"On the 30th of September grave disturbances began at

Constantinople itself. Several hundred Armenians, who had

gathered for the purpose of going in a body to the Sultan's

palace and demanding redress for the grievances of their

countrymen, were dispersed by the police after a severe

conflict in which a number of Turks and Armenians were killed

and wounded. Mob violence followed, the Armenians resident in

various quarters of the capital being assailed by an excited

Turkish rabble, and over 50 were slain. The rioting continued

the next day, October 1, in Constantinople and its suburbs.

Some 800 or 1,000 Armenians were captured or arrested, many of

them being armed with new revolvers of a uniform pattern. By

the third day order was restored, and the Armenians who had

sought refuge in their churches returned to their homes. The

effect of this outbreak at the national capital was most

disastrous in the provinces. The danger of a general massacre

of Christians in the vilayets of Adana and Aleppo seemed so

imminent, that renewed orders for the effective protection of

American citizens in those quarters were demanded and

obtained. Fears for their safety at Hadjin, Mersine, and

Marash were especially felt, and the cruiser Marblehead was

promptly ordered to Iskanderoun (Alexandretta), the nearest

seaport.

"On October 8 a Turkish uprising occurred at Trebizond, due,

it is reported, to an attempt to assassinate the late Vali of

Van as he was about to leave for Constantinople, the Turks

claiming that the act was done by an Armenian and that they

were in danger of a general Armenian attack. On the 9th the

disturbance was renewed, many Armenians being killed and their

homes and shops looted by the mob. The authorities attempted

to quell the riot, but having only some 400 soldiers and

policemen at command, were powerless, and murder and pillage

ran their course as long as an Armenian was in sight. The

official Turkish reports give the number of Armenians slain as

182, of Turks 11, but the general estimate places the total

number at some 500. Reinforcements of troops soon arrived, and

quiet was restored. No injury to American citizens or property

occurred.

"From this time the reports of conflicts between Turks and

Armenians, with great loss of life, become frequent and

confused. At Akhissar, some 60 miles from Smyrna, 50 Armenians

were killed October 9. Koordish raids terrorized many parts of

the Armenian provinces. At Bitlis over 500 were reported

killed, the Turkish accounts alleging that the Armenians

attacked the Moslem mosques during the hour of prayer. At

Diarbekir 5,000 are said to have lost their lives, of which

2,300 were Mussulmans—but the Turkish authorities pronounce

this estimate exaggerated. From Malatia comes the report of a

'great massacre' early in November, when every adult male

Christian is said to have perished. Another sanguinary

outbreak, with great slaughter, is reported from Sivas on

November 12; some 800 Armenians and 10 Koords are said to have

been killed. At Hadjin and Ourfa loss of life is reported, the

American missionaries at those places being protected by

Turkish guards under orders from the Porte.

"The Kaimakam of Hadjin is credibly said to have announced

that he would destroy the town and sow barley on its site.

There being an American school at that place, directed by

American teachers, the United States minister thereupon

notified the Porte that if one of those American ladies

received injury from the riotous conduct of the populace, he

would demand, in the name of the United States, 'the head of

that Kaimakam.' That officer has since been removed. Later

reports allege massacres at Marsovan and Amasia. The consular

agent at Aleppo telegraphs that a severe conflict had occurred

at Aintab, and that great fear prevailed at Aleppo. The

burning of the American buildings at Harpoot took place during

a bloody riot, and many persons are said to have perished in

the province of that name. At Kurun 400 deaths are reported.

Particulars of the recent outbreak at Marash, on November 19,

in which American missionary property was destroyed, have not

yet been received.

{539}

"These scattered notices, for the most part received by

telegraph, are given, not as official averment of the facts

stated, but as showing the alarming degree to which racial

prejudices and fanatical passions have been roused throughout

Asia Minor. As above said, the Department of State has and can

have official knowledge regarding but few of these reported

massacres, and though up to the early part of December the

United States minister estimated the number of the killed as

exceeding 30,000, it is more than likely that the figures are

greatly exaggerated. At latest advices mob violence and

slaughter appear to have been checked, or at least to have

partially subsided. The Turkish Government has been emphatic

in assurances of its purpose and ability to restore order in

the affected localities; new governors have been appointed in

many of the provinces, troops have been sent to the scene of

recent or apprehended disorders, and forces have been massed

to subdue the Armenians who had gained the ascendant in

Zeitoun."

Of the American missionary establishments in Turkey, and of

the extent to which they suffered harm during the outbreaks,

the same report gave the following account:

"The number of citizens of the United States resident in the

Turkish Empire is not accurately known. According to latest

advices there are 172 American missionaries, dependents of

various mission boards in the United States, scattered over

Asia Minor. There are also numbers of our citizens engaged in

business or practicing professions in different parts of the

Empire. Besides these, more or less persons, originally

subjects of Turkey and since naturalized in the United States,

have returned to the country of their birth and are

temporarily residing there. The whole number of persons

comprising these several classes can not be accurately

estimated, but, the families of such citizens being

considered, can hardly be less than five or six hundred, and

may possibly exceed that total.

"Outside of the capital and a few commercial seaport towns,

the bulk of this large American element is found in the

interior of Asia Minor and Syria, remote from the few consular

establishments maintained by this Government in that quarter,

inaccessible except by difficult journeys, and isolated from

each other by the broken character of the mountain country and

the absence of roads. Under these circumstances and in the

midst of the alarming agitation which for more than a year

past has existed in Asia Minor, it has been no slight task for

the representative of the United States to follow the

interests of those whose defense necessarily falls to his

care, to demand and obtain the measures indispensable to their

safety, and to act instantly upon every appeal for help in

view of real or apprehended peril. It is, however, gratifying

to bear testimony to the energy and promptness of the minister

in dealing with every grievance brought to his notice, and his

foresight in anticipating complaints and securing timely

protection in advance of actual need. The efforts of the

minister have had the moral support of the presence of naval

vessels of the United States on the Syrian and Adanan coasts

from time to time as occasion required. …

"While the physical safety of all citizens of the United

States appears up to the present date to have been secured,

their property has, on at least two recent occasions, been

destroyed in the course of local outbursts at Harpoot and

Marash. The details of the Harpoot destruction have so far

been only meagerly reported, although it took place about the

middle of November. It is stated that the buildings at that

place were set on fire separately by Kurds and citizens, in

the presence of the Turkish soldiery, during an Armenian riot.

Besides the chapel, girls' theological school and seminary

building, the ladies' house, boarding house, and residences of

three American missionaries were burned, the aggregate loss on

the buildings, personal property, stock, fixtures, and

apparatus being estimated in the neighborhood of $100,000. The

United States minister has notified the Porte that the Turkish

Government will be held responsible for the immediate and full

satisfaction of all injuries on that score. The American

Missionary School of Science at Marash was burned during a

sanguinary outbreak on November 19. The value of the property

destroyed has not been ascertained, but after prompt

investigation the minister will make like demand for adequate

indemnity."

_United States, 54th Congress, 1st Session,

Senate Document, Number 33._

"On November 9 one of tho Foreign Consuls arrived at

Constantinople from Erzeroum on leave, and he reported the

scene on his journey as heartrending. 'The whole country

between Trebizond and Erzeroum was devastated. He counted 100

dead bodies lying by the road near one town. Nearly all the

villages were burnt, and in many cases the male population

entirely wiped out.' At last, on December 13, 1895, Lord

Salisbury received the following telegraphic despatch from Sir

Philip Currie: 'It may be roughly stated that the recent

disturbances have devastated, as far as the Armenians are

concerned, the whole of the provinces to which the scheme of

reforms was intended to apply; that over an extent of

territory considerably larger than Great Britain all the large

towns, with the exception of Van, Sassun, and Moush, have been

the scene of massacres of the Armenian population, while the

Armenian villages have been almost entirely destroyed. A

modest estimate puts the loss of life at 30,000. The survivors

are in a state of absolute destitution, and in many places

they are being forced to turn Mussulmans. The charge against

the Armenians of having been the first to offer provocation

cannot be sustained. Non-Armenian Christians were spared, and

the comparatively few Turks who fell were killed in

self-defence. The participation of the soldiers in the

massacres is in many places established beyond doubt.'

"Of the appalling horror of this account I wish it were

needless to speak. … [It] would be none the less horrible if

the whole of the people massacred and outraged, ruined, and

starved, and driven to the snowy mountains in the middle of

winter, had been all the rudest villagers of the most rustic

village communities. But when we know that many thousands of

the victims have been people educated at Christian schools and

colleges, and who had acquired there, in addition to the

ineradicable virtues of their native and ancient faith, much

also of the refinements and activities of civilised life, we

may reach some true conception of the agonies which have been

inflicted on such a people in the face of Europe and of the

world by the cruelty and brutality of the Turks.

{540}

It is, indeed, right that our first indignation should be

directed against the infamous Government of Turkey. … Let us

remember that this is not a Government with which we have had

nothing to do, or for which we have had no responsibility, but

a Government which the European Powers, and we especially,

have been protecting and nursing for half a century. … Then we

may indeed begin to think, with remorse and shame, of our

handiwork, and of its results. In this particular case,

indeed, the immediate blame lies almost alone with Russia. By

a complete departure from all her previous great traditions

she deliberately refused to join the other Powers of Europe

for the purpose of compelling the Sultan to act with decent

humanity to those of whom she had been the declared defender.

She had the physical power and the geographical opportunity

which others had not; and there can be no doubt whatever that

a joint occupation of the waters of Constantinople by the

fleets of the European Powers would have secured the very

moderate demands that Europe made upon the Porte."

_The Duke of Argyle,

Our Responsibilities for Turkey,

pages 116-122._

TURKEY: A. D. 1896.

Conflict in Crete between Christians and Mussulmans,

and its preceding causes.

In 1868, the Cretans, for the second time, were thrust under

the Turkish yoke. "By way of solace the Powers exerted

themselves feebly in inducing the Porte to concede the

so-called 'Organic Statute'

_See (in volume 3)

GREECE: A. D. 1862-1881.

Organic Regulation._

… As the Charter remained a dead letter, the Cretans seized

the next favourable opportunity to rise in 1877. Their case

was brought before the Congress of Berlin; but the only relief

the Powers could extend to them was a fresh promise on the

part of the Porte, recorded in the XXIII Article of the

Treaty, to observe scrupulously that Organic Statute, which

had been proved to be unworkable. Meanwhile, the Cretans had

remained under arms during the whole of 1878, the island being

again almost completely devastated by the half-naked and

famishing troops which had survived the Russo-Turkish War.

Ultimately, through the mediation of England, the Porte was

induced, in November of that year, to concede the Pact of

Halepa, so named after the village near Canea where it was

negotiated, and signed under the supervision of the British

Consul, Mr. T. B. Sandwith—this fact being expressly recorded

in the preamble of the document. The arrangement was accepted

by the Cretans as a compromise, in spite of its many and

manifest drawbacks. Nevertheless, it brought about, at the

outset, certain beneficial results. Political parties were

formed in which the Mohammedan Cretans blended, irrespective

of religious differences, with their Christian countrymen; and

the unprecedented phenomenon of a Christian Vali completing

his four years' tenure of governorship was witnessed in the

person of Photiades Pasha.

"But this tendency to conciliation of the conflicting elements

in the island was by no means to the liking of the Porte. The

presence of a Mussulman military governor was therefore

discovered to be necessary; and as his grade was usually

superior to that of the Vali, and the Mussulman sub-governor

was the official whose recommendations were of weight with the

Porte, nothing was easier than to create insuperable

difficulties for the Christian Vali. Thus successive Valis

were compelled—often by private wire from Constantinople—to

tender their resignation; while, at the same time, the Porte

took care not to fulfil the financial engagements prescribed

by the Pact. By these means an acute crisis was brought about

under the Governorship of Sartinski Pasha, a Pole, in 1889,

when a preconcerted plan of deception and treachery was

carried out by the Porte with consummate skill.

"The Cretans, as it is but natural, are guided in critical

contingencies by the advice they seek at Athens. The Porte

therefore promised to the Greek Government, as soon as things

began to assume a threatening aspect in Crete, to satisfy the

demands of the islanders, provided they were prevailed upon to

abstain from occupying certain important positions. In spite

of the transparent perfidy of the proposal, M. Tricoupis, the

then Greek Premier, fell into the snare. While the Cretans

were held back, troops were poured into the island, and the

strategical points having been seized, the Greek Government

and the Cretans were defied. An Imperial firman, issued in

November of that year, abrogated the Pact of Halepa and the

British Government, under whose auspices it was concluded, was

now powerless to exact respect for what was virtually an

international arrangement. There was no longer any question of

a Christian Vali with a fixed tenure of office, or of an

Assembly of Cretan representatives. Shakir Pasha, the

commander of the Turkish troops, was invested with absolute

civil and military authority; Mussulman Albanians occupied the

Christian villages as gendarmes, and Crete continued to submit

to this kind of martial law up to 1894. When, however, Mahmoud

Djelaleddin Pasha, the then Mussulman Vali, surpassed even his

predecessors in arbitrariness, and actually dictated to the

tribunals decisions in favour of Mohammedan litigants, the

Cretans began to lose patience and another outbreak appeared

imminent. It was only then that the Great Powers moved in the

matter and prevailed upon the Porte to revert partly to the

pre-existing order of things, by appointing Alexander

Karatheodory Pasha, a Christian and a Greek, as Governor.

Beyond this, however, the Pact of Halepa was not observed.

True to its traditional tactics, the Porte took with one hand

what it had given with the other. The Mussulman Deputy

Governor and the military commander frustrated every effort of

the Vali, the very funds necessary for the maintenance of the

gendarmerie being denied him. Karatheodory was consequently

forced to resign. Complete anarchy now reigned in the island."

_Ypsiloritis,

The Situation in Crete

(Contemporary Review, September, 1896)._

"Occasional skirmishes between the Christian inhabitants and

the soldiers kept the excitement simmering and ushered in the

sanguinary scenes that finally followed. Turkhan Pasha, taking

time by the forelock, armed the Cretan Moslems for the combat

with the approval of the commander of the troops, and the

city of Canea prepared for a blood bath. The Mohammedan Lent

(Ramazan) was drawing to a close, and the three days of

rejoicing which invariably follow (Bairam) were supposed to be

fixed for the attack on the Christians. These anticipations

were duly realised, and on the 24th May, 1896, at 1 o'clock P.

M., the Turks fired the first shots, blowing out the brains of

several Christians to make that Moslem holiday.

{541}

Forearmed, however, is forewarned, and the Christians defended

themselves to the best of their ability on that day and the

25th and 26th, during which every house in Canea was

barricaded, and neighbours living on opposite sides of the

absurdly narrow streets fired at each other from behind stone

heaps piled up in the windows of their bedrooms. The streets

were deserted, all traffic suspended, and it was not until the

27th that the thirty Christian corpses (including two women

and four children) and the twenty lifeless Turks were removed

for burial.

"These events provoked a new administrative change of scene:

Turkhan Pasha was recalled, and Abdullah Pasha, at the head of

four battalions from Salonica, came to take his place. These

troops laid waste the villages and fields of the provinces of

Apokorona, Cydonia, and Kissamo, burning houses, huts, and

churches on the way. The best soldiers in the world, however,

run terrible risks in the interior of Crete, and Abdullah was

repulsed with the loss of two hundred men at the town of

Vamos. The foreign consuls at Canea, having verified these

facts, strongly blamed his conduct in a joint verbal note, and

the Porte shortly afterwards recalled him, and appointed

Berovitch Pasha [Prince of Samos] in his place. This was the

beginning of the end. The Christians of the island meanwhile

met, and through their delegates formulated certain demands,

which the foreign consuls referred to their ambassadors at

Constantinople, and the famous 'Modifications of the

Convention of Halepa' were framed in consequence. The sultan,

too, yielding to tardy pressure, graciously conceded the

nomination of a Christian governor-general in the person of

Berovitch, the summoning of the National Assembly, and other

demands. … The questions of the tribunals and the gendarmerie

[for the enforcement of peace and order in the island] were to

be arranged by international commissions; but weeks and months

passed away before they were even appointed. … At last the

commissions arrived and began their work in December [1896]."

_E. J. Dillon,

Crete and the Cretans

(Fortnightly Review, May, 1897)._

TURKEY: A. D. 1896 (January-March

Turkish opposition to English and American measures

for relief to Armenian sufferers.

Work of Miss Clara Barton and the Red Cross Society.

For some time the distribution of supplies from England and

America to the sufferers in Armenia was forbidden by the

Turkish government, for reasons stated by the Turkish minister

at Washington as follows: "The collections are made on the

strength of speeches delivered in public meetings by

irreconcilable enemies of the Turkish race and religion, and

on the basis of false accusations that Turkey repudiates.

Besides, the Sublime Porte is mindful of the true interests of

its subjects, and, distinguishing between the real state of

things and the calumnies and wild exaggerations of interested

or fanatical parties, will under its own legitimate control

alleviate the wants of all Turkish subjects, irrespective of

creed or race." The Red Cross Society, of which the American

branch had prepared to send its President, Miss Clara Barton,

with a small corps of assistants, to the scene of the

suffering, was especially excluded, by the order of the Porte.

Miss Barton and her staff sailed, however, from New York, in

January, and Mr. Terrell, the American minister at

Constantinople, succeeded in obtaining permission for them to

do their humane work as private individuals, not in the name

of the obnoxious society, and without displaying its insignia:

The single-mindedness, the prudence, the patient energy with

which Miss Barton pursued the one object of giving relief to

the suffering, overcame all opposition and all obstructions,

so that, in April, she was able to report:

"The way is all made clear for sending supplies. The suitable

agents all along the route are now known, and have been

arranged with for service, so that heavy supplies can be sent

at any and all times as they are needed. I feel my breath come

lighter as I think of these poor scourged and fever-stricken

towns without even one doctor, when our sixteen strong,

skilled men, with twenty-five camels' burden of supplies,

shall carry some light of hope and help into their night of

hopeless woe. I am happy to be able to say for the comfort of

contributors, that I hold the written word of the Porte,

officially given through the minister of foreign affairs from

the grand vizier, that not the slightest interference with any

distribution within the province will be had. This official

document was addressed and delivered to Sir Philip Currie, the

British ambassador, and by him passed to me. The decision is

general and final, without question or reservation, and

settles all doubt."

In September Miss Barton returned home for rest, and to bear

her testimony to America of the immensity of the need still

existing in the Armenian provinces and calling for help. Her

departure from Constantinople was reported by the newspapers

to have been the occasion of a remarkable demonstration, by

cheers, flags and salutes, from ship and shore, of the

estimate put upon the work she had done.

TURKEY: A. D. 1896 (August).

Attack of Armenian revolutionists on the

Ottoman Bank at Constantinople.

Turkish massacre of Armenians in the city.

In the spring of 1896, the Armenian revolutionists, encouraged

by the outbreak in Crete, made fresh appeals for attention to

the sufferings of their country, with threats of some

desperate action if no heed was given. In August, the

desperate act was undertaken, at Constantinople, by 30 or 40

madly devoted men. This reckless little band of misguided

patriots made a sudden attack on the Ottoman Bank, a British

institution which controls finance in the Turkish empire,

gained possession of the building, made prisoners and hostages

of two of its directors and some 80 of its clerks, and were

fully prepared with dynamite to destroy everything within its

walls, including themselves, if certain reforms which they set

forth were not instantly decreed. Their theory was, that "the

Ambassadors would force the Sultan to grant the reasonable

reforms which they demanded for the Armenians, rather than

permit the destruction of the Bank and its staff. It was a

scheme borrowed from the theatre, absurd in itself, and made

ridiculous by the way in which they failed to carry it out.

They went in bravely, and nothing hindered their destroying

the Bank, but they allowed themselves to be talked out of it

by Mr. Maximoff, the Russian dragoman, and would have been the

laughing stock of the world if its attention had not been

absorbed by the massacre which followed.

{542}

"The real heroism of that day was displayed in another quarter

of the city, by another small party of Russian Armenians, men

and women, who took possession of two stone houses and fought

the Turkish troops to the death, the survivors killing

themselves when they could fight no longer. There was no

serious fighting anywhere else, although dynamite bombs were

thrown from the windows of houses and khans upon the troops in

a number of places, showing that some preparation had been

made for a more extended outbreak. There is nothing to be said

in justification of this attempt of the revolutionists. They had

provocation enough to justify anything in reason, but there

was nothing reasonable in this plan, nothing in it to attract

the sympathy of the Powers or to conciliate public opinion;

and if the statements are true which have been made by

Armenians as to certain unexecuted parts of the plan, it was

diabolical. This only can be said on behalf of these

revolutionary committees. They are the natural outcome of the

treatment of the Armenians by the Turkish Government during

the last twenty years. When oppression passes a certain limit

and men become desperate, such revolutionary organisation

always appears. They are the fruit and not the cause of the

existing state of things in Turkey, and if we can judge by the

experience of other countries, the worse things become here,

the more violent will be the action of these committees,

whether Europe enjoys it or not.

"Revolutionists are the same all the world over, but the

Turkish Government is unique, and it is not the attack on the

Bank which interests us but the action of the Government which

followed it. As we have said, the authorities had full

information of what was to be attempted and did nothing to

prevent it, but they made every preparation for carrying out

their own plan. Bands of ruffians were gathered in Stamboul,

Galata, and Pera, made up of Kurds, Lazes, and the lower class

of Turks, armed with clubs, knives or firearms; and care was

taken that no one should kill or plunder in the quarter to

which he belonged, lest he should be recognised and complaint

made afterwards by the Embassies, with a demand for

punishment. A large number of carts were in readiness to carry

off the dead. The troops and police were in great force to

prevent any resistance, and to assist the mob if necessary. It

was a beautiful day, the streets were crowded, and few had any

idea of what had happened at the Bank, when suddenly, without

any warning, the work of slaughter and plunder began,

everywhere at once. European ladies on the way to the

Bosphorus steamers suddenly found themselves surrounded by

assassins, and saw men beaten to death at their feet. Foreign

merchants saw their own employés cut to pieces at their doors.

The streets in some places literally ran with blood. Every man

who was recognised as an Armenian was killed without mercy. In

general, the soldiers took no part in the slaughter and

behaved well, and this somewhat reassured those in the streets

who were not Armenians; but in a few moments the shops were

closed and a wild panic spread through the city. The one idea

of everyone was to get home; and as the foreigners and better

classes live out of the city in summer they had to go to the

Galata bridge to take the steamers, which ran as usual all

through the three days of massacre. This took them through the

streets where the slaughter was going on, and consequently we

have the testimony of hundreds of eye-witnesses as to what

took place. The work of death and plunder continued unchecked

for two days. On Friday there were isolated outbreaks, and

occasional assassinations occurred up to Tuesday.

"The number killed will never be known. The Ambassadors put it

at 5,000 or 6,000; the official report to the palace at 8,750,

besides those thrown into the sea. Thousands of houses, shops

and offices were plundered, including a number belonging to

Greeks and foreigners. Everything was done in the most

systematic way, and there was not a moment of anarchy, not a

moment when the army and police had not perfect control of the

city during all these days. … The majority of those massacred

belonged to the working class—especially the hamals

(porters)—but a large number of gentlemen, merchants and other

wealthy men, were killed, together with about fifty women and

children. The savage brutality of the Moslem mob was something

beyond all imagination, and in many cases the police joined in

beating men to death and hacking others to death with knives,

in the very face of Europeans. … In may cases European

officials appealed to the officers in command of the troops,

who were looking on at the slaughter of helpless, unarmed men,

to interfere and put a stop to it. The reply was 'We have

orders.' It was an officer who killed the clerk of the British

Post-office on the steps. And some of the most cold-blooded

and horrible murders took place in front of the guard house,

at the Galata end of the bridge, in the presence of officers

of the Sultan's household of the highest rank. They also had

their orders.

"Happily for the honour of the Turkish people, there is

another side to the story. It was the Government and not the

people that conducted this massacre. And although the vile

instruments employed were told that they were acting in the

name of the Prophet, and freely used his name, and are

boasting to-day of what they did for Islam, the Sheik-ul-Islam

forbad the Softas taking any part in the slaughter, and many a

pious Turk did what he could to protect his neighbours. … It

is not the people, not even the mob, who are responsible for

this great crime. It was deliberately committed by the

Government. The Ambassadors of the six Powers have declared

this to be an unquestionable fact in the Joint Note addressed

to the Porte.

"Since the massacre this same Government has been carrying on

a warfare against the Armenians which is hardly less inhuman

than beating out their brains with clubs. There were from

150,000 to 200,000 Armenians in Constantinople. They were

merchants, shopkeepers, confidential clerks, employés in banks

and offices of every kind—the chief business men of the city.

They were the bakers of the city, they had charge of the khans

and bazaars and the wealth of the city; they were the porters,

house-servants, and navvies. … Now the Government has

undertaken to ruin this whole population. They are hunted

about the city and over the hills, like wild beasts. …

Thousands have been sent off at once to the Black Sea ports,

to find their way as best they can without money or food to

their desolated villages in the interior. … Thousands have

fled to foreign countries."

_The Constantinople Massacre

(Contemporary Review, October, 1896)._

{543}

TURKEY:A. D. 1897 (January-February).

Fresh conflicts in Crete.

Attitude of Christians and Mussulmans towards each other.

Reports of the British Consul-General and others.

Early in January, 1897, while proceedings for the organization

of the new gendarmerie were under way, and while the

discussion of candidates for the National Assembly, to be

elected in March, was rife, fresh hostilities between

Christians and Mussulmans broke out, and there seems to be

good evidence in the following report, by Sir Alfred Biliotti,

the British Consul-General at Canea, that responsibility for

the state of things in Crete should be charged upon one party

hardly more than upon the other. The despatch of the

Consul-General to Lord Salisbury, written January 9, 1897, is

partly as follows:

"In the afternoon of the 3rd instant a great panic occurred in

the town owing to a wounded Christian having been conveyed to

the hospital, where he died of his wounds in the night, and to

a rumour that two Mussulmans had been killed or wounded at the

same time on the road between Canea and Suda Bay. All the

shops were shut up as usual, but there was no general 'sauve

qui peut,' Christians especially having congregated in the

square near the hospital in the hope of finding out further

information. Happening to be in the town, I took a carriage

and drove towards Suda. When at about a mile distant from

Canea I came upon a number of Mussulmans, who told me that

four Christians going to Apokorona had, without any

provocation whatever, discharged their revolvers on three

Mussulmans, two of whom had been severely wounded. I saw one

of them in his cottage hard by the road with a bullet wound in

the abdomen; the other had been conveyed on horseback to the

village of Tsikalaria (southeast of Suda Bay), 2 miles from

where he had been wounded, of which he was a native. The four

Christians fled across the fields, leaving on the road a horse

and an overcoat, and took to the mountains.

"Between half and a quarter of an-hour after this incident

another Christian, a native, like the Turk, of Tsikalaria, was

passing on the road when he was fired upon by Mussulmans in

retaliation for the wounding of their two co-religionists. Not

having been hit, the Christian jumped from his mule and ran

for his life along the Suda road, being pursued by armed

Turks. He was overtaken by three of them about half-a-mile

farther down, and was shot at and mortally wounded at 20 paces

in front of Commander Shortland, of Her Majesty's ship 'Nile,'

who was coming on foot from Suda Bay to Canea. The wounded

Christian was taken charge of by the Albanian corporal

stationed in a Christian monastery close by, and was

subsequently put in a carriage by the Russian Consul, who was

returning from Suda Bay at that moment, and sent to the town

hospital, where he died. While I was making inquiries on the

road a brisk fusillade was heard towards Tsikalaria, and as I

was about to return to Halepa a young Turk was seen at a

distance running towards us with a letter in his hand. It was

a message sent by the Albanian corporal stationed at

Tsikalaria asking for assistance. This messenger had hardly

arrived when a gendarme was seen coming down in great haste.

He said that the fight between Christians and Mussulmans

having become general, and there being only another gendarme

with the corporal, armed assistance was immediately required.

I took both these messengers and conveyed them to the gate of

the town, from whence I drove to Halepa to acquaint the Vali

with what was taking place. It was getting dark when I met on

the road his Excellency accompanied by the Italian Consul

going on foot to Canea, having found no available carriage,

and I drove back with them. The position was rather

perplexing. There was no available gendarmerie, and no

soldiers could be sent out, as they would have been fired upon

by the Christians. …

"Early on the day following, that is, on the 4th instant, the

Governor-General visited the village of Tsikalaria and the

villages westward of it in order to ascertain the truth with

regard to the numerous reports which were in circulation since

the preceding evening. It would seem that on hearing of his

son having been killed on the Canea-Suda road, the father of

the wounded Mussulman opened fire on the Christians. Other

Christians maintain that this wounded Mussulman, after having

shot at the Christian on the road, hastened to Tsikalaria, and

together with his father, began firing on the Christians. In a

very short time all the Christians rushed towards the heights,

and the Mussulmans towards the plain. During this evolution a

Christian was killed, it is said, by the father of the wounded

Mussulman, who had been arrested and is in prison. The same

night the women and children took refuge in the villages on

the mountains, while a contingent of 150 armed Christians came

down from Campos and Keramia in order to assist the male

population of Tsikalaria to defend their property. On the

other hand, armed Mussulmans flocked from all parts of the

plain to defend their co-religionists. The Mussulmans at

Perivolia, where they are of nearly equal numerical force,

tried to surround the Christians in order to keep them as

hostages for the safety of their co-religionists in other

villages where the Christians are more numerous. In so doing

they shot down a Christian, on whom they also inflicted

numerous knife stabs, finally cutting his throat. This was

followed by an emigration to, and armed assistance from, the

mountain villages as at Tsikalaria. "In the village of

Varipetro the Mayor, assisted by the corporal of gendarmerie,

a Mussulman Albanian, was doing his utmost to prevent a

conflict between its Christian and Mussulman inhabitants, when

a Christian from Lakkos, whose brother had been murdered two

years ago by a native Mussulman, stealing behind the corporal,

shot him dead. The Christians of Varipetro, with whom the

corporal was popular, having tried to arrest his murderer, the

Lakkiotes, who had come there in order to defend their

co-religionists, turned their arms against them, and prevented

them from carrying out their intention. In consequence of this

murder all the Christians of Varipetro emigrated to the

mountains, and all the Mussulmans to the town of Canea. Nearly

1,000 Christians from the plains of Cydonia and Kissamo came

to defend the inhabitants of Galata and Darazzo, and for a

time blockaded the Turks in the village of Kirtomado, Aghia, &c.

{544}

But the inhabitants of Galata, who are all Christians, have so

much confidence in the Mussulman Albanian Lieutenant called

Islam, who is stationed in their village, that they begged

their co-religionists to withdraw, which they did. …

"As is always the case, each party claims to have been

attacked by the other party, and the truth is not likely to be

ever discovered. Be this as it may, both Christians and

Mussulmans remain under the unshaken conviction that they are

wronged by the other party; this increases the animosity of

one sect against the other, and each member of the two races

will act on this conviction. This is the inevitable

consequence of the absolute want of confidence between the two

elements, and there is not the least hope that this feeling

will disappear, nor even slightly decrease, so long as they

are left to themselves. In the present instance it may be that

the Mussulmans, or some of them, may have considered

themselves bound to retaliate for recent murders committed on

their co-religionists by Christians. … The Christians are

convinced, and all their proceedings are marked by that

conviction, that all the incidents which trouble the public

peace are devices of the native Mussulmans to prevent the

execution of the promised reforms. I do not deny that the

attitude of the authorities at Constantinople may have such an

effect on the low class of Cretan Mussulmans; but it is far

from being so with the educated class who are as, if not more,

anxious than the Christians that the intended reforms should

be carried out without delay. In fact, they know that they

have nothing to hope from Constantinople, and that the only

protection of the minority to which they belong lies in the

promised reforms. On the other hand, I have observed with the

greatest pleasure that the Christians laid down their arms at

the first recommendation of the Consuls to do so, which proves

a sincere desire on their part to live in peace. When the

Christians were taking up arms in former times they used to

remain for weeks, even for months, on the mountains in spite

of the entreaties of the Consuls. Therefore, the Christians

and the Mussulmans are respectively well disposed, but there

is such an insuperable distrust on both sides, that they can

never come to a mutual understanding. Whether the incidents

which cause disturbances or disorders on the island are the

work of the Turks or of the Christians or of both is quite

immaterial to me. The important fact to be taken into

consideration is that an exchange of a few shots between one

or two Christians and as many Mussulmans is sufficient to

cause several districts, four in the present instance (Canea,

Apokorona, Sphakia, and Kissamo), to take up arms, and also

that there can be no doubt that such scenes will be repeated

on every recurrence of such incidents."

To the same effect, Captain Custance, of the British ship

Barfleur, reported on the 15th to Admiral Hopkins: "The

general situation, as I understand it, is, that the Cretan

Christian leaders, urged on by certain interested people at

Athens, have been preparing for some time to make an attempt

to drive the Turkish authorities out of the island in the

spring, if a favourable opportunity offers. The Mussulmans

would not be sorry to see the last of the Turkish Government

if they could only be sure that their lives and property would

be safe under the new regime, which, owing to the bitter

hatred existing between the Christians and Mussulmans, cannot

be expected. The two parties are face to face, armed to the

teeth, with long-standing feuds and wrongs, and with no force

between them capable of maintaining order."

On the 27th of January the Consul-General reported by telegram

to Lord Salisbury: "An outburst of terror, such as has not yet

occurred in Candia, has been caused by the commencement of a

fresh immigration of Mussulmans into the town, and by the

murder, within a week, of two men of that faith, and a few

minor outrages." The next day he reported: "Telegraphic news

from Candia, dated to-day, reports murder of a Mussulman, and

wounding of two others, and murder of seven Christians; murder

of further Mussulmans is rumoured. The Mussulman Military

Commissioner, and the Austrian Military Attache, now in

Candia, report that they met about 1,000 armed Mussulmans

moving inland, and numbers of Mussulman families moving

towards the town." Again, on the 2d of February: "Murder of

four Mussulmans last night, following on wounding of Christian

by Mussulman on the 31st January near Canea. Panic ensued in

Canea and Suda Bay this morning. Shops all closed. Shots fired

in town and Halepa, which resulted in death of two Mussulmans.

Four mixed villages, one large Christian village, and several

farms in environs are in flames." On the 4th, Colonel

Chermside, of the gendarmerie commission, sent the following

statement to Lord Salisbury: "The most that we have been able

to attempt to-night is to get a cordon to separate Christian

and Moslem quarters. Patrolling was tried, but the fire from

the Christians was too heavy to maintain it. Several Turkish

soldiers have been killed and wounded."

_Great Britain,

Parliamentary Publications

(Papers by Command:

Turkey, Number 10, 1897, pages 15-45)._

TURKEY: A. D. 1897 (February-March).

Greek interference in Crete.

Greek forces in the island.

Demands for annexation of Crete to Greece.

Action of the Powers in the "Concert of Europe."

Pacific blockade of Crete.

Early in February, the difficulties of the attempt which the

leading European powers, acting in what was known as "the

Concert of Europe," were making to settle affairs in Crete by

reforming its Turkish government, were complicated by

interference from Greece. The Greeks, in ardent sympathy with

their Cretan kinsmen, were eager to take up the cause of the

Christian inhabitants of the island, and their government was

driven into independent action to that end, hoping that

Christian sentiment in Europe would constrain the Powers to

give it a free hand. A Greek squadron was sent to Crete, to

bring away fugitives—women and children especially—and to

prevent the landing of Turkish reinforcements. This was

quickly followed by an expedition of 2,000 men, Colonel Vassos

in command. An instant stimulation of the insurrection

occurred, and declarations demanding the annexation of Crete

to the kingdom of Greece began to appear; while the Greek

government represented in a note to the Powers that no

possible solution of the Cretan problem could be found without

concession to that demand. The Greek troops, considerably

increased in number, were landed on the island, joining the

insurgent Cretans, and beginning operations against the Turks.

{545}

On the 13th of February the admirals commanding the foreign

naval forces at Canea joined in sending a warning to the Greek

commodore, requiring him to "desist from all hostile acts and

to conform with international law." On the 15th a mixed force

of British, French, Russian, Italian and Austrian marines was

landed for the protection of the town. On the same day, from

Colombari, Colonel Vassos, the Greek commander, issued a

proclamation, saying: "In the name of His Majesty, George I.,

King of the Greeks, I occupy the Island of Crete, and proclaim

this to its inhabitants without distinction of sex or

nationality. I promise in the name of His Majesty that I will

protect the honour, life and property, and will respect the

religious convictions, of its inhabitants, bringing them peace

and equality rights." On the 17th, the Turkish forces at Canea

were attacked by the Greeks and insurgents, and the attack was

renewed on the 21st; whereupon, after warnings from the

foreign admirals in the harbor, the Russian, German, Austrian

and British ships opened fire on the attacking troops. In the

meantime, considerable bodies of Mohammedans were being

besieged by superior forces at other points in the island,

with great danger of massacre if overcome.

On the 2d of March, the representatives of Great Britain,

Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, at

Constantinople, arrived at an agreement of action, and jointly

addressed notes to the governments of Turkey and Greece. To the

Porte they wrote: "The Great Powers, animated by the desire to

assure the maintenance of peace and to see the integrity of

the Ottoman Empire respected, have sought for the means of

ending the disorders that have led to their armed intervention

in Crete, as well as of putting an end to the presence of the

Greek forces in the island. They have recognized that in

consequence of the delay in applying them, the reforms

contemplated in the Arrangement of August 25, 1896, no longer

correspond to the requirements of the present situation, and

they have agreed upon the following points:

1. Crete can in no case be annexed to Greece in the present

circumstances.

2. The island will be endowed by the Powers with an autonomous

administration ('régime').

In notifying these decisions to the Sublime Porte by order of

their Governments, the Representatives of the Great Powers at

Constantinople think it their duty to communicate the

resolution which has been taken by their Governments to

address to Greece a summons to withdraw her troops and naval

forces from Crete."

To the Greek government the same announcement was made, that

"Crete can in no case, in the present circumstances, be

annexed to Greece," and the communication was more explicit in

the further statements, as follows:

"In view of the delays caused by Turkey in the application of

the reforms agreed upon in concert with the Powers, and which

now make it impossible to adapt those reforms to a changed

condition of affairs, the Powers are resolved, while

maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to endow

Crete with an absolutely effective autonomous administration

(régime), intended to secure to it a separate government,

under the high suzerainty of the Sultan. The Cabinets are

convinced that these views can only be realized by the

withdrawal of the Greek ships and troops now in the waters and

on the territory of the island which is occupied by the

Powers. We accordingly confidently expect this decision from

the wisdom of His Majesty's Government, which cannot wish to

persist in a course opposed to the decision of the Powers, who

are determined to carry out an early pacification, which is as

necessary for Crete as it is for the maintenance of general

peace. I will not, however, conceal from your Excellency that

I am instructed to warn you that, in case of a refusal of the

Royal Government, the Great Powers have arrived at the

irrevocable decision not to shrink from any measure of

compulsion if, on the expiration of six days, the recall of

the Greek ships and troops from Crete has not been effected."

The Turkish government replied on the 6th: "The Sublime Porte

has had the honour to receive the note which the Ambassadors

of the Great Powers were good enough to address to it on the

2nd of March relative to Crete. The Imperial Government takes

note with satisfaction of the assurances which the Great

Powers are good enough to give it as to their desire to

respect the integrity of the Empire and of the decision which

they have taken to obtain the withdrawal of the Greek ships of

war and troops from Crete. Relying upon their friendly

sentiments, and upon their firm resolve not to impair the

Sultan's rights of sovereignty, the Sublime Porte, which is

itself desirous of assuring the maintenance of peace, accepts

the principle of an autonomy to be accorded to Crete, while

reserving to itself liberty to discuss with the Ambassadors

the form and the details of the administration ('régime') with

which the island is to be endowed."

Two days later, the Greek government replied at greater

length, imploring the Great Powers "not to insist upon the

system of autonomy decided on, but to give back to Crete what

it already possessed at the time of the liberation of the

other provinces which form the Hellenic kingdom, and to

restore it to Greece, to which it already belonged in the time

of the Presidency of Capodistria," and appealing against the

demand for the withdrawal of the Greek military forces from

the island. "Since, in our opinion," wrote M. Skouses, the

Greek minister, "the new autonomous administration ('régime')

condition could not fulfil the noble object of the Powers, it

is clear what would be the condition of the unfortunate island

from now until the establishment of that administration, if

the Great Powers decided to persist in their resolve.

"In this connection, and in the name of humanity, as also in

the interest of the pacification of the island—a pacification

which is the sole object of the solicitude of the Great

Powers—we do not hesitate to appeal to them in regard to the

other measure, relative to the withdrawal of our military

forces. … The presence in the island of the Greek army is …

demanded by the dictates of humanity, and is necessary in the

interest of the definitive restoration of order. It is, above

all, our duty not to leave the Cretan people at the mercy of

Mussulman fanaticism, and of the Turkish army, which has

always intentionally, and by connivance, been a party to the

acts of aggression of the populace against the Christians.

{546}

"Above all, if our troops in the island, who are worthy of the

full confidence of the Great Powers, were intrusted with the

mandate of pacifying the country, their wishes and intentions

would at once be completely satisfied. It would then be

possible, after order had been restored, to obtain a free

expression of the wishes of the Cretan people, with a view to

decide their lot. Not only are the horrors which during

several decades have occurred periodically in Crete, not

committed without profoundly agitating the Hellenic people,

but they also interrupt the social activity, and seriously

disturb the economy and finances of the State. Even if it were

possible for us to forget for a moment that we are

co-religionists of the Cretan people, that we are of the same

race, and allied by blood, we cannot conceal from the Great

Powers that the Hellenic State is unable to resist such shocks

any longer. We therefore appeal to the generous sentiments

which animate the Great Powers, and beg them to allow the

Cretan people to declare how it desires to be governed."

_Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications

(Papers by Command: Turkey, Numbers 4 and 5, 1897)._

The position taken by the Greek government in this reply was

firmly maintained. Its troops were not withdrawn from Crete,

and the Powers of "the Concert," thus practically defied, had

difficulty in agreeing upon the next steps they would take.

France, England, and Italy would not consent to strong

measures of coercion proposed by Russia, Germany and Austria,

and the decision reached finally was to establish what is

known as a "pacific blockade" of the Cretan coast, to begin on

the 21st of March. This was announced on the 18th by the

admirals commanding on that coast, who gave notice: "The

blockade will be general for all vessels flying the Greek

flag. Vessels of the Six Powers or of neutral Powers will be

allowed to enter the ports in the occupation of the Powers and

land their merchandise there, but only if it is not intended

for the Greek troops or for the interior of the island. The

ships of the international fleets may visit these vessels."

The Greek government was notified to recall its men-of-war

still in Cretan waters, with the warning that "they will be

retained there by force if they have not left by 8 A. M. on

the 21st March."

On the day previous to this announcement of blockade the same

admirals had published a proclamation as follows:

"The undersigned, Commanders-in-chief of the naval forces of

Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and

Russia, in Cretan waters, acting under instructions from their

respective Governments, solemnly proclaim and announce to the

people of the island that the Great Powers have arrived at the

irrevocable decision to secure the complete autonomy of Crete,

under the suzerainty of the Sultan. It is well understood that

the Cretans are to be free from all control on the part of the

Sublime Porte as regards their internal affairs. The principal

aim of the Powers being to provide a remedy for the evils

which have afflicted the country, and to prevent their

recurrence, they are drawing up in concert a scheme of

measures intended to regulate the working of the autonomous

régime, to restore peace, to assure to everyone, without

distinction of race or religion, liberty and security of

property, and to facilitate, by the resumption of agricultural

work and trade, the progressive development of the resources

of the country. Such is the aim of the Powers. They wish this

to be understood by all. A new era is commencing for Crete;

let all lay down their arms. The Powers desire peace and

order. They will, if it be required, have the necessary

authority to make their decisions respected. They count on the

co-operation of all the inhabitants of the island, Christian

and Mussulman, to assist them in accomplishing a work which

promises to secure concord and prosperity to the Cretans."

To the promise of an autonomous government for Crete the

insurgent Christians appear to have given no heed; but a great

number of the Mohammedan inhabitants of the island united in

sending telegrams to the British minister at Constantinople,

which were all of the tenor of the following: "Your Excellency

knows that the Christians of Crete, forming the numerical

majority of the population, but incapable of properly

administering the former privileges they enjoyed, have now

again been emboldened to massacre, destroy, and ruin, in the

same way that in the past they have always made ill-use of

their liberties in the country by the treacherous destruction

and ruin of their Moslem fellow-countrymen. Therefore, if the

people are left irresponsible for the government of the

country, which is the very breath of human life, it will

facilitate the completion of their bloodthirsty designs, and

hasten the ruin of the Mussulmans. We are quite sure that this

state of things will not recommend itself to the sympathy of

the Great Powers, the propagators of civilization.

"We therefore beg, in the name of the Mussulman population,

that the internal affairs of the Christian inhabitants of

Crete who have not yet reached even the first step on the path

of civilization, and are led away by the seditious designs of

Greece, may not be removed from the direction of the Sublime

Porte; if this be impossible, we beg that the internal affairs

of the island may be placed under the continual control of the

Great Powers in conjunction with the Porte; and we finally beg

that the necessary measures may be taken for the protection of

the life, honour, and property, as well as the rights of the

20,000 Mussulman inhabitants now living in Turkey, whose

interest in property is greater in value than that of the

Christians, and who are occupied with commerce and other

pursuits, besides those who live In the island, who, if

necessary, are prepared to undergo a census, and who exceed

100,000."

The situation of the Moslem population of the island was

represented a little later by Colonel Chermside, in a despatch

to Lord Salisbury, as follows:

"Over 49,000 Moslems are assembled in Candia and within cordon

area, comprising 25 square miles, viz., about two-thirds of

Moslem population of Crete. Of these, 29,000 are refugees from

central and eastern districts of island. Doles of flour are

issued to 39,000 persons; issue up to date 18 lb. per head; no

other food issued. The mass of the people have no buying power

and no work, but since arrival of British troops, armed

individuals are rare in streets; distress is supported with

great fortitude, in spite of insufficient food and ravages of

small-pox. Population hopes for future foreign protection

against Christian compatriots. "

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

Turkey, Number 10, 1897, pages 153-178._

{547}

TURKEY: A. D. 1897 (March-September).

War with Greece.

Success of the Turkish arms.

Peace sought by the Greek Government.

Notwithstanding the opposition of the Great Powers, the Greeks

were rashly bent upon war with the Turks, and, when balked in

Crete, began hostile demonstrations along the Turkish frontier

in their own peninsula. The events that followed have been

thus described by an eye-witness, who wrote immediately

afterwards: "When I arrived in Athens," says this writer,

"early last March [1897], although the Cretan insurrection was

being openly supported by Greek arms, war had not been

declared against Turkey. It was what I think was once

described in Parliament as 'a condition of war,' but not war.

… King George and his advisers rashly decided to attempt to

hasten matters in their own fashion. Agitation was begun

without and within the Turkish frontier, and the Ethuike

Hetairia manufactured alarms and disturbances in Macedonia and

Epirus. Attempts were made in other directions, but though

money and emissaries were sent, nothing came of it. Meanwhile

the mobilisation of the Greek army was begun, and later on

reserves were called out. Knowing a good deal about the

relative condition of preparedness for war of both Turkey and

Greece, I spoke without reserve on the subject to the King

and, later on, to the Princes. I told them nearly every

military intelligence department in Europe knew that Turkey

had been getting her troops ready for a year past to deal with

insurrection or invasion along the Macedonian frontier. Within

the Salonica military district she had nearly 100,000 men under

arms, all well trained and passably equipped. Besides infantry

she had nearly 10,000 cavalry, and within a month could place

a further force of 70,000 infantry in the field. Against these

the Greeks could not bring more than 60,000 regulars. There no

doubt might be mustered twice that number of men, but they

would be untrained irregulars and volunteers who would take a

month at least before they could be of much use, and Turkey

would have her bands of irregulars out also to offset their

value. It was notorious besides that the Greek army was

indifferently organised, that it had no transport, no

commissariat department, no medical department, and was

without anything like a sufficiency of trained officers. …

"Prepared or not, the Greeks clamoured for war, never doubting

latterly but that they would win. They protested that the

Hellenes were aroused and would fight and die, if need be, to

the last man. Greece would not waive an iota of her demands.

We were told that the Greeks scattered throughout the Turkish

Empire would spring to arms and paralyze the enemy's hands.

There were to be fearful outbreaks in Macedonia, Epirus, and

Albania, and tumults and burnings in all the chief cities

under Turkish rule where Greeks dwelt—Smyrna, Constantinople,

Salonica, and so on. I was informed that insurrectionary bands

were being got ready to invade Macedonia and Epirus, and I was

introduced to several of the leaders of these new expeditions.

… I saw many of these Greek filibusters at Kalabaka and other

places. By order from Athens the local commandants supplied

them with stores, transport, and trenching tools, and sent

guides to direct them, so that they should slip across into

Macedonia at the most suitable points for conducting their

operations. …

"The Greeks had a fairly long innings carrying on the war

within Turkish territory, whilst disingenuously disclaiming

responsibility for the acts of their own levies. Finally, in

April, the Sultan declared war and set his forces in motion.

Prior to that date the Greeks had moved up the whole of their

available strength close to the Thessalian frontier. The army

numbered nearer fifty than sixty thousand, of all ranks. …

Before war was declared the Crown Prince Constantine arrived

in Larissa, and took over the command of the Greek army in

Thessaly. … He had no military experience; and, as events

disclosed, was neither of a martial disposition nor of a firm

temperament. He showed subsequently that he felt keenly his

false position, and he tried to excuse the awful failures made

in the conduct of the campaign of panic and flight. …

"Independence Day having passed without a general invasion of

Macedonia by the Greeks, it is likely that the Turks had

thought the danger over, when suddenly firing began in a night

along the frontier from Nezeros to Ravenni. For a day or two the

Greeks carried all before them, capturing many block-houses

and taking a number of prisoners. They succeeded in

penetrating Turkish territory in some places for two or three

miles. … The Turks were in immediate danger of being

outflanked in one part of the field of operations, and

separated from their main force at Elassona. It was midday,

the 19th of April, when at a critical moment for the safety of

a portion of Edhem's forces an order arrived from the Crown

Prince to cease firing and retire the whole Greek army back

upon their own side of the frontier. … After an interval of

three hours, during which there was little or no firing, a

message arrived from headquarters that a blunder had been made

and the army was to readvance and engage the enemy. It was a

lost opportunity, for the Turks followed up the Greeks and

reoccupied the lines from which they had been driven. … The

cost of the blunder was a serious one to the Greeks, for in a

futile attempt, on the following day, to retake Gresovala,

General Mavromichali lost 2,000 men. …

"On the 21st of April, without any of the pictorial display or

reputed hand-to-hand fighting, some 40,000 Turks, not less,

accompanied by three cavalry regiments and half a score of

batteries, quietly streamed down the zigzag paved way in the

steep Melouna pass into Thessaly. They occupied the village of

Legaria and positions among the lowest foot hills at the

outlet of the pass. The Greeks were not able to embarrass them

as they deployed, although an attempt was made to find the

range with artillery. … For two days there was a fierce

artillery duel, interspersed occasionally with sharp rifle

fire as the infantry became engaged on the right and left of

the line. … All had ended in favour of the Greeks when the sun

set on the 22nd April, and the battle of Mati was over. … It

was the same night that the Crown Prince ordered the army to

retreat upon Larissa, twenty-five miles distant by road. About

8 P. M. the men were roused from their first sleep and

commanded to fall in. They did so very orderly and quietly,

thinking it was intended to deliver a surprise attack upon the

Turks.

{548}

The whole army was on the march, and had got five or six miles

from the battle-field, or close to Turnavos, when the

unaccountable mad panic seized them. Some say it originated

one way, some another. … The army broke into pieces and became

a furious rabble, which fled by road and fields south as hard

as most could run. Arms and ammunition and baggage were cast

aside wholesale. The Greek officers, as a rule, behaved worse

than the men, for they led the fleeing mob, and many of them

never stopped until they reached Pharsala or Vola. … The

whilom Greek army was a mob convinced that the Turkish cavalry

was upon their heels, though it never was near them. It gave

them the strength of despair, and so they covered afoot fifty

to sixty miles within twenty-four hours. The inhabitants of

Larissa and all the surrounding country, terrified at the

sudden calamity, were left by the military and civic

authorities, without hint or warning, to shift for themselves.

… The women and children of Larissa had to carry what they

wished to save upon their own backs. Thousands of these

helpless creatures, together with sick and wounded soldiers,

were left around the railway station, whilst officers rode off

upon the early or later special trains, to fly, as some of

them did, as far as Athens. The troops had gone hours before I

left Larissa, and even then there were no signs of the enemy

to be seen."

_Bennet Burleigh,

The Greek War, as I saw it

(Fortnightly Review, July, 1897)._

"Not until several hours after the departure of the last

Greek, did a few Turkish cavalrymen cautiously enter the town

[Larissa], some distance ahead of the Turkish army. … It was

the design of the Greeks to save Volo, a wealthy town, and the

haven of refuge of many of the peasants. Accordingly, a line

was formed from two miles beyond Pharsala to the pass which

was the doorway to Volo. About three miles from this pass was

the village of Velestino; and on the hills back of it were the

headquarters of Colonel Smollenske, commander of this, the

right wing of the Greek army. The Greek fleet, with decks

cleared for action, was in the Bay of Volo; having gone there

after the defeat of Mati, hoping that, in case the army

failed, its heavy guns would protect the town. After four

days, the Turks, having digested their victory with cigarettes

and coffee, were ready to renew fighting. Meanwhile, the Greeks

had put themselves in a sort of order. Evidently, the first

intention of the Turks was to force their way through

Smollenske's line and on to Volo. Accordingly, they attempted

to storm Smollenske's rifle-pits; but they were driven back

for the first time, and with the greatest loss that any such

movement had yet encountered in the campaign. … The Turks,

after a slight resistance, withdrew from the villages in front

of Velestino, which they had taken, and were soon moving over

to the left. Their plan of cutting the Greek line in two was

executed with energy. On the morning of May 7, Edhem Pasha

sent his fearless infantry, under heavy fire, up the hollows

between the mountain-ridges which ran at right angles to the

Turkish line across the plain. They intrepidly scaled the

ridges, and forced the Greeks from the position. Smollenske's

force was flanked and separated from the Crown Prince's force:

and he retreated in an orderly manner to Almyro. The Crown

Prince's force had been flanked on its left; at the same time

it was being flanked on its right by the force that had

flanked Smollenske. The Crown Prince, therefore, withdrew to

the heights of Domoko.

"So apparent was now the hopelessness of the Greek cause that

even the new ministry, which had been buoyed up into almost an

aggressive spirit by the 'victory' of Velestino, begged for

the intervention of the Powers. It was granted in the form of

a demand on the Sultan for an armistice. As there are six

Powers, each having a formal foreign office, this took some

time. The Sultan, as usual, was more deliberate than the six

tormentors, whom he in return tormented. Being truly Greek,

the Greek Cabinet seemed to believe that articles of peace

would be signed the moment the necessity of peace appealed to

the ministerial mind. … Two days after Pharsala, the Turkish

army appeared on the plain some ten miles from Domoko. There

it rested quietly for more than a week, leisurely celebrating

the important feast of Bairam. This confirmed the belief of

the Greek generals that the war was at an end. The morning of

May 17 found the Crown Prince's force more than ever convinced

of an armistice, and quite unprepared for an attack. At nine

o'clock the whole Turkish army began to advance upon the

astounded Greeks—most astounded of them all were the Crown

Prince and General Macris—in such a manner as to leave no

doubt as to its intention.

"The battle of Domoko which followed was the most sanguinary

of the campaign. … For three hours, that is, until

sundown,—the attack having begun at four o'clock,—the Greeks

steadily returned the hot fire of the Turks, who soon ceased

to advance, and doggedly hung on to the ground that they had

gained. … During this attack in front the Turks were making a

more important movement, strategically, on the right. … With

amazing intrepidity, during the hot action on the centre, the

Turks had fought their way over the mountains at the Greeks'

far right. Some reserves were sent around at sunset—but too

late. The Turkish left wing was already even with the town of

Domoko. Military experts maintain that the Crown Prince, by

readjusting his forces over night, could have given the

phlegmatic enemy a surprise in the morning, and held him in

check for several days. The retreat over the pass to Lamia

began at ten o'clock in the evening; and the next morning the

battalions covering the retreat were under heavy fire. The

Greeks' next stand was to be at Thermopylæ. Should the Turks

advance spiritedly, Smollenske's army would be cut off from

that of the Crown Prince, and forced to surrender. But the

Sultan, being somewhat appeased by more blood-letting, now

bowed before a letter from him whom the Greeks called 'a vile

enemy,'—the Czar,—who, for this act, saw his influence at

Constantinople supplanted by that of Germany, though the fear

of Russia was undiminished. At last the armistice came,—none

too soon for the demoralized army of Greece. The war had

lasted just thirty-one days."

_F. Palmer,

How the Greeks were defeated

(Forum, November, 1897)._

{549}

The preliminary treaty of peace, signed September 18, required

Greece to pay to Turkey a war indemnity of nearly eighteen

millions of dollars, arrangements for securing the payment of

which were to be controlled by an international commission

composed of one representative of each of the mediating

Powers. The same Powers were likewise to settle with Turkey a

rectification of the Greek frontier. Greece, in fact, was

helplessly in their hands.

TURKEY: A. D. 1897-1899.

Prolonged anarchy in Crete.

The inharmonious "Concert of Europe."

Final departure of Turkish troops and

officials from the island.

Organization of government under Prince George of Greece.

"The autonomous regime promised to this unfortunate island—the

Cuba of Europe—is still [at the end of 1897] apparently far

from realization. In the meantime a most distressing

condition; amounting to practical anarchy, prevails everywhere

except at some ports where the international gendarmerie

maintain a fair semblance of order. So completely have the

houses and property of the Mahometan population been destroyed

by the insurgents that the coming of winter has brought no

prospect to the former but one of desolation and famine.

Considerable pillaging of Christian houses by Mahometan

refugees was also reported from Candia, Kydonia, and other

points. In Candia the Turkish gendarmerie—recruited from the

worst class of Bashi-Bazouks—have proved worse than useless

for keeping order; they connive with the marauders and share

in the pillage. The British occupation is said to be only

nominal. …

"A strange satire upon the concert of Europe and the pretenses

of Western civilization was the circular letter addressed by

the Sultan to the powers, about mid-October, urging upon them

'in firm language' the necessity of promptness in restoring

tranquillity to the disordered island, and warning them of the

dangers of procrastination in this matter. … To accomplish the

pacification of Crete, the Sultan, in the letter referred to,

suggested that the entire population, Christian and Mahometan,

should be disarmed; that the disarmament should be carried out

by Ottoman troops; that the international troops should

co-operate in the work if the powers so desired; that the

entire force should be commanded by a European general in the

Turkish service; that an Ottoman garrison should be

permanently maintained; that the governor should be a

Christian and an Ottoman subject; and that a corps of

gendarmerie should be formed. … Toward the end of October it

was announced that the powers had finally chosen for the post

of governor-general of Crete Colonel Charles Schaeffer, a

native of the grand duchy of Luxemburg, and a man of extended

experience in the Turkish and Egyptian services, … related to

several of the principal houses of the aristocracy at St.

Petersburg, as well as to some of the most influential

personages in the entourage of the Sultan. … The Porte,

however, protested, with the support of Germany, against the

appointment of Colonel Schaeffer, who appears to have been

suspected of English sympathies. Russia, too, it was said,

objected, insisting that the appointee must be of the Orthodox

Greek faith. Thus, on the question of selecting a

governor-general for Crete, the concert of the powers broke

down as it did at other points during the long crisis. At the

end of November the name of Prince Francis Joseph of

Battenberg was prominently mentioned as a prospective

candidate of favor. The Cretan assembly proposed, unless a

suitable governor were speedily chosen by the powers, to offer

the post to a candidate of its own selection."

_Current History, 1897,

pages 865-866._

Months went on, while the Powers still discussed the Cretan

situation and no agreement was reached. In January, 1898, the

Turkish government appointed Edhem Pasha governor of Candia;

but, in the face of the admirals of the blockading squadrons,

who exercised an undefined authority, he seems to have had

practically little power. Presently, a new attempt was made to

select a Christian Governor-general. France and Russia

proposed Prince George of Greece, but Austria and Turkey

opposed. In April, Austria and Germany withdrew from the

blockade and from the "Concert," leaving Great Britain,

Russia, France and Italy to deal with Cretan affairs alone.

The admirals of these Powers, acting under instructions, then

divided the Cretan coast among themselves, each directing the

administration of such government as could be conducted in his

own part. The British admiral had Candia, the capital town,

and there trouble arose which brought the whole Cretan

business to a crisis. He attempted to take possession of the

customs house (September 6), and landed for that purpose a

small force of 60 men. They were attacked by a Turkish mob,

with which they fought desperately for four hours, losing 12

killed and some 40 wounded, before they could make their

retreat to the shore and regain their ship. At the same time a

general massacre of Christians in the town was begun and some

800 perished before it was stopped. Edhem Pasha, with about

4,000 Turkish troops at his command, was said to have waited

long for the mob to do its work before he interfered.

This outbreak brought the four Powers to a decisive agreement.

They joined in imperatively demanding the withdrawal of

Turkish troops and officials from the island, and enforced the

demand. Guarantees for the safety of the Mohammedan population in

life and property were given; it was conceded that the

Sultan's suzerainty over Crete should be maintained, and he

was allowed to hold one military post in the island for a sign

of the fact. On those terms the Turkish evacuation of Crete

was carried out in November, and Prince George of Greece was

appointed, not Governor-general, but High Commissioner of the

four Powers, to organize an autonomous government in the

island and administer it for a period of three years. The

appointment was accepted, and Prince George was received with

rejoicing in Crete on the 21st of December. The blockade had

been raised on the 5th, and on the 26th the admirals departed.

During the following two years (1899-1900) there seems to have

been a generally good condition of order restored and

preserved. A constitution was framed by a national assembly,

which conferred the executive authority on Prince George, as

High Commissioner, with responsible councillors, and created a

Chamber of Deputies, elected for the most part by the people,

but containing ten members appointed by the High Commissioner.

Equal rights for all religious beliefs was made a principle of

the constitution.

TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (May-July).

Representation in the Peace Conference at The Hague.

See (in this volume)

PEACE CONFERENCE.

{550}

TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (October).

Concessions to the Armenians.

In October an irade was published by the Sultan which withdrew

restrictions on the movements of Armenians in the provinces,

except in the case of suspects; granted pardon or commutation

of sentence to a number of Armenian prisoners; ordered payment

of sums due to Armenian government officials who had been

killed or expelled at the time of the massacres; directed

assistance to be given in the repairing and rebuilding of

churches, schools, and monasteries which had been injured or

destroyed, and also gave direction for the building of an

orphanage near Constantinople.

TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (November).

Railway to the Persian Gulf.

A German Bank Syndicate obtained from the Sultan, in November,

1899, a concession for the extension of the Anatolian Railway

from Konieh in Asia Minor, to Basra, or Bassorah, on the

Persian Gulf. The line, which will pass through Bagdad, and

along the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, is to be

completed within eight years from the date of the grant. "The

concession is regarded as a startling proof of German

influence in Constantinople, and a defeat both for Russian and

British diplomacy. It is certainly a defeat for the former,

and will greatly increase suspicion at St. Petersburg as to

the ultimate ends of Germany in Turkey; but we suspect that

Indian statesmen will perceive considerable compensations in

the arrangement. Not to mention that all railways which

approach India develop Indian trade, the railway may secure us

a strong ally in Asia. It is not of much use for Russia to be

running a line from the Caspian to Bushire if when she gets

there she finds Britain and Germany allied in the Persian

Gulf, and able by a railway through Gedrosia to Sind to throw

themselves right across her path."

_Spectator (London),

December 2, 1899._

"The opposition of the French company owning the

Smyrna-Kassaba road, which extends east as far as Afion

Karahissar, was removed by granting this company 40 per cent

of the shares in the extension, and the local objection was

obviated by a provision in the concession giving the Turkish

Government the right to purchase the line at any time. Few

railroad lines can be of greater prospective importance than

this 2,000 miles of railroad uniting the Persian Gulf with

Europe, forming a rapid transit to and from the East, opening

up large tracts of agricultural country, and paving the way

for German commercial supremacy in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia.

It is not difficult to see how Germany, with preferential

rates for goods on German lines, will be able to control the

chief markets of Asia Minor and invade the East. … Germans

purchased the Constantinople-Ismid Railroad from an English

company and extended it to Angora. They also checkmated the

French and English by extending their line from Eski-Sher to

Konieh, thus preventing extension of both the Smyrna-Afion

Karahissar and the Smyrna-Aidin-Dinair roads. The two great

distributing points—Constantinople and Smyrna—are thus

controlled by Germans, and German goods may enter the interior

of Asia Minor and the great valley of the Tigris and Euphrates

on German-controlled roads at a decided advantage. Germans

have obtained the right to build docks and warehouses at Haida

Pasha, the terminus of the Anatolian railroads; and with

through rates for German goods on German lines, German freight

cars may be sent across the Bosphorus and travel to Mesopotamia

and the confines of India and Persia without change."

_United States Consular Reports,

April, 1900, page 497._

Professor Hilprecht has remarked, in the "Sunday School Times"

that "a new era for Babylonian archeology will begin when the

railroad from Koniah to Baghdad and Bassorah has been

constructed. It will then take about a week from London to the

ruins of Babylon, where, doubtless, a railway station (Hillah)

will be established. At present the traveler needs at the best

six weeks to cover this route. This railroad," says the

Professor, "has now become a certainty."

TURKEY: A. D. 1899-1901.

Impending outbreak in Macedonia.

The state of things in Macedonia, where the people have long

been on the brink of revolt against Turkish rule, excited to

it from Bulgaria and encouraged from Greece, but warned

otherwise by Russia and Austria, is thus described by the

"Economist," in an article quoted in "Littell's Living Age,"

March, 1899: "It is improbable, for reasons stated below, that

Macedonia will rise in insurrection this year [1899], but,

nevertheless, there is great danger in that quarter, which is

evidently disturbing both Vienna and St. Petersburg, and

exciting apprehensions in Constantinople. The Austrian and

Russian Foreign Offices are both issuing intimations that if a

revolt occurs Turkey will be allowed to put it down by Turkish

methods, and the Sultan is raising more troops, sending

Asiatic levies to Macedonia, and despatching some of his

ablest officers to control the hill districts. Severe warnings

have also been sent both to Belgrade and Sofia, and the Greeks

are warned that if their active party moves the Government of

Athens will not again be saved by Europe from the worst

consequences. All these symptoms imply that there is grave

fear, among those who watch Macedonia, that the patience of

her sorely oppressed people has given way, and that they have

resolved to risk everything rather than remain longer under

the rule of Pashas from whom no man's life and no woman's

honor is safe for twelve hours together. It is known,

moreover, that the course of events in Crete and the

appearance of the Tsar's Rescript have greatly stirred the

population. The former is held by them to show that if a

Christian population in Turkey will risk massacre, Europe will

not allow them to be exterminated, while the latter has made

submission more difficult by putting an end to hope for the

next five years. …

"Turkish subjects must be driven to despair before they will

rise against the Turks, and if they can even hope to be left

alone, the Macedonians will wait, rather than encounter so

dreadful a risk. They have, it is true, the example of the

Cretans to encourage them, but their country is not an island,

and they have the fate both of the Armenians and the

Thessalians to warn them that on the mainland the Turks cannot

be resisted by half-drilled forces.

"It seems almost a truism to say that Europe is foolish to

allow such a source of danger as Macedonia presents to

continue without a cure; but there is something to be said on

the other side. The Powers sincerely desire peace, and the

Macedonian magazine cannot be flooded without a war, if it be

only a war between Russia and the Sultan.

{551}

Nobody knows to what such a war would lead, or in what

condition Eastern Europe might emerge from it. Moreover,

however much the Macedonians may excite the sympathies of

philanthropists, they have done a good deal to alienate those

of politicians. They decline to be either Austrian or Russian.

They asked for years to be aided by Greece, and when Greece

declared war on Turkey they refused to rise behind Edhem

Pasha, whom they could have cut away from his supports. They

now ask aid from Bulgaria, but they are most unwilling to

submit to Sofia, and so make of Bulgaria a fairly strong

State. They wish, they say, to make of Macedonia a

Principality, but if it were so made the Slavo-Macedonians

would begin fighting the Græco-Macedonians, until both had

been nearly ruined. They must join one party or the other if

they wish to be free, and stick to the one they join, and

fight for it with a coherence which they have never yet

displayed."

On the 7th of January, 1901, a correspondent of the "London

Times" wrote on the same subject from Vienna, as follows:

"The situation in Macedonia, as described in trustworthy

accounts coming from different directions, testifies to the

increasing danger of trouble. Things have gone so far that an

outbreak may occur this year. In diplomatic circles it is

considered impossible that in any case it can be delayed for

longer than a twelvemonth. In Constantinople, Athens, and all

the capitals of the Balkan States the eventuality of a

Macedonian rising has been expected for several years past,

and in more than one instance preparations have been made

accordingly. To what extent the Macedonia committees have

received official patronage in Bulgaria is now of secondary

interest. The mischief has been done, and the agitation in

Macedonia is at present beyond the control of the Bulgarian

authorities, even if they wished to keep it in check, which is

not certain. All that can be said with confidence is that last

summer Austria and Russia made a vigorous and successful effort

to put an end to the almost open encouragement extended to the

Macedonian committees at Sofia, which was within an ace of

involving the Principality in a war with Rumania. The

Austro-Russian 'entente' [an understanding or agreement

between Russia and Austria, in 1897, to act together in

keeping peace in the Balkan peninsula] has, in fact, done

excellent service wherever diplomatic pressure can be brought

to bear. But, unfortunately, that does not include Macedonia.

If the revolutionary element in that province of the Ottoman

Empire sets at defiance the imposing Turkish forces

concentrated on the spot, it is not likely that it will be

influenced by what is probably regarded as the remote

contingency of the direct armed intervention of Austria and

Russia. All the warnings and scoldings in the world will not

suffice to preserve peace in Macedonia.

"It is difficult to say what foundation there may be for the

statement that the Sultan himself seeks to take advantage of

the disturbed condition of Macedonia for purposes of his own.

It is alleged that he wishes to prevent any change in the

existing regime in Crete by exciting the apprehension in

Athens and elsewhere that an attempt to modify the status quo

in that island would cause a massacre of the Hellenic

population in Macedonia. This view of the case finds

expression in the following extracts from a letter addressed

to the 'Roumanie,' one of the leading organs of

Bukharest:—'The thoroughly bad policy pursued by the Sublime

Porte in Macedonia, which consists in allowing that unhappy

province to remain a prey to Bulgarian agitators so as in case

of need to terrify diplomacy by the spectre of a revolution,

has contributed to open the eyes of the Powers. On the other

hand, the irresistible attraction exercised by the Kingdom of

Greece, not only on the Cretans themselves, but also on all

the rayahs of the Ottoman Empire, is an indisputable fact.'"

See, also (in this volume),

BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES.

TURKEY: A. D. 1900.

The Zionist movement of the Jews to colonize Palestine.

See (in this volume)

JEWS: A. D. 1897-1901.

TURKEY: A. D. 1901.

The Cretan question.

The provisional arrangement of government for Crete,

administered by Prince George, of Greece, as High Commissioner

for the Powers, expires by limitation in December, 1901. What

shall then be done with the island is a question that was

referred, by the several Powers of the Concert, in the early

part of the year, to their ambassadors at Rome, in conference

with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The

administration of Prince George appears to have been quite

remarkably satisfactory to all concerned, and its continuation

was evidently desired, as much by the Cretans as by the

protecting Powers; but the former sought to have it placed on

a basis of permanency, in some form that would be practically

tantamount to the long craved annexation to Greece. Prince

George naturally looks in the same direction, and he is said

to have made it known that he would decline to hold his post

provisionally beyond the term of three years for which he

accepted it in 1898. The ambassadorial conference at Rome

decided, however, that the time has not come for a permanent

settlement of the Cretan question, and that the provisional

arrangement for its government must be renewed. A Press

despatch from Athens, on the 22d of March, 1901, announced the

decision and indicated the circumstances of the situation, as

follows:

"The Cretan Assembly meets at the end of next month, and its

probable attitude towards the question of union with Greece is

already the subject of speculation here. The decision of the

conference of Ambassadors at Rome is embodied in a memorandum

which has been handed to Prince George by the Consuls at

Canea, while a copy of the document has been unofficially

presented to King George 'à titre d'information.' The

Ambassadors express their opinion that any manifestation on

the part of the Cretans in favour of union with Greece would

be inopportune at the present moment, and they propose a

prolongation of the present provisional system of government

without assigning any definite term to the High Commissioner's

mandate.

"Whether Prince George, who is an enthusiastic advocate of

union with Greece, will accept the new arrangement

unconditionally remains to be seen. Meanwhile the islanders

are occupied with preparations for the elections.

{552}

"It appears that at a recent sitting of the Prince's Council

one of the most prominent of Cretan politicians advocated the

institution of an autonomous Principality on the lines already

laid down by the existing Constitution. The proposal provoked

a violent outburst on the part of the Athenian Press, which

denounces its author as a traitor to the cause of Hellenism.

The opinion apparently prevails here that the establishment of

a Principality would finally preclude the union of the island

with Greece."

TURKEY: A. D. 1901.

Order regulating the visit of Jews to Palestine.

See (in this volume)

JEWS: A. D. 1901.

----------TURKEY: End--------

TWAIN, Mark:

Description of scenes in the Austrian Reichsrath.

See (in this volume)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).

U.

UCHALI, Treaty of.

See (in this volume)

ITALY: A. D. 1895-1896.

UGANDA: A. D. 1894.

Creation of the Protectorate.

See (in this volume)

BRITISH EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE: A. D. 1895-1897.

UGANDA: A. D. 1897-1898.

Native insurrection and mutiny of Sudanese troops.

A train of serious troubles in the Uganda Protectorate began

in May, 1897, with an insurrection of some of the chiefs,

instigated by the king, Mwanga, who was restive under British

control. The revolt was suppressed after some sharp fighting,

especially at Kiango, on the 24th of July, and King Mwanga

escaped into German territory. In August he was formally

deposed by a council of chiefs, and his infant son, Chua, was

elected king in his place, under a regency of three of the

chiefs. But a more serious trouble followed, from the mutiny

of a part of the Sudanese troops which had been serving in

Uganda. These troops were being sent to join an expedition,

under Major Macdonald, for the exploration of the districts

adjacent to the Italian sphere of influence, and were not

permitted to take their women with them. This seems to have

been their chief grievance. They also complained of being

overworked, underpaid, insufficiently fed, and commanded by

young officers who would not listen to their complaints. They

seized Fort Lubas, on the frontier between Uganda and Usoga,

made prisoners of several of their officers, whom they finally

murdered, and held the fort against repeated attacks until early

in January, 1898, when they made their escape. They were

pursued and attacked (February 24) at Kabagambe, on Lake

Kioja, where they had built a fort. Many were killed, the

remainder much scattered. A considerable party got away to the

eastern side of the Nile and continued to give trouble there

throughout the year.

Meantime, the deposed king, Mwanga, had escaped from the

Germans and effected a new rising among his late subjects; and

another deposed king, Kabarega, of Unyoro, had also

reappeared, to make trouble in that region. After the

suppression of the Sudanese mutiny these risings were

overcome, with the help of some 1,100 troops brought from

India for the emergency. In March, there was news of

Kabarega's death, and the British Acting Commissioner and

Consul General issued the following proclamation:

"Whereas Kabarega, the deposed King of Unyoro, is reported to

have deceased, and whereas the present disordered state of

affairs in that country has proved that, for the maintenance

of good government and good-will, it is expedient to provide

for the succession to the kingdom of a member of the Royal

House, it is hereby publicly proclaimed that Karukala, son of

Kabarega, is now appointed King of Unyoro, under the

protection of Her Britannic Majesty. The Kingdom of Unyoro

comprises the provinces of—Busindi, Shifalu, Magungu, Kibero,

Bugoma, Bugahiaobeire. This appointment is in accordance with

the general conditions by which countries in British African

Protectorates are guided and regulated, and it secures to the

Kingdom of Unyoro all the advantages which accrue from its

being an integral part of such a Protectorate. The local

government of the country will be administered, under the

guidance of Her Majesty's Representative, by a Council of

Regency of either two or three Chiefs, to be appointed by Her

Majesty's Commissioner. This Council of Regency will, subject

to the approval of Her Majesty's Commissioner, select and

appoint the Katikiro and the other Chiefs of the first rank

required in accordance with local custom. These Chiefs, on

their appointment being confirmed, will select and appoint in

full Council the lesser grade Chiefs, until the system of

local administration is complete."

Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications

(Papers by Command: Africa, Number 7, 1898, page 42).

UGANDA RAILWAY, The.

On the 30th of April, 1900, the British Parliament voted

£1,930,000 for the completion of the railway under

construction from Mombasa, on the Indian Ocean, to Lake

Victoria-Nyanza, officially known as the Mombasa-Victoria

Railway. Previous expenditure had been about £3,000,000. On

the 30th of October it was reported that rails were laid down

to the 452d mile from Mombasa, and that advance gangs were

working about 40 miles beyond that point.

UITLANDERS.

See (in this volume)

SOUTH AFRICA (THE TRANSVAAL): A. D. 1885-1890, and after.

UNGAVA, The district of.

See (in this volume)

CANADA: A. D. 1895.

UNITED CHRISTIAN PARTY.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).

UNITED IRISH LEAGUE, The.

See (in this volume)

IRELAND: A. D. 1900-1901.

UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL.

See (in this volume)

BRAZIL.

{553}

----------UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Start--------

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1868-1885.

Cuban questions in controversy with Spain.

See (in this volume)

CUBA: A. D. 1868-1885.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1894.

Legislation to promote the reclamation of arid lands.

The following measure of legislation to promote the

reclamation of arid lands was carried through Congress as an

amendment to the appropriation bill for Sundry Civil

Expenditures, and became law August 18, 1894:

"Section 4.

That to aid the public land States in the reclamation of the

desert lands therein, and the settlement, cultivation, and

sale thereof in small tracts to actual settlers, the Secretary

of the Interior with the approval of the President, be, and

hereby is, authorized and empowered, upon proper application

of the State to contract and agree, from time to time, with

each of the States in which there may be situated desert lands

as defined by the Act entitled 'An Act to provide for the sale

of desert land in certain States and Territories,' approved

March 3d, 1877, and the Act amendatory thereof, approved March

3d, 1891, binding the United States to donate, grant and

patent to the State free of cost for surveyor price such

desert lands, not exceeding one million acres in each State,

as the State may cause to be irrigated, reclaimed, occupied,

and not less than twenty acres of each one hundred and

sixty-acre tract cultivated by actual settlers, within ten

years next after the passage of this Act, as thoroughly as is

required of citizens who may enter under the said desert land

law.

"Before the application of any State is allowed or any

contract or agreement is executed or any segregation of any of

the land from the public domain is ordered by the Secretary of

the Interior, the State shall file a map of the said land

proposed to be irrigated which shall exhibit a plan showing

the mode of the contemplated irrigation and which plan shall

be sufficient to thoroughly irrigate and reclaim said land and

prepare it to raise ordinary agricultural crops and shall also

show the source of the water to be used for irrigation and

reclamation, and the Secretary of the Interior may make

necessary regulations for the reservation of the lands applied

for by the States to date from the date of the filing of the map

and plan of irrigation, but such reservation shall be of no

force whatever if such map and plan of irrigation shall not be

approved. That any State contracting under this section is

hereby authorized to make all necessary contracts to cause the

said lands to be reclaimed, and to induce their settlement and

cultivation in accordance with and subject to the provisions

of this section; but the State shall not be authorized to

lease any of said lands or to use or dispose of the same in

any way whatever, except to secure their reclamation,

cultivation and settlement.

"As fast as any State may furnish satisfactory proof according

to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the

Secretary of the Interior, that any of said lands are

irrigated, reclaimed and occupied by actual settlers, patents

shall be issued to the State or its assigns for said land so

reclaimed and settled: Provided, That said States shall not

sell or dispose of more than one hundred and sixty acres of

said land to any one person, and any surplus of money derived

by any State from the sale of said lands in excess of the cost

of their reclamation, shall be held as a trust fund for and be

applied to the reclamation of other desert lands in such

State. That to enable the Secretary of the Interior to examine

any of the lands that may be selected under the provisions of

this section, there is hereby appropriated out of any moneys

in the Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, one thousand

dollars."

_Acts, 53d Congress, 2d Session, chapter 301._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895.

Re-survey of Mexican boundary.

See (in this volume)

MEXICO: A. D. 1892-1895.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (January-February).

The monetary situation.

Contract for replenishing the gold reserve in the Treasury.

The alarming situation of the Treasury of the United States at

the beginning of the year 1895 was clearly described by the

President in his special Message to Congress, January 28.

_See in volume 5, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895)._

By the operation of what had been aptly called "the endless

chain" of the greenback currency issues of the government

(paid out with one hand, to be redeemed with the other in

gold, which the declining value of silver brought more and

more into demand) the gold reserve in the Treasury was fast

being exhausted, and the hour was approaching when, without

some effective relief, the obligations of the nation would

have to be paid in depreciated silver coin, and its credit

lost. The appeal of the President to Congress had no effect.

The Senate was controlled by a majority of men who desired

precisely the result which he wished to avert. The state of

things in that body was described by Senator Sherman, of the

Committee on Finance, in the following words:

"The Committee on Finance is utterly helpless to deal with

this vast question. We are quite divided upon it. We are not

allowed to propose a measure to this Senate which all can

approve of, unless there is attached to it a provision for

free coinage of silver."

The attitude of the House was different, but almost equally

hostile to the President's views. Its Republican majority was

not favorable to the aims of the free silver parties, but held

that the relief needed for the Treasury was to be sought in a

return to higher import duties, as a means of obtaining

increased revenue. Hence, a bill to carry out the

recommendations of the President was rejected in the House, on

the 7th of February, by a vote of 162 against 135.

On the following day, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr.

Carlisle, exercising authority which he possessed to sell

certain four per cent. thirty year bonds, contracted with

August Belmont &; Co., who represented the Rothschilds of

London, and with the house of J. P. Morgan & Co., of New York,

on behalf of J. S. Morgan & Co., London, and themselves, for

supplying 3,500,000 ounces of standard gold coin of the United

States, at the rate of 817.80441 per ounce, in exchange for

such bonds. It was a condition of the contract that one half

of the coin supplied should be brought from Europe: also that

the contracting syndicate should use its influence to protect

the Treasury against withdrawals of gold.

{554}

At the same time, the Secretary of the Treasury reserved the

right to substitute three per cent. gold bonds, if Congress

would authorize such an issue, to be taken by the syndicate at

par, in place of the four per cents to which his existing

authority was restricted. It was shown that the consequent

saving in interest would be $539,000 per annum, amounting to

$16,174,770 in thirty years; but the proposal was rejected in

the House of Representatives by 167 votes against 120. The

contract was accordingly carried out in its original form,

with success so far that the withdrawals of gold from the

Treasury dropped for a considerable period to a low point. It

appeared that when this emergency break was put upon the

working of the "endless chain," the sub-treasury in New York

was believed to be within twenty-four hours of a suspension of

gold payments. But the contract was loudly condemned.

nevertheless, by the opponents of the administration.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (February).

Renewed insurrection in Cuba.

_See (in this volume)

CUBA: A. D. 1895._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (April-May).

Decision of the Supreme Court against the constitutionality

of the Income Tax.

Cases testing the constitutionality of the income tax which

Congress had attached to the Tariff Act of 1894, were brought

to a partial decision in the Supreme Court in April, and

finally in May, 1895.

See, in volume 4 of original edition,

or in volume 5 of revised edition,

TARIFF LEGISLATION, UNITED STATES: A. D. 1894.

[Transcriber's note: For this set see, Volume 4,

"TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1894."]

The cases in question were "Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and

Trust Company," and "Hyde v. Continental Trust Company." On

the first hearing, the illness and absence of one of the

justices, Mr. Jackson, of Tennessee, left but eight members

in attendance, and they divided equally on several points

which were vital to the decision of the question of

constitutionality in the tax. The appellants accordingly

filed a petition for a re-hearing, submitting, among other

reasons, the following: "The question involved in these cases

was as to the constitutionality of the provisions of the

tariff act of August 15, 1894 (sections 27 to 37), purporting

to impose a tax on incomes. The Court has held that the same

are unconstitutional, so far as they purport to impose a tax

upon the rent or income of real estate and income derived

from municipal bonds. It has, however, announced that it was

equally divided in opinion as to the following questions, and

has expressed no opinion in regard to them: (1) Whether the

void provisions invalidate the whole act. (2) Whether, as to

the income from personal property as such, the act is

unconstitutional as laying direct taxes. (3) Whether any part

of the tax, if not considered as a direct tax, is invalid for

want of uniformity.

"The court has reversed the decree of the Circuit Court and

remanded the case, with directions to enter a decree in favor

of complainant in respect only of the voluntary payment of the

tax on the rents and income of defendant's real estate and

that which it holds in trust, and on the income from the

municipal bonds owned or so held by it. While, therefore, the

two points above stated have been decided, there has been no

decision of the remaining questions regarding the

constitutionality of the act, and no judgment has been

announced authoritatively establishing any principle for

interpretation of the statute in those respects."

The re-hearing asked for was granted by the Court on the 6th

of May, when Justice Jackson was able to take his seat on the

bench, after which, on the 20th of May, by the opinion of five

members of the Court against four, the law was pronounced null,

so far as concerned the imposition of a tax on incomes. The

opinion of the majority was delivered by Chief Justice Fuller,

who said, in part:

"The Constitution divided Federal taxation into two great

classes, the class of direct taxes, and the class of duties,

imposts and excises; and prescribed two rules which qualified

the grant of power as to each class. The power to lay direct

taxes apportioned among the several States in proportion to

their representation in the popular branch of Congress, a

representation based on population as ascertained by the

census, was plenary and absolute; but to lay direct taxes

without apportionment was forbidden. The power to lay duties,

imposts, and excises was subject to the qualification that the

imposition must be uniform throughout the United States.

"Our previous decision was confined to the consideration of

the validity of the tax on the income from real estate and on

the income from municipal bonds. … We are now permitted to

broaden the field of inquiry, and to determine to which of the

two great classes a tax upon a person's entire income, whether

derived from rents, or products, or otherwise, of real estate,

or from bonds, stocks, or other forms of personal property,

belongs; and we are unable to conclude that the enforced

subtraction from the yield of all the owner's real or personal

property, in the manner prescribed, is so different from a tax

upon the property itself, that it is not a direct, but an

indirect tax in the meaning of the Constitution.

"The words of the Constitution are to be taken in their

obvious sense, and to have a reasonable construction. In

Gibbons v. Ogden, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, with his usual

felicity, said: 'As men, whose intentions require no

concealment, generally employ the words which most directly

and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the

enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the

people who adopted it must be understood to have employed

words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they

have said.' 9 Wheat. 1, 188. And in Rhode Island v.

Massachusetts, where the question was whether a controversy

between two States over the boundary between them was within

the grant of judicial power, Mr. Justice Baldwin, speaking for

the Court, observed: 'The solution of this question must

necessarily depend on the words of the Constitution; the

meaning and intention of the convention which framed and

proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions

of the people of and in the several States; together with a

reference to such sources of judicial information as are

resorted to by all courts in construing statutes, and to which

this court has always resorted in construing the

Constitution.' 12 Pet. 657, 721. We know of no reason for

holding otherwise than that the words 'direct taxes,' on the

one hand, and 'duties, imposts and excises,' on the other,

were used in the Constitution in their natural and obvious

sense. Nor in arriving at what those terms embrace do we

perceive any ground for enlarging them beyond or narrowing

them within their natural and obvious import at the time the

Constitution was framed and ratified.

{555}

"And passing from the text, we regard the conclusion reached

as inevitable, when the circumstances which surrounded the

convention and controlled its action and the views of those

who framed and those who adopted the Constitution are

considered. … In the light of the struggle in the convention

as to whether or not the new Nation should be empowered to

levy taxes directly on the individual until after the States

had failed to respond to requisitions—a struggle which did not

terminate until the amendment to that effect, proposed by

Massachusetts and concurred in by South Carolina, New

Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island, had been rejected—it

would seem beyond reasonable question that direct taxation,

taking the place as it did of requisitions, was purposely

restrained to apportionment according to representation, in

order that the former system as to ratio might be retained

while the mode of collection was changed. This is forcibly

illustrated by a letter of Mr. Madison of January 29, 1789,

recently published, written after the ratification of the

Constitution, but before the organization of the government

and the submission of the proposed amendment to Congress,

which, while opposing the amendment as calculated to impair

the power only to be exercised in extraordinary emergencies,

assigns adequate ground for its rejection as substantially

unnecessary, since, he says, 'every State which chooses to

collect its own quota may always prevent a Federal collection,

by keeping a little beforehand in its finances and making its

payment at once into the Federal treasury.'

"The reasons for the clauses of the Constitution in respect of

direct taxation are not far to seek. The States, respectively,

possessed plenary powers of taxation. They could tax the

property of their citizens in such manner and to such extent

as they saw fit; they had unrestricted powers to impose duties

or imposts on imports from abroad, and excises on

manufactures, consumable commodities, or otherwise. They gave

up the great sources of revenue derived from commerce; they

retained the concurrent power of levying excises, and duties

if covering anything other than excises; but in respect of

them the range of taxation was narrowed by the power granted

over interstate commerce, and by the danger of being put at

disadvantage in dealing with excises on manufactures. They

retained the power of direct taxation, and to that they looked

as their chief resource; but even in respect of that, they

granted the concurrent power, and if the tax were placed by

both governments on the same subject, the claim of the United

States had preference. Therefore, they did not grant the power

of direct taxation without regard to their own condition and

resources as States; but they granted the power of apportioned

direct taxation, a power just as efficacious to serve the needs

of the general government, but securing to the States the

opportunity to pay the amount apportioned, and to recoup from

their own citizens in the most feasible way, and in harmony

with their systems of local self-government. If, in the

changes of wealth and population in particular States,

apportionment produced inequality, it was an inequality

stipulated for, just as the equal representation of the

States, however small, in the Senate, was stipulated for. …

"Moreover, whatever the reasons for the constitutional

provisions, there they are, and they appear to us to speak in

plain language. It is said that a tax on the whole income of

property is not a direct tax in the meaning of the

Constitution, but a duty, and, as a duty, leviable without

apportionment, whether direct or indirect. We do not think so.

Direct taxation was not restricted in one breath and the

restriction blown to the winds in another. Cooley (On

Taxation, page 3) says that the word 'duty' ordinarily 'means

an indirect tax imposed on the importation, exportation or

consumption of goods'; having a broader meaning than "custom,"

which is a duty imposed on imports or exports'; that 'the term

"impost" also signifies any tax, tribute or duty, but it is

seldom applied to any but the indirect taxes. An excise duty

is an inland impost, levied upon articles of manufacture or

sale, and also upon licenses to pursue certain trades or to

deal in certain commodities.' In the Constitution the words

'duties, imposts and excises' are put in antithesis to direct

taxes. Gouverneur Morris recognized this in his remarks in

modifying his celebrated motion, as did Wilson in approving of

the motion as modified. …

"Our conclusions may therefore be summed up as follows:

"First. We adhere to the opinion already announced, that,

taxes on real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes on

the rents or income of real estate are equally direct taxes.

"Second. We are of opinion that taxes on personal property, or

on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes.

"Third. The tax imposed by sections twenty-seven to

thirty-seven, inclusive, of the act of 1894, so far as it

falls on the income of real estate and of personal property,

being a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution,

and, therefore, unconstitutional and void because not

apportioned according to representation, all those sections,

constituting one entire scheme of taxation, are necessarily

invalid."

Four dissenting opinions were prepared, by Justices Harlan,

Brown, Jackson and White. In that of Mr. Justice Harlan, he

said: "What are 'direct taxes' within the meaning of the

Constitution? In the convention of 1787, Rufus King asked what

was the precise meaning of 'direct' taxation, and no one

answered. Madison Papers, 5 Elliott's Debates, 451. The

debates of that famous body do not show that any delegate

attempted to give a clear, succinct definition of what, in his

opinion, was a direct tax. Indeed the report of those debates,

upon the question now before us, is very meagre and

unsatisfactory. An illustration of this is found in the case

of Gouverneur Morris. It is stated that on the 12th of July,

1787, he moved to add to a clause empowering Congress to vary

representation according to the principles of 'wealth and

numbers of inhabitants,' a proviso 'that taxation shall be in

proportion to representation.' And he is reported to have

remarked, on that occasion, that while some objections lay

against his motion, he supposed 'they would be removed by

restraining the rule to direct taxation.' Elliott's Debates,

302.

{556}

But, on the 8th of August, 1787, the work of the Committee on

Detail being before the convention, Mr. Morris is reported to

have remarked, 'let it not be said that direct taxation is to

be proportioned to representation.' 5 Elliott's Debates, 393.

If the question propounded by Rufus King had been answered in

accordance with the interpretation now given, it is not at all

certain that the Constitution, in its present form, would have

been adopted by the convention, nor, if adopted, that it would

have been accepted by the requisite number of States." The

following is from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brown:

"In view of the fact that the great burden of taxation among

the several States is assessed upon real estate at a

valuation, and that a similar tax was apparently an important

part of the revenue of such States at the time the

Constitution was adopted, it is not unreasonable to suppose

that this is the only undefined direct tax the framers of the

Constitution had in view when they incorporated this clause

into that instrument. The significance of the words 'direct

taxes' was not so well understood then as it is now, and it is

entirely probable that these words were used with reference to

a generally accepted method of raising a revenue by tax upon

real estate. … But, however this may be, I regard it as very

clear that the clause requiring direct taxes to be apportioned

to the population has no application to taxes which are not

capable of apportionment according to population. It cannot be

supposed that the convention could have contemplated a

practical inhibition upon the power of Congress to tax in some

way all taxable property within the jurisdiction of the

Federal government, for the purposes of a national revenue.

And if the proposed tax were such that in its nature it could

not be apportioned according to population, it naturally

follows that it could not have been considered a direct tax,

within the meaning of the clause in question."

Mr. Justice Jackson concluded his dissenting opinion as

follows: "The practical operation of the decision is not only

to disregard the great principles of equality in taxation, but

the further principle that in the imposition of taxes for the

benefit of the government the burdens thereof should be

imposed upon those having the most ability to bear them. This

decision, in effect, works out a directly opposite result, in

relieving the citizens having the greater ability, while the

burdens of taxation are made to fall most heavily and

oppressively upon those having the least ability. It lightens

the burden upon the larger number in some States subject to

the tax, and places it most unequally and disproportionately

on the smaller number in other States. Considered in all its

bearings, this decision is, in my judgment, the most

disastrous blow ever struck at the constitutional power of

Congress. It strikes down an important portion of the most

vital and essential power of the government in practically

excluding any recourse to incomes from real and personal

estate for the purpose of raising needed revenue to meet the

government's wants and necessities under any circumstances.

"I am therefore compelled to enter my dissent to the judgment

of the court."

The opinion delivered by the majority of the Court was

criticised with severity by Mr. Justice White, who said: "The

injustice of the conclusion points to the error of adopting

it. It takes invested wealth and reads it into the

Constitution as a favored and protected class of property,

which cannot be taxed without apportionment, whilst it leaves

the occupation of the minister, the doctor, the professor, the

lawyer, the inventor, the author, the merchant, the mechanic,

and all other forms of industry upon which the prosperity of a

people must depend, subject to taxation without that

condition. A rule which works out this result, which, it seems

to me, stultifies the Constitution by making it an instrument of

the most grievous wrong, should not be adopted, especially

when, in order to do so, the decisions of this court, the

opinions of the law writers and publicists, tradition,

practice, and the settled policy of the government must be

overthrown.

"To destroy the fixed interpretation of the Constitution, by

which the rule of apportionment according to population, is

confined to direct taxes on real estate so as to make that

rule include indirect taxes on real estate and taxes, whether

direct or indirect, on invested personal property, stocks,

bonds, etc., reads into the Constitution the most flagrantly

unjust, unequal, and wrongful system of taxation known to any

civilized government. This strikes me as too clear for

argument. I can conceive of no greater injustice than would

result from imposing on one million of people in one State,

having only ten millions of invested wealth, the same amount

of tax as that imposed on the like number of people in another

State having fifty times that amount of invested wealth. The

application of the rule of apportionment by population to

invested personal wealth would not only work out this wrong,

but would ultimately prove a self-destructive process, from

the facility with which such property changes its situs. If so

taxed, all property of this character would soon be transferred

to the States where the sum of accumulated wealth was greatest

in proportion to population, and where therefore the burden of

taxation would be lightest, and thus the mighty wrong

resulting from the very nature of the extension of the rule

would be aggravated. It is clear then, I think, that the

admission of the power of taxation in regard to invested

personal property, coupled with the restriction that the tax

must be distributed by population and not by wealth, involves

a substantial denial of the power itself, because the

condition renders its exercise practically impossible. To say

a thing can only be done in a way which must necessarily bring

about the grossest wrong, is to delusively admit the existence

of the power, while substantially denying it. And the grievous

results sure to follow from any attempt to adopt such a system

are so obvious that my mind cannot fail to see that if a tax

on invested personal property were imposed by the rule of

population, and there were no other means of preventing its

enforcement, the red spectre of revolution would shake our

institutions to their foundation. …

"It is, I submit, greatly to be deplored that, after more than

one hundred years of our national existence, after the

government has withstood the strain of foreign wars and the

dread ordeal of civil strife, and its people have become

united and powerful, this court should consider itself

compelled to go back to a long repudiated and rejected theory

of the Constitution, by which the government is deprived of an

inherent attribute of its being, a necessary power of taxation."

_United States Reports,

v. 158, pages 601-715._

{557}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (July-November).

Correspondence with the Government of Great Britain

on the Venezuela boundary question.

See (in this volume)

VENEZUELA: A. D. 1895 (JULY), and (NOVEMBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (September).

Executive order for the improvement of the consular service.

In his annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1895, President

Cleveland made the following statement of measures adopted for

the improvement of the consular service of the country:

"In view of the growth of our interests in foreign countries

and the encouraging prospects for a general expansion of our

commerce, the question of an improvement in the consular

service has increased in importance and urgency. Though there

is no doubt that the great body of consular officers are

rendering valuable services to the trade and industries of the

country, the need of some plan of appointment and control

which would tend to secure a higher average of efficiency can

not be denied. The importance of the subject has led the

Executive to consider what steps might properly be taken

without additional legislation to answer the need of a better

system of consular appointments. The matter having been

committed to the consideration of the Secretary of State, in

pursuance of his recommendations, an Executive order was

issued on the 20th of September, 1895, by the terms of which

it is provided that after that date any vacancy in a consular

or commercial agency with an annual salary or compensation

from official fees of not more than $2,500 or less than $1,000

should be filled either by transfer or promotion from some

other position under the Department of State of a character

tending to qualify the incumbent for the position to be

filled, or by the appointment of a person not under the

Department of State, but having previously served thereunder

and shown his capacity and fitness for consular duty, or by

the appointment of a person who, having been selected by the

President and sent to a board for examination, is found, upon

such examination, to be qualified for the position. Posts

which pay less than $1,000 being usually, on account of their

small compensation, filled by selection from residents of the

locality, it was not deemed practicable to put them under the

new system.

"The compensation of $2,500 was adopted as the maximum limit

in the classification for the reason that consular officers

receiving more than that sum are often charged with functions

and duties scarcely inferior in dignity and importance to

those of diplomatic agents, and it was therefore thought best

to continue their selection in the discretion of the Executive

without subjecting them to examination before a board.

Excluding seventy-one places with compensation at present less

than $1,000, and fifty-three places above the maximum in

compensation, the number of positions remaining within the

scope of the order is one hundred and ninety-six. This number

will undoubtedly be increased by the inclusion of consular

officers whose remuneration in fees, now less than $1,000,

will be augmented with the growth of our foreign commerce and

a return to more favorable business conditions. In execution

of the Executive order referred to, the Secretary of State has

designated as a board to conduct the prescribed examinations

the Third Assistant Secretary of State, the Solicitor of the

Department of State, and the Chief of the Consular Bureau, and

has specified the subjects to which such examinations shall

relate.

"It is not assumed that this system will prove a full measure

of consular reform. It is quite probable that actual

experience will show particulars in which the order already

issued may be amended, and demonstrate that, for the best

results, appropriate legislation by Congress is imperatively

required. In any event these efforts to improve the consular

service ought to be immediately supplemented by legislation

providing for consular inspection. This has frequently been a

subject of Executive recommendation, and I again urge such

action by Congress as will permit the frequent and thorough

inspection of consulates by officers appointed for that

purpose or by persons already in the diplomatic or consular

service. The expense attending such a plan would be

insignificant compared with its usefulness, and I hope the

legislation necessary to set it on foot will be speedily

forthcoming.

"I am thoroughly convinced that in addition to their salaries

our ambassadors and ministers at foreign courts should be

provided by the Government with official residences. The

salaries of these officers are comparatively small and in most

cases insufficient to pay, with other necessary expenses, the

cost of maintaining household establishments in keeping with

their important and delicate functions. The usefulness of a

nation's diplomatic representative undeniably depends upon the

appropriateness of his surroundings, and a country like ours,

while avoiding unnecessary glitter and show, should be certain

that it does not suffer in its relations with foreign nations

through parsimony and shabbiness in its diplomatic outfit.

These considerations and the other advantages of having fixed

and somewhat permanent locations for our embassies, would

abundantly justify the moderate expenditure necessary to carry

out this suggestion."

_Message of the President

(54th Congress, 1st Session,

House Documents, volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (December).

Message of President Cleveland on the boundary dispute

between Great Britain and Venezuela.

Prompt response from Congress.

On the 17th of December, 1895, the country was startled and

the world at large excited by a message from President

Cleveland to Congress, relating to the disputed boundary

between British Guiana and Venezuela, and the refusal of the

British government to submit the dispute to arbitration.

See, (in this volume),

VENEZUELA: A. D. 1895 (DECEMBER).

The tone in which the President recommended the appointment of

a commission to ascertain the "true divisional line" between

Venezuela and British Guiana, with a view to determining the

future action of the United States, was peremptory and

threatening enough to awaken all the barbaric passions which

wait and watch for signals of war; and Congress, in both

branches, met the wishes of the President with the singular

alacrity that so often appears in the action of legislative

bodies when a question arises which carries the scent of war.

The House refused to wait for any reference of the matter to

its Committee on Foreign Relations, but framed and passed at

once (December 18) without debate or division, an act

authorizing the suggested commission and appropriating

$100,000 for the expenses of its work.

{558}

In the Senate there were some voices raised against needless

and unseemly haste in the treatment of so grave a proposition.

Senator Teller, of Colorado, was one who spoke to that effect,

saying: "I do not understand that our great competitor in

commerce and trade, our Great English-speaking relative, has

ever denied our right to assert and maintain the Monroe

doctrine. What they claim is that the Monroe doctrine does not

apply to this case. Whether it applies to this case depends upon

the facts, which are unknown to us, it appears. If I knew what

the facts were, as an international lawyer I would have no

difficulty in applying the law. As a believer in the American

doctrine of the right to say that no European power shall

invade American soil, either of North or South America, I

should have no trouble in coming to a conclusion. Is it an

invasion of American soil? I do not know that. I repeat, I

thought I did. I have found that I do not.

"If the President of the United States had said that in the

Department of State they had determined what was the true line

between the British possessions and Venezuela, and if he had

said, 'We are confident that the British Government, instead

of attempting to arrange a disputed line, is attempting to use

this disputed line as a pretense for territorial acquisition,'

no matter what may be the character of the Administration,

whether Democratic or Republican, I would have stood by that

declaration as an American Senator, because there is where we

get our information upon these subjects, and not from our own

judgment. We must stand by what the Department says upon these

great questions when the facts are ascertained by it. The

President says that he needs assistance to make this

determination. We are going to give it to him. Nobody doubts

that. The only question is, how shall we give it to him? I am

as firm a believer in the Monroe doctrine as any man who

lives. I am as firm a believer as anyone in the maintenance of

the honor of the American people, and do not believe it can be

maintained if we abandon the Monroe doctrine.

"Mr. President, there is no haste in this matter. The dispute

is one of long standing. Great Britain is not now taking any

extraordinary steps with reference to the control of the

territory in dispute. They took, it is said, five months to

answer our Secretary's letter of July 20. Mr. President, the

time was not excessive. It is not unreasonable in diplomatic

affairs that there should be months taken in replying to

questions of so much importance. We may properly take months,

if we choose, to consider it before we plant ourselves upon

what we say are the facts in this case. I repeat, so far as

the American people are concerned, the Monroe doctrine is not

in dispute, is not in doubt, whatever may be the doubt about

the facts in this case. If the facts are not ascertained, we

must, before we proceed further, ascertain them.

"This is a very important question. It is not a question of

party politics. It is not a question that any political party

ought to take advantage of to get votes. The political party

that attempts to make capital out of this question will find

that it is a loser in the end. The American people will not be

trifled with on a question of this kind. If the other side of

the Chamber, or the Administration, or anybody, attempts to

make capital out of it they will find that they will lose in

the end, as we should lose on our side if we should be foolish

enough, as I know we are not, to attempt to make capital out

of it in any way. … This question is of so much importance

that I do not care myself if the bill goes to the Committee on

Foreign Relations and lies there a month. You will not impress

the world with our solidarity and solidity on this question by

any haste in this body. Let this proceeding be a dignified

proceeding. Let the bill go to the committee. Let the

committee take their time on it. Let them return it here and

say what is the best way by which we can strengthen the hands

of the President of the United States in his efforts to

maintain this American doctrine.

"Mr. President, I am not one of those who want war. I do not

believe in war. I believe in this case Great Britain made a

great mistake when she said she would not arbitrate, and I

have faith enough in the love of justice and right that

pervades the people of Great Britain to believe that on second

sober thought they will submit this question to arbitration,

as many of their representative men have declared they are

willing to submit all questions of this character. … Let this

bill go to the committee. Let it be considered. If the

committee wants a week, ten days, or two weeks, or a month,

let the committee take it. Nothing will be lost. Great Britain

will not misunderstand our attitude. She does not misunderstand

it now. She knows just as well how we feel upon these subjects

as she will when we pass this bill. She has had it dinned in

her ears again and again from nearly every Secretary of State

that we were not willing to abandon the Monroe doctrine, nor

view with indifference the improper interference of any

European power with any existing American Government, whether

such interference is a violation of the Monroe doctrine or

not."

_Congressional Record,

December 19, 1895, page 246._

Senator Call made a similar appeal, saying: "As to all this

talk about war, in my opinion there is no possibility of war.

There can be, and ought to be, no possibility of it. The

enlightened sentiment of the nations of the world would forbid

that there should be a war between this country and England

upon this question. Nevertheless, it would be the duty of this

country to maintain by force of arms the proposition that

there shall be no forcible establishment of European

institutions and European Governments over any portion of this

territory. Who can entertain the idea that war can be made

with Great Britain, and that the people of the British Empire

will permit that Government to engage in war upon a question

of boundaries which is not sustained by the facts of the case,

but a mere aggression, and that the peace of mankind shall be

disturbed by it. …

"I agree with the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman] that there

is no necessity for haste in this action and that it comports

better with the dignity of Congress for the Senate of the

United States and the House of Representatives to declare that

this Government will firmly maintain, as a definite proposition,

that Venezuela shall not be forced to cede any portion of her

territory to Great Britain or to recognize a boundary line

which is not based upon the facts of history and upon clear

and ascertained proof.

{559}

It seems to me, Mr. President, that all this discussion about

war should not have place here, but that we should make a bold

and independent and firm declaration as to the proper policy

of this Government, and vote the President of the United

States the money necessary, in his judgment, to carry out that

declaration so far as obtaining information which may be

desired. …

"The possibility that war between these two nations will be

the result of our defending the right of Venezuela to the

integrity of her territory against its forced appropriation by

England should not be entertained. These two nations, the

United States and Great Britain, are the main pillars of the

civilization of the world, neither can afford to demand of the

other anything that is wrong or any injustice to the other.

Great Britain recognizes the supremacy of the United States in

the Western Hemisphere, and it is sufficient for them to know

that we will maintain this with all the power of the Republic,

and that this is not an idle menace.

"This is my view of the situation. The President has done his

duty. He has recommended that the traditional policy of this

country to protect all people who establish governments of

their choice against forcible intervention by European powers,

under whatever pretense, whether by claiming fictitious

boundaries and enforcing their claim, or by any other means,

and that we will be the judge of this, but that we are ready

to submit the facts to the judgment of a fair arbitration. It

is sufficient for us to sustain this declaration and for us to

provide the means of obtaining the information necessary for

an intelligent judgment on the question. It will suffice for

the able statesman who represents the Government of Great

Britain to know and to inform his Government that the people

of the United States are united in the determination to

maintain and defend this policy with all their power, and a

peaceable settlement of the question will be made."

_Congressional Record,

December 20, 1895, page 264._

The Senate was persuaded to refer the House Bill to its

Committee on Foreign Relations, but the Committee reported it

on the following day (December 20), and it was passed without

division.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895-1896 (December-January).

The feeling in England and America over the

Venezuela boundary dispute.

Happily President Cleveland's Message did not provoke in

England the angry and combative temper that is commonly roused

by a demand from one nation upon another, made in any

peremptory tone. The feeling produced there seemed to have in

it more of surprise and regret than of wrath, revealing very

plainly that friendliness had been growing of late, much

warmer in English sentiment toward the American Republic than

in American sentiment toward England. Within the past thirty

years there had been what in France would be called a

"rapprochement" in feeling going on between the two peoples;

but the rate of approach had been greater on one side than on

the other, and neither had understood the fact until it was

brought home to them by this incident. There seems to be no

doubt that the English people were astonished and shocked by

the sudden prospect of a serious quarrel with the United

States, and that Americans were generally surprised and moved

by the discovery of that state of feeling in the English mind.

The first response in the United States to the President's

message came noisily from the more thoughtless part of the

people, and seemed to show that the whole nation was fairly

eager for war with its "kin beyond sea." But that was a

short-lived demonstration. The voices that really speak for

the country soon made themselves heard in a different

tone,—anxious to avert war,—critical of the construction that

had been given to the Monroe doctrine by President Cleveland

and his Secretary of State,—earnestly responsive to the

pacific temper of the English public,—and yet firm in

upholding the essential justice of the ground on which their

government had addressed itself to that of Great Britain. The

feeling in the two countries, respectively, at the beginning

of 1896, appears to have been described very accurately by two

representative writers in the "North American Review" of

February in that year. One was Mr. James Bryce, the well-known

English student of American institutions—author of "The

American Commonwealth"—who wrote:

"Those Englishmen who have travelled in America have of course

been aware of the mischief your school-books do in teaching

young people to regard the English as enemies because there

was war in the days of George III. Such Englishmen knew that

as Britain is almost the only great power with which the

United States has had diplomatic controversies, national

feeling has sometimes been led to regard her as an adversary,

and displays of national feeling often took the form of

defiance. Even such travellers, however, were not prepared for

the language of the President and its reception in many

quarters, while as to Englishmen generally, they could

scarcely credit their eyes and ears. 'Why,' they said, 'should

we be regarded as enemies by our own kinsfolk? No territorial

dispute is pending between us and them, like those we have or

have lately had with France and Russia. No explosions of

Jingoism have ever been directed against them, like those

which Lord Beaconsfield evoked against Russia some twenty

years ago. There is very little of that commercial, and none

of that colonial, rivalry which we have with France and

Germany, for the Americans are still chiefly occupied in

developing their internal resources, and have ample occupation

for their energy and their capital in doing so. Still less is

there that incompatibility of character and temper which

sometimes sets us wrong with Frenchmen, or Russians, or even

Germans, for we and the Americans come of the same stock,

speak the same language, read the same books, think upon

similar lines, are connected by a thousand ties of family and

friendship. No two nations could be better fitted to

understand one another's ideas and institutions. English

travellers and writers used no doubt formerly to assume airs

of supercilious condescension which must have been offensive

to Americans. But those airs were dropped twenty or thirty

years ago, and the travellers who return now return full of

gratitude for the kindness they have received and full of

admiration for the marvellous progress they have witnessed. We

know all about the Irish faction; but the Irish faction do not

account for this.

{560}

So we quite understand that resentment was caused in the North

and West of America by the attitude of our wealthy class

during the Civil War. But that attitude was not the attitude

of the British nation. … Our press, whose tone often

exasperates Continental nations, is almost uniformly

respectful and friendly to America. What can we have done to

provoke in the United States feelings so unlike those which we

ourselves cherish?'

"In thus summing up what one has been hearing on all sides in

Britain during the last fortnight, I am not exaggerating

either the amazement or the regret with which the news of a

threatened breach between the two countries was received. The

average Englishman likes America far better than any foreign

nation; he admires the 'go,' as he calls it, of your people,

and is soon at home among you. In fact, he does not regard you

as a foreign nation, as any one will agree who has noticed how

different has been the reception given on all public occasions

to your last four envoys, Messrs. Welsh, Lowell, Phelps, and

Lincoln (as well as your present ambassador) from that

accorded to the ambassadors of any other power. The educated

and thoughtful Englishman has looked upon your Republic as the

champion of freedom and peace, has held you to be our natural

ally, and has even indulged the hope of a permanent alliance

with you, under which the citizens of each country should have

the rights of citizenship in the other and be aided by the

consuls and protected by the fleets of the other all over the

world. The sentiments which the news from America evoked were,

therefore, common to all classes in England. … Passion has not

yet been aroused, and will not be, except by the language of

menace."

_J. Bryce,

British Feeling on the Venezuelan Question

(North American Review, February, 1896)._

The writer who described American feeling, or opinion, in the

same magazine, was Mr. Andrew Carnegie, who said: "In the

United States, East, West, North and South, from which

divergent voices were at first heard, there is but one voice

now. Public opinion has crystallized into one

word—arbitration. In support of that mode of settlement we now

know the nation is unanimous. The proofs of this should not

fail to carry conviction into the hearts of Britons. The one

representative and influential body in the United States which

is most closely allied with Britain not only by the ties of

trade, but by the friendships which these ties have created,

is the Chamber of Commerce of New York. If that body were

polled by ballot, probably a greater proportion of its members

than of any other body of American citizens would register

themselves as friendly to England. So far did the feeling

extend in this body, that a movement was on foot to call a

meeting to dissent from the President's Message. Fortunately,

wiser counsels prevailed, and time was given for an

examination of the question, and for members to make up their

minds upon the facts. The result was that at the crowded

meeting subsequently held, there was passed a resolution, with

only one dissenting voice, in favor of a commission for

arbitration. In the whole proceedings there was only one

sentiment present in the minds of those assembled: 'this is a

question for arbitration.' …

"Every nation has its 'Red Rag,' some nations have more than

one, but what the 'Right of Asylum' is to Great Britain, the

Monroe Doctrine is to the United States. Each lies very deep

in the national heart. Few statesmen of Great Britain do not

share the opinion of Lord Salisbury, which he has not feared

to express, that the 'Right of Asylum' is abused and should be

restricted, but there has not arisen one in Britain

sufficiently powerful to deal with it. The United States never

had, and has not now, a statesman who could restrain the

American people from an outburst of passion and the extreme

consequences that national passion is liable to bring, if any

European power undertook to extend its territory upon this

continent, or to decide in case of dispute just where the

boundary of present possessions stand. Such differences must

be arbitrated. …

"In his speech at Manchester Mr. Balfour said he 'trusted and

believed the day would come when better statesmen in

authority, and more fortunate than even Monroe, would assert a

doctrine between the English-speaking peoples under which war

would be impossible.' That day has not to come, it has

arrived. The British Government has had for years in its

archives an invitation from the United States to enter into a

treaty of arbitration which realizes this hope, and Mr.

Balfour is one of those who, from their great position, seem

most responsible for the rejection of the end he so ardently

longs for. It is time that the people of Great Britain

understood that if war be still possible between the two

countries, it is not the fault of the Republic but of their

own country, not of President Cleveland and Secretary of State

Olney, but of Prime Minister Salisbury, and the leader of the

House of Commons, Mr. Balfour, who do not accept the offered

treaty which would banish war forever between the two nations

of our race. This invitation was sent by the same President

Cleveland, who is now denounced as favoring war. … It was my

office to introduce to Mr. Cleveland, then President of the

United States, as he is now, the delegation from the British

Parliament urging arbitration. In the conferences I had with

him previous to his receiving the deputation, I found him as

strong a supporter of that policy as I ever met. I do not

wonder at his outburst, knowing how deeply this man feels upon

that question; it is to him so precious, it constitutes so

great an advance over arbitrament by war that—even if we have

to fight, that any nation rejecting it may suffer—I believe he

feels that it would be our duty to do so, believing that the

nation which rejects arbitration in a boundary dispute

deserves the execration of mankind."-

_A. Carnegie,

The Venezuelan Question

(North American Review, February, 1896)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895-1896 (December-February).

The gold reserve in the Treasury again imperilled.

Refusal of any measures of relief by the Senate.

In his annual Message to Congress, December 2d, 1895,

President Cleveland described at length the stress of

circumstances under which in the previous February, the

Secretary of the Treasury had contracted with certain bankers

and financiers to replenish and protect the reserve of gold in

the Treasury for redemption of United States notes (see above),

and added: "The performance of this contract not only restored

the reserve, but checked for a time the withdrawals of gold

and brought on a period of restored confidence and such peace

and quiet in business circles as were of the greatest possible

value to every interest that affects our people.

{561}

I have never had the slightest misgiving concerning the wisdom

or propriety of this arrangement, and am quite willing to

answer for my full share of responsibility for its promotion.

I believe it averted a disaster the imminence of which was,

fortunately, not at the time generally understood by our

people. Though the contract mentioned stayed for a time the

tide of gold withdrawal, its good results could not be

permanent. Recent withdrawals have reduced the reserve from

$107,571,230 on the 8th day of July, 1895, to $79,333,966. How

long it will remain large enough to render its increase

unnecessary is only matter of conjecture, though quite large

withdrawals for shipment in the immediate future are predicted

in well-informed quarters. About $16,000,000 has been

withdrawn during the month of November. The foregoing

statement of events and conditions develops the fact that

after increasing our interest-bearing bonded indebtedness more

than $162,000,000 to save our gold reserve we are nearly where

we started, having now in such reserve $79,383,966 as against

$65,488,377 in February, 1894, when the first bonds were

issued.

"Though the amount of gold drawn from the Treasury appears to

be very large as gathered from the facts and figures herein

presented, it actually was much larger, considerable sums

having been acquired by the Treasury within the several

periods stated without the issue of bonds. On the 28th of

January, 1895, it was reported by the Secretary of the

Treasury that more than $172,000,000 of gold had been

withdrawn for hoarding or shipment during the year preceding.

He now reports that from January 1, 1879, to July 14, 1890, a

period of more than eleven years, only a little over

$28,000,000 was withdrawn, and that between July 14, 1890, the

date of the passage of the law for an increased purchase of

silver, and the 1st day of December, 1895, or within less than

five and a half years, there was withdrawn nearly

$375,000,000, making a total of more than $403,000,000 drawn

from the Treasury in gold since January 1, 1879, the date

fixed in 1875 for the retirement of the United States notes.

"Nearly $327,000,000 of the gold thus withdrawn has been paid

out, on these United States notes, and yet everyone of the

$346,000,000 is still uncanceled and ready to do service in

future gold depletions. More than $76,000,000 in gold has

since their creation in 1890 been paid out from the Treasury

upon the notes given on the purchase of silver by the

Government, and yet the whole, amounting to $155,000,000,

except a little more than $16,000,000 which has been retired

by exchanges for silver at the request of the holders, remains

outstanding and prepared to join their older and more

experienced allies in future raids upon the Treasury's gold

reserve. In other words, the Government has paid in gold more

than nine-tenths of its United States notes and still owes

them all. It has paid in gold about one-half of its notes

given for silver purchases without extinguishing by such

payment one dollar of these notes.

"When, added to all this, we are reminded that to carry on

this astounding financial scheme the Government has incurred a

bonded indebtedness of $95,500,000 in establishing a gold

reserve, and of $162,315,400 in efforts to maintain it; that

the annual interest charge on such bonded indebtedness is more

than $11,000,000; that a continuance of our present course may

result in further bond issues, and that we have suffered or

are threatened with all this for the sake of supplying gold

for foreign shipment or facilitating its hoarding at home, a

situation is exhibited which certainly ought to arrest

attention and provoke immediate legislative relief.

"I am convinced the only thorough and practicable remedy for

our troubles is found in the retirement and cancellation of

our United States notes, commonly called greenbacks, and the

outstanding Treasury notes issued by the Government in payment

of silver purchases under the act of 1890. I believe this

could be quite readily accomplished by the exchange of these

notes for United States bonds, of small as well as large

denominations, bearing a low rate of interest. They should be

long-term bonds, thus increasing their desirability as

investments, and because their payment could be well postponed

to a period far removed from present financial burdens and

perplexities, when with increased prosperity and resources

they would be more easily met. …

"Whatever is attempted should be entered upon fully

appreciating the fact that by careless easy descent we have

reached a dangerous depth, and that our ascent will not be

accomplished without laborious toil and struggle. We shall be

wise if we realize that we are financially ill and that our

restoration to health may require heroic treatment and

unpleasant remedies.

"In the present stage of our difficulty it is not easy to

understand how the amount of our revenue receipts directly

affects it. The important question is not the quantity of

money received in revenue payments, but the kind of money we

maintain and our ability to continue in sound financial

condition. We are considering the Government's holdings of

gold as related to the soundness of our money and as affecting

our national credit and monetary strength. If our gold reserve

had never been impaired; if no bonds had ever been issued to

replenish it; if there had been no fear and timidity

concerning our ability to continue gold payments; if any part

of our revenues were now paid in gold, and if we could look to

our gold receipts as a means of maintaining a safe reserve,

the amount of our revenues would be an influential factor in

the problem. But unfortunately all the circumstances that

might lend weight to this consideration are entirely lacking.

In our present predicament no gold is received by the

Government in payment of revenue charges, nor would there be

if the revenues were increased. The receipts of the Treasury,

when not in silver certificates, consist of United States

notes and Treasury notes issued for silver purchases. These

forms of money are only useful to the Government in paying its

current ordinary expenses, and its quantity in Government

possession does not in the least contribute toward giving us

that kind of safe financial standing or condition which is

built on gold alone.

{562}

"If it is said that these notes if held by the Government can

be used to obtain gold for our reserve, the answer is easy.

The people draw gold from the Treasury on demand upon United

States notes and Treasury notes, but the proposition that the

Treasury can on demand draw gold from the people upon them

would be regarded in these days with wonder and amusement; and

even if this could be done there is nothing to prevent those thus

parting with their gold from regaining it the next day or the

next hour by the presentation of the notes they received in

exchange for it. The Secretary of the Treasury might use such

notes taken from a surplus revenue to buy gold in the market.

Of course he could not do this without paying a premium.

Private holders of gold, unlike the Government, having no

parity to maintain, would not be restrained from making the

best bargain possible when they furnished gold to the

Treasury; but the moment the Secretary of the Treasury bought

gold on any terms above par he would establish a general and

universal premium upon it, thus breaking down the parity

between gold and silver, which the Government is pledged to

maintain, and opening the way to new and serious

complications. In the meantime the premium would not remain

stationary, and the absurd spectacle might be presented of a

dealer selling gold to the Government and with United States

notes or Treasury notes in his hand immediately clamoring for

its return and a resale at a higher premium.

"It may be claimed that a large revenue and redundant receipts

might favorably affect the situation under discussion by

affording an opportunity of retaining these notes in the

Treasury when received, and thus preventing their presentation

for gold. Such retention to be useful ought to be at least

measurably permanent; and this is precisely what is

prohibited, so far as United States notes are concerned, by

the law of 1878, forbidding their further retirement. That

statute in so many words provides, that these notes when

received into the Treasury and belonging to the United States

shall be 'paid out again and kept in circulation.'"

_United States, Message and Documents (Abridgment),

1895-1896, page 27._

"The difficulty which had been anticipated in keeping gold in

the treasury became acute as a result of the president's

Venezuelan message of December 17. The 'war scare' which was

caused by that document was attended by a panic on the London

Exchange, which communicated itself to the Continental

exchanges and produced at once serious consequences in New

York. Prices fell heavily, some failures were reported, and

the withdrawal of gold from the treasury assumed great

proportions. On the 20th the reserve had gone down to

$69,650,000, ten millions less than three weeks earlier, with

future large reductions obviously near at hand. The president

accordingly on that day sent to Congress a special message,

stating the situation, alluding to the effect of his recently

announced foreign policy, and declaring that the result

conveyed a 'warning that even the patriotic sentiment of our

people is not an adequate substitute for a sound financial

policy.' He asked Congress to postpone its holiday recess

until something had been done to reassure the apprehensive

among the people, but declared that in any case he should use

every means in the power of the executive to maintain the

country's credit. The suggestion was acted upon. …

"On December 26 two bills were introduced in the House of

Representatives by Chairman Dingley of the ways and means

committee. Adopting the view maintained by the Republicans,

that the chief cause of the difficulty in maintaining the gold

reserve was the deficiency in the revenue, he proposed first a

bill 'to temporarily increase the revenues.' This provided

that until August 1, 1898, the customs duties on most

varieties of wool and woolen goods and on lumber, should stand

at 60 per cent of those imposed by the McKinley Act of 1890,

and that the duties in all the other schedules of the tariff,

except sugar, should, with slight exceptions, be increased by

15 per cent over those of the existing law. This bill passed

the House on the 27th by a party vote of 205 to 81. On the

following day the second bill, 'to maintain and protect the

coin redemption fund,' was passed by 170 to 136,—47

Republicans in the minority. This bill authorized the

secretary of the treasury to procure coin for redeeming

legal-tenders by the sale of three-per-cent five-year bonds,

and to provide for temporary deficiencies by the issue of

three-year three-per-cent certificates of indebtedness in

small denominations. The administration was as little

satisfied with this bill as with that changing the tariff, and

proceeded with the bond issue. …

"The failure of the bills in the Senate was foreseen, but the

precise form in which it was manifested excited some surprise.

On February 1, [1896], the bond bill was transformed by the

adoption of a substitute providing for the free coinage of

silver, and this was passed by a vote of 42 to 35. On the 14th

the House refused, by 215 to 90, to concur in the Senate's

amendment, and the whole subject was dropped. Meanwhile the

Senate finance committee had reported a free-coinage

substitute for the House tariff bill also. But after this

further exhibition of their strength the silver senators

refused to go further, and on February 25 joined with the

Democrats in rejecting, by 33 to 22, a motion to take up the

bill for consideration. This vote was recognized as finally

disposing of the measure."

_Political Science Quarterly,

June, 1896._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895-1896 (December-December).

Plans for coast defense.

In his annual report to the President, 1895, the Secretary of

War wrote as follows of pending plans for coast defense, and

of the progress of work upon them:

"In your annual message transmitted to Congress in December,

1886, attention was directed to the urgent necessity for

seacoast defense in these words: 'The defenseless condition of

our seacoast and lake frontier is perfectly palpable; the

examinations made must convince us all that certain of our

cities should be fortified and that work on the most important

of these fortifications should be commenced at once.' … Since

that time the condition of these defenses has been under grave

consideration by the people and by this Department. Its

inadequacy and impotency have been so evident that the

intelligence of the country long since ceased to discuss that

humiliating phase of the subject, but has addressed itself to

the more practical undertaking of urging more rapid progress

in the execution of the plan of defense devised by the

Endicott Board in 1886, with subsequent slight modifications.

That plan contemplated a system of fortifications at 27 ports

(to which Puget Sound was subsequently added), requiring 677

guns and 824 mortars of modern construction, at a cost of

$97,782,800, excluding $28,595,000 for floating batteries. By

an immediate appropriation at that time of $21,500,000 and an

annual appropriation of $9,000,000 thereafter, as then

recommended, the system of land defenses could have been

completed in 1895.

{563}

"The original plan contemplated an expenditure of $97,782,800

by the end of the present year. The actual expenditures and

appropriations for armament and emplacements have, however,

been but $10,631,000. The first appropriation for guns was

made only seven years ago and the first appropriation for

emplacements was made only five years ago. The average annual

appropriations for these two objects has been less than

$1,500,000. The work has therefore been conducted at about

one-seventh the rate proposed. If future appropriations for

the manufacture of guns, mortars, and carriages be no larger

than the average authorized for the purpose since 1888, it

will require twenty-two years more to supply the armament of

the eighteen important ports for which complete projects are

approved. If the appropriations for the engineer work are to

continue at the rate of the annual appropriations since 1890,

it will require seventy years to complete the emplacements and

platforms for this armament for the ports referred to."

_Report of the Secretary of War, 1895,

page 19 (54th Congress, 1st Session,

House Document volume 1)._

In his Message of the following year, the subject was touched

upon by the President, as follows:

"During the past year rapid progress has been made toward the

completion of the scheme adopted for the erection and armament

of fortifications along our seacoast, while equal progress has

been made in providing the material for submarine defense in

connection with these works. … We shall soon have complete

about one-fifth of the comprehensive system, the first step in

which was noted in my message to the Congress of December 4,

1893. When it is understood that a masonry emplacement not

only furnishes a platform for the heavy modern high-power gun,

but also in every particular serves the purpose and takes the

place of the fort of former days, the importance of the work

accomplished is better comprehended. In the hope that the work

will be prosecuted with no less vigor in the future, the

Secretary of War has submitted an estimate by which, if

allowed, there will be provided and either built or building

by the end of the next fiscal year such additional guns,

mortars, gun carriages, and emplacements, as will represent

not far from one-third of the total work to be done under the

plan adopted for our coast defenses—thus affording a prospect

that the entire work will be substantially completed within

six years. In less time than that, however, we shall have

attained a marked degree of security. The experience and

results of the past year demonstrate that with a continuation

of present careful methods the cost of the remaining work will

be much less than the original estimate. We should always keep

in mind that of all forms of military preparation coast

defense alone is essentially pacific in its nature."

_Message of the President, 1896

(54th Congress, 2d Session, House Document, volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (January).

Admission of Utah to the Union.

See (in this volume)

UTAH: A. D. 1895-1896.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (January-February).

Appointment of commission to investigate the

Venezuela boundary.

Re-opening of discussion with Great Britain on the

arbitration of the dispute.

See (in this volume)

VENEZUELA: A. D. 1896-1899.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (February).

New treaty with Great Britain for arbitration of

Bering Sea claims.

See (in this volume)

BERING SEA QUESTIONS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (February).

Weyler made Governor of Cuba.

His Concentration Order.

See (in this volume)

CUBA: A. D. 1896-1897.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (March).

Removal of Confederate disabilities.

The following enactment of Congress, which may, with

propriety, be styled an "Act of Oblivion," was approved by the

President on the 31st of March, 1896:

"That section twelve hundred and eighteen of the Revised

Statutes of the United States, as amended by chapter forty-six

of the laws of 1884, which section is as follows: 'No person

who held a commission in the Army or Navy of the United States

at the beginning of the late rebellion, and afterwards served

in any capacity in the military, naval, or civil service of

the so-called Confederate States, or of either of the States

in insurrection during the late rebellion, shall be appointed

to any position in the Army or Navy of the United States,' be,

and the same is hereby, repealed."

_United States of America, Statutes at Large,

volume 29, page 84._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (May).

Extension of civil service rules by President Cleveland.

See (in this volume)

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: A. D. 1893-1896.