THE EXCHANGE AND THE CAUSE OF ITS INTERRUPTION--BRIEF RESUME OF THE
DIFFERENT CARTELS, AND THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LED TO THEIR SUSPENSION.
Few questions intimately connected with the actual operations of
the Rebellion have been enveloped with such a mass of conflicting
statement as the responsibility for the interruption of the exchange.
Southern writers and politicians, naturally anxious to diminish as
much as possible the great odium resting upon their section for the
treatment of prisoners of war during the last year and a half of the
Confederacy’s existence, have vehemently charged that the Government of
the United States deliberately and pitilessly resigned to their fate
such of its soldiers as fell into the hands of the enemy, and repelled
all advances from the Rebel Government looking toward a resumption
of exchange. It is alleged on our side, on the other hand, that our
Government did all that was possible, consistent with National dignity
and military prudence, to secure a release of its unfortunate men in
the power of the Rebels.
Over this vexed question there has been waged an acrimonious
war of words, which has apparently led to no decision, nor any
convictions--the disputants, one and all, remaining on the sides of the
controversy occupied by them when the debate began.
I may not be in possession of all the facts bearing upon the case, and
may be warped in judgment by prejudices in favor of my own Government’s
wisdom and humanity, but, however this may be, the following is my firm
belief as to the controlling facts in this lamentable affair:
1. For some time after the beginning of hostilities our Government
refused to exchange prisoners with the Rebels, on the ground that this
might be held by the European powers who were seeking a pretext for
acknowledging the Confederacy, to be admission by us that the war was
no longer an insurrection but a revolution, which had resulted in the
‘de facto’ establishment of a new nation. This difficulty was finally
gotten over by recognizing the Rebels as belligerents, which, while it
placed them on a somewhat different plane from mere insurgents, did not
elevate them to the position of soldiers of a foreign power.
2. Then the following cartel was agreed upon by Generals Dig on our
side and Hill on that of the Rebels:
HAXALL’S LANDING, ON JAMES RIVER, July 22, 1882.
The undersigned, having been commissioned by the authorities they
respectively represent to make arrangements for a general exchange of
prisoners of war, have agreed to the following articles:
ARTICLE I.--It is hereby agreed and stipulated, that all prisoners
of war, held by either party, including those taken on private armed
vessels, known as privateers, shall be exchanged upon the conditions
and terms following:
Prisoners to be exchanged man for man and officer for officer.
Privateers to be placed upon the footing of officers and men of the
navy.
Men and officers of lower grades may be exchanged for officers of
a higher grade, and men and officers of different services may be
exchanged according to the following scale of equivalents:
A General-commanding-in-chief, or an Admiral, shall be exchanged for
officers of equal rank, or for sixty privates or common seamen.
A Commodore, carrying a broad pennant, or a Brigadier General, shall
be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or twenty privates or common
seamen.
A Captain in the Navy, or a Colonel, shall be exchanged for officers of
equal rank, or for fifteen privates or common seamen.
A Lieutenant Colonel, or Commander in the Navy, shall be exchanged for
officers of equal rank, or for ten privates or common seamen.
A Lieutenant, or a Master in the Navy, or a Captain in the Army or
marines shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or six privates
or common seamen.
Master’s-mates in the Navy, or Lieutenants or Ensigns in the Army,
shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or four privates or
common seamen. Midshipmen, warrant officers in the Navy, masters of
merchant vessels and commanders of privateers, shall be exchanged for
officers of equal rank, or three privates or common seamen; Second
Captains, Lieutenants or mates of merchant vessels or privateers, and
all petty officers in the Navy, and all noncommissioned officers in
the Army or marines, shall be severally exchanged for persons of equal
rank, or for two privates or common seamen; and private soldiers or
common seamen shall be exchanged for each other man for man.
ARTICLE II.--Local, State, civil and militia rank held by persons
not in actual military service will not be recognized; the basis of
exchange being the grade actually held in the naval and military
service of the respective parties.
ARTICLE III.--If citizens held by either party on charges of
disloyalty, or any alleged civil offense, are exchanged, it shall only
be for citizens. Captured sutlers, teamsters, and all civilians in the
actual service of either party, to be exchanged for persons in similar
positions.
ARTICLE IV.--All prisoners of war to be discharged on parole in ten
days after their capture; and the prisoners now held, and those
hereafter taken, to be transported to the points mutually agreed
upon, at the expense of the capturing party. The surplus prisoners
not exchanged shall not be permitted to take up arms again, nor to
serve as military police or constabulary force in any fort, garrison
or field-work, held by either of the respective parties, nor as guards
of prisoners, deposits or stores, nor to discharge any duty usually
performed by soldiers, until exchanged under the provisions of this
cartel. The exchange is not to be considered complete until the officer
or soldier exchanged for has been actually restored to the lines to
which he belongs.
ARTICLE V.--Each party upon the discharge of prisoners of the other
party is authorized to discharge an equal number of their own officers
or men from parole, furnishing, at the same time, to the other party a
list of their prisoners discharged, and of their own officers and men
relieved from parole; thus enabling each party to relieve from parole
such of their officers and men as the party may choose. The lists
thus mutually furnished, will keep both parties advised of the true
condition of the exchange of prisoners.
ARTICLE VI.--The stipulations and provisions above mentioned to be of
binding obligation during the continuance of the war, it matters not
which party may have the surplus of prisoners; the great principles
involved being, First, An equitable exchange of prisoners, man for
man, or officer for officer, or officers of higher grade exchanged
for officers of lower grade, or for privates, according to scale of
equivalents. Second, That privates and officers and men of different
services may be exchanged according to the same scale of equivalents.
Third, That all prisoners, of whatever arm of service, are to be
exchanged or paroled in ten days from the time of their capture, if it
be practicable to transfer them to their own lines in that time; if
not, so soon thereafter as practicable. Fourth, That no officer, or
soldier, employed in the service of either party, is to be considered
as exchanged and absolved from his parole until his equivalent has
actually reached the lines of his friends. Fifth, That parole forbids
the performance of field, garrison, police, or guard or constabulary
duty.
JOHN A. DIX, Major General.
D. H. HILL, Major General, C. S. A.
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES.
ARTICLE VII.--All prisoners of war now held on either side, and all
prisoners hereafter taken, shall be sent with all reasonable dispatch
to A. M. Aiken’s, below Dutch Gap, on the James River, in Virginia, or
to Vicksburg, on the Mississippi River, in the State of Mississippi,
and there exchanged of paroled until such exchange can be effected,
notice being previously given by each party of the number of prisoners
it will send, and the time when they will be delivered at those points
respectively; and in case the vicissitudes of war shall change the
military relations of the places designated in this article to the
contending parties, so as to render the same inconvenient for the
delivery and exchange of prisoners, other places bearing as nearly as
may be the present local relations of said places to the lines of said
parties, shall be, by mutual agreement, substituted. But nothing in
this article contained shall prevent the commanders of the two opposing
armies from exchanging prisoners or releasing them on parole, at other
points mutually agreed on by said commanders.
ARTICLE VIII.--For the purpose of carrying into effect the foregoing
articles of agreement, each party will appoint two agents for the
exchange of prisoners of war, whose duty it shall be to communicate
with each other by correspondence and otherwise; to prepare the lists
of prisoners; to attend to the delivery of the prisoners at the places
agreed on, and to carry out promptly, effectually, and in good faith,
all the details and provisions of the said articles of agreement.
ARTICLE IX.--And, in case any misunderstanding shall arise in regard
to any clause or stipulation in the foregoing articles, it is mutually
agreed that such misunderstanding shall not affect the release of
prisoners on parole, as herein provided, but shall be made the subject
of friendly explanation, in order that the object of this agreement may
neither be defeated nor postponed.
JOHN A. DIX, Major General.
D. H. HILL, Major General. C. S. A.
This plan did not work well. Men on both sides, who wanted a little
rest from soldiering, could obtain it by so straggling in the vicinity
of the enemy. Their parole--following close upon their capture,
frequently upon the spot--allowed them to visit home, and sojourn
awhile where were pleasanter pastures than at the front. Then the
Rebels grew into the habit of paroling everybody that they could
constrain into being a prisoner of war. Peaceable, unwarlike and
decrepit citizens of Kentucky, East Tennessee, West Virginia, Missouri
and Maryland were “captured” and paroled, and setoff against regular
Rebel soldiers taken by us.
3. After some months of trial of this scheme, a modification of
the cartel was agreed upon, the main feature of which was that all
prisoners must be reduced to possession, and delivered to the exchange
officers either at City Point, Va., or Vicksburg, Miss. This worked
very well for some months, until our Government began organizing negro
troops. The Rebels then issued an order that neither these troops nor
their officers should be held as amenable to the laws of war, but that,
when captured, the men should be returned to slavery, and the officers
turned over to the Governors of the States in which they were taken, to
be dealt with according to the stringent law punishing the incitement
of servile insurrection. Our Government could not permit this for a
day. It was bound by every consideration of National honor to protect
those who wore its uniform and bore its flag. The Rebel Government was
promptly informed that rebel officers and men would be held as hostages
for the proper treatment of such members of colored regiments as might
be taken.
4. This discussion did not put a stop to the exchange, but while it
was going on Vicksburg was captured, and the battle of Gettysburg was
fought. The first placed one of the exchange points in our hands. At
the opening of the fight at Gettysburg Lee captured some six thousand
Pennsylvania militia. He sent to Meade to have these exchanged on
the field of battle. Meade declined to do so for two reasons: first,
because it was against the cartel, which prescribed that prisoners must
be reduced to possession; and second, because he was anxious to have
Lee hampered with such a body of prisoners, since it was very doubtful
if he could get his beaten army back across the Potomac, let alone his
prisoners. Lee then sent a communication to General Couch, commanding
the Pennsylvania militia, asking him to receive prisoners on parole,
and Couch, not knowing what Meade had done, acceded to the request.
Our Government disavowed Couch’s action instantly, and ordered the
paroles to be treated as of no force, whereupon the Rebel Government
ordered back into the field twelve thousand of the prisoners captured
by Grant’s army at Vicksburg.
5. The paroling now stopped abruptly, leaving in the hands of both
sides the prisoners captured at Gettysburg, except the militia above
mentioned. The Rebels added considerably to those in their hands by
their captures at Chickamauga, while we gained a great many at Mission
Ridge, Cumberland Gap and elsewhere, so that at the time we arrived in
Richmond the Rebels had about fifteen thousand prisoners in their hands
and our Government had about twenty-five thousand.
6. The rebels now began demanding that the prisoners on both sides be
exchanged--man for man--as far as they went, and the remainder paroled.
Our Government offered to exchange man for man, but declined--on
account of the previous bad faith of the Rebels--to release the balance
on parole. The Rebels also refused to make any concessions in regard to
the treatment of officers and men of colored regiments.
7. At this juncture General B. F. Butler was appointed to the command
of the Department of the Blackwater, which made him an ex-officio
Commissioner of Exchange. The Rebels instantly refused to treat
with him, on the ground that he was outlawed by the proclamation of
Jefferson Davis. General Butler very pertinently replied that this only
placed him nearer their level, as Jefferson Davis and all associated
with him in the Rebel Government had been outlawed by the proclamation
of President Lincoln. The Rebels scorned to notice this home thrust by
the Union General.
8. On February 12, 1864, General Butler addressed a letter to the Rebel
Commissioner Ould, in which be asked, for the sake of humanity, that
the questions interrupting the exchange be left temporarily in abeyance
while an informal exchange was put in operation. He would send five
hundred prisoners to City Point; let them be met by a similar number
of Union prisoners. This could go on from day to day until all in each
other’s hands should be transferred to their respective flags.
The five hundred sent with the General’s letter were received, and
five hundred Union prisoners returned for them. Another five hundred,
sent the next day, were refused, and so this reasonable and humane
proposition ended in nothing.
This was the condition of affairs in February, 1864, when the Rebel
authorities concluded to send us to Andersonville. If the reader will
fix these facts in his minds I will explain other phases as they
develop.