
divine economy has nothing to do in directing means and circumstances
to the developement of the laws of nature and to the discovery of
useful inventions? And if you allow it has, why do you not assign a
reason why these discoveries should not have been made in all ages, to
all nations, and written or rather _printed_, in all languages that
cannot as well be applied in the other case? In this way you would do
away his reasoning and my own likewise, for as you notice, we were
both of one mind on this subject.
Before I close this postscript, I wish to remark on the subject which
you have in view, in reviewing the evidences of divine revelation,
which you say is to "see if they are such that it is _impossible_ it
should be false." Now it appears to your humble servant, that faith
does not require evidence of the description you lay down. I grant it
wants to be satisfied and it has a right to expect it; it feels under
no obligation to evidence which comes short of conviction; but it does
not require all _possibility_ to be taken into its account. This would
seem to go beyond the limits of faith and enter into the regions of
certainty. If the evidences in support of faith be sufficient to give
rest, peace, and consolation to the mind, and if the faith be strong
enough to effect the conduct of the believer in a proper manner, the
object of faith is obtained.
The hopes of the husbandman may serve to illustrate this particular.
He does not know for certainty that his fields will produce him any
thing; he does not know that the coming season will be favourable to
his crops, yet he plants and sows in comfortable expectation. He rises
early and labours cheerfully, his expectations are full of comfort, he
sleeps quietly and enjoys content. But if you ask him whether he views
it _impossible_ that he should fail of a harvest? he will with but
very little concern answer in the negative.
"The just shall live by faith, we walk by faith and not by sight."
All, therefore, that we can reasonably expect in the case before us,
is to find a decided _balance_ of evidence in favour of the religion
of the gospel. And to _review_ the evidences of this religion, it
seems necessary first to allow that there are evidences in existence
which go to prove it, if their validity be allowed. For instance, the
four evangelists, the acts of the apostles, together with the epistles
of the apostles are considered evidences of the truth of this
religion. And can you reasonably require more until you are able to
show that all these come short of establishing the credibility of the
facts which they relate with apparent honesty and simplicity not to be
met with in any other ancient writings?
There are a great many other evidences which serve to corroborate
those mentioned, but if you can do _them_ away, no doubt the others
may be as easily removed.
You will duly consider that in disproving the religion of Jesus
Christ, you disprove all religion, for I am satisfied that you will
not pretend that you are making a choice between the gospel and some
other doctrine. No, the choice is between the gospel and no religion
at all.
Come then, strip away all the clouds of superstition, and demonstrate
at once that there has been no sun in the firmament during the whole
of a cloudy day! Soar like the strong pinioned eagle, make your tour
beyond the mists of error and bring us the joyless tidings that there
is no clear sky in the heavens. Can you imagine any thing to be more
pleasing than the coming of one that brought _good_ tidings? But let
us have the worst of it. Show from undoubted authority that there
never was such a man as Jesus, or show that he was a wicked impostor
and deservedly lost his life. Show moreover, that there never were
such men as the apostles of Jesus, or that they were likewise
impostors, and all suffered death for their wicked impiety! Give the
particulars of Saul's madly forsaking the honourable connexion in
which he stood, for the sake of practising a fraud which produced him
an immense income of suffering!
But you say the apostles were not bad men. Very well, then let us see
how good men could tell so many things which they knew were not true,
and suffer and die in attestation of what they knew to be false. You
will see the danger of supposing that honest men can bear testimony to
falsehood under the pretence of doing good, as this would destroy all
testimony at once; even your own cannot be relied on after you
maintain this abominable principle, which has been practised a wicked
priesthood for ages. H.B.
* * * * *
EXTRACTS No. IV.
[The objector in his fourth number begins by explaining himself in
some particulars wherein he had not been fully understood, and also by
making some concessions respecting the importance of retaining the
original languages in which the scriptures were written; and, bringing
these remarks to a close, he proceeds as follows:]
"In regard to a revelation from God, the three propositions which you
have stated answer my mind well enough, as far as they go, to which,
however, I would wish to add a fourth; and ask, admitting the three
first propositions true. 'Fourth. Is it reasonable to suppose that the
apostles had any other means of forming their opinions relative to a
future state than what passed before their eyes?--viz. the miracles of
Christ, the circumstances attending his death, his resurrection, and
the miracles wrought by themselves in his name?'
"1st. Is it reasonable to suppose that God has ever made a special
revelation to man?
"You say I have acknowledged that a divine revelation 'if real, is of
all truths the most important;' hence you call upon the 'eye of
reason' to examine this proposition to see why it should be considered
more important than the discoveries made in the arts and sciences, &c.
I think these questions may be easily and correctly answered. One
relates to the blessings of _eternity_; and the others to those only
of _time_; hence if the truths manifested by a revelation had been of
no more importance to man than the truths in natural philosophy,
reason would say, God would have left them also to be discovered, if
discovered at all, like all other truths, without a special
revelation. But, you must excuse me for not being able to see the
force and conclusiveness of your reasoning, when you say that my
'allowing it any importance at all, is, in the eye of reason, an
argument in its support.' Supposing I am informed of a large estate
bequeathed to me by some benefactor. I acknowledge that it is very
important to me, if true, as I am in great need; yet I do not believe
it true. Now, is my acknowledging its importance, if true, an argument
in support of its truth? If it is so, the reason of it is out of my
sight.
"I should think that the reason of man (the only reason with which we
are acquainted) would hardly undertake to say whether a revelation is
either necessary or not necessary. The only evidence that reason can
have of its necessity is its truth; and a supposition that it is not
true equally supposes it not to be necessary. For to suppose otherwise
supposes that God has omitted something which was necessary to be
done! Try the matter as it respects a new revelation. Who will
undertake to say that a new revelation either is or is not necessary?
No one who believes in a revelation will deny the possibility of such
an event. Suppose then for the moment it is true; and something is
brought to light infinitely more glorious than any thing of which the
human mind has yet conceived; will any one say it is unimportant? Or
is the 'allowing it any importance--an argument in its support?'
"I am very ready to allow that a 'divinely munificent Creator would
not omit any thing which is of importance to his intelligent
creatures:' and on this ground I admitted the _importance_ of
revelation 'if real;' but I am yet unable to see how this is any
argument in its support. It seems to me that this argument might be
turned right the other way with equal force. If revelation be not
true, it is not necessary it should be; and man can be made just as
happy in this world by knowing all that he can know without it, as
those are who believe in it; and admitting it not true there is no
more importance in all the stories about it, than there is in the
_Alcoran_! Now, supposing you should 'allow' all this, would it be any
argument against the truth of revelation? I think not.
"In answer therefore to the first particular, I must be allowed to say
that the only reason in favour of a divine revelation must grow out of
the evidence in support of the facts on which it is predicated; for,
aside from those evidences, I do not see why mankind should be taught
to believe in a future life and immortality by special revelation, any
more than they should be taught the arts and sciences by special
revelation; yet reason does not reject the evidences of such an event
when they are made clear to the understanding.--Therefore, it appears
to me that your first proposition is involved in the second, viz.
"2d. Is the resurrection of Jesus capable of being proved?
"I should have said something more on the subject which was answered
in your first number, and which I neglected to acknowledge in my
second, if it had occurred to me as being necessary. I will briefly
state here that your reasoning on that subject is satisfactory; and if
a revelation can be fully proved I feel not disposed to complain on
account of its seeming partiality. Infinite wisdom dispenses his
blessings so as best to answer his benevolent designs; and were we to
object to the _manner_, merely because we do not comprehend the
_equality_, we should be satisfied, strictly speaking, with nothing.
"But you have excused yourself from undertaking to prove your second
proposition in a way that I did not expect, viz. by finding, as you
supposed, in my words, an acknowledgement of its truth. Here again I
must confess my misfortune in giving too much grounds for the wrong
construction. Every one knows however the ambiguity of words, and how
the meaning of a sentence may be altered by placing the emphasis on a
different word from what the author intended. I acknowledge that my
words will admit the construction you have given them; yet you could
but see that it was giving up at once what I had in a number of
places, both before and after, considered a main question. And then,
you ask me why I wish you to prove what I acknowledge to be true. If
you will be good enough to review the passage, and notice that the
word _substantially_ was emphatic, and contrasted with
_circumstantial_, a little below, you will perceive that my meaning
was simply this. No one will pretend that the evangelists were correct
in every minute particular, but only correct in _substance_; and by
the ALL, by whom this will be admitted, I mean those who believe in
divine revelation; that even they would acknowledge, that in point of
correctness, the writers were 'no more' than _substantially_ so.
However:
"You think if I am 'disposed to doubt,' &c. it is my province to bring
forward my 'strong reasoning,' &c. I know of no disposition that I
feel respecting the subject but to ascertain, if possible, the truth.
If I have doubts, it is not because I choose to doubt, but because I
cannot help them; and if I have faith it is such as is given me. Of
one thing I have no doubt; that is, that the truth, whatever it is, is
right. But:
"Admitting the scriptures are not true, I shall not attempt to guess
what is true respecting the subjects to which they relate. For I might
guess a hundred different ways to account for what we know is true,
and all of them be wrong.
"My doubts on this subject are nothing more than _doubts_; they do not
amount to a confirmed _unbelief_; because they admit the possibility
of the account's being true.
"Yours, &c.