States—though not nearly as many as was generally supposed—the only one
of them who measured up to the popular conception of a spy was a woman
known as Madame de Victorica. In certain respects she came very near to
meeting the specifications for an international adventuress as laid down
in the mystery stories of Messrs. Chambers and Oppenheim. The results
she obtained were, however, distinctly disappointing—at least from the
Wilhelmstrasse point of view. Her father was the Prussian general to whom
Marshal Bazaine handed his sword at the surrender of Metz; her mother was
a Prussian countess; her sister was married to a Prussian nobleman, and
her brother was a Jesuit priest serving as a chaplain in the Austrian
Army. Madame de Victorica has had three husbands—all South Americans. Two
died within a few months after marrying the handsome adventuress; the
third was divorced. According to her confession, Madame de Victorica was
trained in espionage work at the Naval Intelligence Bureau in Berlin and
was sent to the United States by the authorities of the Wilhelmstrasse
for the purposes of obtaining military and naval information, to foment
labor troubles, to tamper with the Roman Catholic clergy, and to lay the
plans for a rebellion in Ireland more successful than the abortive one of
1916. She memorized a code before leaving Berlin. The secret ink in which
her letters were written was given her at the Chemical Institute and
was carried in two silk mufflers, the ink being obtained by saturating
them in cold water and wringing them. Writing in this ink could be
developed with iodine tablets, manufactured by a well-known firm of
London chemists, dissolved in vinegar. Other messages were transmitted by
means of pin-pricking certain letters in newspapers. Madame de Victorica
was unquestionably a woman of considerable intelligence and social
position; she had had some experience as a journalist, and was apparently
credited by the Germans with quickness of wit and resourcefulness as
an organizer. This reputation she only partly justified, however, for
she talked indiscreetly on the steamer while coming over, wasted time
and money after her arrival in New York in buying elaborate gowns, and
was an inveterate user of drugs. As the result of converging lines of
inquiry pursued by Military Intelligence and the Department of Justice,
she was arrested, together with several of her confederates, in August,
1918. There you have a thumb-nail sketch, as it were, of the most
dangerous German agent in America. She can thank her lucky stars that
the Wilhelmstrasse sent her to the United States instead of to France or
England, for had she been caught in either of those countries her career
would have ended not between stone walls but between a stone wall and a
firing-party.
It is easy enough to understand, if not to sympathize, with the reasons
which led Madame de Victorica to come to the United States in the
capacity of a German spy, for she was, after all, German to the core, her
relatives for generations before her having held high positions under the
Prussian crown. But it is not easy, indeed it is almost impossible, for
a loyal American to understand how men who were born and educated in the
United States and who had a long line of American ancestors behind them,
could sell their honor and their loyalty for German gold. It is, however,
a curious and regrettable fact that certain persons whose disloyalty
was proved beyond the shadow of a doubt were purely American, so far as
their birth and parentage were concerned, their only connections with
Germany being financial ones. Of these I have particularly in mind three
men, all, if I am not mistaken, possessing university educations, who
were journalists and correspondents of considerable standing until the
discovery of their pro-German activities blasted their reputations and
plunged them into oblivion. One of them—a correspondent who had seen
service in several wars—was caught in the act of carrying messages from
the Austrian Ambassador in Washington to Berlin. He was arrested by
British intelligence officers and returned to the United States. His
passport was taken from him, and those who were once his friends now pass
him by without speaking. Another of these gentry succeeded, in spite
of his German sympathies and affiliations, in obtaining admission to a
training-camp, being given a commission and sent to France. But, as the
result of representations made by the Intelligence Division, which was
thoroughly familiar with his career, he was brought back to the United
States, subjected to an official interrogation, confessed, and, though he
made desperate efforts to have the President accept his resignation, was
dismissed from the army “for the good of the service.” The third of this
precious trio went to Germany as a correspondent, at once constituted
himself a champion of everything German, savagely attacked the land of
his birth, and, upon the fall of the Kaiser, fled to Sweden, where, so
far as I am aware, he is still living in exile, a real “Man Without a
Country.”
The great organization built up by Von Papen and his fellows for purposes
of sabotage made it imperative, upon the entry of the United States into
the war, that a system should immediately be devised for the protection
of those plants and workers engaged in the manufacture of munitions. With
the declaration of war the United States became, almost overnight, the
greatest manufacturer of war materials in the world. In every city in the
land factories producing the tools of the fighter’s trade were running
night and day, and other factories, hundreds of them, began to spring
up as though at the wave of a magician’s wand. The nation was a-hum
with feverish industry from ocean to ocean. But of what avail was this
tremendous wave of manufacturing activity, of what use the expenditure of
billions in the erection and operation of plants and factories, unless
those plants and factories were afforded protection against fire and the
acts of enemy agents? To fill this need there was organized, in July,
1917, the Plant Protection Section of the Military Intelligence Division.
The system of plant protection provided, first of all, for a physical
examination of the munition factories of the country with a view to
minimizing the danger of their destruction by fire. Basing their plans on
the estimates of the insurance companies that 85 per cent of all fires
are the result of carelessness, the inspectors sent out by the section
insisted, as a measure essential to the success of their work, on a
systematic and wholesale house-cleaning, the wave of cleanliness which
struck those American plants engaged in the manufacture of munitions
during the first year of the war being directly traceable to the orders
of the Plant Protection Section. The officers of the section next turned
their attention to measures for the prevention of sabotage and the
fomentation of labor troubles by enemy agents, which was accomplished by
the introduction of what was known as the “interior organization system.”
This consisted in the establishment within the plant of a complete
espionage system, composed of old and trusted employees, who worked
as Secret Service agents, and were unknown to one another. In cases
where it was deemed necessary, this body was re-enforced by trained and
experienced operatives from the Plant Protection Section, who usually
obtained positions as workmen in the plant without the knowledge of the
management. By this means the perpetrators of many cases of sabotage were
discovered, incipient strikes were prevented, agitators and professional
trouble-makers were kept under surveillance, and, if their actions
warranted, were placed under arrest, and an unceasing watch kept on the
movements of enemy agents. The campaign of sabotage and destruction which
German sympathizers had been conducting almost unchecked was abruptly
halted, for so wide-spread and efficient was the section’s organization
that the enemy agent was constantly haunted by the fear that his most
trusted confederate might be a secret operative who was watching his
every action. Though it never had more than 400 active agents (this does
not include, of course, the enormous number of volunteer operatives
recruited from the workers themselves), the section extended its
protection to more than 37,000 manufacturing plants, and, during the
period of its war-time operations, made upward of 270,000 recommendations
for arrests, investigations, and prosecutions, or for further plant
protection.
Agents of the Plant Protection Section succeeded in gaining admission
to the innermost councils of the I. W. W. and kindred organizations,
and, by thus obtaining advance notice of any contemplated action, were
successful in averting strikes and labor troubles which would have
caused the loss of millions of dollars, and, through halting the flow
of munitions to the front, the loss of thousands of American lives. The
success of the section in this phase of its work was due, first, as I
have already explained, to its ability to obtain advance information of
impending trouble, and, secondly, to the fact that the agents of the
section were in a position to handle a delicate labor situation in an
absolutely impartial manner, taking no sides and inspiring the confidence
of both employers and employees. Thus it came about that the section was
frequently able to compose differences between capital and labor when
other arbitrators, who did not so completely hold the confidence of both
parties to the dispute, failed.
After the Armistice the activities of the section consisted, in the main,
in protecting the government against fraudulent claims presented by
manufacturers and in guarding the great plants and warehouses which were
abandoned upon the cancellation of war contracts. In one case the section
obtained and prepared evidence for a grand jury which so conclusively
showed fraud on the part of certain manufacturers holding government
contracts, that another concern, which had already presented claims
amounting to $600,000, upon learning that they were being investigated by
agents of the section, hurriedly withdrew them. Another example of the
efficiency which characterized the work of the section is illustrated by
the case of a concern engaged in the manufacture of shells, the evidence
presented by the section resulting in the indictment of the president
and ten other officials of the company for submitting shells to the
government for inspection under fraudulent circumstances.
* * * * *
The difficult, perplexing, and highly delicate work connected with the
various phases of the censorship was intrusted to the Tenth Section of
Military Intelligence, a number of subsections being established for the
censorship of mail matter, telegraphs and telephones, radio, books and
permanent literature, foreign-language newspapers, religious and pacifist
publications, photographs, motion-pictures, and mail to or from prisoners
of war.
To assume censorship of the mails was a new experience to our government,
for it was in direct opposition to American customs and traditions
and was extremely repugnant to a large and influential section of the
American people. It was undertaken, indeed, only after its necessity
had been urgently and repeatedly emphasized by our allies. Early in the
war France had taken over the censorship of the Swiss mails, leaving
to England the supervision of the mails to and from Holland and the
Scandinavian countries. Little attention had been paid, however, to
the Spanish, Mexican, and Central and South American mails, save when
they passed through the postal barrier erected by the Allied censorship
around the neutral states of Europe. The first problem that faced the
American censors, therefore, was to close the channels of information
leading into Germany through Spain, or out of Germany, via Spain, to the
Americas, Spain being in constant communication with Berlin by a powerful
system of wireless. Upon our entrance into the war it became imperative
to close this gap in the news blockade which was in force against the
enemy. This done, the only possible way for a German sympathizer in the
western hemisphere to communicate with Germany was indirectly, through
an intermediary in a neutral country, it becoming necessary for a German
agent in South America, for example, to direct his communications to
some confederate in Holland or Scandinavia. Such communications, which
were usually disguised as innocent social or business letters, but in
reality contained concealed messages in code, cipher, or invisible ink,
would then be transcribed by the confederate in the neutral country and
forwarded to the particular bureau of the German Government for which
they were intended, either by special courier or through ordinary postal
channels.
Owing to the peculiar position of the United States and its distance from
the actual battle-front, about 95 per cent of its postal-censorship work
was negative in character and only 5 per cent positive, these terms,
“negative” and “positive,” being used in the same sense as they applied
to other activities of Military Intelligence. By far the greater part of
the mail that required censorship was of a nature which might have caused
social unrest, labor troubles, or even rebellion in this country. Only
a comparatively small number of letters were intercepted which brought
positive information concerning the plans of the enemy or of neutrals. In
studying this positive information it was necessary for the censors to
keep constantly in mind the fact that the enemy intentionally permitted
false information to be sent out, which, were it taken at its face value,
might lead us to alter our plans or to relax our efforts. For periods of
two or three months, perhaps longer, immediately preceding each of the
great German offensives, there trickled into the offices of the censor
scores of letters depicting in heartrending terms the social unrest and
the appalling food conditions in the Fatherland.
Early in 1918 the United States, following the example of France and
England, established large chemical laboratories in New York and
Washington, where thousands of letters were subjected to tests for
invisible ink. The usual letter-paper which is used for communications in
invisible ink can be given minor tests without altering its appearance.
These preliminary tests are for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
paper has been moistened or subjected to other treatment preparatory to
the use of invisible ink. In case the minor tests show the paper has
received some unusual treatment, a major test is given which results in
developing any invisible writing, though it at the same time affects the
texture and color of the stationery so that it is impossible to restore
it to its original appearance. Practically all mail to or from persons
on the suspect lists kept by England, France, and the United States was
subjected to such examination.
By assuming the censorship of the Spanish, West Indian, and Latin
American mails, the American authorities were able to break up the trade
relations which up to that time had existed between German sympathizers
in the United States and German forwarding agents in South America.
In the latter months of the war Germany found herself in desperate
need of rubber in any form for use in electrical devices, particularly
for the construction of electrical apparatus to be used in torpedoes
and submarines. Hence we find the censorship intercepting suspicious
orders for such goods as dental rubber, tobacco-pouches, rubber soles
and heels. The censorship also intercepted and confiscated hundreds of
tons of German propaganda literature prepared by German agents in Spain
and intended for distribution in Latin America. Had this propaganda
reached the German agents in South and Central America to whom it was
addressed and had it been distributed in accordance with their plans,
it would unquestionably have resulted in great social unrest, political
demonstrations, and revolutions, if not, indeed, in actual war between
certain Latin American countries, thus interrupting our supply of certain
products essential to the manufacture of munitions. Had the Germans, for
example, succeeded in starting a war between Chile and Bolivia over the
Tacna-Arica question, our supply of Chilean nitrates, which we imported
in enormous quantities, in all probability would have been cut off. In
fact, it was the likelihood of just such an occurrence which led us to
spend millions of dollars in the erection of nitrate plants in the United
States, thus making us independent of the Chilean nitrate beds. The
censorship was likewise largely responsible for preventing revolutions
which were planned to take place simultaneously in Cuba and Mexico.
German agents had planned to launch a revolution in the Oriente province
of Cuba with a view to burning the cane-fields, while at the same time
an insurrection was to break out in the Tampico district of Mexico,
thus providing an excuse for the destruction of the oil-wells. Had this
plan been successful—and it came much nearer being successful than most
persons realize—our main sources of supply for oil and sugar would have
disappeared. But the plotters in Cuba were indiscreet enough to discuss
their plans in letters sent to their representatives in the United
States; these letters were intercepted by the postal censors, and a few
days later a transport, loaded to the gunwales with American Marines, set
sail for Guantanamo. The commander of the Marines had orders to prevent
the peace of the island republic from being disturbed. And he did. For
which we—and the Cubans—have to thank the postal censors.
It did not take the government long to realize that, if the cable and
postal censorships were to be made sufficiently water-tight to prevent
our military secrets leaking through to the enemy, it would be necessary
to reinforce them with a censorship of photographs and motion-picture
films. Accordingly, the Censorship Section of Military Intelligence was
charged, in addition to its numerous other duties, with the censorship
of all pictures taken by military photographers for the use of the
Committee on Public Information and for other publicity purposes, as
well as of those taken for commercial purposes by private concerns.
In order to keep our own people, as well as those of the Allied and
neutral countries, acquainted with the progress which the United States
was making in the business of war, scores of cameramen belonging to
the Photographic Section of the Signal Corps were sent out, at the
request of the Committee on Public Information, to take pictures at the
cantonments, training-camps, and munition factories in this country and
in the theatres of operations overseas. As, however, there were countless
details of our equipment, munitions, training methods, and the like
of which the enemy must be kept in ignorance, it was imperative that
all such pictures be carefully examined and passed upon before being
released for publication or exhibition. And, moreover, they must be
passed upon by men who were authorities on the various phases of the army
with which the pictures dealt. That it was a matter which could not be
left with safety to amateurs was emphasized by an incident which occurred
in October, 1918, when the great Allied offensive was at its height.
One Sunday morning the officers of the General Staff were astounded to
see, in the illustrated supplement of a New York newspaper, detailed
photographs of the new French howitzers, the very existence of which
up to that time had been one of the most carefully guarded secrets of
the Allies. The young officer who passed the pictures for publication
explained that, not being an artilleryman, the howitzers looked like
any other guns to him. A few weeks later the Staff was again surprised
and angered to see another secret—the small tanks which were being
manufactured in this country—revealed in the same paper. Here was another
case of an officer having passed a photograph dealing with a subject of
which he was ignorant. In order to prevent a repetition of such blunders,
the Censorship Section arranged to work in close co-operation with the
Chief Naval Censor and with experts in the offices of the Chief of Coast
Artillery, the Chief of Field Artillery, the Chief of Ordnance, the
Director of Military Aeronautics, the Bureau of Aircraft Production,
the quartermaster-general and the surgeon-general, these experts being
consulted in regard to all pictures relating to their respective arms
of the service. With their assistance a series of precedents was
established and a set of regulations for the censorship of photographs
was evolved. Among the pictures withheld from the public were those
dealing with new inventions of military significance, such as radio
telephony; with all examples of military and naval camouflage, and with
the various new types of artillery, especially those on tractor mounts.
Such photographs as were not released were placed in the archives of the
War College to become a permanent part of the pictorial history of the
war, while those which were passed were turned over to the Committee on
Public Information for distribution to the various agencies which were
in a position to give them the greatest publicity. There was also an
informal, intimate, and extremely valuable service which the section
was able to perform. As pictures were received from the A. E. F., a
systematic effort was made to furnish to the relatives and friends of
soldiers serving overseas copies of the photographs or sections of the
films in which their loved ones appeared, of the hospitals in which they
were being treated, or of the spots where they were buried. As a result
of this official thoughtfulness, comfort was given to many a lonely wife,
many an anxious parent.
A no less important phase of the section’s activities was the censorship
of still and motion pictures taken for commercial use at home and abroad
and the supervision of the firms and individuals taking them. When one
remembers that “The Birth of a Nation” is estimated to have been seen by
60,000,000 people, a realization can be had of the enormous possibilities
of the motion-picture for purposes of propaganda and the necessity
of subjecting it to rigid censorship. Whenever a picture contained
a suggestion of enemy propaganda, or when the policy of a producing
company appeared to be antagonistic to the interests of the United
States, a systematic investigation was started to determine the loyalty
of the officers of the organization and the source of its financial
backing. If the enemy propaganda was evidently intentional, steps were
immediately taken to prosecute the producers under the Espionage Act. If,
however, as was usually the case, the fault was due to mere ignorance
or thoughtlessness, a conference with the persons concerned generally
resulted in the alteration or withdrawal of the offending picture.
Exceptional precautions were observed in the censoring of films destined
for export. This work was in charge of the Customs Division of the
Treasury Department, the films being viewed by a board composed of
representatives of the Customs, Military and Naval Intelligence, and
the Committee on Public Information. If a member of this board made
any objection to a film it was sent to the custom-house for review by
another board of censors. If the matter to be deleted was unimportant,
the objectionable parts were cut out in the projection room. If the film
was approved, a letter of clearance was issued by the Committee on Public
Information and an export license was then granted by the War Trade
Board; should the film be rejected, the license was, of course, refused.