the artillery, it also demanded increased weight and range. To meet
this requirement there were devised various types of railway-artillery,
ranging in size from 7 to 16 inch, thereby making available for use on
the battle-front numerous guns from our seacoast fortifications which
could not have been used otherwise. Early in the war the Army borrowed
from the Navy a number of 7-inch naval rifles on pedestal mounts, for
which the Ordnance Department provided specially designed gun-cars,
thus affording a powerful and yet mobile form of defense for our coasts
in the event of submarine attack. The next performance worthy of note
was the mounting on railway-cars of ninety-six 8-inch guns taken from
various seacoast fortifications. Both of the above types of gun, as well
as the 12-inch mortars, were mounted on the so-called Barbette carriage,
which permits of all-round fire at any desired elevation. The 10-inch
seacoast rifle and all sizes above it were mounted on the Batignolles
type of carriage, which depends primarily on the track arrangement for
its direction of fire. Both the Barbette and Batignolles mounts had,
after the initial setting, all the characteristics of fixed emplacements,
but with the added advantage of being able to advance or retire with
a minimum loss of time. A third type of railway-mount, which was used
very successfully by the French and which was being adapted for certain
of our 10, 12, and 14 inch guns when the war ended, was the Schneider,
or sliding type of mount. Though this mount also depends upon the track
arrangement for its direction of fire, it has none of the features of a
fixed emplacement, the force of the recoil being taken up by permitting
the entire mount to slide back on the track during the recoil of the
gun. The “Chilean project,” as it was known, consisted in mounting
six 12-inch guns, which had been manufactured in the United States for
Chile and were on the point of delivery when they were commandeered
by our government, on special sliding mounts designed by the Ordnance
Department. Still another venture was the mounting for railway use of
a number of 14-inch guns loaned by the Navy to the War Department. But
the most ambitious project undertaken by Ordnance in connection with
railway-artillery was the production of the huge 16-inch howitzer, to
manufacture sixty-two of which an entirely new shop had to be erected by
the Midvale Steel Company. This, the heaviest railway-mount of American
design, weighs, with its gun, nearly a million pounds. The design and
production of a device which would absorb its recoil of _seven million
pounds_ was in itself no inconsiderable engineering problem. Each of
these monster railway-cannon has its own train, consisting of standard
and narrow-gauge ammunition-cars, as well as cars for tools, for spare
parts, for repair work, and for the crews. Huge as they are, rivalling in
range and power anything which the Germans had at Metz or the British at
Gibraltar, they are extremely mobile, any one of them being able to drop
its load of high explosive far behind the enemy’s lines, “pull stakes,”
and be miles away before the enemy could get its range.
[Illustration: A 12-INCH SEACOAST MORTAR ON A RAILWAY MOUNT.]
[Illustration: 6-INCH SEACOAST RIFLES TAKEN FROM COAST FORTIFICATIONS AND
MOUNTED FOR FIELD USE IN FRANCE.]
Speaking of the range of artillery, some truly amazing results in this
field were achieved by Major Forest Ray Moulton, one of America’s
foremost mathematicians, who was professor of astronomy in the University
of Chicago before he was given a commission in the Engineering Division
of Ordnance and turned his knowledge of ballistics to military account.
One usually thinks of a professor of astronomy as a highly impractical
person whose mind is absorbed in comets, meteors, and stars, yet no
individual in the armies of the United States did as much as Doctor
Moulton toward perfecting devices for killing Germans at long range. Here
is a sample of his achievements. As the result of a series of abstruse
calculations he made a change in the shape of the copper driving-band on
the 6-inch shell, whereby, _without adding to the powder charge and with
no modification whatever in the gun, he increased its range two and a
half miles_. What is even more remarkable and important, he so reduced
the variation between successive shots that a given number of shell will
fall into one-eighth the area formerly covered by their dispersion. Had
the war continued a year or so longer, there is no saying where Doctor
Moulton’s ballistic discoveries would have led. It was evidently of one
of the shell designed by him that the negro soldier remarked:
“Ah could staht runnin’ at brekfus’-time an’ that theah shell ’ud git me
jes’ when Ah got home foah suppah.”
Whereupon his companion exclaimed scornfully:
“All one of dem shells wants is jes’ yo’ address, niggah—jes’ yo’
address.”
* * * * *
No phase of the Ordnance Department’s work during the war came in for
such severe criticism as the adoption and production of machine-guns.
Now it so happens that I am thoroughly familiar with the details of
the long and bitter controversy which began with the original rejection
by the Ordnance Department of the Lewis gun and which ended with the
eventual adoption of the Browning. Many of the attacks made on the
War Department by the supporters of Colonel Lewis, as well as in the
editorial columns of the newspapers, were not justified by the facts and
showed an incomplete knowledge of the circumstances, yet, as an impartial
observer with some inside knowledge of the situation, I freely admit
that for certain of the criticisms there was ample justification. Let me
remind you, moreover, that the Lewis being considerably heavier than the
Browning machine-rifle and much lighter than the Browning machine-gun,
could not satisfactorily have taken the place of either. With which
passing comment we will let the machine-gun controversy rest.
Machine-guns of the so-called heavy type had been developed to a
serviceable stage at the time of the Spanish-American War, but neither
then nor in subsequent conflicts did they receive anything like the
attention which they attracted immediately after the outbreak of the war
in Europe. The Germans had apparently realized better than any one else
the value of machine-guns in the kind of fighting which they expected
to be engaged in, having had, it is reported, 50,000 machine-guns when
hostilities opened. American appreciation of the rôle destined to be
played in warfare by machine-guns is best evidenced by the fact that,
when we entered the war, our tables of organization gave to each
regiment four machine-guns!
When war was declared there were on hand in this country approximately
670 Benet-Mercie machine-rifles, 285 Maxim machine-guns, and 350 Lewis
guns chambered for British ammunition. The machine-gun manufacturing
facilities in the United States were also more limited than were the
facilities for rifle manufacture, by reason of the fact that England
and France had depended on their domestic resources to supply the bulk
of their machine-guns. As a result there were only two plants in the
United States which were actually producing machine-guns in quantity
when hostilities began. Six days after our entry into the war the War
Department ordered 1,300 Lewis guns (which order was subsequently
increased) and, in June, 2,500 Colt guns, which were to be used for
training purposes. The first division to be sent abroad was necessarily
armed with the all-but-obsolete Benet-Mercie machine-rifle, but upon its
arrival in France the French Government offered to equip the division
with Hotchkiss machine-guns and Chauchat machine-rifles—the same
automatic arms which the French had been using for three years. The offer
was thankfully accepted, not only for the first division but for a number
of succeeding divisions, thus insuring a supply of automatic weapons for
our troops until we were in a position to supply them ourselves.
The result of a series of machine-gun tests held by a board appointed
by the Secretary of War in May, 1917, proved conclusively that the gun
invented by John M. Browning, a Utah gunsmith who already possessed a
wide reputation as an inventor of automatic weapons, was the best type
of heavy machine-gun known to the board, and that the light automatic
rifle, also an invention of Browning, was likewise the most efficient
weapon of its type. The Lewis and the Vickers, both of which had been
extensively used by the British since the opening days of the war,
were also favorably reported upon and it was recommended that their
manufacture be continued. Acting on the recommendation of the board,
the Ordnance Department immediately increased its orders for Lewis
guns, placed orders with the Colt’s Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing
Company for Browning machine-rifles and machine-guns, and began the
development of large manufacturing facilities for the last-named types
in order that the quantities required could be produced within the time
specified. Although the Colt Company was the owner of an exclusive
right to build machine-guns and automatic rifles under the Browning
patents, the Ordnance Department early recognized that no single plant
could hope to produce a sufficient number of these weapons to meet the
constantly increasing requirements of our armies. Arrangements were
therefore made with the Colt Company and with the inventor, Mr. Browning,
for the surrender of their exclusive rights, the United States being
granted authority to manufacture these weapons wherever it saw fit
during the period of the war. As a result of this energetic, action,
by the early part of 1918 the Savage Arms Company at Utica, New York,
was producing Lewis guns of the flexible type for use on aircraft (the
large orders for Lewis ground guns having been diverted to aircraft use
upon the cabled recommendation of General Pershing); the Marlin-Rockwell
Corporation at New Haven was manufacturing large quantities of Marlin
Aircraft machine-guns of the synchronized type; the Colt’s Company
was building Vickers machine-guns of the heavy mobile type, while
various factories selected by the Ordnance Department because of their
facilities were energetically tooling up for the immense production of
Browning machine-guns and automatic rifles which later followed. Early
in March, 1918, the Winchester Repeating Arms Company, to whom, as the
result of the arrangement already referred to, the Browning plans and
specifications had been turned over, produced the first Browning rifles,
and two months later the New England Westinghouse Company turned out the
first Browning machine-guns. When the Armistice was signed, the American
Expeditionary Forces had been equipped with 41,348 Browning heavy
machine-guns and 48,082 Browning rifles.
As the Marlin Aircraft machine-gun was available and was giving a
considerable degree of satisfaction, no particular effort was made to
push the development of the Browning Aircraft machine-gun, as it was
feared that to do so might interfere with the production of the Browning
machine-gun for ground use. Only a few hundred Browning Aircraft guns
had, therefore, been produced up to the time of the Armistice. These had,
however, been satisfactorily synchronized so as to fire through the
airplane propellers, and had been speeded up to the amazing rate of fire
of _1,300 shots per minute_.
[Illustration: JOHN M. BROWNING, THE INVENTOR OF THE PISTOL, RIFLE, AND
MACHINE GUN WHICH BEARS HIS NAME.
Mr. Browning is holding the automatic rifle which he invented.
_Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A._]
[Illustration: THE BROWNING HEAVY MACHINE GUN.
This, the deadliest weapon of the war, can fire at the rate of 1,000
shots a minute.
_Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A._]
[Illustration: A RIFLE GRENADIER.
His rifle is fitted with a “tromblon” for firing rifle-grenades.]
Upon their arrival in Europe the two Browning weapons created a marked
sensation both in the armies of the Allies and in our own forces. Not
only were they exquisite examples of the gunsmith’s art but they could
pour lead into the enemy at an unheard-of rate, they were to all intents
and purposes fool-proof, and they proved themselves capable of standing
up under the most trying conditions. The Browning automatic rifle in
particular, as beautifully finished and balanced as a trap-shooter’s
double-barrel, formed a striking contrast to the clumsy French Chauchat,
which looked as though it had been made by a village blacksmith. During
the summer of 1918 our government was approached by representatives of
England, France, and Belgium with inquiries as to the possibility of
sufficient Brownings being produced to supply their armies as well as our
own.
The 79th was the first division to enter the line equipped with Browning
automatic rifles and machine-guns. In view of the various criticisms
of these weapons which have appeared from time to time in the American
press, it seems worth while to quote from the report of the Ordnance
Machine-Gun Officer of that division:
“The guns went into the front line for the first time in the night of
September 13th. The sector was quiet and the guns were practically not
used at all until the advance, starting September 26th. In the action
which followed, the guns were used on several occasions for overhead
fire, one company firing 10,000 rounds per gun into a wood in which there
were enemy machine-gun nests, at a range of 2,000 metres. Although the
conditions were extremely unfavorable for machine-guns on account of rain
and mud, the guns performed well. Machine-gun officers reported that
during the engagement the guns came up to the fullest expectations, and
even though covered with rust and using muddy ammunition, they functioned
whenever called upon to do so.”
The design and adoption of the Browning gun not only gave our armies
the most efficient and dependable weapon of its kind in the world, but
it saved the American taxpayer $75,000,000. This figure is based on the
difference in cost to the government of the Browning and its nearest
equivalent, the Vickers—the latter at a price representing its cost
after having been in war production for three years. The design and
adoption of the Browning automatic rifle gave us far and away the best
weapon of that type possessed by any army, and it saved the government
nearly $13,000,000—not a very large figure, it is true, compared with war
expenditures, but nevertheless worth saving.
When the war ended we had on hand 52,000 Browning automatic rifles and
29,000 Chauchats—a total sufficient to arm an army of approximately
3,500,000 men. On the same date there were completed 3,340 Hotchkiss,
9,337 Vickers, and 42,050 Browning guns, thus giving us enough heavy
machine-guns to equip over 200 divisions, or an army of approximately
7,000,000 men. Thus it will be seen that, no matter what the future has
in store for us, it will be a long time before we will have occasion to
worry about a shortage in machine-guns.
* * * * *
Though less novel and, therefore, less interesting than certain other
products of Ordnance, there were six items, all produced in stupendous
quantities, which rendered greater service than all the big guns,
tanks, and airplanes put together in nailing down the coffin-lid on
Germany’s dream of world domination. I refer to rifles, pistols,
revolvers, bayonets, helmets, and small-arms ammunition. They, with
the gas-respirator, the water-bottle, the cartridge-belt, and the
pack, constituted the equipment of the fighting Yank. They were the
infantryman’s tools of trade.
When the news of the sinking of the _Lusitania_ reached Paris, I heard
the then American Ambassador to France assert, in the words of Mr.
William Jennings Bryan, whose appointee he was, that were the United
States to enter the war, a million men would spring to arms overnight.
“I’ll admit, Mr. Ambassador,” said a sceptical listener, “that we might
get the million men. But where would we get the arms?”
“We’d stamp ’em out, sir,” replied the diplomat. “We’d stamp ’em out the
way we stamp out tin plates.”
But, unfortunately, the matter of supplying weapons for our fighting
forces was very far from being as simple as the ambassador seemed to
think, for the modern high-power service rifle is a delicately adjusted
and highly finished piece of mechanism, to manufacture which requires
the finest quality of materials and the highest grade of expert
workmanship. So, though we did not realize the dream of the ambassador by
producing arms for a million men overnight, American Ordnance performed
a feat almost as amazing by producing _enough rifles to equip an army of
seven million men in less than fifteen months_.
Some years before our entry into the war a parsimonious Congress reduced
the appropriations for the manufacture of small arms and small-arms
ammunition to such an extent that it was found necessary to shut down the
rifle-plant at the Rock Island Arsenal and to greatly reduce the output
of rifles at the Springfield Armory and of cartridges at the Frankford
Arsenal. This resulted, as might have been foreseen, in the dispersion
of the large force of highly skilled workmen who had been in government
employ, most of them seeking occupation with private concerns or turning
to other vocations. When, therefore, our entry into the Great War made
it necessary to take up the manufacture of small arms and ammunition on
an unprecedented scale, the War Department was dismayed to find that it
did not have nearly enough workmen, and that, owing to the enormous wages
which were then being paid in other industries, it could not get them.
Thus it became necessary, in order to obtain an immediate and adequate
supply of weapons for the great new armies which we were raising, to
enlist the co-operation of private manufacturers.
The three leading manufacturers of small arms in this country—the
Winchester Repeating Fire Arms Company of New Haven, Conn., the Remington
Arms-Union Metallic Cartridge Company of Ilion, N. Y., and the Remington
Arms Company of Eddystone, Pa.—were devoting themselves at this time
to the manufacture of the British .303 rifle, the production of which,
however, due to the decrease in the requirements of the British
Government, was gradually slowing down. But, though these plants had
every facility for turning out in large quantities the British .303
Enfield, it would have required many months for them to alter their tools
and machinery for the manufacture of the .30-calibre Springfield, which
was the standard arm of the American service. The Ordnance Department
found itself confronted, therefore, by three alternatives. It could
change the equipment of these plants so as to permit of the manufacture
of Springfield rifles—a proceeding which would have involved a delay of
several months; it could adopt the British Enfield, which would also have
necessitated the adoption of another calibre of ammunition—an unthinkable
thing in time of war; or it could utilize the facilities of these three
great plants by modifying the British rifle so that it would take
American ammunition. The latter course was decided on.
The modification consisted in changing the magazine, chamber, and bore
of the Enfield rifle so that it would take the U. S. service .30-calibre
rimless cartridge instead of the British .303 rim cartridge. So rapidly
were the plans worked out, the drawings and specifications produced,
and sample rifles submitted and tested, that within less than eight
weeks after the declaration of war orders were given to Winchester and
the two Remington concerns for a million “modified Enfields,” as the
new weapons were called. Putting aside the keen trade rivalry which had
formerly existed, the three plants virtually operated as one mammoth
rifle factory, so that when one shop found itself short of parts it was
promptly supplied from another where there was a surplus. The combined
factories had so fully gotten into their stride by the fall of 1918 that,
when the Armistice was signed, they were turning out approximately 10,000
rifles a day, this being in addition, remember, to the spare parts which
were being manufactured at all three plants as well as in the government
establishments at Rock Island and Springfield. The records show that more
than 2,500,000 rifles had been accepted by November 9, 1918. Add to this
the 600,000 Springfields and the 160,000 Krag-Jorgensens which we had
on hand at the beginning of the war, the 280,000 rifles which had been
manufactured for Russia but which were taken over by the United States,
and the 20,000 Ross rifles purchased from Canada, and it will be seen
that we had a total of more than 3,500,000 rifles. As only about one-half
of the troops in an American division carry rifles, we had, therefore,
enough weapons to equip an army of 7,000,000 men.
In spite of the endless complications due to the use by our forces during
the early days of the war of French machine-guns and automatic rifles of
a calibre different from our own, and to the insistent demands of the
Air Service for special types of cartridges—tracer, armor-piercing, and
incendiary—there was never a time when we did not have enough small-arms
ammunition to supply our forces in the field. I might mention in this
connection that one of the most perplexing problems which had to be
solved by Ordnance was the manufacture of ammunition which would function
equally well in two rifles—the Springfield and the Enfield—and in seven
different types of machine-gun—the Benet-Mercie, the Lewis, the Vickers,
the Colt, the Marlin, and the light and heavy Brownings. In these
machine-guns the firing-pin points, or strikers, are different in shape
and size and function differently, each giving a different weight of blow
on the primers of the cartridge, yet, notwithstanding this handicap,
the success of the American ammunition in this respect was remarkable.
The daily average of small-arms ammunition manufactured in the United
States reached the enormous total of 14,900,000 completed rounds—a
production equal to that of England and France put together. The total
number of cartridges of all classes produced up to the end of the war was
3,500,000,000; enough, if placed tip to primer, to put a girdle of brass
and steel around the globe.
At the outbreak of the war the Colt automatic pistol, of .45 calibre,
was the standard arm of the American Army. This pistol was manufactured
by Colt’s at Hartford, Conn., and by the government at the Springfield
Armory. The Ordnance Department quickly realized, however, that even the
combined capacity of these two plants would prove wholly inadequate to
meet the demands of the new armies, whereupon it obtained permission
from the War Department to supplement the supply of automatics with
arms of other types, particularly Colt and Smith & Wesson .45-calibre
revolvers—the famous “six shooters” of the plains. These revolvers did
not take the rimless, or cannelured-head, cartridge used in the pistols,
but this difficulty was overcome by means of a loading-clip, which had
the additional advantage of enabling them to be loaded almost as quickly
as an automatic. The revolver, which is somewhat less accurate and less
powerful than the pistol, and which is considerably more tiring for the
user, was adopted as an emergency measure only, due to the imperative
necessity of supplying the troops. The demands of the A. E. F. increased
so rapidly, however, that in the summer of 1918 contracts were let to
eight other firms possessing equipment which could be converted to the
manufacture of pistols and revolvers. It is interesting to note that
among the concerns which turned from the manufacture of essentially
peace-time devices to the production of implements for killing the Hun
were the Burroughs Adding Machine Company and the National Cash Register
Company. At the signing of the Armistice, there had been produced a
grand total of 375,000 pistols and 268,000 revolvers, and the rate of
production was rapidly increasing, thereby bringing us within sight of
the day when, in accordance with the plans of the General Staff, it would
be possible to arm every American soldier with that characteristically
American weapon, the “shooting-
Transcriber’s Note: The end of this paragraph will remain a mystery, as
it was omitted from the original printing (multiple copies were checked
to ascertain this).