LORD MAYO'S MILITARY POLICY
The Mutiny of 1857 left on the hands of the Government of India two
great armies--a vast shattered wreck of Native Troops, and a European
Force, fewer in numbers, but admirably equipped, hardened by a fierce
struggle, and organised on the basis of constant readiness for war.
In the year preceding that memorable lesson, the Native army had
numbered 249,153 men; the European regiments 45,522. The teaching of
the Mutiny resulted in the reduction of the Native army to nearly
one-half, and in the increase by over one-half of the British troops.
In 1862, after all apprehension of renewed hostilities had
disappeared, and the armies rested on their new peace footing, the
Native force consisted of 140,507 officers and men, the European
troops of 75,337. Under the vigorous Government of Lord Lawrence from
1864 to 1869, as the civil administration grew more effective, and
the country settled down into assured internal tranquillity, it was
found possible to make further reductions, {159} which left the
Native army on the 1st April, 1869, at 133,358 of all ranks, and the
European force at 61,942.
This was the situation when Lord Mayo reached Calcutta. But exactly a
fortnight after his arrival, the Duke of Argyll, as Secretary of
State for India, penned a Despatch which gave a fresh impulse to
questions of Indian military reform. His Grace pointed out that
notwithstanding the numerical decrease in the forces since the
Mutiny, the expenditure on them had increased from 12-3/4 millions
sterling in 1856-57 to over 16 millions in 1868-69. He also referred
to the fact, that while a new and costly system of police had been
organised, the expectations of army retrenchment based upon it had
borne no fruit. The Despatch concluded with a hope that the Viceroy
would devise means to bring down the army military expenditure in
India by a million and a half sterling.
Lord Mayo found that army retrenchment might be effected by two
distinct lines of approach,--by economy in the military
administration, and by numerical reduction of the forces. Each of
these subjects again divided itself into two great branches, the
former into retrenchments in the Staff, and retrenchments in the Army
Departments; the latter into reductions in the European troops, and
reductions in the Native army. He ascertained that retrenchments
aggregating 79,000 pounds were possible without any sacrifice of
efficiency in the Staff and the Military Departments; and he
stringently carried them out. {160} But when he came to reductions in
the European troops and in the Native army, he found that the
questions involved were of a more complex character; and as his views
on these points have been sometimes misunderstood, I shall endeavour
to state them in his own words.
As regards the European troops, he believed that he had not one man
too many in India. In a private letter to one of Her Majesty's
Ministers, after urging his plan of retrenchment, he writes thus:
'One thing, I implore, may not be done, and that is the removal of a
single British bayonet or sabre from India. We can, I believe, reduce
our military expenditure by a million, without giving up one of the
little white-faced men in red.' 'We are strongly impressed with the
belief,' he wrote, in his public Despatch a few weeks later, 'that we
have not one British soldier too many in this country. We should most
strongly object to any reduction of their number, because we are
convinced that such a step could not be taken without endangering and
weakening authority, one of the mainstays of British rule.'
Nevertheless, he proposed to reduce the charges for the European
troops by half a million sterling. This, too, without decreasing the
total rank and file by a man, or the pay of either officers or men by
a shilling. He proved that a chief cause of the increased military
expenditure, of which the Secretary of State so justly complained,
arose from the fact that European regiments in India had gradually
declined from their full {161} effective strength, so that a larger
number of separate regiments were required to give an equal total of
fighting men. He proposed, by strengthening each regiment, to keep
the same total of fighting men, and to reduce the number of separate
regiments. He would thus get rid of the costly organisation of eleven
extra European regiments, and of the heavy drain on the Indian
Treasury which the needless number of regimental headquarters
involved. The rank and file would be slightly increased, the pay of
officers and men would remain the same. The Indian military
authorities believed that efficiency would not be lessened, while the
abolition of the superfluous regimental headquarters and similar
charges in the British cavalry and infantry alone would yield an
annual saving of 297,220 pounds. A corresponding, but not quite
identical, reform in the artillery would add a further saving of
271,542 pounds sterling a year. Total saving in European troops,
568,762 pounds.
In Lord Mayo's minutes on proposed retrenchments in the Native army,
two considerations constantly came to the surface. First, that the
lengthy, exposed frontier of Northern India, with the fierce elements
of internal disquiet within it, rendered any substantial reduction of
either Native cavalry or Native infantry in Bengal impossible.
Second, that the separate _esprit de corps_ of the Madras and the
Bombay Native armies would resent reductions which fell exclusively
upon them, and left the Bengal Native army untouched. The Viceroy and
{162} the Commander-in-Chief were most anxious to avoid wounding the
_amour propre_ of any one of the three gallant bodies of men who make
up the Native army in India; but their paramount duty--a duty which
ranked above all local considerations--was so to shape their
reductions as not to impair the defences of British India.
After long and earnest discussion with his military advisers and the
Local Governments, Lord Mayo submitted the following proposals to the
Secretary of State.
As regards Native artillery, Lord Mayo's Government followed out the
accepted policy of dispensing with Native gunners, and his proposals
were readily sanctioned by the Secretary of State. He abolished two
Bengal batteries (namely the Eurasian Battery in Assam, and one light
field battery of the Punjab Frontier Force); the Native Company of
Artillery in Madras; and one Native company of artillery in Bombay.
Total reductions of Native artillery, four batteries or companies;
annual saving, 17,003 pounds.[1]
[Footnote 1: Sanction conveyed in Despatch from Secretary of State to
Governor-General, No. 23, dated 27th January, 1870, par. 10.]
Regarding the cavalry and infantry in the Bengal Native army, the
Viceroy came to the conclusion (as demonstrated by his military
advisers) that not a man could be spared. But with their consent he
found that a considerable saving could be effected by reducing the
number of separate regiments, and bringing up the strength of the
remainder to a more efficient standard. He proposed, therefore, a
reduction of one regiment of Bengal Native cavalry, and {163} one of
Bengal Native infantry, raising the rank and file in the other
regiments so as to maintain the same total of rank and file in the
Bengal Native army. Annual saving 27,200 pounds a year.
As regards the Madras Native army, he acted on the decision of the
Governor (Lord Napier of Ettrick), confirmed by the opinions of the
Commander-in-Chief in India (Lord Sandhurst), and of Major-General
Sir Henry Durand. 'In the Madras Presidency,' its Governor had
written, 'it is my opinion that the cost of the army far transcends
the wants of the country.' Indeed, Madras had for years sent her
redundant troops, amounting to one regiment of Native cavalry and
five of infantry, to do duty at Bengal stations. This proved to be an
extravagant arrangement. Thus a regiment of Madras cavalry, with a
strength of only 300 privates, cost 22,937 pounds a year, while a
regiment of Bengal cavalry cost only 21,963 pounds for a strength of
384 privates.
The waste was intensified by the 'family system' of the Madras
sepoys, who are accompanied by their wives and children--a system
which may be suitable for a stationary local army, but which produces
many evils if such corps are moved to other Presidencies. For
example, the Commander-in-Chief had lately had to represent the
difficulty which would arise with a Madras cavalry regiment, if the
Bengal plan were enforced of sending it out into camp, in event of an
epidemic of cholera. The Madras corps in question had only a strength
of 202 fighting men at {164} headquarters, and were attended by no
fewer than 1296 women, children, and followers.
Lord Mayo proposed, therefore, that henceforth the Madras regiments
should be kept to their own Presidency. This would enable him to
reduce five regiments of Madras infantry, and one of Madras cavalry,
then serving at Bengal stations (or a number equal to them). He also
found he could safely dispense with three other regiments of Madras
infantry. Another separate regiment of Madras cavalry would be saved
by incorporating three into two. Total reduction of the Madras Native
army--cavalry, 2 regiments (1 dispensed with, and 1 reduced by
incorporating 3 into 2); infantry, 8 regiments reduced out of 40.
Annual saving, 178,745 pounds.
The Bombay army proved to be more accurately adjusted to the actual
demands upon it. But it was found that a small saving of 9,900 pounds
a year might be safely effected by reorganising the Sind horse into 2
regiments of 4 squadrons each, in place of 3 regiments with 3
squadrons each. As regards infantry, even when there were two Bombay
regiments in China, the propriety of reducing two regiments had been
raised. The Governor-General in Council, having regard to the return
of the regiments from China, the strong police, the tranquil state of
the Presidency, its limited extent and population, and the absence of
any frontier requiring protection, except in Sind, now decided that
four regiments of Bombay Native infantry might safely be spared,
representing a {165} saving of 67,719 pounds a year. Total annual
retrenchment from Bombay Native army, 77,619 pounds.
The burden of working these reforms fell on the Bengal Native army.
It lost 2 batteries of artillery, 1 regiment of cavalry, and 4 of
infantry (the total rank and file of its cavalry and infantry being
neither increased or diminished); and it had the additional labour
thrust on it of the six Madras regiments which were to be withdrawn
from Bengal stations. This was inevitable. 'Influences of whatever
kind,' wrote the Commander-in-Chief in summing up that part of the
military policy of Lord Mayo's Government, 'all notions as affecting
this or that Presidency, in short, all matters which could imply even
the shadow of bias, were resolutely put on one side, and the
interests of the country were alone considered.
'I am able to say that this was the spirit in which all the questions
involved were argued in our long and arduous discussions.
'We had to weigh the necessities of those parts of India where war is
an impossibility, and at the same time to consider those wide
frontiers where war is always impending over us--in fact, where in
one form or another it can hardly be said ever to cease.'
In submitting the above scheme to Her Majesty's Government, the Earl
of Mayo believed that it would tend towards the practical efficiency
of the Indian army. In this belief he had the firm support of the
Commander-in-Chief (Lord Sandhurst) and the Military Member of
Council (Sir Henry Durand). While {166} strenuous for economy in the
military administration, he grudged no expenditure required to place,
and to maintain, the army on a basis of thorough practical
efficiency. I am here stating both his own view and that of the
eminent military advisers on whose counsel he acted. 'I have this
year,' wrote Lord Mayo to a friend in 1870, 'without any suggestion
from any quarter, pressed upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity
that exists for immediately arming every European soldier and
volunteer in India with a Snider rifle. I have, ever since the
beginning of 1869' (when he assumed the Viceroyalty), 'pointed out
the defective state of our artillery force, and recommended the
immediate adoption of rifled guns. I never, therefore, let economic
considerations interfere in cases of necessity. I have suggested
nothing which, in my opinion, is calculated to diminish our military
strength. But I do desire to reduce military expenditure by a very
large amount. I firmly believe that there are forces in India which
we should be better without, and that it is better to keep only those
regiments in arms which would be useful in war.'
The results of the proposed reforms may be briefly stated thus. The
Secretary of State sanctioned in full the first two sets of
retrenchments, namely, in the Indian Staff and the Army Departments.
But he did not see his way to adopt in their entirety either of the
other two series of measures, namely, those which affected the
British regiments serving in India, or the reductions of the Native
army. As regards {167} the former, Her Majesty's Government reduced
the British cavalry by two instead of four regiments, and the British
infantry by two instead of seven regiments; _but without the
corresponding increase in the rank and file of the remaining
regiments_, on which the Indian Government had so strongly insisted.
As regards the Native forces, the artillery reductions were
sanctioned; but the Secretary of State thought that the cavalry and
infantry reductions bore too heavily on the Madras army. He proposed
an alternative plan which would have broken up two regiments of
Bengal cavalry, and one in each of the other Presidencies; with six
regiments of Native infantry, two in each Presidency.
The Indian Government, on its side, did not think that the military
requirements of Northern India, with its great frontier towards
Central Asia, permitted of this arrangement being carried out, and
suggested as a compromise the reduction of 3 regiments of Native
cavalry (one in each Presidency), and 8 regiments of Native infantry
(2 in Bengal, 4 in Madras, and 2 in Bombay). After a careful
reconsideration, and having received the views of Lord Napier of
Magdala (who did not on this point concur with the preceding
Commander-in-Chief, Lord Sandhurst), Her Majesty's Government failed
to see their way to accepting the compromise, and suggested a third
scheme, which would have reduced the rank and file of the Native army
to the extent of 9000 men equally in the three Presidencies. The
Government of India believed, however, that such a reduction {168}
would be unsafe from a military point of view, and returned to the
proposals which it had previously submitted. Thus the question
remained at the time of Lord Mayo's death.
In his military measures, as in every other department of his
Government, the Earl of Mayo lived long enough to carry out a large
part of his proposals, but not the whole. His original plan would
have eventually reduced the military expenditure by 948,253 pounds a
year. The portions of it adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and
practically carried out, yielded an annual saving of 591,440 pounds.
The current administration of the army is conducted by the
Commander-in-Chief, and to Lord Sandhurst and Lord Napier of Magdala
belongs the credit of improvements in detail effected during Lord
Mayo's rule. But to these improvements the Viceroy gave a liberal and
strenuous support. 'Lord Mayo,' wrote a high authority on his
military measures, 'hated waste, but knew that waste follows
excessive saving no less than excessive expenditure. His object was
to reduce what was superfluous in the army, but not to starve what
was essential.' He advocated the economising of the health and vigour
of the European troops by a system of sanataria and hill-stations,
and one of his latest orders in the Military Department was to this
end. 'To him also it is mainly due,' says the high authority above
cited, 'that the troops in the hill-stations occupy quarters, or
cottage barracks, which, while fulfilling every desideratum of
health, comfort, {169} and discipline, enable a whole regiment to be
housed for a smaller sum than, under the old system of imposing but
less comfortable structures, it would have cost to house three
companies.' Wherever he went, one of the first things he wished to
see was the hospital; and every sanitary requirement was sure of his
liberal support.
To the difficult problem of making fit provision for the children and
orphans of the British soldiers in India, he devoted much earnest
thought; and, among other measures, appointed a committee with a view
to the more efficient working of the noble bequest of Sir Henry
Lawrence. A thick file of papers before me bears witness to his
personal interest in the Lawrence Asylums. Regimental workshops,
exhibitions, and every device for keeping alive the mental vitality
of the British soldier under the strain of the Indian climate, found
in him a constant friend. As regards improvements in efficiency, it
may here be briefly stated that during his rule the Indian army was
equipped with a better weapon, the artillery was furnished with the
most approved rifled guns, and the cold weather camps of exercise,
which now form so important a feature in the Indian military
training, were inaugurated under his own eye. For these and for every
other measure with a view to perfecting the Indian defences, the Earl
of Mayo, however severe might be the strain of his financial
necessities, found the requisite funds. He desired to avoid waste,
but he was resolved above all things to secure efficiency; {170} and
he enjoyed a personal popularity with the army, both Native and
European, such as few Governor-Generals of India have ever won.
'Every shilling that is taken for unnecessary military expenditure,'
he wrote in 1870, 'is so much withdrawn from those vast sums which it
is our duty to spend for the moral and material improvement of the
people. I admit to the full that a complete and an efficient military
organisation is the base and foundation of our power here. We are
bound to see that every officer and man is fit for immediate service,
and that every arm and every military requisite is maintained in a
state of the utmost efficiency. I believe that in the proposals which
have been made, these principles have been strictly adhered to.'
A single sentence of the last Despatch which Lord Mayo lived to issue
on the subject of army reform will fitly conclude this branch of my
narrative. 'We cannot think that it is right to compel the people of
this country to contribute one farthing more to military expenditure
than the safety and defence of the country absolutely demand.'
{171}