high an average, both mentally and physically, as any organization in
the army, not even excepting the Air Service. About 65 per cent of the
corps were technically trained men—engineers and machinists—while
the remaining 35 per cent was composed of business and professional
men, farmers, cow-punchers, college undergraduates, and soldiers of
fortune. They came from every section of every State in the Union. Their
versatility was denoted by the pipings of their overseas caps—blue, red,
and yellow—which denoted that they combined the functions of infantry,
artillery, and cavalry. Several other colors might appropriately have
been added, however, for the tank men were as familiar with Browning,
Lewis, and Vickers as the machine-gunners, they knew as much about
gas-engines as the Motor Transport Corps, they were as competent to make
repairs as the men of the Ordnance Department, and in action they took as
many risks as the youngsters on whose breasts were embroidered the silver
wings. They were as keen as razors and as hard as nails. They were, to
use the phraseology of the plains, fairly “rarin’ to go,” and they were
ready and anxious to fight at the drop of the hat. In fact, that was
why they joined the Tank Corps—because they believed it offered more
opportunities for Boche-killing than any other branch of the service.
The training of the tank units was based on infantry drill, which is the
best means of instilling discipline. This was supplemented, however,
by instruction in the use of machine-guns and tank cannon and in the
operation and maintenance of gas-engines, the men finally being brought
to a point where they were ready to take up technical and tactical tank
training at the British and French tank-training centres, to which they
were sent as soon as there was accommodation for them. Thousands of men,
trained to the limit of the facilities in this country, were held at
Gettysburg from April and May until August and September because of the
shortage of tanks and the lack of training facilities in France. Not
until September, in fact, did any tanks become available for training
purposes in the United States, when there arrived five British heavy
tanks and several light tanks of American manufacture, thus permitting
training to be resumed on a larger scale. When the Armistice was signed,
the Tank Corps had a total of 20,212 officers and men, of whom 8,183 were
serving in Europe. Shortly before the collapse of Germany preparations
had been begun for the great Allied drive planned for the spring of 1919,
steps being taken to increase the corps to a point where it could supply
tank units for four field armies. The proposed strength for this purpose
was 57,940 officers and men, it being planned to have this entire force
fully organized, trained, equipped, and in France by the early spring of
1919.
The programme of tank construction for the American Army was initiated
in February, 1918, but, owing to the extensive arrangements which had
to be made with numerous manufacturers for the enormous number of parts
required, and to the fact that there existed in the United States little
or no accurate data regarding tank construction, the first light tank was
not delivered to the Tank Corps in the United States until the following
September. Owing to the more complicated mechanism of the heavy tanks,
none of them was completed before the signing of the Armistice. The
machines used by the American Tank Corps units engaged on the Western
Front were supplied by the French and British, no American-built tanks
being employed in active fighting during the war.
[Illustration: THE AMERICAN WHIPPET TANK.]
[Illustration: THE MARK V TANK.]
[Illustration: A SQUADRON OF WHIPPET TANKS ADVANCING IN BATTLE FORMATION.
_Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A._]
[Illustration: A SQUADRON OF WHIPPET TANKS PARKED AND CAMOUFLAGED TO
CONCEAL THEM FROM ENEMY OBSERVATION.
_Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A._]
After a series of conferences between American, French, and British tank
officers, it was decided that two types of tanks should be manufactured
in the United States: a heavy model (Mark VIII) and a light machine
(Mark I) known as a “whippet.” The heavy tank, which weighs thirty-five
tons and carries a crew of one officer and nine men, is armed with two
six-pounder rapid-fire guns and six Browning machine-guns, and is capable
of a speed of from four and one-half to six miles an hour over ordinary
ground. The whippet, named after a breed of small dog used in England for
racing, was an adaption of the French Renault tank. It weighs six tons
and carries a crew of two men—a driver and a gunner—and over ordinary
ground can move at a speed of from seven to eight miles an hour. These,
then, were the two types of tanks originally decided upon, but, as will
be seen, the programme was considerably altered.
When it was decided that the United States should embark on a programme
of tank construction, the Ordnance Department had only the haziest
instructions to guide it. Owing to the mystery in which the French and
British enshrouded the details of their tank construction, all that
our Ordnance officers knew about a tank was that it should be able to
cross trenches at least six feet wide, that it should be protected
with armor-plate approximately five-eighths of an inch thick, and
that it should carry one heavy gun and two or three machine-guns. Two
experimental machines were laid down and work started on them at once,
these models being intended to develop the possibilities of the gas,
electric, and steam systems of propulsion as well as to ascertain the
relative advantages of very large wheels and a specially articulated form
of caterpillar tread.
At this time the British were using and were interested in a large
tank only. The French had been using a medium-sized tank, known as the
Schneider, but, as it had not been wholly successful, they had developed
a much smaller two-man machine, called the Renault, which presented
some very decided advantages and which they eventually adopted as their
only type. While the large British tank had been reasonably successful
in operation, it had certain very decided limitations which the British
themselves recognized, so, after a thorough investigation of its
possibilities and shortcomings, it was decided to redesign the large tank
rather than to copy the existing model with its admitted defects. It was
furthermore decided that the work of designing should be done jointly by
British and American engineers, acting under the Anglo-American agreement
drawn up as the result of a conference at British General Headquarters,
which provided for the joint production by England and the United States
of 1,500 large tanks, England to furnish the hulls, guns, and ammunition,
the United States to provide the power-plant and driving mechanism.
When the Armistice was signed, approximately 50 per cent of the work
represented by the American components had been completed, and it was
confidently expected that the entire programme of 1,500 would have been
completed by March. England had about 250 of the hulls ready when the
Armistice was signed.
* * * * *
The work of manufacturing the French type of tank had not progressed
satisfactorily, however, this being partly due to the delay involved in
changing all drawings from the metric system to the American, and to
the difficulty which was experienced in inducing American concerns to
take on the production of this machine, which is extremely complicated
and difficult to manufacture. It was necessary, therefore, to divide up
manufacturing activities on this tank between a considerable number of
plants. The original programme called for 4,440 of these small tanks, of
which 209 had been completed by the end of December, 1918, with 289 more
partly completed and production just getting under way. There was every
reason to believe that the entire number would have been ready for use by
April, 1919.
During the last summer of the war two new types of tank were developed.
One of these was a two-man, three-ton affair, which the Ford Motor
Company guaranteed to produce at the rate of one hundred a day. Orders
were placed with that concern for 15,000 of these “flivvers” and the
first 500 machines would have been ready for delivery on January 1, but
upon the signing of the Armistice their production was stopped. The
other machine was a successor to the French Renault, but designed with a
view to quantity production. It carried three men instead of two and was
armed with both a 37-mm. cannon and a machine-gun, whereas the Renault
carried only two men and one weapon. The cost of production would have
been very much less than the Renault machine and the weight substantially
the same. One thousand of these had already been ordered and negotiations
were pending for a second thousand—the first to be delivered in January
and the entire two thousand by the end of March.
In addition to the above activities, the Ordnance Department had decided
to build 1,450 of the large Mark VIII tanks, including hull, guns, and
ammunition, entirely in this country. In fact, work on the interior
components for this lot of machines was well under way when the Armistice
was signed.
It was perhaps as well for the Germans that they contracted yellow fever
when they did, for had the war continued long enough to permit of America
launching the avalanche of tanks which she had under construction, the
Huns certainly would have had heart-failure. I doubt, indeed, if any
Americans, save the handful of officers directly concerned, realize
how tremendous was our tank programme. When the war ended, orders
had actually been placed for 23,390 tanks, representing an outlay of
approximately $175,000,000. This vast fleet of tanks was to be manned by
some 58,000 men—as many as there were in the entire American Army prior
to the war with Spain. _Had these tanks been placed side to side they
would have formed a moving wall of steel forty miles long._ Even the
comparatively few Tank Corps units which had an opportunity to get into
action gave the enemy a taste of what we were preparing for him. Their
crest was an angry cat. Their motto was “Treat ’Em Rough!” And they did.
IX
“GET THERE!”
It may be said, without taking undue liberties with the truth, that the
newest branch of the American Army, the Motor Transport Corps, owes its
existence to a Mexican bandit named Francisco Villa, sometimes called
“Pancho” for short. You may have heard of him. Though the officers who
wear on their collars the insignia of the wheel and the winged helmet
will probably disagree with this statement, asserting that their corps
is an outgrowth of the Great War, it is, nevertheless, a fact that the
present huge organization, which controls all the motor-driven transport
of the American Army, had its beginning in the handful of trucks, barely
a score in all, which ploughed their way across the sands of Chihuahua in
the wake of Pershing’s little punitive column.
When Villa and his raiders swooped down upon the border settlement of
Columbus on the night of March 8, 1916, there was not a single organized
motor-truck unit in the army, our officers, most of them trained in the
schools of Indian and Filipino warfare, insisting that no motor-driven
vehicle was as sturdy and dependable as the old-time escort wagon and its
four-mule team. The refusal of our staff authorities to recognize the
advantages of motor transport is the more difficult to understand when
it is remembered that for close on four years there had been unfolding
before our eyes the countless object-lessons of civil life and of the
war in Europe, every highway from the North Sea to the Alps being crowded
with the motor-driven vehicles of the fighting armies.
The present Motor Transport Corps may be said to have been born when,
three days after the Columbus raid, General Funston, in command of the
Southern Department, telegraphed to Washington for authorization to
form a number of motor-truck companies for service with the punitive
expedition. The War Department acted promptly. The request was
immediately approved, and within three days twenty-four trucks had been
purchased, a force of civilian drivers had been recruited, and the entire
outfit loaded aboard special trains. As soon as the trains reached
Columbus the trucks were loaded with supplies and sent across the border
to overtake the expedition, which was already well into northern Mexico.
Notwithstanding the total absence of anything resembling roads, despite
the deep sand, the extreme heat, and the inexperience of the drivers, the
trucks caught up with the column before the supplies which it had taken
from the United States were exhausted. From that moment the value of
motor-driven vehicles for military purposes was firmly established in the
minds of American officers, even the most hidebound old Indian fighters,
who disapproved of everything new on principle, being compelled to admit
that the mule must give way to the motor.
The first two motor-truck units proved so extremely efficient that the
organization of others was begun, and by June 30 there had been formed
fifteen companies in all. The personnel of these early motor-transport
companies was civilian, the drivers and repair men being provided by
the factories which supplied the trucks, but it quickly became apparent
that the employment of civilians would not prove satisfactory because
of their lack of discipline and the consequent difficulty of keeping
them under control, the officers not knowing how to handle civilians.
So, whenever possible, enlisted men who had had experience with motor
vehicles or who possessed some mechanical aptitude were transferred to
the truck companies to replace the civilians, the latter remaining on
to give instruction in driving and maintenance. Maintenance is, I might
add, perhaps the most important factor in the successful operation of
motor vehicles, for broken-down cars must be repaired, worn parts must
be replaced, and the vehicles must frequently be overhauled. In order to
maintain in a state of efficiency the truck trains operating in Mexico,
it was found necessary, therefore, to build repair-shops and to organize
repair crews. Though the personnel of these shops, like the drivers, was
at first largely civilian, it, too, was gradually replaced by enlisted
men, so it may be said that by the opening of 1917 motor transportation
had become a recognized branch of the military establishment, although it
was not until some time after declaration of war that it was authorized
for the army.
Although, upon our entry into the European war, preparations were
immediately begun for the complete motorization of the various
trains—ammunition, engineer, sanitary, and supply—which comprise the
divisional trains, each of these sections was still controlled by
the corps or department to which it pertained. In other words, the
ammunition trains were controlled by the Ordnance Department so far as
the procurement of vehicles and the supply of personnel was concerned;
the engineer trains were under the control of the Corps of Engineers;
the sanitary trains were under the Medical Corps, and only the supply
trains came under the jurisdiction of the Quartermaster Corps. It must
be understood, however, that the divisional trains were assigned to
and became a part of the division itself, being, therefore, under the
direct command of the divisional commander. As might have been expected,
this system resulted in inefficiency and confusion because of municipal
officers in control. Instead of all motor activities being directed by a
single head, each of the staff departments using motor vehicles had its
own ideas and worked along its own lines. Thus, the Corps of Engineers
had designed and was manufacturing various types of vehicles adapted
to engineering work. The Signal Corps was producing vehicles designed
for carrying radio equipment, photographic laboratories, and the like.
The Medical Corps was experimenting with various types of ambulances,
dental wagons, and mobile laboratories, while the Ordnance Department was
dividing its allegiance between the tractor type and the model known as
the “Quad” or four-wheel drive. Thus it was that for many months after
the declaration of war the motor activities of the army were distributed
among several arms of the service, with the inefficiency and duplication
of effort which invariably results from decentralization.
The necessity for a separate organization to handle motor transportation
was first recognized by the A. E. F., and in December, 1917, General
Pershing issued a general order creating a Motor Transport Service. The
new service was described as a part of the Quartermaster Corps, and an
assistant to the Chief Quartermaster was detailed as its chief. For
all practical purposes, however, it became a separate organization.
In the United States the transition was more gradual, it not being
until August, 1918, that the Secretary of War authorized the creation
of a Motor Transport Corps as a separate and distinct branch of the
military establishment, Colonel Charles B. Drake, who was later made a
brigadier-general, being named as its first chief. The new organization
was built up along the same lines as the Motor Transport Service, the
officers and men of the latter being transferred to similar positions
in the new corps, thus enabling them to continue the performance of
their duties without interruption or confusion. The effect was as though
the Motor Transport Service was lifted bodily out of the Quartermaster
Corps, renamed, and made completely independent, the only visible
sign of the change being, however, that the officers and men changed
their Quartermaster insignia for the winged helmet superimposed upon a
motor-wheel which was adopted as the device of the new corps.
Under the new order all the motor transportation of the army, save
only tractors used for artillery purposes, was embraced in the Motor
Transport Corps. The Medical Corps, the Engineer Corps, the Quartermaster
Corps, the Signal Corps, and the Department of Military Aeronautics, all
of which had developed special types of vehicles for their respective
needs, immediately turned over their equipment to the new organization.
The designing of bodies was left to the several branches, but the
designing of all types of chassis was included in the functions of the
Motor Transport Corps. Among the duties of the new corps were the design,
procurement, storage, maintenance, and replacement of all motor vehicles,
though a few weeks later procurement was assigned to the Purchase,
Storage, and Traffic Division of the office of the Quartermaster-General,
with the proviso, however, that the Motor Transport Corps should
prescribe the type and design of the vehicles supplied to it. The corps
was thus enabled to insist that it be supplied only with the standardized
military truck, the design of which had been achieved by the Motor
Transport Service in spite of much opposition and after untiring effort.
This arrangement also effectually prevented the purchase and use of
vehicles of many different designs and put an end to the complicated and
extravagant system of spare parts and supplies inseparable from the use
of a multiplicity of types.
I might mention, in passing, that in the spring of 1917, just prior to
our entry into the war, the automotive engineers of the United States
met in Washington and, putting aside all thought of commercial rivalry
or profit, or, indeed, of everything save patriotism, designed a
motor-truck which combined the best features of the many trucks which
were then being manufactured, placing at the disposal of the government
designs and patents that were the result of heavy expenditures of time,
money, and talent. This work of standardization was in charge of Mr.
Christian Girl, who was probably better fitted for the task than any man
in the United States. The result was a standardized military motor-truck
which is generally admitted to be the most efficient vehicle of its kind
in existence.
The efficiency of any motor-transport service, no matter how well
equipped with vehicles, must depend primarily upon the efficiency of its
personnel. The finest truck that mechanical genius can design and money
can buy can be ruined in a few hours by the carelessness or ignorance
of its driver. It was quickly realized, therefore, that, if the Motor
Transport Corps was to give efficient service, its officers and men must
be as carefully trained as their fellows in the combatant branches of
the army. The first real training-school for Motor Transport officers
was established by General Pershing in France, its students being
recruited mainly from Americans who had gone overseas prior to our entry
into the war and had entered the French service as camion and ambulance
drivers. These men possessed much practical knowledge, gained in actual
warfare, and a large percentage of them were given commissions in the
Motor Transport Service of the A. E. F. The chief training-centre in the
United States was at Camp Joseph E. Johnston, on the St. John’s River,
near Jacksonville, Fla., and a smaller one was later organized at Camp
Meigs, in the District of Columbia. Using as a basis of instruction
the curriculum adopted by the A. E. F., the officers and men at these
camps were given a very thorough course of training in all phases of
motor-transport work, including road-training, tactics, maintenance
and repair of cars, and a certain amount of infantry drill in order to
inculcate discipline. But with the growth of the army increased training
facilities became imperative, it being estimated that between 20,000 and
30,000 men per month would be required by the Motor Transport Corps. In
fact, requirements from overseas for men for operations up to July 1,
1919, was placed at upward of 231,000 officers and men. In order to train
these men and organize them into the proposed units, it was planned to
establish motor-transport training-centres at Camp Bowie, Texas; Fort
Sheridan, Illinois; Camp Frémont, California; Camp Wheeler, Georgia, and
Camp Taylor, Kentucky, which, in conjunction with the schools already in
operation at Camp Joseph E. Johnston and Camp Meigs, and other schools
which had been established by the Committee of Education and Special
Training, would have given a total monthly training capacity of 23,800
men. The signing of the Armistice put an abrupt end to this enormous
training programme, but plans have already been perfected for the
formation of a Motor Transport Reserve Corps, which, it is believed, will
result in providing a large number of officers trained in motor-transport
duties and ready for immediate service in the event that the United
States should again go to war.
About six weeks before the signing of the Armistice a spectacular
campaign was inaugurated in order to obtain for the corps recruits
possessing the necessary technical and mechanical training. Officers and
civilians were sent to the principal cities in the United States to open
recruiting offices, though no funds were appropriated for office rent,
clerical hire, supplies, or advertising, each recruiting officer being
expected to exercise his ingenuity in procuring all of the above without
cost to the government. But thanks to the co-operation and assistance
rendered by the local Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade, and
to the patriotism of the automobile manufacturers and newspapers, the
campaign proved, in spite of the lack of funds, a remarkable success,
there being received more than 50,000 applications for enlistment.