CHAPTER VII

MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS AS POETRY WHEN WRITTEN WITH ECSTASY

Our views of poetry, or the literature of ecstasy, illuminate many dark

crannies in one of the most unfathomable caverns of aesthetic

speculation; speculation of the connection between poetry and morals,

form and matter, art for art's sake and didacticism. It has been often

asked whether poetry should deal with moral subjects, sociological

questions, and philosophical ideas. The question disappears when we

regard literature of ecstasy in prose as poetry, for all ideas are dealt

with in prose and some may be ecstatically treated. If poetry is an

atmosphere that suffuses literature, it may bathe most various ideas.

Emotional treatment of the ideas gives us literature of ecstasy or

poetry. If the natural language of ecstasy is prose, we certainly do not

wish to see a train of philosophical, moral or sociological views

treated in verse. To this extent the old critic was right who did not

want poetry (a long composition in verse, as he understood it) to deal

with ethics or science.

The question is then not really whether poetry should be concerned with

moral, sociological or psychological themes, for these themes always

have poetry in them, and an emotional treatment of them brings the

poetry into prominence. Ideas are the substance of poetry and nearly all

ideas are moral, sociological or psychological. Even scientific facts

and metaphysical utterances may be so stated by a writer as to show the

latent poetry. The two famous passages in _Leaves of Grass_ beginning

"I open my scuttle at night" and "I am an acme of things accomplished

and an encloser of things to be" are emotional statements of the facts

of the infinity of the universe and of the evolution of man,

respectively; Whitman brought out the poetry in a philosophical and in a

scientific idea.

Moral views may be imaginatively treated and be poetry. The theme of

_Great Expectations_ is a sermon against pride and snobbery, and the

emotional treatment, especially by force of example, makes part of the

book poetry. Portrayals of hypocrites, for instance, so truthfully and

movingly artistic as to arouse an ecstatic state in the reader, become

poetry. Hence Tartuffe and Pecksniff are poetical portraits, even when

drawn in prose.

Poetry was supposed to appeal to the imagination, prose to the

intellect; poetry was presumed to be dictated by the heart, prose by the

mind; fancy was thought to hold sway in poetry, logic in prose. But

nevertheless, the great English poets like Shakespeare, Browning,

Shelley, Wordsworth, Whitman, gave us much poetry that was produced by

the intellect, weighed by the mind, and governed by logic. Any

intellectual and even moral performance may be elevated into poetry,

when emotionally and ecstatically presented. And philosophers like

Plato, Pascal, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche have demonstrated this.

Our definition of poetry throws much light on the subject of the

relations of politics and morals, of social and philosophical problems

to poetry. Poets should instruct, while delighting, is the contention of

one group. They ought merely to express beauty and emotions, is the

emphatic demand of another class. I doubt if there has ever been a great

poet who hasn't done both of these things. If a poet is to teach he

must teach something; he must express ideas, and ideas mean thoughts

about life, and these in turn refer to the relations of man to himself,

to one another, to the opposite sex, to society, to the universe, to

nature. But it is while doing this that he must give us beauty and

emotion.

When a prose writer is purely didactic without any emotional or

aesthetic appeal he is no poet. It is manifestly absurd also for an

author to give in metre didactic works which could be better written in

prose. To this extent the disciples of art for art's sake are right,

that the poet should not give us unecstatic political, philosophical or

moral lessons in metre. If, as I believe, our emotions may be expressed

in prose or free verse probably more poetically than even in metre, it

is surely inadvisable to drive home a prosaic idea in verse, and

especially at great length. Yet this has often been done. Browning gave

us an effective harangue against spiritualism in _Mr. Sludge, "The

Medium,"_ in blank verse, Byron proved a good critic of society in _Don

Juan_, in Ottava Rima metre, Shelley preached moral reforms in the

_Revolt of Islam_, in the Spenserian stanza. Two of the best poems of

the nineteenth century, among the masterpieces of their authors, are

Swinburne's _Hertha_, and Browning's _Rabbi Ben Ezra_, and they are both

ecstatically didactic.

But the future poets will not spin out their ideas in metre at great

length. The short verse poem embodying an idea will always be with us,

but I doubt if we will have, or at least ought to have, philosophical or

moral works, extending into hundreds or thousands of lines of regular

verse.

John Addington Symonds has in his _Essays Speculative and Suggestive_

taken two of the most famous dicta in English literature regarding the

function of poetry in relation to form and matter, and given us a sane

viewpoint. He analyzes Arnold's statement that poetry is a criticism of

life, and Pater's assumption that all art, including poetry, aspires

towards the condition of music which thus in his opinion becomes the

true type or measure of consummate art. Symonds shuns both the

didacticism which Arnold's view encourages, and the worship of form

implied in Pater's statement; though it should be said that Pater in his

essay on "Style" urges that, after all, subject matter is the deciding

factor in determining great art. As Symonds says, the poet gives us

rather a revelation than a criticism of life, a presentment according to

his faculty for observing and displaying it; he is more a reporter and a

seer than a judge. Poets take their final rank by matter and not by

form. Though Symonds mentions slurringly a great poet like Baudelaire,

still the following lines should be carefully pondered by many of our

versifiers: "The carving of cherry-stones in verse, the turning of

triolets and rondeaux, the seeking after sound and color without heed

for sense, is all foredoomed to final failure." Poetry appeals to the

imaginative reason, and must embody thought and emotion. As Symonds

remarks, Pater's discrimination between these two is fanciful.

Poetry then must not be timid about dealing with ideas in an emotional

or imaginative manner. It may even take up moral problems provided it

does not sink into the commonplace ethical purposes that we have in the

_Psalm of Life_ and _Excelsior_, two of Longfellow's most inferior and

popular poems. An idea that is the result of reason may be uttered with

ecstasy, and hence there may be logic in poetry.

In his _Oxford Lectures on Poetry_ in the essay on "Poetry for Poetry's

Sake," Professor A. C. Bradley takes issue with those who claim that it

is no consequence what a poet says but how he says it, and he rightly

regards as of small aesthetic value that formalist heresy which

encourages men to taste poetry as though it were wine. Poetry inheres in

ideas. To insist, as the poetry for poetry's sake school does, that a

poem has no more lesson for us than a tree is to institute a false

comparison, for the tree has a lesson for any one who finds it.

When one finishes a volume of poetry by some of the purely aesthetic

poets, one is amazed at the kind of life they embody in art. It is often

such a petty life, a talk to a cat, or an imitation of an image of an

old poet, or a superabundant reference to flowers. It is not of the

substance of which noble lives are made. We are pained to find that

trite utterances or references are tricked out in gaudy images and given

forth to the world in large quantities.

Verses of trivial facts and ideas set forth with artifice are not

poetry. Indeed, it is a petty employment for poets to be giving vent to

labored conceits about gold fish, and vases, about dandelions and

kittens and lollypops, investing none of these themes with imagination

or intellect. Man is stirred by thousands of emotions arising from his

inability to adjust himself to surroundings, by his thwarted will and

suppressed desires. He is often wrapped in gloom for want of real

truthful consoling poetry. He experiences tragedies due to conflicts

with relatives, friends, to lack of harmony in matrimonial or amorous

affairs. His life is often being gradually snuffed out by the prevailing

of stupid and deplorable customs; he is often starving or being

insufficiently fed, and frequently sees his children in unhappy

circumstances. He is the victim of tyrants and unjust social systems,

and is engaged in soul-killing occupations. He faces the great

mysteries of existence, the riddle of the Sphinx. He witnesses cruelties

of all kinds, persecution of races and individuals, mismanagement of

affairs, lynchings, massacres, wars and imprisonments. Hypocrisy and

vindictiveness are rife and man suffers thereby. He thirsts for beauty,

he pants for happiness.

Yet poets who may find numerous and important subjects for the

literature of ecstasy, are busy writing sugared verses about mosaics,

candles, and puppies, and arranging vowel sounds and rhythms. Men's

souls are starving to be fed with poetry and the versifiers polish and

file and chisel verses on themes that interest no one. As Horace says,

the mountains are in labor and the issue is but a ridiculous mouse.

Indeed it is not the subject the poet chooses that one objects to, but

to the absence of ideas, or the shallowness or triviality of the idea.

Burns took a daisy and made it the symbol of the racked poet, and could

write about a mouse or a louse and deduce some universal idea. Shelley

and Keats could endure emotions and thoughts by singing of a skylark or

a nightingale. But the petty poet cannot deduce anything but a trifling

idea, no matter what theme he selects.

Another feature which distinguishes the minor poet in prose or verse is

his investing a trite idea with an emotion out of all proportion. He

hales with enthusiasm a commonplace, he gets into ecstasy about that

toward which an intelligent man displays little or no emotion. It is the

distinction of the unknown author of the ancient Greek fragment _On the

Sublime_ that he deprecates the tendency to wax emotional about the

unemotional. The silly ideas and emotions about which versifiers get

excited are often an index to their own moral and intellectual failing,

as well as their aesthetic deficiency. From Sainte-Beuve Matthew Arnold

appropriately quotes a saying to the effect that, in judging a work, the

French question not only whether they are moved by it, but whether also

they have the right to be moved by it.

So when we look through much of the so-called popular poetry, we see why

we cannot often admit it to the high realm of the literature of ecstasy.

It contains the childish sentimental excitement about facts that every

thinking man takes for granted. When we read the eloquent sermon on the

advantage of practicing justice, we wonder at the folly of making a

comment about so obvious a truism. It is for this reason that moral

axioms lack the elements of poetry, because they do not admit of

exposition with appreciable ecstasy. Verse is full of stale themes sung

over so often that we almost rebel when the new poet comes along and

sings over the same old story.

It requires a great intellect to know when to judge rightly about the

propriety of one's emotions for the subject of literature. We do not

think that it is the subject matter of emotion to go into ecstatic

praises, for example, over a man who supports his child. We find that

animals provide food for their young; hence it is not fit to grow

eloquent because a man does what even the lowest animal has the instinct

to do.

Conventional morality only becomes poetry when colored by the

imagination or illustrated by an unusually pleasing ecstatic

presentment. When Fuller, for instance, says that we should not mock at

the defects of people who are physically or mentally disabled, he utters

a stale truism that is not poetry but ethics. When he adds that it is

pitiable to beat a cripple with his own crutches, the little prose

passage is lifted up into poetry, for we are brought into a state of

ecstasy by the imaginative illustration. Similarly take some of the

instances of self-sacrifice by the common people which Bret Harte and O.

Henry delighted in depicting. Some of their stories become poetry by

emotional presentation of a trite idea.

There must also be more or less sympathy with the poet's viewpoint. "All

right human song," says Ruskin in his _Lectures on Art_, "is the

finished expression by art, of the joy or grief of noble persons, for

right causes. And accurately in proportion to the rightness of the

cause, and purity of the emotion, is the possibility of the fine art. A

maiden may sing of her lost love, but a miser cannot sing of his lost

money."

Ruskin may have corrupted our artistic outlook somewhat by insisting on

an ethical aim. Yet we should remember that our aesthetic feelings are

influenced by our moral outlook. While we should not seek an ethical aim

in literature as an end in itself, while we should shun the preacher of

commonplaces who poses as a poet, we cannot respond to the sympathetic

depicting of an emotion which we ourselves could never feel because of

repugnance to it.

To appreciate a poem truly, we must feel as the poet does and sympathize

with the motives that inspired his feelings. The reasons that urge him

to express his emotions must appear to us just ones. If our intellect is

far greater than that of the poet, we shall find that many of the causes

that inspire him to sing as he does would not at all arouse in us the

emotions experienced by him; his poem is not the greatest art to us. If

his intellect is superior to ours, we shall not like his work; but then

it will be because he is more advanced than we are.

If a poet were to sing of an incestuous love; or decry sympathy for the

distressed; or to laud a cruel action; or to gloat over the schemes of

the fraudulent; or sing favorably of any action which we think a base

one, his poem would not be art for it does not evoke emotional response

from anybody.

Poe laid down the principle of art for art's sake that poetry deals with

beauty alone and that the only faculty for appreciating it is that of

taste. He held that poetry had nothing to do with truth or duty; that

the intellect and the moral sense were concerned with these and hence

had no field for exercising themselves either in writing or judging

poetry.

As a matter of fact all three faculties, taste, intellect and moral

sense, are called into use in creating and appreciating the highest kind

of poetry or any other form of literature. There is no reason why a poet

should not make use of all three faculties if he has them all developed.

Goethe and Ibsen possessed them. The highest form of taste can scarcely

be attained unless the poet's intellect and moral sense are fine. For

falsehood and sin are repugnant to our taste for beauty. A book that is

absolutely tainted with moral perversities or shows a foolish and

inconceivable conception of intellectual values will be certainly

deficient in some phases of beauty. Our consciences and our minds are

unconsciously consulted in our conception of the beautiful. Not only

truth, but duty is beauty. Even Poe maintained that Taste held intimate

relations with Intellect and Truth and he therefore placed it between

them.

The greatest classics are those that appeal to all three faculties in us

and those works which offend both our intellect and moral sense do not

completely satisfy our sense of beauty. The best critics from Hazlitt to

Brandes understood that. Fortunately many of the classics have lost only

in parts their moral and intellectual value, and hence still hold sway

over us. And sometimes the beauty is so intensely striking that we

charitably overlook faults of morality and intellect.

As Professor Woodberry says in his _A New Defense of Poetry_ in _The

Heart of Man_: "Can there by any surprise when I say that the method of

idealism is that of all thought? that in its intellectual process the

art of the poet, so far from being a sort of incantation, is the same as

belongs to the logician, the chemist, the statesman? It is no more than

to say that in creating literature the mind acts; the action of the mind

is thought; and there are no more two ways of thinking than there are

two kinds of gravitation."

The connection between art and ethics is closer than some critics

imagine. Spingarn was mistaken when he said that we have done with all

moral judgment of literature. A book is often artistically great chiefly

because its ethical viewpoint is right. The rightness of it is often

what creates the ecstasy. Let us take Ibsen's _Ghosts_. The real

greatness of this play is not chiefly in its picture of heredity or of a

man becoming an idiot. Its real value lies in its attitude towards the

marriage problem and its contrast of the two characters, Mrs. Alving,

the representative of the new order, and of Pastor Manders, representing

society. The leading question there is, should Mrs. Alving have gone

back to her husband, knowing that he was possessed of a loathsome

disease which might be inherited by any possible progeny? Was she

justified in leaving him? That these are the important questions is

evident from the motive which prompted Ibsen to write the play, namely,

to answer the critics of the _Doll's House_. The conclusion reached by

Ibsen from the terrible picture is that Mrs. Alving was wrong in going

back to her husband, that there are times when it is justifiable to

leave one's husband. This is the moral lesson of the play, and is

conveyed with great ecstasy; in fact, the moral intensifies the ecstasy.

A conventional playwright would have concluded that Mrs. Alving should

have remained with her husband in obedience to duty, that the

simple-minded Pastor was in the right. The play even if handled as well

as by Ibsen could not have been the great work of literature that it is,

if written in defense of the conventional moral code. A great author

attacks conventional morality to battle for a higher morality.

The moral ideas of an author have much to do with the literary

excellence of his work.[133:A] But this does not mean that we must go

back to the old Greek idea that poetry be a vehicle for the inculcation

of the commonplace ethics. Nor does it imply that we cannot appreciate a

poet because we disapprove of the religion or political party with which

he is affiliated.

In the conclusion of his essay on "How a Young Man Should Study Poetry,"

Plutarch shows that the philosopher and the poet are engaged in the same

mission. He takes passages from the poets and shows us that they are

similar to those he selects from the philosophers. The doctrines of

Plato and Pythagoras agree with the ideas by the dramatists spoken on

the stage, and with those that lyricists sang to the harp. We may accept

Plutarch's views except in so far as he urges that poetry should preach

dogmatic and conventional ethics.

We also see that parts of Dante, Pope, and Shelley may be placed

parallel respectively to passages from thinkers who influenced them,

Aquinas, Bolingbroke, and Godwin, to learn that the poetry resided in

the original philosophic prose passage. It was enhanced not by the verse

form but by the process of ecstatic re-statement.

Should we say that Cowper and Wordsworth are poets, and that Rousseau,

from whom they got many ideas, is not? Is Browning only a poet and no

philosopher, and is Carlyle only a philosopher and not a poet? Is the

verse of Goethe where pantheism is taught, poetry, and do you find no

poetry at all in Spinoza's _Ethics_?

Among the most famous philosophical passages of Shakespeare is the one

in _The Tempest_ describing the transitoriness of this world and ending

with the famous line about our life being rounded with sleep. If there

is anything in Shakespeare that is poetry of a high order, this famous

passage is, and yet it is really philosophy. It is poetry not because it

is in blank verse or has rhythm, but because the ideas are stated in an

emotional and ecstatic manner. There is poetry in ideas and those

critics who shrink from applying the word poetry to intellectual

performances are urged to honeycomb their Shakespeare for numerous ideas

that are beyond question poetry.

A great idea is poetry; a profound and farseeing idea is poetry, whether

written with rhythm or not. If a commonplace thought, rhythmically

adorned, may sometimes be poetry, most certainly a profound idea

ecstatically but unrhythmically expressed is poetry.

What is the difference between poetry and philosophy? If we examine into

the nature of each we will find that there is a line at which they meet

and where it is hard to distinguish one from the other. As a rule, the

principles of metaphysics, epistemology and logic as written down in the

average philosophical work seldom are poetry. Only occasionally have

the philosophers waxed ecstatic. Yet many novelists, essayists and verse

writers have made many of these philosophical principles poetry by

stating them in an ecstatic manner. Any philosophical principle arousing

our emotions is poetry.

The general truths of sociology, ethics and psychology form the subject

matter of the literature of ecstasy, but they are poetry only when

ecstatically treated. The psychological novel and the problem play deal

with these truths. Go to some original treatises on sociological, moral

or psychological subjects and omit the statistics, the laboratory work

and the cold hard reasoning and you will often find great ideas

emotionally stated that belong to the literature of ecstasy. We have

parted with the idea that an author must be tearing a passion to

tatters, or telling a story, or uttering a complaint, in order to

produce poetry. When Herbert Spencer analyzes love for a page and a half

and tells us how it is composed, we exclaim, this is the literature of

ecstasy even though we find it in a treatise on psychology. He describes

to us how we feel when we love by enumerating to us the different

sensations we experience. (_Principles of Psychology_ Vol. 1, Part IV,

Ch. 8, Par. 215.) The passage may not be passionate poetry, but it would

not have been out of place in a novel by Stendhal, George Eliot or

Meredith.

When Freud reveals our souls to ourselves, when Fabre writes a book on

the doings of insects, we often are reading poetry or the literature of

ecstasy, when we think we are reading science.

We might select many passages from philosophical works that belong to

the literature of ecstasy, passages from Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, and

Hume, but more especially from Plato, Pascal, Schopenhauer and

Nietzsche. There are isolated paragraphs in their works wherein we find

the imagination and the intellect fused; we cannot distinguish that

which belongs to the realm of logic and that which is the result of pure

emotion. Of philosophers of our own time, Bergson and Bertrand Russel

have occasional passages where a profound idea is emotionalized. Hence

these belong to the literature of ecstasy, or poetry.

We must no longer conclude that only that is poetry which sings a song

in verse. It is just because the verse lyric, epic, and tragedy are

among the oldest forms of literature that the theories of poetry have

been built up by examining chiefly these forms. Aristotle's _Poetics_,

except for a few vital passages, has done more mischief in literary

criticism than his _Logic_ has done in philosophy.

What a queer definition of poetry is that which includes a metrical

insipid utterance or a versified fact of microscopic importance, and

excludes the sublime reflections of philosophers who contemplate the

nature of the entire cosmos, who fathom the mysteries of the universe,

and who state for us our relation to it and give us profound conceptions

of it. If one finds poetry only in the saccharine sonnets of our

magazine writers and none at all in the great philosophers, he does not

understand what poetry is. If you, however, call a philosophical

principle poetry when you find it in verse, you must admit that the

poetry was there before it was put in verse, in the prose version. For

poetry, not being a branch of literature but an emotional spirit bathing

all literature, also holds philosophical ideas, intellectual conceptions

in solution, whenever these are in prose and move to ecstasy.

Aristotle and many others were also absorbed as to the difference

between poetry and history, as they had been between poetry and

philosophy. He stated truly enough that Homer as a poet did not differ

from Herodotus as a historian simply because of their difference in

metre. He found that the difference between poetry and history lay in

this, that poetry dealt with the universal and history with the

particular. This definition means very little to us to-day even though

commentators try to explain that Aristotle includes under poetry any

treatment also of the particular which presents universal situations and

depicts universal traits. History, however, also treats of the

universal, for it records universal traits in the particular events

which it describes. Aristotle's distinction falls, for history and

poetry deal with both the particular and universal. We cannot say with

Aristotle that history tells what Alcibiades actually did, while poetry

would tell what any man would do. An actual emotional account of the

deeds and character of Alcibiades is poetry, as you will observe by

reading Plutarch.

For all historical writing may be poetical and contain poems, if the

ecstasy is there. What distinguishes the poetry in history is the

emotion, and all history that is a dry narrative is history and not

poetry. Thucydides's _Peloponnesian War_ and Carlyle's _French

Revolution_ contain much poetry though they deal with the particular,

but they are made poetry by the ecstasy. Some of Herodotus is poetry,

and much of Homer is history.

Again Aristotle's distinction is obsolete in these days of prose fiction

which deals with the particular, and often with the actual, and merely

changes the names. And these novels often contain poems. We recall

Fielding's distinction between novels and histories, the former being

true in everything but the names, and the latter being false in

everything but the names.

There is poetry in Livy, Tacitus, in Gibbon, Froude, and all great

historians.

FOOTNOTES:

[133:A] "Moral nihilism inevitably involves an aesthetic nihilism. . . .

The values of literature are in the last resort moral. . . . Literature

should be a kingdom where a sterner morality, a more strenuous liberty

prevails."--J. Middleton Murry.

The Literature of Ecstasy · 第 7 / 12 章