1. It is best to distribute the columns irregularly under

trees of gardens, avenues, roads, and courtyards, even

if not very dense.

2. The camouflage of wagons or artillery pieces by means

of branches does not secure them from reconnaissance by

airplanes, when the column is in the open on light-colored

ground, as, for example, on dry roads. Shadows enlarge in

a surprising manner.

3. In villages, keep close to the houses, walls, enclosures

of gardens and hedges, but, if possible, with irregular

distribution. The best side is always the north side of

houses, walls, etc., on account of the shadow.

4. In small courtyards the wagons are lined up one beside

the other and the tarpaulins joined in order to make a

roof. This appears as a smooth and very natural surface

on the photograph, which does not attract the enemy’s

attention.

5. Lessen the tracks, if possible. Do not widen the

roads of approach uselessly. Follow the track. Mark out

footpaths, staking them out, if necessary, by wire.

(_b_) Troops on foot, wagons, and artillery columns on the

march.

1. Even at night make more use of tracks which are

generally dark; the columns can then with difficulty

be observed by airplanes; on the other hand, columns

on roads which appear light can be seen even at night.

2. Infantry columns will be divided into small groups

distributed in depth and advance along the shady side of

roads.

3. When airplanes use light projectors at night keep in the

shade of trees or buildings.

III. GENERAL RULE.

When surprised by airplanes, either by day or by night, use

all natural shade provided by trees, embankments, houses,

etc., and remain motionless.

By Order of the General Commanding the Army.

CHIEF OF STAFF.

(Signed) FAUPEL, _Lieutenant-Colonel_.

So great, indeed, was the importance attached to camouflage by the

German High Command that, during the last year of the war, there was

attached to every German division a “security officer” whose duty it was

to enforce the rigid observance of camouflage discipline. In many cases

these security officers kept a watch on their respective division from

observation-balloons. They were answerable only to Great Headquarters and

were empowered, I understand, to recommend the removal of all officers

up to and including generals of division for infraction of the rules for

camouflage discipline as laid down by Ludendorff.

Camouflage, it should be kept in mind, is of two kinds—negative and

positive. Negative camouflage consists in the concealment of troops,

trenches, mine-shafts, battery positions, ammunition-dumps, hangars, or

other objects, knowledge of whose location must be kept, if possible,

from the enemy. Positive camouflage, on the contrary, consists in the

imitation or suggestion of troops, trenches, batteries, etc., in certain

locations, when, in reality, there is nothing of the sort there, in order

to deceive and bewilder the enemy. It occasionally became necessary,

for example, to convince the Germans that a large troop movement was in

progress behind a certain sector of the front, whereas the real movement

was taking place scores of miles away. If it was desired to suggest a

movement by rail, smoke-pots with clouds of dense black smoke bellying

from them were placed on flat cars and moved about from point to point on

the military railways. German aviators, observing these columns of smoke

at numerous points along the railways, naturally assumed that they came

from locomotives hauling troop-laden trains and promptly reported that

large bodies of troops were apparently being moved by rail behind the

American lines. Thereupon the German commander would rush up his reserves

to resist the attack which he believed to be impending. Or, if it was

desired to imitate a troop movement by road, the camouflage officer would

requisition large numbers of Fords, which would be driven madly along the

roads, dragging bundles of brush behind them. The great clouds of dust

which thus suddenly appeared on the highways naturally suggested to the

German observers that the _verdamte_ Yankees were rushing large bodies of

troops to the front by bus or motor-truck. Fooling Fritz was an amusing

game while it lasted.

This latter ruse, I might mention parenthetically, was not original with

the Americans, for President Diaz, of Mexico, once related to me how,

when he and his little band of patriots were being hotly pursued by the

French forces sent to Mexico to keep Maximilian on his unstable throne,

he ordered his vaqueros to cut bundles of mesquite and drag them behind

them by their lariats. It was in the dry season, and the dense clouds

of yellow dust thus stirred up convinced the French commander that

the Mexican force was far stronger than it really was. He thereupon

precipitately abandoned the pursuit and a few weeks later General Diaz,

having gained the breathing-spell necessary to augment his forces, fought

and won the decisive battle of Puebla.

It has frequently been said that the camera does not lie, but such

assertions were made before the Camouflage Corps commenced its

operations. Thereafter the negatives brought in by the German airmen

began to prove so unreliable that the officers whose business it was to

interpret them never knew whether they were telling the truth or not. For

example, it frequently became necessary after heavy bombardments in which

long stretches of entanglements had been destroyed, to convince the enemy

that the wire had been repaired. This illusion was accomplished by the

simple stratagem of driving stakes into the ground and festooning them

with fish-nets, for, in a photograph taken from the sky, fish-nets thus

arranged are indistinguishable from wire. If such ruses are to deceive

the enemy, however, as much attention must be paid to detail in their

execution as David Belasco pays to detail in the production of a play.

On a certain British sector a not overintelligent subaltern was ordered

by his battalion commander to take a working party and put out some 500

yards of this imitation wire, as there was reason to believe that the

Huns, thinking the sector unprotected by entanglements, were preparing

to make an attack. Now it is some job, even for a large and well-trained

working party, to put out 500 yards of wire in much under a day. Heedless

of such minor details, however, the lieutenant gayly slammed in his

stakes and spread his fish-nets as fast as his men could work, “wiring”

the 500 yards of front in little more than an hour. From high in the blue

German airmen photographed the proceeding. When one set of photographs

showed a sector destitute of wire and another set of pictures, taken

an hour later, showed the same area with a complete system of wire

entanglements, the suspicions of Von Hindenburg’s intelligence officers

were naturally aroused, and the next morning at dawn the Germans launched

their attack. In camouflage work one can’t afford to be slipshod.

The most elaborate camouflage works can be rendered utterly useless,

however, by the carelessness of a single soldier, for there is little

that escapes the eye of the airman’s camera, particularly when it was

fitted, as during the latter days of the war, with a stereoscopic

attachment. I remember that in one of the Champagne sectors the Germans

had installed a battery of heavy guns which were so ingeniously concealed

that the French were unable to locate them. It was believed that they

were hidden somewhere in a fringe of woods along a stream, but though

there was a considerable area of cultivated land beyond the woods, the

aerophotographs of it showed nothing which would suggest a path such as

would be made by artillerymen going to and from their guns. One day,

however, a new batch of plates, upon being developed, showed a dim gray

line, faint as the shadow of a hair, leading across this cultivated

area to a small wood on the bank of the stream, where a battery might

easily be concealed. Upon studying an enlargement of the picture the

intelligence officers became convinced that the shadowy line on the

negative really represented the trail left by a soldier crossing the

field. Proceeding on the surmise that the soldier was an artilleryman

going up to his gun-position, the French gunners registered on that

particular patch of woods the following morning, whereupon the fire

from the concealed battery abruptly ceased. German prisoners captured a

few days later explained how the secret of the battery’s position had

been kept so long. The German security officer had issued orders that

the artillerymen must under no considerations walk across the fields in

order to reach their guns, but that they must instead follow a much-used

highroad until they reached a bridge over the stream, drop from the

bridge into the water, and wade up the stream until opposite their

position. But one night an artilleryman, in a hurry to reach his battery

and confident that the tracks left by a single man could do no harm, took

a chance and a short cut across the forbidden field. I have told you

what happened to his battery as a result of his carelessness. Knowing

something of German discipline, I can imagine what happened to him.

But it was not often that the Germans were caught napping, and so

ingenious were some of their ruses and stratagems, that it required an

intelligence officer with the imagination of a Sherlock Holmes to keep up

with them. During the operations on the Flanders front a British aviator

brought in some photographs of a certain area behind the German lines.

The intelligence officer whose duty it was to scrutinize them detected

a suspicious something which he was convinced was a cleverly camouflaged

German battery, but though it was in the midst of open country there was

no suggestion of a path leading to it. After studying the photographs for

several hours he suddenly exclaimed:

“I have it! They get up to the guns on the covers of biscuit-boxes.”

“What do you mean?” his chief asked curiously.

“It’s as plain as the nose on your face,” explained the youngster. “The

Boche knows jolly well that if he walked across that open ground his

tracks would show up in our air photos. So when he wants to get up to his

battery he gets a couple of wooden biscuit-box covers and ties strings

to them. He stands on one cover and throws the other ahead of him, then

stands on that and drags up the first cover by means of the string and

repeats the operation. Deuced clever of the beggars, I call it.”

And, as subsequent events proved, the intelligence officer was right in

his deduction. That was precisely what the Germans had done.

By far the most important work of the Camouflage Corps was the

construction of “flat-tops” and “false contours.” A flat-top, I should

perhaps explain, is a screen for concealing a gun from enemy observation.

It consists of a fish-net, usually 37 feet square, into the mesh of which

are woven and knotted narrow strips of burlap of colors to blend with the

vegetation of the region where the flat-top is to be used. The interwoven

burlap becomes gradually thinner as the edges of the net are approached,

so that no sharply defined shadow may be cast. Every piece of artillery,

large and small, in the A. E. F. had its own flat-top, which accompanied

the gun everywhere, being stretched above it, like a canopy, when the

piece was in action, at other times being rolled up and carried on the

limber. A somewhat similar device was also provided for the concealment

of machine-guns. It resembled one of those huge umbrellas used in summer

on delivery-wagons, and, like an umbrella, it could be quickly raised

or lowered. It was the intention of the Camouflage Corps, had the war

continued, to provide one for every machine-gun.

A false contour can best be described as the prolongation, by means

of burlap spread over a sort of wire trellis, of a ridge, promontory,

or hill. It being desired to place a battery at the foot of a hill

and at the same time conceal it from enemy observation—which included

photographs taken from enemy airplanes—the Camouflage Corps would first

of all erect a light wooden framework, something like that of a grape

or rose arbor, but conforming to the general contour of the hill. Over

this framework was stretched wire netting, which supported, in turn, a

finer mesh of chicken-wire, into which were woven strips of burlap dyed

so as to exactly match the color of the hill itself. The space beneath

this burlap screen provided perfect concealment for anything up to a

battery or a battalion, while so closely was nature imitated in the

shaping and coloring of the false contour that photographs taken by enemy

flyers would show only an innocent hillside, with not enough vegetation

to provide cover for a sniper. The burlap used in the construction of

these false contours was frequently “slashed,” after the fashion of

foliage-drops in theatres, and was dyed in a great variety of shades,

all of which were standardized and could be ordered by number. There

were burlaps slashed and dyed to imitate ploughed fields, grain-fields,

roads, lawns, quarries, water, rocks, and spring, summer, autumn, and

winter foliage; in short, every phase of nature as found in the zone of

operations.

[Illustration: SUITS KNOWN AS CAGOULES.

These suits are made of burlap and painted to match the vegetation and

were frequently used by American snipers and raiding-parties.]

[Illustration: THE WORK OF THE CAMOUFLAGE CORPS.

As the enemy had this road under direct observation, traffic along it was

concealed by means of burlap screens.

_Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A._

An overhead road screen made of burlap strips and chicken wire.

_Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A._]

The first time I visited the big warehouse of the Camouflage School

at Fort St. Menge, I thought for a moment that I was back in the old

Eden Musée which used to stand in West 23d Street, for stacked against

the walls were scores of lifelike silhouettes of soldiers charging

with fixed bayonets, while the shelves were lined with soldiers’ heads

beautifully executed in papier-maché. The silhouettes, which were of

painted canvas mounted on light wooden frames, were used in the so-called

“Chinese attacks”—an idea which we borrowed from the British. When it

was necessary to ascertain how quickly the enemy could switch on his

artillery-fire in a certain sector, or the location of his batteries or

machine-guns, a hundred or more of these silhouettes would be carried out

into No Man’s Land under cover of darkness and laid down in front of our

wire in such a manner that they could be pulled upright by means of cords

running back to our trenches. Just at daybreak, at that hour when objects

are still indistinct and when the nerves of the men in the trenches are

at the greatest tension, a signal would be given, the cords pulled, and

a long line of what appeared to the startled Germans to be charging

Yankees would suddenly appear in the mist overhanging No Man’s Land.

Instantly the German trenches would crackle and blaze with musketry, the

concealed batteries and machine-gun nests would betray their positions by

going into action, and by the time the Huns discovered the hoax that had

been played upon them, our observers had obtained the information which

they required. Sometimes, in order to further chagrin the Boche, the

silhouettes would be left standing.

The papier-maché heads to which I have already referred were used for the

purpose of locating German snipers. When a sniper became particularly

annoying and defied all attempts to locate him, the camouflage officer

attached to the division would be summoned. Under his direction a

papier-maché effigy of a soldier’s head, steel helmet and all, made so

as to move up and down in wooden guides, would be set up in that part

of the trench which the sniper had been annoying. At intervals the

head would be slowly raised and lowered, so that from the outside of

the trench it looked precisely like a soldier peering cautiously over

the parapet. Sooner or later the hidden marksman would send a bullet

through the careless Yankee’s brain. The neat hole drilled through the

papier-maché showed the exact direction from which the bullet came, and

by inserting in the hole a tiny telescope, no larger than a pencil, and

looking through it by means of a periscope, the loophole from which the

sniper was firing could be located. In one case a sniper was found to be

firing through a hole bored in the heel of an old boot, apparently thrown

carelessly onto the glacis.

Though I have described at some length the use of silhouettes and

papier-maché heads because they are picturesque and interesting phases

of modern war, it should be borne in mind that they were designed to

meet exceptional conditions, that they were used infrequently, and that

they were in no sense typical of the enormously important work of the

Camouflage Service.

* * * * *

In the foregoing pages I have sketched the multitudinous activities of

the Engineers only in the barest outline. To attempt to compress the

story of their achievements into the limits of a single chapter would

be absurd, so I have dwelt only on the most picturesque and unusual

phases of their work—the high spots, as it were. There is much that I

have left unsaid, not because it is not worth saying, but because I

have no space in which to set it down. The stories which I have had,

perforce, to leave untold would in themselves fill a volume. Among their

other accomplishments the Engineers designed a portable steel bridge,

made up in sections so that it could be transported on trucks, and so

designed that it could be bolted together, which could sustain a load

of thirty tons over a span of ninety feet. These bridges were used all

along the fighting front, as our forces advanced, to replace the bridges

destroyed by the retreating Germans. They had under construction, when

the war ended, a raft designed for the transportation of the heaviest

pieces of mobile artillery in existence—by means of which, had necessity

required it, we could have ferried our giant howitzers across the Rhine.

The portable floating foot-bridges—passarelles—which our troops used in

crossing the Meuse and the adjacent canals under fire were invented by an

officer of Engineers. The Engineers threw one of them across the Canal de

l’Est, near Dun-sur-Meuse, under a shell and machine-gun fire so heavy

that it was twenty-six hours before the infantry could cross it. The

Engineers have invented a very ingenious and remarkable device whereby

search-lights can be operated from a distance, thus making it possible

for an officer to control a battery of scattered search-lights just as

the man in a signal-tower controls, by means of levers, the switches in a

railway yard. The corps has perfected a blasting machine for demolition

work which destroyed ruins faster than the Huns could make them. Military

operations are absolutely dependent upon maps and plenty of them. The

Engineers met the demand by erecting and operating in France a larger

map-producing plant than was possessed by France herself or any of the

Allies. In order to provide a more rapid means of obtaining topographical

information, Major James W. Bagley, of the Engineers, invented an aerial

cartograph or mapping camera, which takes three pictures at a time from

an airplane, mapping a strip of territory three and a half miles wide at

5,000 feet elevation, the series of pictures thus taken forming a mosaic

map of the country over which the airplane has flown which is as accurate

and far more detailed than a map drawn from surveys. This invention

opens up an entirely new field for the use of airplanes and a possible

revolution in former methods of mapping. The Engineers likewise produced

portable machine, blacksmith, and lithographic shops, the capacity of

the portable lithographic truck-sets furnished the 29th Engineers—the

Surveying and Printing Regiment—being greater than that of the permanent

map-reproduction plant of the Geological Survey in Washington. Mobile

sterilizers, water-tanks, job-presses, photographic laboratories,

derricks, pile-drivers, road-sprinklers, and oilers were all asked for by

the A. E. F., whereupon the Engineers designed them and shipped them to

France.

I fully realize that what I have written in the preceding pages contains

no mention of the supply work performed by the corps in the United

States, which was so enormous that 27 per cent of all the tonnage

shipped to France up to the signing of the Armistice was from or for

the Engineers. Furthermore, I have touched only here and there upon the

activities of the corps oversea, where in addition to the enormous amount

of engineering work which had to be done with the armies, including

fighting, the construction of fortifications, and the building of roads,

railways, and bridges, it executed an incredible amount of general

construction, such as docks and warehouses, railroad yards and railroad

bridges, camps and hospitals, balloon sheds and airplane hangars, not

to mention the installation of water, heating, lighting, and sanitary

systems. And, bear in mind, the oversea activities of the Engineers

were not confined to France, but extended to England, Italy, Russia, and

Siberia.

* * * * *

“_Essayons!_” The more I have seen of the work of the Engineers, the more

appropriate seems their motto.

“_Essayons!_” There is apparently nothing that these men with the

castles on their collars will not essay. And everything they essay they

accomplish.

III

THE GAS-MAKERS

Were you to grow up with a boy who eventually became widely talked about,

watching him pass from knickerbockers to trousers and from youthful

shyness to burly aggressiveness, the chances are that you would follow

his career with an almost proprietary interest, and that when you came

upon his picture in _The World’s Work_ or _The Police Gazette_, according

to whether he had become famous or notorious, you would display it to

your friends, explaining proudly: “Why, I’ve known him ever since he was

a youngster. I always felt sure that he would attract attention some day.”

Such, in a manner of speaking, has been my acquaintance with poison-gas,

or toxic-gas, as the chemists call it. I was in the Ypres salient, on

the British front, when the first gas attack in the history of warfare

was launched against the Africans and Canadians on April 22, 1915, and

that night, in the hospitals, I saw the earliest victims of gas warfare,

gasping on their cots like fish thrown on the bank to die. On several

occasions during the months which followed I again encountered the malign

creature—on the Yser, in the Champagne, in Alsace, and on the Isonzo—and

on each succeeding occasion it was more threatening and was causing

greater concern. So that when, after the United States had been at war a

year or more, I visited the great arsenal at Edgewood, on the shores of

Chesapeake Bay, and was shown the vast plants devoted to the production

of chlorine, chlorpicrin, phosgene, mustard, and other deadly gases, and

caught the familiar nauseous odor, I felt as though I were renewing an

old and undesirable acquaintance.

The army behind the army · 第 6 / 31 段