GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The curse of Negro slavery affected the whole English speaking world;
and that part of the world where it was commercially profitable
resisted its abolition. The British part of this world does not need
to assert any higher sense of justice and right than had those who
lived in the Northern States; and it may well be that had Negro slave
service been as profitable in Canada as in the Cotton States, the
heinousness of the sin might not have been more manifest here than
there. Nevertheless we must not too much minimize the real merit of
those who sought the destruction of slavery. Slaves did not pay so
well in Canada as in Georgia, but they _paid_.
It is interesting to note the various ways in which slavery was met
and finally destroyed. In Upper Canada, the existing slaves, 1793,
remained slaves but all those born thereafter were free, subject to
certain conditions of service. There was a statutory recognition of
the existing status and provision for its destruction in the
afterborn. This continued slavery though it much mitigated its
severity and secured its downfall in time. But there were slaves in
Upper Canada when the Imperial Act of 1833 came in force. The Act of
1793 was admittedly but a compromise measure; and beneficial as it was
it was a paltering with sin.
In Lower Canada, there was no legislation, and slavery was never
formally abolished until the Imperial Act of 1833; but the courts
decided in effect if not in form that a master had no rights over his
slave, and that is tantamount to saying that where there is no master
there is no slave. The reasoning in these cases as in the Somerset
case may not recommend itself to the lawyer but the effect is
undoubtedly, "Slaves cannot live in Lower Canada."
In Nova Scotia, there was no decision that slavery did not exist.
Indeed the course of procedure presupposed that it did exist, but the
courts were astute to find means of making it all but impossible for
the alleged master to succeed; and slavery disappeared accordingly.
In New Brunswick the decision by a divided court was in favor of the
master; but juries were of the same calibre and sentiments in New
Brunswick as in Nova Scotia and the same results were to be
anticipated, if Nova Scotian means were used; and the slave owners
gave way.
In the old land, judicial decision destroyed slavery on the British
domain; but conscience and sense of justice and right impelled its
destruction elsewhere by statute; and the same sense of justice and
right impelled the Parliament of Great Britain to recompense the
owners for their property thus destroyed. If there be any more
altruistic act of any people in any age of the world's history I have
failed to hear or read of it.
In the United States, slavery was abolished as a war measure. Lincoln
hating slavery as he did would never have abolished it, had he not
considered it a useful war measure. No compensation was paid, of
course.[1] Everywhere slavery was doomed and in one way or another it
has met a deserved fate.
WILLIAM RENWICK RIDDELL
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ONTARIO,
OSGOOD HALL, TORONTO,
February 5, 1920
FOOTNOTES:
[1] I had with the late Hon. Warwick Hough of St. Louis, Missouri, who
had been an officer in the Southern Army, several conversations on the
subject of slavery. He gave it as his firm conviction that, had the
South succeeded in the Civil War, it would shortly have itself
abolished slavery and sought readmission to the Union. His proposition
was that the power and influence of the planter class was waning,
while the manufacturers, merchants and the like were increasing in
number and influence and they would have for their own protection
abolished slavery. I have not met a Northerner or a Canadian who
agreed with this view; but a few Southerners have expressed to me
their general concurrence with my friend's proposition.
BOOK REVIEWS
_Africa and the Discovery of America._ Volume I. By LEO WIENER,
Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Harvard
University. Innes & Sons, Philadelphia, Pa., 1920. Pp. i-xix,
1-290.
The present volume is the first of a series in which Professor Wiener
will show that Arabicised Negroes, chiefly Mandingoes, brought to
America as slaves, profoundly influenced the culture of the Indians,
and were an important, if not always direct factor in establishing the
_modus vivendi_ between the Indians and the Europeans, which made
practicable the colonization of the New World.
The book is packed with valuable data, newly discovered, and brought
together for the first time. It should be read slowly, and read
through at least twice before judgment is passed on it. With the first
reading comes a shock. One learns that the _Journal of the First
Voyage_, and the _First Letter of Columbus_ are literary frauds,
though containing material which came from Columbus's own pen, and
that tobacco, manioc, yams, sweet potatoes and peanuts are not gifts
of the Indian to the European. Yet with a more intimate study of the
subject matter, the conviction increases that the author has built
upon the bed-rock of fact, and that his position is unassailable.
It is impossible, within the limits of a review, to do more than to
emphasise the most important of his discoveries. In his studies of the
_First Letter_, and of the _Journals_ giving account of the first and
the second voyages of Columbus, Professor Wiener seeks to determine
how much testimony they give pertaining to Indian names and things,
after the elimination of all that is not Indian. The non-Indian
elements are of two sorts; the names of the Islands, and the words for
"gold," etc. Columbus, dominated by the fixed idea, that, sailing
westward, he would find a short cut to India, China and Japan, began
with the first sight of land, to be engrossed with the task of
identifying each newly discovered country with some island or district
of the Far East, named on his maps. He was an ignorant man, though he
knew Ptolemy and Marco Polo by heart, credulous, uncritical, not
consciously dishonest, but unready to correct false impressions caused
by his ignorance and gullibility. His notes, as may be seen from a
reproduction of a page of his manuscripts (facing p. 38), were in an
execrable hand. The forger of the _Journal of the First Voyage_ was no
puzzle expert, and made mistakes in deciphering scrawls. Thus, for
example, the note _Giaua min._, _i.e._, Java minor, was read
_Guanahin_, the same destined to masquerade as _Guanahani_, the Indian
name of the first island sighted on October 12, 1492.
Perhaps the best specimen of such ghost-words in the _Journal_ is the
name _Carib_. This is nothing but Marco Polo's _Cambalu_, the capital
of the Grand Khan, successively misread as Canibal, Caniba, Cariba. So
also, "canoe" is a ghost-word, traced to a misreading of _scaphas_ as
_canoas_ in the manuscript, or the Gothic text of the Latin version of
the First Letter. It is interesting to learn that _maize_, in the
forms _masa_, _maza_, ultimately from Portuguese _mararoca_, is the
African name for Guinea corn. The transference of the name from Guinea
corn to Indian corn, "rests on a misunderstanding of a passage in
Peter Martyr's _First Decade_" (p. 123).
The question arises whether or not there had been a colony of
Europeans, with African slaves in America, before the arrival of
Columbus.
Fray Ramon Pane, Oviedo, and Las Casas give _conico_ as the Indian
word for "farm, plantation." This is clearly the Mandingo _kunke_
"farm." The Indian word for "golo," according to the Journal entry for
January 13, 1493, is _caona_. It is found also in the name of _Cacique
Caonabo_, called in the _Journal of the Second Voyage_ "master of
mines,"--the name being explained in the Libretto as "lord of the
house of gold." Now the words for "gold" in the Negro languages are
mostly derived from Arabic _din[=a]r_, which, through Hausa _zinaria_,
and Pul _kanyera_, reaches Vei as _kani_. Evidently _canoa_, written
also _guani_, is nothing but this Vei word. In "Cacique Caonabo," we
have three Mande words in juxtaposition. _Cacique_ is not far removed
from _kuntigi_, Soso _kundzi_, "chief,"--_caona_, that is _kani_, is
"gold," and _boi_, from Arabic _beii_, _bai_, is "house." The chance
that three such words should be identical in the dissimilar languages
of Africa and America, is _nil_. The words are African, though
represented as belonging to the spoken language of the New World.
Moreover, Ramon Pane, in the account he wrote for Columbus of the
Indian religion, gives as Indian words, the Mande _toto_, "frog," and
the Malinke _kobo_, "bug." What is more important, he imputes to the
Indians, a knowledge of the terrible West African itch, or _craworaw_,
which he calls by the supposed Indian name _caracaracol_. The critic
faces a dilemma. Either Ramon Pane lied, or he told the truth. Either
he fabricated stories of Indians, which he drew from books or
manuscript relations by Spanish and Portuguese traders, who were
writing about Negroes in Africa, or there had been in Hispaniola, a
pre-Columbian colony of European adventurers, with their African
slaves, who taught the Indians the Negro words for "farm, gold, frog,
bug, itch," etc., and also African folk-lore. No other hypothesis is
possible.
{Transcriber's Note: The following paragraphs contain a number of
characters with diacritical marks which are represented as follows:
[=a] a-macron
[=o] o-macron
[=e] e-macron
[>e] e-caron
[>z] z-caron}
The documentary and philological history of tobacco smoking and the
cultivation of edible roots, shows additional convincing evidence of
the influence of Africa on the culture of America in the colonial
period. Columbus never saw the Indians smoking tobacco. According to
the _Journal of the First Voyage_, on October 15, 1492, an Indian
brought him a ball of earth and certain precious dried leaves. On
November 16, two Spaniards reported that the Indians, carrying
firebrands and leaves, used them to "take incense." In the _Journal of
the Second Voyage_, Columbus (this part of the Journal is definitely
ascribed to him by his son) writes of Indians spreading powder on a
table, and sniffing it through a forked reed, thereby becoming
intoxicated. Now the first account is suspiciously like a book-story
of Oriental hashish-taking.--the second has no implication of smoking
at all, while the third describes nothing but the process of taking a
sternutatory. Indeed this last account is clearly based on a book
account, in which there was a play on the Arabic words _tubb[=a]q_
"styptic" and _tabaq_ "table." Ramon Pane, when he tells of Indians
sniffing the powder, calls it _caboba_, a mere Italianisation of the
Arabic _qasabah_ "reed," transferring the name of the inhaler to the
drug. Smoking tobacco through a forked reed of the sort described, has
been proved by trial, to be impossible. As late as 1535, Oviedo is
unable to tell a straightforward story of Indians smoking tobacco, but
he adds the significant fact that the Negroes in the West _Indies_
smoked and cultivated tobacco. Negroes, by the way were first allowed
to come to America in 1501,--two years later, Ovando, the governor of
Hispaniola complained that they joined with the Indians to make
trouble. By 1545, "smoking had become fairly universal in America" (p.
127). It cannot be argued that half a century is too short a time for
a new vice to become so widespread. Consider the case of banana
culture. Oviedo says that the first bananas were introduced into
America in 1516. Within twenty years, the fruit was universally
cultivated, while the Spanish name _platano_ has survived in a large
number of derivatives in the Indian languages.
As far as the linguistic history of the tobacco-words in the Indian
languages is concerned, it leads back to an eastern origin. In Arabic,
_tubb[=a]q_ means "styptic." Tobacco leaves were used as a styptic by
the Indians of Brazil in the sixteenth century. The Low Latin
equivalent of the Arabic _tubb[=a]q_ "styptic," is _bitumen_, whence
Portuguese _betume_, and French _betun_, _petun_. "The French
traders," says Professor Wiener, "at the end of the sixteenth century,
carried the word and the Brazilian brand of tobacco to Canada, and
_petun_ became imbedded in several Indian languages. The older Huron
word for "tobacco" is derived from the Carib _yuli_, which itself is
from a Mandingo word. Thus, while the Carib and Arawak influence is
apparent in the direction from Florida, to the Huron country, the
Brazilian influence proceeds up the St. Lawrence. The whole Atlantic
triangle between these two converging lines was left uninfluenced by
these two streams, and here, neither Carib nor Brazilian words for
"tobacco," nor the moundbuilders' craft have been found. Here the
"tobacco" words proceeded northward from Virginia, where the oldest
form of the words is an abbreviated Span. _tabaco_, or Fr. _tabao_ (p.
191). The Carib _yuli_ "smoke," is found in Carib and Arawak, side by
side with derivatives of Mande _tama_, _tawa_, which are also in the
Algonkian languages. The fact that the Hurons, apparently the first
Indians to plant tobacco, have no native word for the plant is
significant. It shows that the Hurons learned to smoke from the
Arawaks or Caribs, then already under Negro influence, and at a time
prior to the introduction of the tobacco-plant into Canada by the
French. When we consider, then, that tobacco is native to Africa, that
_tubb[=a]q_ and _petun_ are the ancestors of the Indian names for the
weed, that by 1503, Negroes in large numbers were living in America,
deserting their masters to join the Indians, that the Negroes in
America smoked and raised tobacco, the conclusion is inescapable that
tobacco smoking was discovered and taught by them to the Indians and
the Europeans.
"The tobacco-pipe in America," says Professor Wiener, "began its
career as a Mandingo amulet" (p. 184). This statement will distress
the American archaeologists, but the arguments in support of it cannot
be overcome. A counter-claim of pre-Columbian antiquity for pipes
found in the mounds cannot be made, since it is so clearly shown that
the mounds are not prehistoric, but were fortifications erected along
the lines of communication from Florida to the Huron country, to
protect the overland trade established in the beginning of the
sixteenth century.
In the _Journal of the First Voyage_, we find mention of _ajes_ and
_niames_, as name of edible roots, but the account hopelessly confuses
reports of yams, sweet potatoes and manioc. Neither yams nor sweet
potatoes are native to America, and both bear in America, only African
names. Oviedo indeed, says distinctly, that the _name_ is "a foreign
fruit, and not native to these Indies,"--also, that "it came with that
evil lot of Negroes, ... of whom there is a greater number than is
necessary, on account of their rebellions" (pp. 203-4). Now in Africa
the yam (Dioscorea), cultivated before the coming of the Europeans, is
known by names derived from Arabic _arum_ and _gambah_, _e.g._, Ewe
_ad[>e]_, _ad[>z]e_, Mandingo _nyambe_, Malinke _nyeme ku_,--whence
the supposed Indian names, _aje_, _age_, _niame_, _igname_, used
indiscriminately of any edible roots. The African names of the manioc
have come from Arabic _'uruq_ "roots," notably in the Congo languages,
_y[=o]ka_, _y[=e]ke_, _edioko_, plural _madioka_, whence, as the plant
was introduced into America, it was known there as _vuca_, _mandioca_.
As to sweet potatoes and peanuts, the former were cultivated in Asia
before the discovery of America, while the latter, mentioned by Ibn
Batutah as an article of food in Africa, took to the New World, their
African names _mandube_, _goober_ and _pinder_ (compare Mozambique
_manduwe_, Basunde _nguba_, Nyombo _pinda_). Professor Wiener's
conclusion is that manioc culture was taught to the Brazilian Indians
before 1492 by Portuguese castaways, who knew of the economic
importance of the plant in Africa, while the peanut, spreading north
and south from the Antilles, may also have reached America a few years
before Columbus.
The numerous full-page illustrations are extremely helpful in aiding
the reader to a clear understanding of difficult points in the
discussion.
The book is epoch-making. To all seekers of the truth, the coming of
the second volume, in which Professor Wiener will deal exhaustively
with the Negro element in Indian culture, will be an eagerly
anticipated event.
PHILLIPS BARRY, A.M., S.T.B.
CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS
* * * * *
_A Comparative Study of the Bantu and Semi-Bantu Languages._ By
SIR HARRY H. JOHNSTON, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.Sc. (Cambs). Oxford:
at the Clarendon Press, 1919, pp. 815, 2 sketch maps.
The author of this monumental work, in the opinion of the reviewer, is
in himself a composite of many of the capacities, which, combined or
singly in her subjects have made the greatness of Britain. He has been
a great colonial administrator, a distinguished African explorer; he
is a talented artist, and has recently astonished the literary world
by producing what H. G. Wells declares to be one of the best first
novels he has ever read. The contributions of Sir Harry Johnston to
the sciences of botany, zoology, and anthropology are truly
prodigious. It is in the last named field that his major interests
have lain, and a succession of important works have established him as
the foremost authority upon the ethnology of Africa and upon the
anthropology of the Negro race.
This ponderous volume on the Bantu and Semi-Bantu languages is the
first part of a work which represents the fruit of many years of study
of multitudinous African languages and dialects. The major portion of
the book consists of illustrative vocabularies of 366 Bantu and 87
Semi-Bantu languages and dialects with an extensive bibliography. A
competent criticism of this portion of the work can be made by no one
but a philologist with a special knowledge of African languages. The
present reviewer does not possess these qualifications. Nevertheless
it is obvious to any student of Africa that the publication of this
work places a mine of useful information at the disposal of the
linguist, the grammarian, and the missionary, and will also be
invaluable to the student of African ethnology and to the physical
anthropologist.
The first chapter sketches the history of research into the Bantu
laguages. The contributions of various philosophists are appraised.
The second chapter on the distribution and character of the Bantu
languages is of greatest interest to the layman and to the general
anthropologist. We are informed that the Bantu languages "constitute
a very distinct type of speech which, as contrasted with others
amongst the group of Negro tongues, is remarkable as a rule for
Italian melodiousness, simplicity and frequency of its vowel sounds,
and the comparative ease with which its exemplars can be acquired and
spoken by Europeans" (p. 15). "This one Negro language family now
covers the whole of the southern third of Africa, with the exception
of very small areas in the southwest (still inhabited sparsely by
Hottentot and Bushman tribes) and a few patches of the inner Congo
basin" (p. 15). Throughout Africa, north of the Bantu border line, the
traveller meets with numerous languages widely different and mutually
incomprehensible whereas with a knowledge of one Bantu language it is
not difficult to understand the structure and even the vocabulary of
others. The importance of this language family in Africa is therefore
obvious. The author defines clearly the special and peculiar
characteristics of Bantu languages. There follows an interesting
discussion of the origin and spread of these languages. Probably the
parent speech was spoken originally in the very heart of Africa,
somewhere between the basins of the Upper Nile, the Bahr-al-ghazal,
the Mubangi, and the Upper Benue. The archaic Bantu seem first to have
moved eastward, toward the Mountain Nile and the Great Lakes. Probably
they remained in the Nile Valley north of the Albert Nyanza "till at
least as late as three or four hundred years before Christ--late
enough to have been in full possession of goats and oxen and to have
received the domestic fowl from Egypt or Abyssinia. They then embarked
upon their great career of conquering and colonizing the southern
third of Africa" (p. 22).
The original Bantu invaders found before them in Central and South
Africa other peoples--Negroes of different types, pygmies, Bushmen,
and Hottentots. "The first great Bantu migrations undoubtedly emanated
from the vicinity of the Victoria Nyanza and the north Tanganyika, and
were directed round and not through the Congo forests" (p. 24). On the
basis of linguistic, ethnological and anthropological evidence Sir
Harry is led to deduce that at a critical period in their career the
Negro speakers of the early Bantu languages were brought under the
influence of a semi-Caucasian race from the north or northeast. This
contact gave rise to the many handsome-featured pale-skinned castes
and ruling clans in so many of the Bantu peoples.
The following statement is of great anthropological importance: "The
Bantu-speaking peoples of Africa, ... do _not_ constitute a race apart
from the other negroes or offer any homogeneity of physical type. But
on the whole they represent so much the average negro type that
'Bantu' is still in favor as a physical definition among
craniologists. In reality, they are just fifty millions of Negroes
whose speech belongs to one of the many language families of 'Negro
type'; only in this case the language family instead of being confined
in its range to a hundred villages or two hundred square miles, is
spread over the southern third of Africa--say over 3,500,000 square
miles--from the Cameroons, the Northern Congo, the Nyanzas, and the
Mombasa coast to Cape Colony and Natal" (p. 25), Bantu languages are
spoken by peoples of diverse physical types.
"Yet about the Bantu speech and the culture which accompanies it
(ordinarily) there is a suggestion, strengthened by the association of
these languages with metal working (iron more especially), with
agriculture, cultivated plants, and cattle-keeping, that adds to the
impression derived from their legends, their religious beliefs, games,
and weapons. It is thought that the Bantu language family was finally
moulded by some non-Negro incomers of possibly Hamitic affinities,
akin at any rate in physique and culture, if not in language, to the
dynastic Egyptians, the Galas, and perhaps most of all to those
'Ethiopians' of mixed Egyptian and Negro-Nubian stock that down to one
thousand years ago inhabited the Nile basin south of Wadi Halfa and
north of Kordofan." (Pp. 25-26.)
Sir Harry attributes most of the higher cultural elements associated
with the Bantu languages to the non-Negro invaders. He believes that
the Bantu invasions of southern and central Africa cannot be referred
back much earlier than the second century B. C., and that the
differentiation of the more than two hundred forms of Bantu speech
occurred subsequently and rapidly.
To the student of African ethnography this volume is a great
disappointment in one respect. The sketch map showing the distribution
of Bantu and Semi-Bantu languages is absurdly inadequate. The writer
of this review had confidently expected an authoritative large-scale
map showing the distribution of linguistic families, dialects, and
tribes. It is to be hoped that such a map will form a part of the
completed work.
E. A. HOOTON.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
* * * * *
_History of the United States from Hayes to McKinley, 1877-1896._
By JAMES FORD RHODES, LL.D., D.Litt. Volume VIII, 1877-1896. The
Macmillan Company, New York, 1919. Pp. 484.
This is supposed to be a continuation of Mr. Rhodes _History of the
United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of
Home Rule at the South in 1877_. As one, however, considers the
treatment of the former work in comparison with this recent treatise,
he must conclude that the author has not maintained the standard set
in his earlier volumes which show deeper insight and a more scientific
point of view. Persons who have looked forward to the continuation of
Mr. Rhodes's comprehensive history from the transition period of
Hayes' administration will certainly be disappointed in observing how
he has failed in tracing the threads of history, which in our time,
have become momentous. After reading the volume one is still at a loss
as to what forces in our national life the author considers as being
actually in the making during the period which the volume covers.
The work begins with a treatment of Hayes' administration setting
forth facts which have appeared elsewhere in the author's studies in
this particular period. As in other works, the author defends almost
everything Hayes did and arraigns the Reconstruction Republicans who
were opposed to him. He then presents in an unscientific way the brief
discussion of economic questions bearing on railroad rates, wages,
strikes, mobs and riots. Financial depression, the silver question and
the valuable service of John Sherman are given considerable attention.
Valuable facts are set forth in his discussion of civil service
reform, the tariff commission and the Chinese question. Too much of
the book, however, is devoted to merely political matter involving a
detailed discussion of campaigns and elections at the expense of the
economic, constitutional and diplomatic movements decidedly
influencing the history of this country.
In this work the author pays very little attention to the Negro except
as he leaves the impression that the race was justly deprived of the
suffrage and of holding office. He makes reference to the complaint of
the Republicans to show that in disfranchising the Negro in the South
to make that section solidly Democratic that every white voter in the
South thereafter possessed the political power of two white voters in
the North. He mentions also the federal election laws and the Force
Bill but finally concludes that the experiment of making the Negro a
citizen was a failure. Here again Mr. Rhodes shows his lack of
knowledge of human affairs in that he studies history only in the
present tense. No man at present is wise enough to say whether we
shall finally obtain more good than bad results from the
Reconstruction, for we are too close to that part of our history to
make a proper estimate of these events.
* * * * *
_The Negro Year Book._ Edited by MONROE N. WORK, Director of
Department of Records and Research, Tuskegee Normal and
Industrial Institute. The Negro Year Book Publishing Company,
Tuskegee Institute, Alabama, 1919. Pp. 523.
There has appeared for 1918-1919 a new edition of the _Negro Year
Book_ to which students of Negro Life and History have learned to look
for information concerning the Negro. This volume appears with a table
of contents and a useful index to the numerous facts compiled. The
volume not only covers the field of former editions but includes also
much up to date material throwing light on Negro current history. The
very first portion of the work is entitled _Fifty-three Years of
Progress, 1866-1919_. This is a statistical study of Negro schools,
Negro ownership of property, and Negro enterprise. The reader will be
interested in such information as illiteracy, music, painters, actors,
occupations, agriculture, business, and the study of crime.
The Negro Year Book is a desirable step in the right direction. Mr.
Work and his coworkers deserve unusual praise for this undertaking in
a field where for a number of years yet to come the returns must
necessarily be meagre. The work meets a long felt want of statistical
information as to exactly what the Negro people are doing. These facts
will serve not only as an inspiration to the race itself but to refute
so much misinformation often circulated to do Negroes injury. It is
earnestly hoped that the managers of this work will find it possible
in the near future to publish an annual volume and to this end the
public should give the movement unstinted support to make such an
undertaking financially profitable.
NOTES
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has published a
monograph entitled _Negro Migration during the War_ by Mr. Emmett J.
Scott, Secretary-Treasurer of Howard University. This is the first
effort at a detailed treatment of the movement of the Negroes from the
South to the North. It has such interesting chapters as the causes of
the migration, stimulation of the movement, the call of the
self-sufficient North, the draining of the black belt, efforts to
check the movement, the effect of the migration on the South, the
situation in the congested districts in the North and West, and
remedies for relief. Persons who have an interest in this conspicuous
event of our internal history will find it profitable to read this
volume.
The Illinois Centennial Commission has published Volume V of the
_Modern Commonwealth_, a history of that State. On page 21 appears
this paragraph:
"Half way between the native stock and the foreign born stands the
Negro population, practically all of whom have drifted into the state
since the Civil War. In 1870 there were only 28,762 Negroes in
Illinois, but since that time they have been increasing steadily and,
with the exception of the decade 1880-1890, at a more rapid rate than
the white population. Especially rapid was the growth in the decade
ending with 1870, when it was 277 per cent or almost four times the
rate of increase of the white population. As a result of this influx
of Negroes the proportion which they constitute of the total
population has increased very steadily from 1.1 per cent in 1870 to
1.9 per cent in 1910. But the absolute number is still small,
amounting only to 109,049 at the last census."
The American Negro Academy has published Number 20 of its _Occasional
Papers_ containing a study of _Alexander Crummell, an Apostle of Negro
Culture_ by William H. Ferris. This dissertation sets forth not only
the main facts of the life of the subject of the sketch but gives also
some interesting history in connection with the founding of the
American Negro Academy.
Major John R. Lynch, one of the most conspicuous figures of the
Reconstruction period now living, has discovered certain errors in
the Reconstruction records published in the January number of the
Journal of Negro History, and has written the editor the following
letter to make the necessary corrections:
4352 FORESTVILLE AVENUE,
CHICAGO, May 17th, 1920.
_Editor, Journal of Negro History._
In compliance with your request I write this to point out a few
errors which appeared in the January 1920 issue of the Journal
covering the Reconstruction period.
Page 67 the name of Benjamin F. Turner appears as a member of the
43d Congress, and Jeremiah Haralson as a member of the 44th
Congress. Turner was a member of the 42d but not of the 43d
Congress.
Haralson and Rapier were members of the 43d Congress, both having
been elected in 1872.
On page 73, Rubert Gleed should be Robert Gleed. A.R. Davis
should be A. K. Davis, Dr. Stiles should be Dr. Stites, W.H.
Fonte should be W. H. Foote.
On page 74, H. M. Faley should be H. M. Foley. To the list of
Colored men elected to that Legislature should be added the name
of J. M. Wilson, of Marion County.
On the same page is the statement: "John R. Lynch elected speaker
of the House." This is incorrect. Lynch was elected speaker in
January 1872, by the Legislature that was elected in November
1871. The man who was elected speaker in January 1870, by the
Legislature that was elected in November 1869, was Judge Freeman
E. Franklin, a white Republican from Yazoo County. Shortly after
the adjournment of the first session of that Legislature speaker
Franklin died. When the second session convened in January 1871
Hon. H. W. Warren, a white Republican from Leake County was
elected speaker for the unexpired term.
Respectfully yours,
(Signed) JOHN R. LYNCH.
THE JOURNAL
OF
NEGRO HISTORY
VOL. V--OCTOBER, 1920--NO. 4
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
BEARING ON THE RETURN OF NEGRO SLAVES, 1783-1828[1]
Diplomatic relations bearing on the Negro of the Revolutionary period
constitute one of the mooted questions of American foreign policy. Yet
although this question was then one of the disturbing factors in our
relations with Great Britain, it has hitherto passed unnoticed.[2] As
a large number of Negroes were taken from the United States by Great
Britain during the Revolutionary War there followed so much effort to
secure the return of these Negroes that the subject had to be dealt
with in the Treaty of Paris which ended the war in 1783. So numerous
were the infractions of the stipulation prohibiting the carrying off
of the Negroes and so fruitless were the discussions resulting from
the non-fulfillment of the articles in the treaty that several
diplomatic representatives were sent on missions to Great Britain, the
last of which ended with the Jay Treaty of 1794. Obviously, no
satisfactory settlement as to the Negro could then be reached. An
array of evidence from the sources[3] shows that the question was
frequently discussed and that its significance lies in its absence
from the stipulations of the Jay Treaty. It is evident, moreover, that
the United States was not satisfied with this treaty and that between
Great Britain and this country there was widening a breach which
culminated in the War of 1812, during which Great Britain committed
the same offence that she did during the war for independence.[4]
How can one account then for the unfavorable attitude of Great Britain
toward the return of the Negro fugitives? The humanitarian spirit of
Great Britain which, by the celebrated decision of Lord Mansfield in
the Somerset case in 1772 guaranteed to every man his freedom as soon
as he set foot on British soil, extended beyond the limits of the
empire. Although this decision of the judge evoked some unfavorable
comment, for slavery was the "normal condition of the Negro," his
ideas were disseminated by the military authorities defending the
Crown in America. During the Revolutionary War many of the British
commanders issued proclamations of freedom to the Negro slaves. Lord
Dunmore, the dethroned Governor of Virginia, was among the first to
issue a proclamation of freedom[5] to all Negroes who would fight for
the King. Soon thereafter, Clinton,[6] the Commander-in-chief of the
British forces in America, issued a proclamation to the same effect.
Still later, Cornwallis issued a proclamation specifying the grant of
"freedom and protection" to all Negroes who would seek his command.
Whatever motive prompted the issuance of these orders, it is evident
that the status of the Negro during this "emergency" as regarded by
Great Britain was that of a freeman.
To these proclamations many Negroes responded. For instance, General
Greene learned on Long Island that a group of Negroes aggregating two
hundred (200) had in July, 1776, sought freedom within the British
lines and had been accepted as a regiment in that vicinity.[7] He
reported, moreover, to General Washington in 1781 that enough Negroes
in North Carolina to form two regiments had sought British freedom and
protection and that they were being organized by the British.[8]
Whether they came within the British lines as a result of these
proclamations or in recognition of the laws of war "it has been
computed by good judges" says Ramsay,[9] "that at the evacuation of
one part, two hundred and forty-one Negroes and their families were
taken off to St. Lucia in one transport, the _Scimitar_; and that
between the years 1775 and 1783, 25,000 Negroes, that is, one-fifth of
all the slaves, were taken from the State of South Carolina." In
Georgia,[10] there was made a report that the loss was much greater,
probably three-fourths or seven-eighths of all the Negroes in the
State. Again, from an estimate made at the time, Jefferson observed
that about thirty thousand Negroes were taken from Virginia.[11] From
the other slave-holding States which were invaded by the British, many
other Negroes were carried away from their masters. So effectively was
the scheme carried out that fear was expressed throughout the South
less the economic position of that section would be threatened. In
consequence of such actions on the part of Great Britain, General
Washington receded from the position of excluding Negroes from the
American Army and took drastic steps in preventing the carrying away
of other Negroes by Great Britain.[12]
Considered, therefore, as an American slave in time of peace and an
American soldier in time of danger, it is no anomaly that the status
of the Negro complicated the negotiations between military
representatives of Great Britain and the United States. Extended but
fruitless negotiations ensued. A satisfactory settlement of the return
of the Negroes seemed impossible. With independence assured through
the representatives assembled, the Treaty of Paris was negotiated in
1783. Franklin urged in his communication with Oswald, 1779, that the
question as to the return of Negroes taken away by Great Britain be
adjusted immediately.[13] This suggestion was strengthened by the
support given it by the American representative, Henry Laurens, who
had been in confinement in London during the war and whose chance
arrival on the closing day gave the subject increased importance. Thus
credit for the incorporation of the article on the Negro into the
Treaty of Paris is given to Henry Laurens.[14]
By the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Paris,[15] it was stipulated
that the British troops should withdraw from the United States without
carrying away or destroying any property belonging to the citizens of
the United States. In spite of this agreement at the peace conference,
this stipulation was not fulfilled by Great Britain. Convincing
evidence of an infraction of this stipulation is seen in a letter
written by General Washington to Sir Guy Carleton, May 6, 1783, in
which the former expressed himself as being surprised to hear that
embarkations of Negroes had taken place during the whole of that
year.[16] He, moreover, expressed his private opinion to the effect
that such an action "is totally different from the letter and spirit
of the treaty." A few days thereafter the Virginia delegates in
Congress wrote to the Governor of Virginia that they would make this
the subject of a "pointed remonstrance from our minister in Europe to
the British Court with a demand for reparation and in the meantime
urge General Washington to insist on a more faithful observance of
that stipulation at New York."[17]
Notwithstanding further orders which were issued by Sir Guy Carleton,
May 12, 1783, to prevent the carrying away of any Negroes or other
property of the American inhabitants many other infractions of the
provision were reported.[18] Even General Washington remarked[19]
that "some of his own slaves and those of friends living with him were
probably carried away to New York." "If by chance," continued he, "you
should come at the knowledge of any of them, I will be much obliged by
your securing them so that I can obtain them again." So numerous were
the violations of this part of the treaty that Thomas Jefferson,
Secretary of State, in a letter written to Vergennes, the Foreign
Minister of France, asked for suggestions from France in regard to the
infractions of this article of the Treaty of Paris. In it, he
expressed the objection of the Crown, which was to the effect that
Negroes had come within the British lines under the promise of freedom
and protection and that this promise was fulfilled by Great Britain in
preference to the stipulation in the treaty.[20]
The situation became more aggravated. The breach between the two
countries was gradually widening. Sensing this acute situation,
Washington suggested that Carleton meet him in a conference at
Orangetown, New Jersey, May, 1783. At one of their meetings Washington
called the attention of Carleton to several resolutions passed by
Congress relating to the return of all Negroes and other property of
American inhabitants taken away by the British forces. Concerning
these, Carleton replied that he wished to be considered as giving no
construction of the treaty, but that he "conceived it could not have
been the intention of the British Government by the treaty of peace to
reduce themselves to the necessity of violating their faith to the
Negroes who came within the British lines under the proclamation of
the predecessors in command."[21] In point of fact, however, he said
"delivering up the Negroes to their former masters would be delivering
them up--some to execution and others to punishments which would in
his own opinion be a dishonorable violation of the public faith." He
concluded, nevertheless, that if the sending off of the Negroes should
hereafter be declared an infraction of the treaty, "compensation ought
to be made by Great Britain to the owners."[22]
In regard to the last suggestion of Carleton, Washington observed that
many difficulties would arise in compensating the proprietors for
their Negroes. He also thought it impossible to ascertain the value of
the Negroes, for the value of a slave, contended he, "consists chiefly
in his industry and sobriety." Another difficulty Washington observed
was that of identifying the slave. He was of the opinion that the
slave would give the wrong name of his master. Washington considered
this conduct on the part of General Carleton, moreover, a departure
from both the letter and spirit of the Seventh Article of the Treaty
of Paris.
In answer to these contentions Carleton said that as the Negroes were
free and secured against their masters they could have no inducement
to conceal their true name or that of their masters. In commending
compensation Carleton was of the opinion that he was pursuing a course
which would operate most for the security of the proprietors. "If the
Negroes were left to themselves," he remarked, "numbers of them would
very probably go off and not return to the parts of the country from
whence they came or clandestinely would get on board the transports in
such a manner as would not be in his power to prevent." "In either
case," continued Carleton, "an inevitable loss would ensue to the
proprietors."[23] But as the business was then conducted they had at
least a chance for compensation.
In conformity with these views, Carleton suggested that commissioners
be appointed by the two countries "to agree upon the mode of
compensating as well as the amount and other points with respect to
which there was no provision made in the treaty." This suggestion was
approved by Congress, and in compliance with it Egbert Benson,
William Smith, and Daniel Parker were appointed[24] with specific
instructions from Washington to "assist representatives of Great
Britain in inspecting and superintending the embarkation of persons
and property in fulfillment of the Seventh Article of the Treaty of
Paris."[25]
These commissioners began their work immediately by examining the
claim of one Phillip Lott to a Negro named Thomas Francis[26] on board
a vessel called the _Fair American_ in New York harbor and about to be
carried to the island of Jamaica. Concerning this inquiry a pointed
remonstrance was made to Sir Guy Carleton. After the details of the
examination were presented to him, the commissioners requested Great
Britain to prohibit its representatives from carrying away the Negro
and to deliver Francis to Lott. Notifying Washington, June 14, 1783,
of their progress, the commissioners reminded him that Sir Guy
Carleton intimated an impropriety in the claim, as the property was
not suggested to be in danger of being sent away. "This left room,"
said the commissioners, "for an idea that possibly property about to
be sent away would be restored ... and we conceive it is now reduced
to a certainty that all applications for the delivery of property will
be fruitless and we therefore desist from them."[27]
A few days later the commissioners reported to Washington that in
superintending an embarkation of fourteen transports bound for Nova
Scotia "about 3000 souls, among whom were at least 130 Negroes who
appeared to be property of the citizens of the United States," were
carried away. They also indicated that these embarkations were made in
spite of their presence and remonstrance and for this reason asked
General Washington for "further directions on this subject."[28] Other
reports of the commissioners to General Washington, June 17, 1783,
show that on many other occasions Negroes not residing within the
British lines were taken away. To the remonstrances of the
commissioners, Sir Guy Carleton gave a deaf ear. They, in the
meantime, wrote General Washington that they had interpreted
Carleton's silence as a "determination that all future applications
should remain equally unnoticed." That they realized that their
efforts were fruitless goes without saying, for they confessed that
their work was ineffective and that the British vessels were never
subjected to any rigid inspections and it was, therefore, impossible
to determine, from the register provided by Sir Guy Carleton, the
exact number of Negroes carried away in those vessels.[29]
The work of the commissioners, nevertheless, was noteworthy. They
called Washington's attention to the fact that Sir Guy Carleton
affected to distinguish between the cases of such Negroes as came
within the British lines in consequence of the promise of freedom and
protection promulgated by Carleton's predecessors and such as came in
either previous to the proclamations or subsequent to the cessation of
hostilities. "Negroes of the first description," insisted Carleton,
"were not included in the treaty." The commissioners soon realized
that even this limited construction given to the article was not
intended to be fulfilled by Carleton's subordinate officers. They
based their contention upon the fact that printed certificates
granting Negroes the privilege of embarking[30] were distributed by
the commandant of New York City, "as their convenience might
require."[31] These certificates fell into the hands of many persons
for whom they were not intended. So loosely were they distributed that
one was picked up by the commissioners who transmitted the same to
General Washington.
On the other hand, the commissioners insisted that the treaty
stipulated specifically that his Brittanic Majesty should withdraw all
his armies, garrisons and fleets from the United States and from every
port, place and harbor within the same without causing any destruction
or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American
inhabitants.[32] With these two interpretations of the Seventh Article
invariably insisted upon by Carleton on the one hand and the
commissioners on the other an agreement was less likely to be reached
and, in spite of the efforts to the contrary, the deportation of
Negroes took place steadily until all the British departed.[33]
In the meantime, Congress was discussing the ratification of the
Treaty of Paris. The non-observance of the Seventh Article on the part
of Great Britain and the destruction worked by Carleton evoked many
resolutions opposing the ratification of the treaty for the expressed
reason that it did not provide for the loss of Negroes. One of these
resolutions was to the effect that it was "inexpedient to concur in
passing laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty."[34] These
efforts of Congress, however, like those of the commissioners were of
no avail. Complaints of American citizens of the loss of their
property were expressed by the representatives in Congress. They, to
be sure, had their effect, for soon thereafter, Congress transferred
the question of the return of Negroes to the realm of actual
diplomacy.[35]
John Adams, 1788, who, by the way, was one of the representatives of
the United States who signed the Treaty of Paris, received an
appointment as representative of this country to England to settle the
alleged violations of the Treaty of Paris. He was instructed in 1785
to press for a fulfillment of the terms of the treaty of peace on the
part of Great Britain.[36] He had little time, however, to press his
claim before representatives of Great Britain were inquiring why the
United States did not perform her part in this reciprocal contract. To
these inquiries, Adams replied that "America could not; that it was
hardly a government at all." He, moreover, informed Congress that the
reason assigned by Laurens for incorporating the Seventh Article was
that the people of the United States would be unable to comply with
the part of the treaty which respects debts unless the provision which
respects Negroes was made. "This construction," he continued, "was
never denied and that it seemed to be understood by the ministry that
on a settlement with the United States compensation must be made."
Obviously, then, both Great Britain and America understood that the
Seventh Article would be fulfilled by Great Britain only when the
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Articles were fulfilled by the United
States.[37] This point, however, was discussed pro and con for many
months and was seldom admitted by the American diplomatic
representatives, Adams himself said that he could "get no comfort from
his mission." The construction given the Seventh Article making its
fulfillment by Great Britain contingent upon the execution of other
provisions only complicated matters.
Another mission was planned in 1789,[38] but before another
representative was appointed Washington urged upon Gouverneur Morris,
who contemplated visiting London, "to find out the reasons why Great
Britain had not complied with the Seventh Article." In a letter
written to Morris, October 13, 1789, Washington desired Morris to
converse with his Brittanic Majesty's Ministers as to whether there
was any objection to performing those articles remaining to be
performed on his part. "Learn with precision," he concluded, "what
they mean to do on this head." In compliance with this request, on
April 7, 1790, Morris interviewed the British representative, the Duke
of Leeds, who gave to him only "general assurances" for a faithful
observance of the articles and, becoming a "little embarrassed," could
not say how the matter in regard to the Negroes stood. After many days
of silence, the Duke of Leeds, April 23, 1790, "lamented every
circumstance" which delayed the fulfillment of engagements on the part
of the United States.[39] He also indicated that, if circumstances
rendered their final completion impracticable, he had no scruples in
declaring the object of Great Britain would be to "retard the
fulfillment of such subsequent parts of the treaty as depend entirely
upon Great Britain until redress is granted to their subjects upon the
specific points of the treaty itself or a fair and just compensation
for the non-performance of those engagements on the part of the United
States."[40]
Informing Washington of his progress, May 29, 1790, Morris disclosed
the fact that he was no longer contending for the return of the
Negroes, for that would involve either "breaking faith" with those
whom they had seduced by the offer of freedom or the violation of the
stipulation which they had made with the United States in the Treaty
of Paris. In presenting America's side, however, he insisted upon
compensation in order that it would not be difficult for the planters
to show that they had sustained a heavy loss from the want of men to
cultivate their lands and thereby produce the means of paying their
debts. To this the Duke of Leeds replied that he wished to "consider
the treaty subject generally" and thought that some compensation could
be mutually made. He declared, nevertheless, that he would rather
"make a new treaty than perform the Seventh Article of the Treaty of
Paris."[41]
Subsequent diplomatic negotiations between Jefferson and Hammond, the
Minister of Great Britain, indicate that Washington was not satisfied
with the status of the case after Jefferson cited specific infractions
of the Seventh Article of the treaty, enclosing documents supporting
these claims. Hammond informed the United States, November 30, 1791,
that the King had suspended the execution of the Seventh Article in
consequence of the non-compliance on the part of the United States of
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Articles. In short, he insisted that the
stipulations should be performed in the order in which they stood. He
stated, moreover, that the "two objects were so mutually connected
with each other as not to admit of separation either in the mode of
discussing them or in any subsequent engagements which might result
from that discussion."[42]
It was soon evident then that such extended discussions were
fruitless. This state of affairs, to be sure, could not exist very
much longer. Citizens of the United States were pressing "more
zealously" for the return of the Negroes. For almost a decade the
subject had been discussed without an amicable adjustment. In a
communication to the Congress, April 16, 1794, Washington showed that
he had grasped the situation by informing that body of the fact that
"despatches received from our minister in London contain a serious
aspect of our affairs with Great Britain." He suggested, therefore, to
the Senate that an envoy extraordinary be sent to England. To this end
Washington appointed John Jay to settle the infractions of the Treaty
of Paris.[43]
In Jay's instructions nothing was specifically said concerning the
carrying away of the Negroes by the British, but, as it appeared from
subsequent transactions, it is quite certain that the infractions of
the Seventh Article as well as those of other articles were to be
adjusted. In this wise, the "irrepressible question"--relating to the
return of Negroes carried away by Great Britain during the
Revolutionary War became one of the purposes of Jay's mission.[44]
During the negotiation with Grenville there took place many heated
debates, in which each party accused the other of the first
aggression. Meanwhile Jay ascertained, September 13, 1794, that
Grenville supported the contention held by his predecessors, that the
article of the treaty was intended to prevent depredations at the
departure of the army; that no alteration in the actual state of
property was intended by the Seventh Article; that every Negro who
strayed or escaped from the American lines and came into the lines of
the British Army became by the laws of war British property; and that
to extend the Seventh Article of the treaty to include Negroes who
came within the British lines under the proclamation of freedom was to
give it a "wider latitude than the terms of it would warrant."[45] In
short, Grenville contended that in regard to those within the British
lines before the signing of the treaty they were "left entirely
without restrictions."[46]
In reply to Grenville's argument Jay divided the subject of the
Negroes into three groups: first, the Negroes captured or disposed of
during the course of the war; second, the Negroes who remained with
and belonged to American citizens within the British lines; and third,
the Negroes who, confiding in the promise of freedom, fled from their
masters and took refuge with the British. Concerning the first two
groups, no extended discussion followed. Grenville stated, however, in
regard to the second group, that he was "not so sure." The last-named
group on the other hand, produced much pourparler, for Jay maintained
that these Negroes were "clearly comprehended by the terms of the
treaty." According to his argument, Negroes could not by "mere
flight" alter their slave character. He soon appreciated the difficult
position of England in trying to keep the pledges of freedom offered
to the Negroes and at the same time fulfill, according to the American
interpretation, the article of the treaty in regard to the return of
Negroes.
During the negotiation Jay admitted, moreover, that the carrying away
of Negroes was justifiable in view of the promises of freedom and
protection promulgated by British military representatives.[47] He
concluded, however, with the thought that "Great Britain ought not to
expect to escape the consequence of the folly of her Generals in
America." For this reason he restated the idea expressed by other
American representatives to Great Britain, that compensation should be
obtained for the Negroes carried away. In spite of Jay's change of
position Grenville persisted with unyielding opposition in the view
that such slaves were no longer American property. "On this point"
wrote Jay to Randolph, "we could not agree."
Concerning this question, Jay said, moreover,[48] that "various
articles have been under consideration but did not meet with mutual
approbation and consent." Sensing the situation Randolph declared to
Jay, December 3, that he was extremely afraid that the reasoning of
Grenville about the Negroes would not be satisfactory. "Indeed I own,"
said Randolph, "that I can not myself yield to its force." Randolph
knew of the anti-British sentiment in the South and realized that the
treaty would be opposed by the South because that section would feel
that it had been neglected,[49] should it receive no compensation for
the Negroes carried away by the British.
In a communication to Jay two weeks later it is obvious that there was
no concerted opinion even in America in regard to the much mooted
question. Jay and Randolph, for instance, differed as to whether the
slaves concerned ever became the property of Great Britain. Jay held
that the Negroes in question never became the property of Great
Britain whereas, Randolph held that while property is acquired in
movables as soon as they come within the power of the enemy, yet
"property rights thus acquired in war may by the treaty of peace be
removed."[50]
To the contention of Great Britain that the Seventh Article meant
merely an engagement against further depredations, Randolph declared
the stipulation "superfluous"; for he maintained that the mere
cessation of war meant that much. To this point, Grenville declared
the treaty "odious," if the stipulation were interpreted to include
Negroes who sought British lines under the promise of freedom and
protection "on the basis of common morality." Great Britain was not to
be expected to execute a stipulation with such an interpretation.
Obviously, then, Great Britain would not recede from her position.
Citizens of America, especially those deprived of their property, were
beginning to think that our diplomatic relations were not properly
taken care of by Jay. Expressions of disapproval of the treaty by
resolutions in the Senate evinced the temper of the people. Jay, in
the meantime was called "traitor"; his mission was declared a failure
and the treaty was attacked from many sides.
At this juncture special mention must be made of the objections of the
southerners on the ground that the treaty did not provide for the
return of their property, while the objection of the North was not so
pressing. In fact, northerners acquiesced in the opinion of Hamilton
who had substantially the same view that Grenville had.[51] Thus we
see the first glimpse of the North becoming estranged from the South
because of the difference of opinion in regard to the Negro.
The leading source of dissatisfaction of the treaty of Jay seemed to
be a failure to get compensation for the Negroes carried away by Great
Britain. The stipulation, moreover, was not definite, for many
constructions could be placed upon it. The words of the treaty,
moreover, were too vague and uncertain to express accurately the
intention of the signers. Whether Negroes whom the British carried
away could any longer be considered American property, seemed to be
the crux of the situation. Although no definite settlement could be
reached by the two nations, authorities of international law[52] give
the case to Great Britain. One rule which was recognized by the
foremost nations of the world was to the effect that a slave escaping
in war becomes free. Concerning this Halleck says that such slaves
cannot be regained by their former masters.[53] Woolsey says that "a
slave sojourning to a free land cannot be treated as his master's
property--as destitute of jural capacity." To the same purport,
Heffter says "in no case is a state bound to allow the slavery which
subsists in others." Dana, in his edition of Wheaton's _International
Law_ supports this contention.[54]
Dissatisfied with results but not discouraged, however, Washington
appointed commissioners, December 7th, 1798, to work with
commissioners from Great Britain and proceed with the infractions of
the treaty. A short time thereafter President Adams in an address to
Congress, November 23, 1797, reported that several decisions on the
claims of citizens of the United States for losses and damages
sustained by reason of irregular and illegal captures or condemnations
of their vessels or other property had been made by the commissioners
in London, conformably to the Seventh Article of the Treaty. "The sums
awarded by the Commissioners," said he, "have been paid by the British
Government; a considerable number of other claims where costs and
damages and not captured property were the only objects in question
have been decided by arbitration, and the sums awarded to the citizens
of the United States have also been paid."[55] These decisions served
to allay the discontent in America. Still later, Adams informed
Congress that "such progress had been made in the examination and
decision of cases ... which were the subject of the Seventh Article
that it is supposed the Commissioners will be able to bring their
business to a conclusion in August of the ensuing year."[56]
No account of the final settlement of these claims, however, is found
in the sources. Dissatisfaction became more intense. Claimants were
pressing on all sides for a fair compensation for the loss of their
property. So serious was the situation that the House of
Representatives went beyond its accustomed limitation and discussed in
1798 the treaty-making power of the United States. Pressure had been
brought to bear upon the representatives of the people because the Jay
Treaty had been ratified by the President and Senate and it did not
contain a provision covering the return of the Negroes.
Further efforts, nevertheless, were made to adjust the differences
between the two countries. They, however, were of little avail. The
Republican policy of Jefferson which this country strictly followed
from 1801 to 1809 had as its basic principle that governments ought to
do as little as possible. Hence our army and navy were cut down to the
extent that the American Government could not assert itself against
foreign encroachment. Particularly in 1804 our relations with Great
Britain became worse when the Jay Treaty of 1794 by agreement was
allowed to expire. To compel Great Britain to come to terms Congress
enacted a non-important act which never had the desired effect.
Soon thereafter the continental system and the paper blockade engaged
the attention of the American Government. Negotiations had failed.
Great Britain would not make a treaty. The accumulation of injuries
called for action of some kind. To yield and say nothing meant to give
up the rights of an independent nation. For this reason Jefferson
introduced in 1807 the Embargo with which he hoped to force France as
well as Great Britain to come to terms--to recognize the United States
as a "free sovereign and independent nation." Meanwhile a spirit of
nationality was developing in the country. Soon thereafter war was
declared and waged against Great Britain to win the respect and honor
which every nation deserves.
In this state of war the provisions of the Treaty of Paris and the Jay
Treaty were nullified. In response to an inquiry as to whether these
treaties, so far as they were not fully executed, terminated by the
War of 1812, the British Department of State in a communication
replied that "with respect to the treaties you are informed that they
were claimed by Great Britain at the conclusion of the Treaty of Ghent
to have terminated by the War of 1812."
Against this view the United States protested. In the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel v. the Town of New Haven, the view was
expressed that provisions of a treaty remain in full force in spite of
war.[57] The general rule of inter-national law, however, is that war
terminates all subsisting treaties between the belligerent powers.[58]
The United States, moreover, soon acquiesced in this view, for
President Polk in his message to Congress, December 7, 1847, said, "a
state of war abrogates treaties previously existing between the
belligerents."[59] Great Britain then was legally excused by the best
authorities of the world from executing fully the provisions of the
Treaty of 1783 and the Jay Treaty of 1794.
As a result, the same policy in regard to the carrying away of Negroes
was followed during the War of 1812.[60] While the British forces were
occupying the forts and harbors of the United States, Negroes came
within their possession. Many were induced to run away while others
were captured in battles. From the Dauphin Islands-possessions
claimed to be without the limits of the newly acquired Louisiana
territory the British carried away slaves. In fact, from whatever
places the British occupied they carried away Negroes. Many Negroes
came also into the possession of the British by the proclamation of
Admiral Cochrane of Great Britain, April 2, 1814, setting such loyal
adherents free. In effect, this proclamation extended an invitation to
all persons desiring to change their slave status. Although the
proclamation[61] did not specify the Negroes, the meaning and object
of Admiral Cochrane was evidently to bring Negroes within the British
lines. Many, to be sure, responded to the proclamation. As many more,
no doubt, were carried away from the United States by the British
under the veil that they were captives in the war and, therefore, no
longer the property of American inhabitants.
With victory assured and the representatives of Great Britain and
America assembled in Ghent, July 11, 1814, one of the first questions
for the commissioners to consider was evidently the return of the
Negroes. This question had primary consideration in the final draft of
the Treaty of Ghent. By the first article of the treaty it was
provided that "all possessions whatsoever taken by either party during
the war or which might have been taken after the signing of this
treaty shall be restored without delay and that these possessions
should not be destroyed." It specified, moreover, that artillery,
public and private property, originally captured in the forts of the
United States should not be carried away.[62]
Negroes were carried away by the British forces after the treaty was
signed as well as before. In Georgia many Negroes came into possession
of the British at Cumberland Island fortified by Admiral Cockburn.[63]
In a letter dated November 22, 1914, Joseph Cabell gave evidence to
support the above-mentioned facts when he declared that he was on
board a British squadron in Lynnhaven Bay at the time Major Thomas of
York attempted to recover his Negroes, who had gone off to the British
and that the destination of the Negroes on board the ships was a
subject of curiosity and concern. Soon, however, he learned that they
were to be sold in the Bahamas.[64] From another reliable source comes
the information that a shameful traffic had been carried on in the
West Indies.[65] Secretary Monroe presented to the Senate, moreover,
an affidavit of a Captain Williams who had been a prisoner in the
Bahamas for some time. In this he declared that he had been present at
the sale of Negroes taken from the vicinity of Norfolk and Hampton.
"This affidavit," said Monroe, "was voluntarily given and the facts
have been corroborated by a variety of circumstances."
Such information was given in the Senate. In discussing the
ratification of the treaty the Senate suggested that commissioners be
appointed to carry into effect the first article. In line with this
view John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and Albert Gallatin were
authorized to supervise the execution of this article. In a
communication to Secretary Monroe, Feb. 23, 1815, the commissioners
reported that "all slaves and other private property are claimed to be
delivered up."[66]
So much progress in so short a time was remarkable. To adjust all the
claims in an amicable way would hardly occur. It was soon learned by
the commissioners that "all slaves and other private property" were
delivered up by the British using as their guide a different
construction of Article I. "The construction," Monroe said, "ignored
the distinction which existed between public and private property."
Had it been intended he continued, "to put slaves and other private
property on the same ground with artillery and other public property
the terms "originally captured in the said forts or places which shall
remain therein on the exchange of the ratification of the Treaty"
would have followed at the end of the sentence after "slaves and other
private property."[67] With their construction, he contended that both
interests, the public and private would have been subject to the same
limitation. Besides, Monroe held that the restrictive words
immediately following "artillery and other public property" was not
intended to include the words "slaves and other private property." If
"the slaves and other private property" are placed on the same footing
with artillery and other public property, "the consequences must be
that all will be carried away."
Monroe learned, furthermore, that Mr. Baker, Charge D'affaires of
Great Britain, had placed another construction on Article I of the
treaty. In this new construction he had made a distinction between
slaves who were in British ships of war in American waters and those
in the ports held by British forces at the time of the exchange of
ratifications.[68] Monroe and the commissioners, on the other hand,
were of the opinion that the United States was entitled to all slaves
in possession of the British forces within the limits of the United
States forts or British ships of war. Concerning this opinion Baker
wrote April 3, 1815, that it could not be shown that Monroe's
construction was sanctioned by the words of the Article. "If this
construction had been known then," he remarked, "we would have
decidedly objected to it and proposed others."[69]
Accessible reports indicate that the governments of Great Britain and
the United States persisted in the constructions given by their
respective representatives. Clavelle, the Commander-in-Chief of the
British forces in the Chesapeake, claimed that the treaty meant only
such slaves or other private property should be delivered up as were
"originally captured in the forts or places to be restored." In
conformity with their construction of the Article, Clavelle refused
furthermore to restore the slaves taken from Tangier Islands, because
they were not originally captured there. The United States, on the
other hand, was of the opinion that the country was entitled to all
slaves within its limits on the exchange of the ratifications of the
treaty. The United States believed, finally, that the carrying away of
Negroes applied to both kinds of property because the word was common
to both descriptions.
By the usage of civilized nations in cases of invasion private
property with the exception of maritime captures was respected. This
meant, in effect, that none could be lawfully taken away. Influenced
by this usage Great Britain receded from her position and declared
that the claim of the United States to indemnification for her
slaves--had never been resisted. In the meantime Great Britain
declared April 10, 1816, that she could not consider any property
which had been previous to ratification of the treaty removed on
shipboard as "property forming a subject for a claim of restoration or
indemnification." In spirit, these two declarations were
contradictory. Besides they made the subject more difficult and
puzzling.
In the meanwhile the work of the commissioners continued. In their
efforts to take an inventory of the slaves so that the claims might be
adjusted, they encountered the opposition of Clavelle and Cockburn. It
was clearly evident that the efforts of the commissioners would be of
no avail. More coercive means were necessary to settle such an
extended and controversial question. In a convention of commerce
between Great Britain and the United States October 20, 1818,
representatives realized that an agreement in regard to the Negroes
was hardly possible. The representatives from the United States,
therefore, offered to refer the differences to some friendly sovereign
or State to be named for that purpose. They agreed further to consider
the decision of such a friendly sovereign or State to be "final and
conclusive."[70]
Very soon thereafter the Emperor of Russia offered to use his good
offices as mediator and after a short discussion, his proposal was
accepted. To this end there was concluded on June 30, 1822, a
convention in which the adjustment of the claims for indemnity was
left to a mixed commission. This action was followed by desultory and
extended discussions which terminated, nevertheless, in the final
disposition of the controversy. The point of difference was decided in
favor of the United States. In handing down his decision the Emperor
held that the limitations as to the restitution of public property
bore no relation to private property. In effect, he said that the
treaty prohibited the carrying away of any private property whatever
from the places and territories stipulated in Article I of the Treaty
of Ghent. He contended that "the United States was entitled to
consider as having been carried away all slaves who had been
transported from those territories on board of English vessels within
the waters of American territories and who for that reason had not
been restored."[71]
In compliance with the decision of the Emperor of Russia a mixed
commission, one commissioner and one arbitrator from Great Britain as
well as the United States met July 30, 1822, at Washington, D.C.,
under the Emperor's mediation.[72] For the United States Langdon
Cheves was the commissioner and Henry Sewell the arbitrator; for Great
Britain George Jackson was the commissioner and John McTavish the
arbitrator. George Hay was appointed, also, by the President of the
United States to give such information and support that might be
needed since individual claimants could not be present. The purpose of
the commission was to prove the average value of the Negroes at the
time of the ratification of the treaty and to determine the validity
of individual claims. In the event no agreement could be reached
recourse was had to the Emperor of Russia whose decision would be
"final and conclusive." This action was insisted upon by America,
whereas Great Britain persisted in refusing to submit such matters to
the Emperor. Their progress, as a result, was not very marked. In
considering the "definitive lists"[73] of claims these commissioners
encountered many more doubtful and intricate problems. Claims not
contained in this list were not to be taken cognizance of; nor was the
British government required to make compensation for them. With
respect to compensation, Great Britain promised to produce all
evidence which was in the possession of her naval and military
officers concerning the number of slaves carried away. It was provided
by the commission that no payment was to be made within twelve months.
September 11, 1822, the board unanimously agreed on the average value
of slaves as follows:
Each slave from Louisiana $580
Each slave from Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama 390
Each slave from Maryland, Virginia and other States 280
The next difficulty of the board occurred in regard to the allowance
of interest on claims. Concerning this point, Cheves held that a
reasonable compensation for the injury sustained should have been
granted. "A just compensation," said Cheves, "is the reestablishment
of the thing taken away with an equivalent for the use of it during
the period of detention." In reply to this Jackson held that the
convention of 1822 did not grant the commissioners the power to fix
interests and, besides, that interests not being a part of the debt
could not be allowed. Realizing the futility of his claims Cheves
offered to submit the difference to arbitration, but Jackson declined.
Equally difficult questions arose in regard to the slaves taken away
from Dauphin Island in Mobile Bay.[74] This island, controlled by the
British during the war, was later surrendered to the United States.
Concerning this Jackson held that it was not legally at the time of
the ratifications of the treaty a part of the United States, that is,
it was not a part of Louisiana but belonged to West Florida, which was
not ceded to the United States until 1819.[75] In regard to this
Cheves offered to refer these claims to arbitration, but in this view
Jackson refused to acquiesce. The situation did not become any better
even when Rufus King was sent as our minister to England to succeed
Henry Clay who became John Quincy Adams's Secretary of State.
Continued disagreement of the representatives of Great Britain and the
United States resulted. Their failure to agree upon the provisions of
the Convention of 1822--that matters under dispute be referred to
arbitration made the work of this convention of little avail. Clay's
offer of settlement was not favorably received in Great Britain. As to
a basis of compromise, Clay said that the "total number of slaves on
the definitive list was 3,601; that the entire value of all the
property for which the indemnity was claimed including interest might
be stated at $2,693,120." Realizing that this large sum would never be
secured, Clay suggested that $1,151,800 might be used as the minimum
in the negotiation. He used as a guide the fact that Parliament had
appropriated 250,000 pounds to cover the awards of the commission.
This sum, Mr. King observed also, was nearly the sum mentioned as a
minimum by Clay in his instructions to him. Even with this
information, the commissioners made little progress.
On the other hand, Mr. Vaughan, the British Envoy at Washington, said
April 12, 1826, "that His Majesty's Government regretted to find
themselves under the absolute impossibility of accepting the terms of
compromise offered by the envoy from the United States in London." He
did not admit, moreover, that the question of interest should be
referred to arbitration, but maintained that the demand was
unwarranted by the convention and unfounded by the Law Officers of the
Crown.[76] In reply to his observation, Clay informed Vaughan of the
fact that Great Britain's representatives had refused to refer many
questions to arbitration and that if this refusal to cooperate in this
regard should be upheld it would virtually be making him the final
judge of every question of difference that arose in the joint
commission.[77] This disagreement continued until 1825, when the
commissioners met to collect and weigh evidence.
Soon thereafter, Albert Gallatin, who had been appointed Envoy of the
United States to London, was authorized to treat with Canning on the
oft-discussed question. During the first interview he discovered that,
while there was a great reluctance to recede from the ground already
taken by Jackson, there was also a disposition to settle that
controversy.[78] Following the instructions given to King, Gallatin
used the 250,000 pounds as the basis of settlement. This sum he was
authorized to accept. He, however, did not make this offer known
immediately but waited for the formal offer of $1,200,000 from the
British Government; and in conformity with his instruction of a later
date, Gallatin offered as an ultimatum an acceptance of $1,204,960,
which the British Government reluctantly agreed to pay.[79]
On November 13, 1826, a convention to carry out this agreement was
concluded. The amount specified above was to cover all claims under
the award of the Emperor of Russia. It provided, moreover, that the
money was to be paid in Washington, in the current money of the United
States, in two installments; the first twenty days after the British
Minister in the United States should have been officially notified of
the ratifications of the convention, and the second August 1, 1827. In
this way the convention of 1822 was annulled, save as to the two
articles relating to the average value of slaves which had been
carried into effect, and as to the third article as related to the
definitive list which had also been carried out.[80] This ended the
work of the board. After ratification had been exchanged the board
adjourned, March 26, 1827.
This left one more matter to be disposed of, that of executing the
provisions of the commission of 1826. In compliance with this Congress
passed an act, March 2, 1827, to carry out this agreement.[81] A
convention was thereby called to meet in Washington July 10th and
proceed with the consideration of claims, "allowing such further time
for the production of evidence as they should think just." As soon as
the claims were validated and the principal amounts ascertained
seventy-five per cent of the principal was paid with the explanation
that when all claims were settled, the other twenty-five per cent
would be paid, if the fund permitted it. If it did not, then the
remainder would be distributed in proportion to the sums awarded. In
these negotiations, Langdon Cheves and Henry Sewell, who had only
recently represented the United States in London, together with James
Pleasants of Virginia, were appointed commissioners. They considered
not only the claims on the definitive list but also those deposited in
the Department of State and which had not been previously adjusted.
The conflicting interests of payments and the inconclusive evidence
which were presented made the work of this convention more difficult.
The records were very poor and contained little of the information
desired. For this reason many claims were denied; especially was this
true in Maryland and Virginia.[82] Many of the claimants of other
States nevertheless were compensated. Seventy-five per cent was
granted them, the sum totalling $600,000 being paid. This condition of
affairs caused a clash among the 1,100 claimants, 700 of whose
petitions on the definitive list were examined. Many other claimants
were seeking evidence to secure compensation. They were not
successful, however, for Cheves opposed the admission of hearsay
testimony as well as the testimony of slaves. Well informed as to the
progress of the commission, Congress passed an act May 15, 1828,[83]
specifying August 31st as the last day on which the commission would
meet. Of that entire amount awarded $1,197,422.18 had been paid to the
claimants. The remaining sum was "distributed and paid ratably," to
all the claimants to whom compensation had been made. The work of the
Convention of 1827 thus ended.
ARNETT G. LINDSAY
FOOTNOTES:
[1] This dissertation is the result of the researches of Mr. A. G.
Lindsay under Dr. C. G. Woodson at Howard University during the
academic year 1919-1920 and was submitted to the Committee on Graduate
Studies in candidacy for the degree of Master of Arts. Dr. C. G.
Woodson was the chairman of this committee.
The following sources were used in the preparation of this manuscript:
_American State Papers, Foreign Relations_; _American State Papers,
Confidential Documents_; _American State Papers_, Wait's Edition;
_Annals of Congress_; _Diary of John Quincy Adams_, in his _Memoirs_;
_Diplomatic Correspondence_; Force, _American Archives_; _Journals of
Congress_; _Journals of Continental Congress_; McDonald's _Source Book
of American History_; _Niles Register_; _Treaties and Conventions_,
Edition 1889; _United States Statutes at Large_.
The following works were also consulted: John Adams, _Works_; Van
Tyne, _The American Revolution_; _American Historical Association
Reports_; Babcock, _Rise of American Nationality_; Benton, _Naval
History of England_; Channing, _History of the United States_; Ford,
_Washington's Writings_; Ford, _Jefferson's Writings_; Fiske,
_Critical Period_; Gibb, _Administrations of Washington and Adams_;
_The Journal of Negro History_; Morse, _John Adams_; _Naval Chronicle
of England_; Ramsay, _History of South Carolina_, Edition, 1809;
Sparks, _Washington_; Moore, _International Arbitration_; Moore,
_Digest of International Law_; Wharton, _Digest of International Law_,
Edition, 1887; Halleck, _Elements of Law_; Wheaton, _Elements of Law_,
Edition, by Dana.
[2] Ramsay, _History of South Carolina_, Edition, 1809, Vol. I, pp.
474-475.
[3] _American Historical Association_, Vol. I, p. 273. F. A. Ogg,
_American State Papers_, Vol. IV, p. 304.
[4] Moore, _International Arbitrations_, p. 350.
[5] Van Tyne, _American Revolution_, p. 61; Force, _American
Archives_, 4th Series, III, 1385.
[6] Proclamation--"Whereas the enemy have adopted a practice of
enrolling Negroes among their troops, I do hereby give Notice that all
Negroes taken in Arms or upon any military Duty shall be purchased for
the public service at a stated price; the money to be paid to the
captors. But I do most strictly forbid any Person to sell or claim
right over any Negroes the property of a Rebel who may take refuge
with any part of this Army. And I do promise to every Negro who shall
desert the Rebel Standard full Security to follow within the Lines any
occupation which he may think proper." Given under my Hand at
Headquarters, Phillipsburg, the 30th day of June, 1799.
H. CLINTON.
By his Excellency's Commander
JOHN SMITH, Sec.
Journal of Continental Congress, II, 26; Van Tyne, _American
Revolution_.
[7] Force, _American Archives_, I, 486, Fifth Series.
[8] _Journal of Continental Congress_, II, 26.
[9] Ramsay, _History of South Carolina_, Edition, 1809, I, 474.
[10] Moore's _Historical Notes_, 14; _Journal of Negro History_, Vol.
I, p. 117.
[11] _Jefferson's Works_, Vol. II, p. 426.
[12] Sparks, _Washington's Works_, III, 218.
[13] Channing's _History of the United States_, Vol. III, pp. 348-369.
[14] _American Historical Association Report_, Vol. I, p. 273.
[15] Article 7, Treaty of Paris.--"There shall be a firm and perpetual
peace between his Brittanic Majesty and the said States, and between
the subjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore all
hostilities both by sea and land shall from henceforth cease: All
prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty, and his Brittanic
Majesty shall with all convenient speed, and without causing any
destruction or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the
American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons and fleets
from the said United States, and from every port, place and harbour
within the same; leaving in all fortifications the American artillery
that may be therein; and shall also order and cause all archives,
records, deeds and papers belonging to any of the said states or their
citizens which in the course of the war may have fallen into the hands
of his officers to be forthwith restored and delivered to the proper
states and persons to whom they belong."
McDonald, _Documentary Source Book of American History_, p. 208.
[16] _American Historical Association Report, 1874_, p. 421. Waits,
_American State Papers_, Vol. I, p. 279.
[17] _Journal of Negro History_, Vol. II, pp. 411-422.
[18] Sparks, _Washington_, Vol. VIII, Appendix, p. 544.
[19] Washington to Daniel Parker in Ford's _Washington's Writing_, X,
246-247.
[20] Ford's Edition of _Jefferson's Writings_, p. 127.
[21] _Journal of Negro History_, Vol. II, p. 417.
[22] Ford, _Washington's Writings_, X, 241-243.
[23] _Journal of Negro History_, II, 418.
[24] _Diplomatic Correspondence_, Vol. XI, p. 335.
[25] Ford, _Washington's Writings_, X, 241-243.
[26] _American State Papers--Foreign Relations_, I, p. 190.
[27] _Ibid._, I, p. 191.
[28] _Ibid._, I, pp. 188-192.
[29] _American State Papers, Foreign Relations_, Vol. I, pp. 188-192.
[30] _Blank certificate_--New York, April 23, 1783.
This is to certify to whomsoever it may concern that the bearer hereof
........... a Negro restored to the British Lines in consequence of
the proclamation of Sir William Howe and Sir Henry Clinton, late
Commanders-in-chief in America; and that the said Negro has hereby his
excellency's Sir Guy Carleton's permission to go to Nova Scotia or
wherever else .......... may think proper.
By order of
BRIGADIER GEN. BUCK.
E. WILLIAMS,
Major of Brigade.
[31] _American State Papers_, Vol. I, pp. 190-192.
[32] McDonald's _Source Book of American History_, p. 208.
[33] _American Historical Association Report_, Vol. I, p. 276.
[34] _Annals of Congress_, 4th Congress, p. 970.
[35] _Report of the American Historical Association_, pp. 413-444;
_Diplomatic Correspondence 1783-1789_ (3 Vol. ed.), II, 340.
[36] Morse, _John Adams_, p. 235.
[37] _Adams' Works_, Vol. VIII, p. 303.
[38] _American Historical Association Report, 1894_, p. 422.
McLaughlin. _American State Papers, Foreign Relations_, Vol. I, p.
122.
[39] _American Historical Association Report_, 1894, p. 422.
[40] _American State Papers, Confidential Documents_, Vol. X, p. 80.
[41] _American State Papers, Confidential Documents_, Vol. X, p. 85.