II

_The Actual Return Upon Taxable and Tax-Exempt Securities_

Dear Sir:

Your letter indicates that you do not sufficiently realize the

enormous advantage in interest yield which under the income tax

schedule as fixed in the House Bill is possessed by tax-exempt

securities as compared to taxable securities, especially, of

course, in respect of large incomes.

Permit me to call your attention to the following eloquent facts:

The yield of tax-exempt securities at prevailing prices ranges from

3-1/2% to nearly 4-1/2%. _Under the rates fixed in the War Revenue

Bill as it passed the House of Representatives, a taxable 6%

investment_ would yield:

PER ANNUM

2.28% on incomes over $2,000,000

2.34% " " " 1,500,000

2.40% " " " 1,000,000

2.69% " " " 500,000

2.97% " " " 300,000

3.26% " " " 250,000

3.54% " " " 200,000

3.90% " " " 150,000

4.20% " " " 100,000

Or, to put it in another way, the investment in 3-1/2% "Liberty

Bonds" is thus equivalent to investing in a taxable security

yielding:

PER ANNUM

9.21% in respect of incomes over $2,000,000

8.97% " " " " " 1,500,000

8.75% " " " " " 1,000,000

7.82% " " " " " 500,000

7.07% " " " " " 300,000

6.45% " " " " " 250,000

5.93% " " " " " 200,000

5.38% " " " " " 150,000

5.02% " " " " " 100,000

The investment in, say, New York City Bonds, being tax-exempt, at

their present yield of 4.20%, would represent the following rates

of income as compared to investments in taxable securities:

PER ANNUM

11.05% in respect of incomes over $2,000,000

10.76% " " " " " 1,500,000

10.50% " " " " " 1,000,000

9.38% " " " " " 500,000

8.48% " " " " " 300,000

7.74% " " " " " 250,000

7.12% " " " " " 200,000

6.46% " " " " " 150,000

6.02% " " " " " 100,000

Of course, all these figures hold good only for the period during

which the proposed rates of income taxation would prevail. As the

income tax rate decreases, the yield from tax-exempt securities

diminishes proportionately.

The volume of tax-exempt securities at present outstanding,

including the new "Liberty Loan," is estimated at not less than

$8,000,000,000.

The ability of corporations to find a ready market for their

securities is a prerequisite for the continuance of business

prosperity or, indeed, of adequate business activity. I need not

elaborate the effect which the comparison of the income yield from

tax-exempt securities as against taxable securities under an

excessively high income tax schedule--even if confined to larger

incomes--must necessarily have upon the eligibility of corporate

securities for investment purposes. The conclusion seems

unescapable that the resulting degree of disinclination to invest

in such securities coupled with the impulse to dispose of existing

holdings would bring about liquidation, severe shrinkage of values

and more or less pronounced demoralization in the investment

market--a condition of things which could not fail in a measure to

affect adversely the country's business in general, and which could

only partially be counteracted by Government expenditures, however

large.

As to your observations concerning the principle of tax-exempt

issues, I believe the Government acted wisely, considering all the

elements of the situation, in making its first great war issue, the

Liberty Loan, tax free. But in the face of the figures above

quoted, the question naturally presents itself whether our

traditional policy of making Government issues tax-exempt should

not be discontinued, which, of course, would mean that a materially

higher rate of interest than 3-1/2% would have to be paid for

Government borrowing.

In theory, it seems to me, there can be little doubt that the

balance of arguments is against the tax-exemption of Government

loans. As an abstract proposition little can be said, I think, in

favor of a policy the effect of which gives an advantage to the

rich and well-to-do, militates against the widest possible

distribution of Government issues amongst the people, tends to

facilitate Governmental extravagance by concealing the true cost

and establishes a fictitious basis of national credit.

Thus, for instance, on the $1,000,000,000, or thereabouts, which

our Government has loaned to the Allies at 3-1/2% interest, it is

losing money, because, whilst it nominally borrows this money

through the Liberty Loan at 3-1/2%, the cost to it is actually

considerably higher because it loses the revenue which would accrue

to it from the income tax if the bonds were not tax-exempt.

Let me add that I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that

our Government should charge to the Allied Nations more than the

nominal rate at which it is borrowing. They have been fighting

these three years and bringing unheard of sacrifices for a cause

which we have recognized to be ours no less than theirs, and if we

loan them money somewhat below its actual cost to us that item

weighs but very lightly in the scale, especially also if we

consider the immense monetary profits which our country has reaped

from the sale to them of munitions, material and supplies.

However, as against the theoretical objections, some of which I

have mentioned, to the tax-exemption of Government loans, there are

certain "imponderabilia"--things which cannot be exactly

weighed--in favor of a low rate of interest for Government

borrowing, even if the lowness of the rate is to an extent

fictitious. There are also certain practical reasons for the

maintenance of our traditional policy, and various concrete facts

which must be taken into account. For instance, there is the

problem of how to deal with the situation that might result from

the withdrawal of deposits from savings banks and similar

institutions, which probably would be liable to occur in case the

Government offered a bond issue at the higher rate it would have to

fix if the inducement of tax-exemption were removed.

There is the problem of the existence of billions of municipal and

state securities which offer to the holder the privilege of freedom

from municipal, state _and Federal_ taxes. I understand that it is

the consensus of opinion of our leading lawyers that under the

legal theory which treats such issues as "instrumentalities of

government" that privilege cannot be abridged and that Congress has

no constitutional power to tax state and municipal issues.

If state and municipal issues to be made during war time retain the

feature of being free from taxation, can the Federal Government

afford to make its war loans taxable, and thereby place itself in a

position where it would have to borrow under conditions which would

put it and its credit at a disadvantage as compared to state and

municipal issues?

The problem is a complex one altogether and, like all economic

questions, requires to be approached in a dispassionate spirit,

giving due consideration to the reasons for and against. The temper

of the stump speaker is not appropriate for dealing with taxation

problems.

Let me add, in conclusion, that I fully agree that it is "sheer

fiscal stupidity" and "socially inexpedient as well" to permit

"mushroom fortunes" to be built out of war profits. I believe there

ought to be imposed a large excess war profits tax on the English

model upon a fair and well conceived average basis of earnings so

calculated as to take account of the vast difference in the

country's industrial plant to-day and before the European war. Such

a tax may not be entirely free from objections in theory, but from

the social and moral point of view it is, I am convinced,

thoroughly sound and proper and called for. Appropriate taxation of

excess profits, together with an adequately though not exorbitantly

heavy income tax would go a long way to prevent the enrichment of a

class through the calamity of war, without at the same time

affecting wages or laming the enterprise and business activities of

the country.

Yours very truly,

(_Signed_) OTTO H. KAHN

War Taxation: Some Comments and Letters · 第 14 / 14 题