TORPEDO OPERATIONS.
A REVIEW, however brief, of the numerous torpedo operations that have
of late years been carried out in actual war, must prove not only of
great interest, but of material aid to those who may be desirous of
studying this branch of naval warfare, for the experience so gained
ought alone to be the basis on which a system of submarine offence and
defence should be constructed.
No new torpedo invention should be adopted, however theoretically
perfect it may be, until it has been subjected to a very severe
practical test, under conditions as nearly analogous to those that
would occur on active service as it would be possible to obtain. The
vast importance of a carefully planned and executed system of submarine
_defence_ is an established fact, and it only remains to discover what
are the best weapons for, and most practicable mode of manipulating a
system of submarine offence, to establish torpedo warfare in all its
branches as a necessary function of naval warfare.
It would be a mere waste of time to dwell on the Anglo-French and
American wars of the beginning of this century (1797-1812); though
during that period various attempts were made by Fulton and others
to destroy hostile vessels by means of submarine infernal machines,
inasmuch as they all partook more or less of the nature of experiments,
and were all failures, but come at once to the Crimean war (1854-1856),
when what may be termed a systematic employment of torpedoes for
harbour defence was first employed.
CRIMEAN WAR (1854-56).
_Defence of Sebastopol Harbour, &c._--The Russians employed a large
quantity of submarine mines, both electrical and mechanical,
principally the latter, in their defence of the harbours of Sebastopol,
Sveaborg, and Cronstadt.
According to General Delafield, U.S.A., the arrangement of the
mechanical mines was entirely new, the conception and idea of an
eminent Russian chemist, Professor Jacobi.
_Electrical Mines._--No mention is made by the General of the
employment of electrical mines, but the fact of a hulk being captured
by the Allies at Yenikale, with a number of torpedoes on board, and
all the arrangements necessary to explode them by electricity, such as
Voltaic piles, electric fuzes, several miles of conducting wire, &c.,
is sufficient proof of this type of submarine mine being extensively
used by the Russians in their harbour defences.
Many of their mechanical mines were picked up by the Allies, several of
which were found to have their safety caps on. Owing to this neglect,
and the smallness of the charge of the torpedoes (only some 25 lbs. of
gunpowder), it is not to be wondered at that no serious injury was done
to any ships of the allied squadron.
Deterred most probably by the failures of Bushnell, Fulton, and others
in previous years with the submarine and other torpedo boat attacks,
nothing of this description was attempted by either side.
_Russian Mechanical Mines._--The Russian mechanical mines consisted
of barrels of powder fitted with fuzes, so arranged that a blow would
smash a glass tube containing sulphuric acid, causing the acid to mix
with some chlorate of potash, resulting in combustion and the explosion
of the mine.
AUSTRO-ITALIAN WAR (1859).
_Defence of Venice by Von Ebner._--During this brief struggle,
defensive torpedo operations were carried out under the direction of
Colonel Von Ebner, of the Imperial Austrian Engineers.
The harbour of Venice was protected by a most elaborate system of
submarine mines, devised by the above-named officer. Though the
importance of his system was proved by the fact of no attempt being
made on Venice, yet no opportunity was afforded of _practically_
testing its efficiency.
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1861-65).
_Cause of the Present Importance of the Torpedo._--The prominent
position the torpedo now holds as a most important and legitimate
function of naval warfare is owing without doubt to the successful and
extensive employment of them on the part of the Confederates during
this long and bloody struggle.
_Reasons which induced the Confederates to employ Torpedoes._--The
numerous harbours and navigable rivers in the possession of the
Southerners, the few ships of war at their disposal, the overwhelming
fleet of the Northerners, and the introduction for the first time of
ironclads in naval warfare, are the principal causes which forced the
Confederates to resort to torpedoes as a means of offence and defence.
Though a few rude and extempore submarine mechanical mines were met
with by the Federals during the earliest part of the war, it was not
until many months after the commencement of hostilities that the
Confederates, finding themselves quite unable to cope with their rivals
on the sea, set to work in earnest to organise a system of submarine
warfare on a grand scale.
_Torpedo Corps formed, &c.--Loss of "Cairo."_--By October, 1862, a
secret service torpedo corps, with headquarters at Richmond, was in
full swing, and the principal harbours and rivers of the Confederates
were systematically protected by means of electrical and mechanical
mines, also a scheme of offence by drifting and spar torpedoes was in
preparation, and in December of the same year they experienced the
first-fruits of their labour by the total destruction of the Federal
war steamer _Cairo_.
The following brief review of the numerous torpedo operations carried
out by both sides, and the effect their use had on the war, will be
sufficient to enable the general reader to gain some idea of the vast
importance of this submarine weapon in future warfare.
Fuller and more detailed accounts will be found in Commander S.
Barnes's, U.S.N., Colonel Von Scheliha's, and Captain H. Steward's
torpedo works.
_Every Species of Torpedo used--Frame Torpedoes at Charleston,
&c.--Federal Ship Disasters--Small Effect of Electrical Mines--Loss of
the "Commodore Jones," &c._--Every species of submarine mine seems to
have been used by the Southerners for their harbour and river defence,
the most effectual of which were the barrel, frame, and Singer's
torpedoes. These were all mechanical, fired by means of sensitive
concussion fuzes. At Charleston and elsewhere the frame torpedo, which
also acted as an obstruction, was largely used, and where this species
of mine was known to be laid, the Northerners never attempted to force
a passage. Out of some thirty or forty Federal ships sunk or injured by
torpedoes, by far the larger proportion of such disasters was effected
by means of the barrel and Singer's mines. Though electrical mines were
very extensively used on the St. James River and at Charleston, &c.,
yet only one Federal steamer, the _Commodore Jones_, was sunk, and only
one other, the _Commodore Barney_, was injured.
_Case of the "New Ironsides."_--The Federal ship _New Ironsides_, at
the attack on Charleston in 1863, was anchored for one hour and a half
exactly over a 5000 lbs. electrical mine, which despite all the efforts
of the Confederates could not be exploded. The reason of this was owing
to the deterioration of the primer, due to too constant testing.
_Welden Railway._--A notable instance of the effect of torpedoes on the
war was the saving of the Welden line of communication in December,
1864. The Welden Railway was the principal artery of communication
to Richmond for the Confederates. To intercept this, by destroying
the railway bridges, a fleet of nine Federal gunboats was sent up the
Roanoke river; when nearly arrived at their destination, and though
every precaution in the shape of bow projecting spars, creeping, &c.,
was taken, seven of the vessels were either sunk or severely injured by
submarine mines. Thus the expedition ended in a most disastrous failure.
_General Butler's Attack on Richmond._--Again, in April, 1864, General
Butler's attack on Richmond utterly failed, owing to the Federal fleet
being unable to co-operate with him, the destruction of the _Commodore
Jones_ completely checking any further advance of Admiral Lee's ships,
thus allowing the Confederates to employ the garrisons of their river
batteries in their land line of entrenchments.
_More than One Line of Torpedoes required._--The capture of the Spanish
fort at Mobile in April, 1865, by a Federal fleet under Admiral Lee,
proves the necessity of employing more than one line of torpedoes,
where the safety of a position depends almost entirely on those means
of defence, as this one did. Here, though several Federal vessels were
either sunk or severely damaged, yet the fort was captured.
_Boat Torpedo Attacks._--In regard to boat torpedo attacks, the
Confederates were only successful in two out of many attempts made by
them to sink Federal vessels.
_The "Housatonic" and "Minnesota."_--These successes were the complete
destruction of the Housatonic by a submarine boat, fitted with a spar
torpedo, and serious injury caused to the _Minnesota_ by the explosion
of a contact spar torpedo, carried by an ordinary gig, commonly termed
"David's." In the former instance the attacking boat was sunk,[Q] in
the latter instance she was uninjured.
_Destruction of the "Albemarle."_--On the part of the Federals,
Lieutenant Cushing with a steam launch fitted with a Wood and Lay
torpedo, succeeded in sinking the Confederate ram _Albemarle_. The
boat in this instance was swamped by the column of water thrown up on
the explosion of the torpedo, she having been driven full speed at the
Albemarle.
_Ship Spar Torpedoes._--On both sides, spar torpedoes fitted to the
bows of ships, and also on rafts slung over the bows, were somewhat
extensively used, but on no occasion were they the means of injuring or
sinking any vessels.
To increase the difficulties of the Northerners in searching for
submarine mines, the Southerners laid down a great number of dummy
torpedoes, also erected false torpedo stations, and laid false wires.
It must always be borne in mind, in connection with the torpedo
operations above detailed, that the apparatus were very crude, and the
operators at the commencement inexperienced.
PARAGUAYAN WAR (1864-68).
_Torpedoes employed by the Paraguayans._--During their protracted
struggle with the Brazilians, the Paraguayans employed submarine mines
for the protection of their river forts, &c.
_Loss of the "Rio Janeiro"--Brazilian Fleet entrapped._--On the 2nd
of September, 1866, the Brazilian ironclad _Rio Janeiro_, after
being well-battered by the guns of the Curupaity fort, was sunk by a
torpedo. Later on, near the same place, a whole fleet of Brazilian war
ships were entrapped by the Paraguayans, between two rows of submarine
mines, but owing to faulty arrangements they escaped unharmed.
AUSTRIAN WAR (1866).
_Venice, Pola, &c., protected by Torpedoes._--During this war,
torpedoes for the defence of Venice, Pola, &c., were extensively used
by the Austrians, under the direction of Baron von Ebner, but as in '59
no opportunity was afforded of proving their practical worth, though
morally they were of great value, the Austrian harbours so defended
being considered impregnable by the enemy, and therefore no attempt was
made to force them.
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (1870-71).
Little or nothing in the matter of torpedo operations was attempted by
the Germans, and on the part of the French nothing whatever.
_Germans employed Submarine Mines._--Electrical and mechanical mines
were placed in several of the German harbours, the former containing
about 200 lbs. of dualine, the latter some 80 lbs. of gunpowder. The
only attempt to destroy French ships by means of offensive torpedoes
was made by the German vessel the _Grille_, off Rügen, which resulted
in failure.
In laying down and in picking up after the war was over their
mechanical mines, several exploded, killing some ten to fifteen men.
_Boats necessary._--Towards the end of the war, the Germans were
constructing special torpedo boats, believing that such were necessary
for the complete defence of harbours. This war added another proof of
the moral worth of submarine mines; the French fleet not daring to
approach German waters _supposed_ to be defended by such means.
RUSSO-TURKISH WAR (1877-78).
_Superiority of Turkey to Russia in the matter of Ships._--On the
Danube, in the Black Sea, and Mediterranean, where the principal naval
portion of the war was carried out, Turkey was possessed of a fleet
of ships infinitely superior to Russia, both in point of numbers and
strength, and therefore, to enable her to hold her own against this
vast superiority of the Turks, the Russians resorted to an extensive
employment of torpedoes, for both offensive and defensive purposes.
_Russian Torpedoes._--For many years previous to the outbreak of
hostilities in April, 1877, the Russians had been studying the subject
of torpedo warfare in all its branches, a certain number of their
naval and military officers and men having every year passed through
a regular course of torpedo study, at a school specially formed for
such a purpose; they had also laid in large stores of submarine mines,
spar torpedoes, and were in possession of the Whitehead and towing
torpedoes, and also several electric lights, and a few months after war
was declared they obtained a fast Thornycroft torpedo boat.
_Turkish Torpedoes._--On the other hand, the Turks were only in
possession of a number of those huge, unwieldy 500 lbs. buoyant mines,
and one electric light; circuit closers, contact mines, boats (steam or
otherwise) fitted for use with torpedo, or offensive torpedoes, being
conspicuous by their absence.
Thus it will be seen that in the matter of submarine offence and
defence, the Russians were as superior to the Turks as the latter were
to the former in the matter of ships.
_Turkish Defensive Torpedo Operations._--The defensive torpedo
operations carried out by the Ottoman naval officers and men were as
follows:--
The harbour of Batoum in the Black Sea was protected by a few 500 lbs.
buoyant mines, arranged to be fired by observation.
The mouth of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were similarly defended.
For this work great praise is due to those who executed the work, for
the very strong current and great depth met with in those waters would
render such a service a work of great difficulty, even when properly
constructed mooring boats, and men trained to such, were employed, both
of which in this particular instance were absent.
Soulina, one of the mouths of the Danube, and Suda Bay (Candia) were
also protected by similar means.
_Russian Defensive Torpedo Operations._--The Russian defensive torpedo
operations were very extensive, their principal harbours in the
Baltic, as well as those in the Black Sea, were carefully defended by
electro-contact mines of the latest type; so also they protected their
numerous bridges across the Danube, double and sometimes treble rows
of such mines being moored on either side, and in addition they also
placed several mines in the Danube, on the chance of destroying the
Turkish Danube flotilla.
_Destruction of Turkish Gunboat "Suna" by a Russian Submarine
Mine._--The only instance that occurred during this war of a vessel
being sunk by a stationary submarine mine was that of the Turkish
gunboat _Suna_, at Soulina, in October, 1877, on the occasion of the
unsuccessful attack on that place made by the combined Russian and
Roumanian flotilla.
About 6 A.M. on the morning of the attack, a "loftcha" containing two
of the enemy's electro-contact mines, fitted for laying down, was
captured by the Turks, from which it was evident that the Russians had
been employed during the night in torpedoing the reach immediately
above the Turkish defences. However, not heeding this very practical
warning, the Pacha in command of the Soulina squadron ordered the
_Kartal_ (a paddle-wheel tug vessel) and the _Suna_ (an old wooden
gunboat) to reconnoitre up the river; they accordingly started, the
_Kartal_ leading the way. At 8.5 A.M., about fifteen minutes after the
two vessels had left their moorings, an explosion was heard, and almost
at the same instant the unfortunate gunboat _Suna_ was observed to go
down head foremost, her masts only remaining above water. The _Kartal_,
which at the time of the catastrophe was some distance in advance, at
once turned back to the assistance of her consort, and managed to save
a number of the gunboat's crew, this work having to be performed under
a galling fire from the allied flotilla. Owing to this day being the
"Feast of Bairam," the unfortunate gunboat was dressed with masthead
flags, thus four Turkish ensigns fell into the hands of the enemy, the
Pacha refusing permission for any attempt to be made to save them. The
reason that the _Kartal_ escaped the fate of her consort was due to her
only drawing some 5 feet of water, while the _Suna_ drew at least 8
feet.
The gunboat struck the mine that sunk her on her port bow, the effect
of the explosion being to completely smash in that side of her bow,
dismount her foremost guns, and carry away her foremast just above the
deck (the mast remained standing, though inclined forward); the second
lieutenant of the _Suna_, who was at the time of the explosion standing
on her fore bridge, was thrown off and killed, and some twelve of
the crew were killed and wounded. To complete the destruction of the
_Suna_, another torpedo was exploded under her port quarter by the
Russians. The torpedo that was used on this occasion is detailed at
page 68.
_Offensive Torpedo Operations._--The numerous boat torpedo attacks made
by the Russians against the Turkish fleet will now be considered. The
following accounts have been carefully compiled from two sources, viz.
an article written by Captain Chardonneau, which appeared in the 'Revue
Maritime et Coloniale,' 1878, and which has been recently translated
for the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution by Lieutenant
J. Meryon, R.N., and notes taken by the author during his service with
the Imperial Ottoman Navy (1877-78).
1ST AFFAIR.
_The Batoum Attack._--The first torpedo boat attack occurred on the
night of the 12th-13th of May at Batoum.[R]
On the night of the attack there were lying in the harbour several
vessels of the Ottoman fleet, including ironclads, transports,
despatch-boats, &c. These vessels were totally unprotected by guard
boats, booms, electric lights, &c., and only the usual number of
sentries were posted, the Turks at that time not quite believing in
such boat attacks, thus offering peculiar advantages for a torpedo
attack.
Four torpedo boats formed the attacking force, viz. the _Tchesme_,
_Sinope_, _Navarino_, and the _Soukoum Kalé_.
These boats were carried by a ship of the Maritime Company of Odessa,
named _Grand Duke Constantine_. She was an iron screw steamer,
able to steam about 10 knots per hour, and fitted to hoist up the
above-mentioned torpedo boats. She was armed with four 4-pounders, and
torpedoes.
Early in the evening of the 12th the _Constantine_ left Poti, and
proceeded off the harbour of Batoum, her captain (Lieutenant de
Vaisseau Makaroff) deeming it advisable to lay to seven miles from the
harbour, the supposition that the Turks had placed submarine mines off
the entrance being the cause of his so doing.
About 11 P.M. the four torpedo boats started to the attack, Makaroff
being in command of one of them. They were all painted sea green,
and possessed a high speed. The night being dark, and having been
despatched some distance off, they reached the entrance in somewhat
straggling order. The _Tchesme_, commanded by Lieutenant Zatzarennyi,
and armed with a towing torpedo, was the first to enter the harbour,
and, without waiting for her consorts, dashed at the Ottoman fleet, and
succeeded in getting close to a large Turkish paddle-wheel transport,
and her commander dipping his torpedo, struck the ship under her
quarter; but that little something which so often causes a failure in
this mode of warfare occurred, and no explosion followed the pressing
down of the firing key, much to the chagrin and disgust of Zatzarennyi.
As might be supposed, by this time an alarm had been raised, and guns,
rifles, &c., were fired in and from every direction, causing the
torpedo boats to beat a precipitate and hasty retreat. Fortunately the
Turks were not possessed of any steamboats, nor were any of their ships
ready to dash out, or the defeat would have been a far more disastrous
one than was the case. Neither of the boats were damaged, nor any of
the crews injured.
The failure of this first attempt was due in a great measure to the
mode of attack, no system or unanimity of action on the part of the
four commanders being observable; and also to the somewhat half-hearted
support given to the _Tchesme_, for had her three consorts only dashed
at the Turkish ships as boldly, one at least of the Ottoman fleet would
have been sunk, the only defence resorted to being their guns and small
arms.
The moral effect of torpedoes was displayed here, causing the
_Constantine_ to lay too far off the entrance to the harbour, thus
decreasing the chance of her boats making a successful attack.
The Russian version finishes up by saying, "although this first
endeavour was unsuccessful, the authors of it were received at
Sebastopol with enthusiasm."
2ND AFFAIR.
_The Matchin Attack._--The second attempt was made on the 25th-26th of
May on two Turkish monitors, the _Fettu Islam_ and the _Duba Saife_,
and a small river steamer, the _Kilidj Ali_, lying at anchor off
Matchin.[S]
Four Russian torpedo boats were sent to the attack, viz. the
_Czarowitch_, Lieutenant Doubasoff; the _Xénie_, Lieutenant Chestakoff;
the _Djiquite_, Midshipman Persine; and the _Czarevna_, Midshipman
Bali. The total number of officers and men carried by these boats on
this occasion was forty-six.
The night of the attack was rainy, but not completely dark, since the
moon was above the horizon during nearly the whole of the expedition.
The force left Brailoff at one o'clock on the morning of the 26th,
and advanced in two columns up the river, finding great difficulty in
stemming the strong current.
A boat from the _Duba Saife_, rowing guard some 500 yards in advance of
the squadron, observed the approach of the Russian boats, but allowed
them to pass on their voyage of destruction without attempting to
stop them, or alarm the vessels. On reaching within 150 yards of the
_Duba Saife_, Dubasoff in the _Czarowitch_ was challenged, and failing
to give the correct answer was immediately fired at; but, nothing
daunted by the hail of shot and bullets, he dashed on, and succeeded
in exploding one of his spar torpedoes on the port side of the _Duba
Saife_, just under her quarter, a column of water and _débris_ being
thrown up to a height of 120 feet, which partly filled his boat, but
notwithstanding managed to get safely away. The monitor not sinking as
soon as expected, Chestakoff in the _Xénie_ dashed in, and completed
the work of destruction, the unfortunate ship sinking in a very few
minutes after this last explosion. The _Djiquite_ was struck in the
stern, and had to be run ashore for repairs, but eventually all four
boats reached Brailoff in safety. The Russians allowed to neither
killed nor wounded, which, when the time they were exposed to the fire
of the three Turkish ships (about twenty minutes), the number of men
(forty-six) engaged, and their very close quarters, seems miraculous.
The _Duba Saife_, thus lost to the Turks, carried two 12 cm. Krupp
guns, and a crew of some sixty officers and men, few of whom were
saved. Lieutenants Dubasoff and Chestakoff were decorated with the
4th Class of the Cross of Saint George, and three seamen received the
insignia of the Order of Military Merit.
This attack was conducted in a most gallant manner, and far more
systematically than the Batoum affair. If instead of holding one of the
boats in reserve, which was part of Dubasoff's plan, and the remaining
three attacking one vessel, the force had divided itself into two
parties, and had made a simultaneous attack on both the monitors, the
probability is that the _Fettu Islam_ would have shared the fate of her
consort.
The officer of the Turkish guard boat was tried by court-martial,
but what his ultimate fate was is not generally known. He certainly
deserved nothing less than death.
3RD AFFAIR.
_The Soulina Attack._--The third attempt took place on the 9th-10th
of June, 1877, on a Turkish squadron lying at anchor off Soulina.[T]
This squadron consisted of the three ironclads _Feteh Bulend_,
_Moocardemikhair_, and _Idglalieh_, and a tug, _Kartal_.
The Russian attacking force consisted of six torpedo boats, viz. the
No. 1, Lieutenant Poutschin; the No. 2, Lieutenant Rojdestvenski; the
_Tchesme_, Lieutenant Zatzarennyi; the _Sinope_, the _Navarino_, and
the _Soukoum Kalé_. The No. 2 was a specially constructed torpedo
boat, 68 feet long, and very fast. All were armed with spar torpedoes,
with the exception of the _Tchesme_, which carried a towing torpedo.
The boats were convoyed from Odessa by the _Constantine_, some being
carried, and some being towed; another steamer, the _Vladimir_,
supported her. The Turkish squadron were anchored in quarter line,
about one mile from the harbour; the _Kartal_, under weigh, being used
as an advance guard, and a few boats rowing guard close to the ships
being _the only means of protection_ adopted by the Turks. Passive
obstructions, such as booms, nets, crinolines, &c., were not thought
of, much less used.
On arriving about five miles from Soulina, the boats were formed into
two groups, the first consisting of the No. 1, the No. 2, and the
_Tchesme_, and despatched on their way. The working of their engines
was scarcely heard, and all lights were carefully hidden by tarpaulins.
The first casualty that happened was the disabling of the _Tchesme_,
by the electric wire of her towing torpedo fouling the screw, this
obliging her to return to the _Constantine_. Aided by good fortune,
and by the darkness of the night, the No. 1 and the No. 2 succeeded
in getting close to (30 yards) one of the Turkish vessels, the
_Idglalieh_, before being discovered, when they were at once hailed,
and, not answering, a tremendous fire of big guns and rifles was
directed on them from the _Idglalieh_, which was promptly followed by
that of the whole squadron, though from the other ships nothing of the
boats could be seen.
According to the Russians, the No. 2 succeeded in exploding her
torpedo close to, if not in contact with, a Turkish vessel, but from
eyewitnesses on board the squadron only one explosion was heard, viz.
that of Lieutenant Poutschin's torpedo. Any way, no damage whatever
was experienced by the Ottoman squadron. The No. 1 came down on the
_Idglalieh's_ starboard bow, fouled her cable, and swung alongside,
exploding one of her torpedoes in so doing, but with no other result
than a wetting to those of the ironclad's crew, who were on the
forecastle. Alongside Poutschin remained for some minutes, but at last
managed to get clear, and then was either sunk by the _Idglalieh's_
fire, or, as he avers, on finding his screw foul, he sunk his boat,
rather than let her fall into the hands of the Turks. Poutschin and
four of his crew were picked up, after being some hours in the water,
by the squadron's boats.
The No. 2 seems to have suffered severely, her funnel being bent, the
axle of the steering wheel damaged, sixteen rivets were started, and
the iron keel plate had dropped some 18 inches, and finally the lower
part of her rudder broken, and one of the blades of her screw bent aft;
part of this damage was no doubt the effect of the explosion of her
torpedo, which was probably not in position, but unless she ran over
some loose stones of the Soulina breakwater, the damage to her keel and
rudder cannot be accounted for.
The second group of boats had followed up the first, but on hearing the
noise of the explosions and roar of the guns and rifles they returned
to the _Constantine_.
That ship, on observing the firing, endeavoured to close the land, but
she grounded, and remained until daylight in a difficult position, but
at last got afloat, and returned to Odessa with five out of her six
torpedo boats.
Lieutenant Rojdestvenski, the Commander of the No. 2, received the 4th
Class of the Cross of Saint George, and three seamen the insignia of
the Order of Military Merit.
On the part of the No. 1 and No. 2, this was a most gallant affair,
though unsuccessful, but as regards the remainder of the boats the less
said the better.
Had the Turkish squadron slipped the instant the alarm was given, and
steamed full speed in the direction of Odessa, the _Constantine_ and
her convoy might have been cut off. Both the _Moorcademikhair_ and
_Feteh Bulend_ were 13 knot ships, and therefore considerably faster
than the enemy. But, as usual, the Turks were far too dilatory to take
advantage of the occasion.
4TH AFFAIR.
_The Rustchuk Attack._--The fourth torpedo attack was made on the
afternoon of the 20th of June, 1877, on a Turkish monitor off Rustchuk.
The only Russian torpedo boat sent to the attack on this occasion was
a Thornycroft named the _Choutka_, commanded by Lieutenant Skrydloff,
and accompanied by a celebrated Russian artist, Verechtckaguine by
name. The instant the torpedo boat was observed, so well directed and
steady a fire was kept up by the monitor that both the lieutenant and
the artist were badly wounded, and the electric wires of the torpedo
severed, thus obliging the _Choutka_ to beat a retreat. According to
the Russian account, the monitor was struck by the boat's torpedo
spar, but the above seems the more likely version. This was certainly
a most audacious attack, and had the Turks only succeeded in hitting
the _Choutka_ with her big gun, it would have ended fatally for the
Russians; as it was, the boat was struck by several bullets, but none
of the crew were wounded.
5TH AFFAIR.
_The Aluta Attack._--The fifth attack was made on the 30th of June,
1877, on a Turkish monitor off the mouth of the Aluta, in the river
Danube. This attempt, like the last, took place in broad daylight. Four
Russian boats were sent forward, but in spite of the captain of the
Turkish vessel doing all he could to run the boats down, none of them
succeeded in getting sufficiently near the vessel to enable a torpedo
to be placed in contact. The captain of the monitor took the precaution
to rig his lower booms out, and so managed to keep the enemy's boats
at a respectful distance, they imagining that mines were fixed to the
ends of the booms. After two hours of this dodging about, the Russians,
finding the case hopeless, abandoned the attack.
The Russian account states--1st, that the captain of the monitor was an
Englishman; 2nd, that the vessel was protected by nets and torpedoes
lashed to the extremities of her booms--both of which statements are
radically wrong.
The torpedo boats forming the attack were the _Choutka_, Midshipman
Niloff, and the _Mina_, Sub-Lieutenant Arens, both armed with the spar
torpedo.
Unless indeed the Russians acted up to the old proverb which says
"Discretion is the best part of valour," it is difficult to understand
how four small easily handled boats could have been for one hour
endeavouring to strike a ship (which ship was at the same time being
manoeuvred with a view of running them down) without either effecting
their object or being sunk or damaged in the attempt.
The Russians, though unsuccessful, behaved gallantly. Midshipman Niloff
was severely wounded, but no mention is made as to the number of the
crew that were killed and wounded, or of the damage received by the
boats. Niloff received the 4th Class of the Cross of St. George, and
Arens the Order of Military Merit.
The Turkish captain, Ali Bey, behaved most pluckily and skilfully. The
only wonder is that both the boats were not sunk by the monitor's fire.
6TH AFFAIR.
_The Soukoum Kaleh Attack._--The sixth attempt was made on the
23rd-24th of August, 1877, on a Turkish ironclad, the _Assari Shefket_,
at the time lying at anchor off Soukoum Kaleh.[U] Four torpedo boats
composed the attacking force, viz. the _Sinope_, Lieutenant Pisarefski;
the _Torpedoist_, Midshipman Nelson Hirst; the _Navarino_, Lieutenant
Vichnevetski; and the _Tchesme_, Lieutenant Zatzarennyi, the latter
officer being in command. These boats had been brought to the entrance
of the harbour by the _Constantine_, and were despatched on their
mission of destruction about half past ten.
An eclipse of the moon occurred on this night, and, taking advantage of
this fact, the four Russian torpedo boats dashed into the harbour at
full speed and made for the Turkish vessel.
Fortunately for the safety of his ship and lives of his crew, the
captain of the Turkish ironclad had several boats rowing guard round
his ship, and otherwise everything on board in readiness for immediate
action. On the attacking flotilla nearing the guard boats, blue lights
were burnt, rifles fired, &c., and the alarm given to those on the
look-out in the _Assari Shefket_. The moment the enemy were within
range, such a well-directed and heavy fire was poured on them that
the attack was completely foiled. One of the Russian torpedoes was
exploded, but failed to do more than throw a quantity of water up.
The next morning a pole with torpedo fixed on it was found by the
Turks, and on the strength of this and the numerous fragments of wood
similarly found, one if not more of the enemy's boats it was supposed
must have been sunk, or much knocked about.
This was a much better planned and executed attack, but was
unsuccessful owing to the extreme vigilance of the Turks.
This attempt will always be remembered by the Turks, on account of the
general order that appeared in the papers on the part of the Russians,
in which "the brilliant exploit and successful destruction of the
Turkish ironclad _Assari Shefket_" was set forth at great length; she
at the time that this appeared being quietly at anchor off the dockyard
at Stamboul, not having received any damage whatever.
7TH AFFAIR.
_The Second Batoum Attack._--The seventh attempt was made on the night
of the 27th-28th of December, 1877, on several Turkish men-of-war
anchored in the harbour of Batoum (the scene of the first Russian
torpedo attempt and failure). Four boats composed the attacking force,
viz. the _Tchesme_, Lieutenant Zatzarennyi, in command, armed with a
Whitehead fish torpedo, containing 32 kilog. of gun-cotton, fitted
to fire from a tube under the boat's keel; the _Sinope_, Lieutenant
Stchelinski, armed with a similarly charged fish torpedo, fitted to
fire from a raft, which was towed by the boat, and two other boats,
armed with spar and towing torpedoes.
The means employed at Batoum for the safeguard of the Ottoman fleet
there against such an attack was that of guard boats and a barrier
formed of logs of wood, with planks secured to them, so arranged by
means of weights that the planks remained perpendicular to the surface
of the water when in position.
Owing to the extreme darkness of the night, the Russians managed to
evade the guard boats, and when, as they imagined, some 60 to 65
yards from a Turkish ironclad, the _Tchesme_ and _Sinope's_ Whitehead
fish torpedoes were started on their deadly mission; but, owing most
probably to the want of practice of manipulating these somewhat
delicate instruments, also to the darkness, and the slight swell there
was on at the time, both missed their mark, and were landed high and
dry on the beach astern of the ship.
One of these weapons was perfect, the other minus her fore compartment,
this having been knocked off by the torpedo colliding with some hard
object. No explosion was heard or seen by the Turks.
This was the second time that the fish torpedo had been employed on
actual service, and, as in the previous instance, failed.
The guard boats and barrier of the Turks seem to have been of little
avail.
8TH AFFAIR.
_The Final Attack._--The eighth and last attempt was made on the night
of the 25th-26th of January, 1878.
This was originally intended to be an attack on the Turkish fleet at
Batoum, but on entering that harbour the two Russian torpedo boats,
the _Tchesme_, Lieutenant Zatzarennyi, and the _Sinope_, Lieutenant
Stchelinski, were met by a Turkish revenue steamer, against which the
boats discharged their Whitehead torpedoes, resulting in her complete
destruction, at the same time arousing the squadron, and causing the
boats to beat a retreat.
Though the vessel destroyed was not a frigate, yet the expedition
was successful in so far as proving that it is possible to project
Whitehead fish torpedoes from boats at a distance of 70 to 90 yards
from an enemy's ship, on a dark night, and strike her with them.
This concludes the whole of the offensive torpedo operations that were
carried out during the war, of which two out of eight attempts were
successful, which is without doubt a fair percentage.
There seems every probability that the present struggle between Chili
and Peru, in the Pacific, will afford torpedoists further experience of
the various offensive torpedoes, when subjected to the test of active
service.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote Q: See page 185.]
[Footnote R: A Turkish port, situated on the east coast of the Black
Sea, capable of holding several large ships when anchored head and
stern, but otherwise only a few.]
[Footnote S: A town situated on the south bank of the Danube, about
eight miles from Brailoff.]
[Footnote T: One of the principal mouths of the Danube.]
[Footnote U: A place taken from the Russians in the early part of the
war, situated on the east coast of the Black Sea.]