known to chemists as dichlorethylsulphide. Its nature is as formidable as
its name. It has a distinctive smell, like garlic rather than mustard.
It has no immediate effect on the eyes, beyond a slight irritation, but
after several hours the eyes begin to swell and inflame and practically
blister, causing the most intense pain; the nose discharges freely,
and severe coughing and even vomiting ensue. Direct contact with the
spray causes blistering of the skin so severe that it is virtually
burned. Even when protected by masks and specially made clothing, it is
impossible for troops to remain for more than eight hours in an area
which has been bombarded with mustard-gas. Dichlorethylsulphide, to use
its correct name, is produced by blowing ethylene-gas into liquid sulphur
monochloride in large iron reaction vessels. Contrary to the popular
impression, this gas contains no mustard. The details of devices and
methods for introducing the ethylene and sulphur monochloride into the
vessels, the removal of the product, the necessary agitation and cooling
of the mass, and the like, were frequently changed during the development
of the process and had not reached a final form even when the Armistice
was signed. Nevertheless, when the war ended, Edgewood was producing 30
tons of mustard-gas a day and a rapid increase up to 100 tons daily was
practically assured.
Though the Germans began their use of gas by releasing it from cylinders,
depending upon the wind to carry it over the enemy’s lines, these
“cloud attacks,” as they were called, did not prove satisfactory and
were eventually discontinued, for great difficulty was experienced in
getting the heavy cylinders up to the front and installing them in the
trenches, and favorable winds could not be depended upon. It seems
likely, indeed, that the Germans failed to recognize the significance of
the meteorological records and charts of northern France, which show that
75 per cent of the prevailing winds are from a southerly or southeasterly
direction, thus leaving the Germans only 25 per cent of the time in
which they could use their gas without danger of its being blown back
over their own lines. It was in order to overcome these meteorological
conditions that the Germans evolved the idea of loading the gas into
shell, usually in the form of liquid, which turned into gas when it came
into contact with the air upon the explosion of the shell, and firing
these shell from guns or mortars, thus enabling them to place the gas
wherever they desired without reference to the weather. During the last
two years of the war, barring a few isolated instances, gas was used in
no other way.
The filling of shell was, therefore, one of the most important of
Edgewood’s many activities. Let me explain to you, as simply and briefly
as possible, how the shell were filled with phosgene.
The empty shell, after inspection, were loaded on trucks together
with the required number of loaded boosters. (A booster, it should be
explained, is the cap or stopper containing a charge of high explosive,
usually TNT or dynamite, which is screwed on the nose of the shell after
it has been filled with gas, much as a metal top is screwed onto a
bottle. Just before firing, a fuse is inserted in the booster, igniting
the explosive, which in turn shatters the shell, thus releasing the gas.)
The trucks with the empty shell were then run by electric locomotives to
the filling buildings. Here the shell were transferred to a conveyer,
a sort of moving platform, which slowly moved through a room kept cold
by refrigeration. About thirty minutes was required for this operation,
during which time the shell were cooled to a temperature of about zero.
This chilling of the shell was made necessary because phosgene has a low
boiling-point. It was imperative, therefore, that the temperature of the
shell be kept considerably below the boiling-point of phosgene in order
that the latter should remain in liquid form while the filling was taking
place. The chilled shell were then transferred to trucks and hauled
by motor through the filling-tunnel to the filling-machines. Here the
phosgene, kept in liquid state by refrigeration, was run into the shell
by automatic machines. The truck then carried the filled shell forward
a few feet, at which point the boosters were screwed into the noses of
the shell by hand. The final closing of the shell was then effected by
motors operated by compressed air. The filled shell were next conveyed
to the shell-dump, where they were classified and stored for twenty-four
hours, nose down on skids, in order to test them for leaks. The following
day the shell were again placed on conveyers which carried them through
a painting-machine, where air-brushes gave them a coat of elephant gray
and striped them with the distinctive bands of color which denoted the
type of gas they contained. The methods followed in filling shell with
chlorpicrin were similar to those for phosgene except that refrigeration
was unnecessary. The peculiar properties of mustard-gas, however,
required an entirely different filling system. Edgewood Arsenal also had
separate plants for filling the stannic-chloride hand-grenades used for
“mopping up” trenches; for filling both shell and grenades with white
phosphorus for use in forming smoke-screens to conceal the movements of
advancing troops, and for loading the incendiary drop-bombs used by the
Air Service.
The various plants which I have just described by no means comprised
the whole of Edgewood’s activities, however, for, in order to obtain a
sufficient supply of bromine, certain compounds of which are excellent
tear-producing materials, a series of brine-wells was sunk at Midland,
Michigan; a plant for the production of another lachrymator, brombenzyl
cyanide, was erected at Kingsport, Tennessee; and an establishment for
the manufacture of diphenychlorarsine—an arsenical material used in gas
warfare because it produces violent sneezing, thus causing the troops
to remove their gas-masks and thereby exposing them to the effects of
the toxic-gases used in combination with the arsenicals—was started at
Croyland, Pennsylvania.
As a matter of fact, the great mother-plant on Chesapeake Bay had
branches and ramifications of which the public had scarcely an inkling,
so carefully were the details of our gas production guarded. I have
already pointed out that it was the original intention to secure the
entire supply of toxic materials from existing chemical plants, and
that it was only after this plan was found to be unfeasible that the
decision to build government plants was reached. This decision did not
signify, however, that no such material would be obtained from existing
firms. On the contrary, it was decided to utilize such firms whenever it
was possible to secure their co-operation. But as the products desired
had never been prepared on a commercial scale in this country, it was
impossible to forecast with accuracy the cost of their manufacture. As
a result, the co-operation of the existing chemical concerns could be
secured only on the condition that the government would finance the
work. These plants, therefore, though they continued to be operated by
their owners, became in fact government plants, being financed by the
government, representatives of the War Department being stationed at
each establishment to supervise their administration and look after the
government’s interests. At first they were under the direction of the
trench warfare section of the Ordnance Department, but, under a later
order, they were made a part of Edgewood Arsenal and placed under the
administration of its commanding officer. The list of these outside
plants, with their official designation and the product manufactured in
each, is as follows:
Edgewood Arsenal, Niagara Falls Plant: Manufacture of phosgene.
Edgewood Arsenal, Midland (Mich.) Plant: Sinking of brine-wells
for the purpose of securing adequate supplies of bromine.
Edgewood Arsenal, Buffalo Plant: Manufacture of mustard-gas.
Edgewood Arsenal, Bound Brook (N. J.) Plant: Manufacture of
phosgene.
In addition to the above, the following outside plants were not only
built (or were in process of construction at the date of the Armistice)
but were operated as well by the government. Their location at points
other than Edgewood was decided upon partly because of the fact that
it was thought wise to have at least two plants for the manufacture of
each important material located at different places, since an accident
at one would in no way interfere with production at the other. These
government-owned establishments were:
Edgewood Arsenal, Stamford (Conn.) Plant: Manufacture of
chlorpicrin.
Edgewood Arsenal, Hastings (N. Y.) Plant: Manufacture of
mustard-gas.
Edgewood Arsenal, Kingsport (Tenn.) Plant: Manufacture of
brombenzyl cyanide.
Edgewood Arsenal, Croyland (Pa.) Plant: Manufacture of
diphenychlorarsine.
In addition to these nine great outlying plants, with their thousands
of workmen, there was the splendidly equipped Research Department at
American University, on the outskirts of Washington; the Experimental
Field and Proving-Ground near Lakehurst, New Jersey; and the Army Gas
Schools at Camp Kendrick, New Jersey, and Camp A. A. Humphreys, Virginia.
The tract of land near Lakehurst taken over for experimental purposes was
5 miles long and 4 wide and had an area of nearly 14,000 acres. As the
nearest habitation was 2½ miles away no difficulty was experienced in
conducting the highly important experiments with the necessary secrecy.
The camp included quarters for 50 officers and barracks for 800 men, a
completely equipped chemical laboratory, the staff of which included
expert glass-blowers who could make every kind of apparatus required, a
meteorological station, commanded by a former official of the Government
Weather Bureau, equipped with the latest apparatus necessary for making
and recording meteorological observations, a mechanical shop containing
lathes, drills, and tools for making repairs of every description, an
ice-making plant, a post hospital, a goat hospital, a dog hospital,
a dog kitchen, and enclosures for animals which had to be kept under
observation for long periods. In order to determine the effects of the
various gases on living subjects a large stock of animals—goats, dogs,
cats, rats, mice, guinea-pigs, and monkeys—had to be kept constantly on
hand. These animals were not obtainable in the necessary numbers without
considerable difficulty, it being necessary, on one occasion, to send
an officer to Mexico to purchase 1,500 Angora goats, experiments having
shown that the goat possesses powers of resistance to gas which more
nearly approximate those of a human being than does any other common
animal. Representatives of these various animal types were placed in
trenches modelled after those on the Western Front and bombarded with
different forms of gas-shell, those which remained alive being subjected
to close observation, sometimes for many days, by the experts of the
Pathological and Physiological Department. A human note enters into
this grim business of preparing for war in the fact that those animals,
particularly the dogs, which survived such an experiment were not
subjected to it again. I imagine, however, that the officials of the S.
P. C. A. would have entered a vigorous protest had they been permitted to
lift the veil of secrecy which for many months enveloped the operations
of the Chemical Warfare Service at Lakehurst.
The new methods and devices in gas warfare which were developed by
the great corps of scientists and laboratory experts attached to the
American University Experiment Station were given practical trials at
Lakehurst, where they were tested under conditions approximating as
nearly as possible those of actual warfare. Here experiments were carried
out to determine the value of gas-shells bursting in the air instead of
by impact, the value of mixing toxic or lachrymatory gas with shrapnel,
the value of 14-inch naval shell filled with a combination of high
explosive and toxic substance, and the value of clouds of poison-smoke.
Had the war continued, I imagine that the results of some of these
experiments would have given the Germans the surprise of their lives.
Though the gas production of Edgewood Arsenal from August to November,
1918, increased from 450 to 675 tons a week, and though the filling-plant
had a weekly capacity of nearly 1,000 tons, less than 100 tons of gas
was actually filled into shell weekly. This unfortunate state of affairs
was due to the failure of the Ordnance Department to supply enough, or
nearly enough, shell and boosters to keep pace with the production of
gas. In other words, there was far more gas than there were shell to
put it in, and far more shell than there were boosters for them. During
the early summer of 1918, large quantities of this surplus gas were
shipped overseas and there loaded into shell, but later instructions
were received to stop all shipments in bulk except a limited amount of
chlorine. From that time on, the production of gas was limited by the
number of shell and booster available, because it is impossible to store
toxic-gases in any large quantities. In fact, at all times after the
manufacture of poison-gases began in the United States, the supply of
such materials was not only in excess of the supply of shell and booster,
but the gas-plants could not be operated to their full capacity because
there was no way of utilizing the maximum output.
Do you remember how often, during the months immediately following our
entrance into the great conflict, one heard the assertion made that
American inventive genius would eventually produce a weapon so dreadful,
so potent, that it would end the war because flesh and blood would be
unable to withstand it? It was asserted, with a wealth of circumstantial
detail, that Mr. Edison had been locked up for weeks in his New Jersey
laboratory perfecting a device for the wholesale slaughter of the Huns
which would startle the world. But, as the war continued on its bloody
course, the public faith in inventors gradually waned and the American
people settled down to a realization that victory could be achieved only
by man-power, munitions, and food. Yet the persons who talked so glibly
of some startling discovery which would paralyze the efforts of the enemy
and abruptly end the war little realized how near to the truth their
imaginations led them—_for the government actually had in its possession
the secret of a weapon so terrible that, had it been used, it would
probably have ended the war_.
The story of how the secret came into the possession of the government
is a curious one. Years ago a student of chemistry, then living in a
foreign country, while carrying on a series of laboratory experiments,
stumbled upon a chemical combination which almost cost him his life.
It was a compound never before made, or, at least, never recorded.
Later the chemist came to the United States, but it was not until he
read of the use of toxic-gases by the Germans that he recalled his all
but fatal experiment of many years before. He kept silence, however,
until America’s entry into the war, when he imparted his formula to
the government. The chemist’s assertions of what his compound could
accomplish were at first received with considerable scepticism, but
this scepticism abruptly disappeared when the reports from the Research
Division of the Chemical Warfare Service at American University, where
the formula was developed, were received. So appalling was its nature,
indeed, that the War Department at first refused to permit the use of the
weapon thus strangely placed in its hand on the ground that the nation
using it would be guilty of inhumanity. But in July, 1918, following
the wholesale use of mustard-gas against our troops by the Germans,
the scruples of those in power disappeared and orders were given that
quantity production of the new toxic material should immediately be begun.
This super-gas, as it has been termed, was known to the Chemical Warfare
Service as G-34, though it was more commonly referred to as methyl,
a name which was given it because it in no way suggested the true
character of this newest and deadliest of poisons. It has also been
dubbed “Lewisite” because it was developed from the original formula to
a stage which made it practicable for military use by Professor W. Lee
Lewis, chief of the Defense Department of the Research Division of the
Chemical Warfare Service. Methyl, or Lewisite, is an oily, amber-colored
liquid, with an odor which vaguely suggests that of the geranium. It is
somewhat more volatile than mustard-gas, being comparable in that respect
to benzol. Instead of being inoffensive at first contact, like mustard,
it starts an acute pain which quickly becomes unendurable. A single drop
spilled on the hand will penetrate to the blood, attacking first the
kidneys, then the heart and lungs. It hardens the cell-tissues of the
lungs and causes simultaneously strangulation and a weakening of the
heart which result in speedy and violent death. If taken into the lungs
by inhalation in any perceptible quantity it kills almost instantly, the
victim dying in terrible agony. _It is estimated to be seventy-two times
deadlier than mustard-gas._
The manufacture of methyl was carried on in an abandoned motor-car
plant at Willoughby, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland, the work being in
charge of Colonel F. M. Dorsey, who, before the war, was a chemical
engineer in the employ of the General Electric Company. Every step in
the process of manufacture was enveloped in the most profound secrecy.
Every workman who entered the stockade surrounding the plant did so
under a voluntary agreement not to leave the eleven-acre space until
the war was won, though this arrangement was later modified upon the
men promising upon their honor not to divulge the nature of the product
or even the existence of the plant. All mail was censored and even the
use of the word Willoughby in correspondence was forbidden, letters
for the officers and men connected with the plant being addressed to
a lock-box in Cleveland. There was no recreation, the work was hard
and danger was always present, the men working with their gas-masks
constantly at the “alert” position. Though none of the masks designed
for protection against chlorpicrin, phosgene, or mustard were of the
slightest avail against methyl, the safety of the workers was ensured by
specially designed masks and clothing. Had we used methyl against the
Germans, however, it is extremely unlikely that they would have succeeded
in devising a means of protection against it—at least in time to save
themselves.
The methyl, as manufactured, was loaded into both shell and drums. The
shell, of 155mm. calibre, contained about ten pounds of the liquid, which
becomes a gas upon contact with the air; the drums, which held from 350
to 400 pounds each, were to be dropped from airplanes. It is estimated
that half a hundred of these drums, judiciously distributed, would
exterminate the entire population of Manhattan Island. When the Armistice
was signed methyl was being produced at the rate of approximately ten
tons a day and the plant at Willoughby was two months ahead of its
schedule, orders having been given that 3,000 tons should be in France,
ready for use, by March 1, 1919. It was well for Germany that she quit
when she did. Had methyl been turned loose against the Huns, civilization
would have had its revenge on the assassins of the _Lusitania_, on the
fiends who ravaged France and raped Belgium.
Within forty-eight hours after the signing of the Armistice the work
of dismantling the plant at Willoughby had begun, and ten weeks later
its demolition was complete. A special train, running at night under
heavy guard, carried the hundreds of tons of methyl which had already
been produced, in iron containers, to Edgewood Arsenal, where it was
transferred to a steamer, taken out to sea, and lowered into three miles
of salt water. But the formulæ and processes for manufacture still exist,
locked away in the great vaults of the War College in Washington, so, if
the nation is ever again forced to take up arms, it has at hand the most
terrible weapon ever devised for the purpose of wholesale slaughter.
Notwithstanding the fact that toxic-gases had been in almost constant
use by the European belligerents for two years before the United States
entered the conflict, the declaration of war found us totally unprepared
to commence the manufacture of the gas-defense equipment with which every
soldier going overseas must be provided. Such an article as a gas-mask
had never been produced in this country, the sum total of American
knowledge on the subject having been obtained from the masks brought
back as souvenirs by war correspondents and displayed in shop-windows
and from the pictures in the illustrated papers. Incredible as it may
seem, in view of the enormously important rôle which gas was playing
on the European battle-fields, only a single American army officer,
Major L. P. Williamson of the Medical Corps, had studied the subject
of gas defense, and he had done so on his own initiative. Thus it came
about that within a few days after the declaration of war, the military
authorities, confronted by the imperative necessity of providing our
expeditionary forces with gas-defense equipment, were conducting a
frantic search among the various scientific departments of the government
to discover one possessing the necessary facilities for handling the
problem. The Bureau of Chemistry did not have the personnel to carry on
the work and the Department of Agriculture did not have the necessary
apparatus, but the Bureau of Mines at Pittsburg possessed some experience
in kindred problems arising from mine-rescue work, and it also had
adequate facilities for handling the experimental work involved. It
was, therefore, selected for the purpose. The research facilities at
Pittsburg soon proved inadequate, however, and in the summer of 1917
there was taken over the American University Experiment Station, near
Washington, where virtually all of the research work connected with the
numerous branches of the Chemical Warfare Service was conducted. The
Research Division, instead of being dismissed with passing mention, is
deserving of a chapter to itself, the services which it performed in the
development of gases, protective equipment, and manufacturing processes
having been of enormous assistance in the prosecution of the war.