CHAPTER IX

WHAT IS TREASON?

No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony

of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open

Court. (Constitution, Article III, Section 3.)

Such are the jealous provisions of our laws in favor of the

accused that I question if he can be convicted. (Jefferson.)

The scenes which have passed and those about to be transacted

will hereafter be deemed fables, unless attested by very high

authority. (Aaron Burr.)

That this court dares not usurp power is most true. That this

court dares not shrink from its duty is no less true.

(Marshall.)

While the grand jury had been examining witnesses, interesting things

had taken place in Richmond. Burr's friends increased in number and

devotion. Many of them accompanied him to and from court each day.[1153]

Dinners were given in his honor, and Burr returned these courtesies,

sometimes entertaining at his board a score of men and women of the

leading families of the city.[1154] Fashionable Richmond was rapidly

becoming Burr-partisan. In society, as at the bar, the Government had

been maneuvered into defense. Throughout the country, indeed, Burr's

numerous adherents had proved stanchly loyal to him.

"I believe," notes Senator Plumer in his diary, "even at this period,

that no man in this country, has more personal friends or who are more

firmly attached to his interests--or would make greater sacrifices to

aid him than this man."[1155] But this availed Burr nothing as against

the opinion of the multitude, which Jefferson manipulated as he chose.

Indeed, save in Richmond, this very fidelity of Burr's friends served

rather to increase the public animosity; for many of these friends were

persons of standing, and this fact did not appeal favorably to the rank

and file of the rampant democracy of the period.

In Richmond, however, Burr's presence and visible peril animated his

followers to aggressive action. On the streets, in the taverns and

drinking-places, his adherents grew bolder. Young Swartwout chanced to

meet the bulky, epauletted Wilkinson on the sidewalk. Flying into "a

paroxysm of disgust and rage," Burr's youthful follower[1156] shouldered

the burly general "into the middle of the street." Wilkinson swallowed

the insult. On learning of the incident Jackson "was wild with

delight."[1157] Burr's enemies were as furious with anger. To spirited

Virginians, only treason itself was worse than the refusal of Wilkinson,

thus insulted, to fight.

Swartwout, perhaps inspired by Jackson, later confirmed this public

impression of Wilkinson's cowardice. He challenged the General to a

duel; the hero refused--"he held no correspondence with traitors or

conspirators," he loftily observed;[1158] whereupon the young

"conspirator and traitor" denounced, in the public press, the commander

of the American armies as guilty of treachery, perjury, forgery, and

cowardice.[1159] The highest officer in the American military

establishment "posted for cowardice" by a mere stripling! More than ever

was Swartwout endeared to Jackson.

Soon after his arrival at Richmond, and a week before Burr was indicted,

Wilkinson perceived, to his dismay, the current of public favor that was

beginning to run toward Burr; and he wrote to Jefferson in unctuous

horror: "I had anticipated that a deluge of Testimony would have been

poured forth from all quarters, to overwhelm Him [Burr] with guilt &

dishonour--... To my Astonishment I found the Traitor vindicated &

myself condemned by a Mass of Wealth Character-influence &

Talents--merciful God what a Spectacle did I behold--Integrity & Truth

perverted & trampled under foot by turpitude & Guilt, Patriotism appaled

& Usurpation triumphant."[1160]

Wilkinson was plainly weakening, and Jefferson hastened to comfort his

chief witness: "No one is more sensible than myself of the injustice

which has been aimed at you. Accept I pray, my salutations and

assurances of respect and esteem."[1161]

Before the grand jury had indicted Burr and Blennerhassett, Wilkinson

suffered another humiliation. On the very day that the General sent his

wailing cry of outraged virtue to the President, Burr gave notice that

he would move that an attachment should issue against Jefferson's hero

for "contempt in obstructing the administration of justice" by rifling

the mails, imprisoning witnesses, and extorting testimony by

torture.[1162] The following day was consumed in argument upon the

motion that did not rise far above bickering. Marshall ruled that

witnesses should be heard in support of Burr's application, and that

Wilkinson ought to be present.[1163] Accordingly, the General was

ordered to come into court.

James Knox, one of the young men who had accompanied Burr on his

disastrous expedition, had been brought from New Orleans as a witness

for the Government. He told a straightforward story of brutality

inflicted upon him because he could not readily answer the printed

questions sent out by Jefferson's Attorney-General.[1164] By other

witnesses it appeared that letters had been improperly taken from the

post-office in New Orleans.[1165] An argument followed in which counsel

on both sides distinguished themselves by the learning and eloquence

they displayed.[1166]

It was while Botts was speaking on this motion to attach Wilkinson, that

the grand jury returned the bills of indictment.[1167] So came the

dramatic climax.

Instantly the argument over the attachment of Wilkinson was suspended.

Burr said that he would "prove that the indictment against him had been

obtained by perjury"; and that this was a reason for the court to

exercise its discretion in his favor and to accept bail instead of

imprisoning him.[1168] Marshall asked Martin whether he had "any

precedent, where a court has bailed for treason, after the finding of a

grand jury," when "the testimony ... had been impeached for perjury," or

new testimony had been presented to the court.[1169] For once in his

life, Martin could not answer immediately and offhand. So that night

Aaron Burr slept in the common jail at Richmond.

"The cup of bitterness has been administered to him with unsparing

hand," wrote Washington Irving.[1170] But he did not quail. He was

released next morning upon a writ of habeas corpus;[1171] the argument

on the request for the attachment of Wilkinson was resumed, and for

three days counsel attacked and counter-attacked.[1172] On June 26,

Burr's attorneys made oath that confinement in the city jail was

endangering his health; also that they could not, under such conditions,

properly consult with him about the conduct of his case. Accordingly,

Marshall ordered Burr removed to the house occupied by Luther Martin;

and to be confined to the front room, with the window shutters secured

by bars, the door by a padlock, and the building guarded by seven men.

Burr pleaded not guilty to the indictments against him, and orders were

given for summoning the jury to try him.[1173]

Finally, Marshall delivered his written opinion upon the motion to

attach Wilkinson. It was unimportant, and held that Wilkinson had not

been shown to have influenced the judge who ordered Knox imprisoned or

to have violated the laws intentionally. The Chief Justice ordered the

marshal to summon, in addition to the general panel, forty-eight men to

appear on August 3 from Wood County, in which Blennerhassett's island

was located, and where the indictment charged that the crime had been

committed.[1174]

Five days before Marshall adjourned court in order that jurymen might be

summoned and both prosecution and defense enabled to prepare for trial,

an event occurred which proved, as nothing else could have done, how

intent were the people on the prosecution of Burr, how unshakable the

tenacity with which Jefferson pursued him.

On June 22, 1807, the British warship, the Leopard, halted the American

frigate, the Chesapeake, as the latter was putting out to sea from

Norfolk. The British officers demanded of Commodore James Barron to

search the American ship for British deserters and to take them if

found. Barron refused. Thereupon the Leopard, having drawn alongside the

American vessel, without warning poured broadsides into her until her

masts were shot away, her rigging destroyed, three sailors killed and

eighteen wounded. The Chesapeake had not been fitted out, was unable to

reply, and finally was forced to strike her colors. The British officers

then came on board and seized the men they claimed as deserters, all but

one of whom were American-born citizens.[1175]

The whole country, except New England, roared with anger when the news

reached the widely separated sections of it; but the tempest soon spent

its fury. Quickly the popular clamor returned to the "traitor" awaiting

trial at Richmond. Nor did this "enormity," as Jefferson called the

attack on the Chesapeake,[1176] committed by a foreign power in American

waters, weaken for a moment the President's determination to punish the

native disturber of our domestic felicity.

The news of the Chesapeake outrage arrived at Richmond on June 25, and

John Randolph supposed that, of course, Jefferson would immediately call

Congress in special session.[1177] The President did nothing of the

kind. Wilkinson, as Commander of the Army, advised him against armed

retaliation. The "late outrage by the British," wrote the General, "has

produced ... a degree of Emotion bordering on rage--I revere the

Honourable impulse but fear its Effects--... The present is no moment

for precipitancy or a stretch of power--on the contrary the British

being prepared for War & we not, a sudden appeal to hostilities will

give them a great advantage--... The efforts made here [Richmond] by a

band of depraved Citizens, in conjunction with an audacious phalanx of

insolent exotics, to save Burr, will have an ultimate good Effect, for

the national Character of the _Ancient dominion_ is in display, and the

honest impulses of true patriotism will soon silence the advocates of

usurpation without & conspiracy within."

Wilkinson tells Jefferson that he is coming to Washington forthwith to

pay his "respects," and concludes: "You are doubtless well advised of

proceedings here in the case of Burr--to me they are incomprehensible as

I am no Jurist--The Grand Jury actually made an attempt to present me

for Misprision of Treason--... I feel myself between 'Scylla and

Carybdis' the Jury would Dishonor me for failing of my Duty, and Burr &

his Conspirators for performing it--"[1178]

Not until five weeks after the Chesapeake affair did the President call

Congress to convene in special session on October 26--more than four

months after the occurrence of the crisis it was summoned to

consider.[1179] But in the meantime Jefferson had sent a messenger to

advise the American Minister in London to tell the British Government

what had happened, and to demand a disavowal and an apology.

Meanwhile, the Administration vigorously pushed the prosecution of the

imprisoned "traitor" at Richmond.[1180] Hay was dissatisfied that Burr

should remain in Martin's house, even under guard and with windows

barred and door locked; and he obtained from the Executive Council of

Virginia a tender to the court of "apartments on the third floor" of the

State Penitentiary for the incarceration of the prisoner. Burr's counsel

strenuously objected, but Marshall ordered that he be confined there

until August 2, at which time he should be returned to the barred and

padlocked room in Martin's house.[1181]

In the penitentiary, "situated in a solitary place among the hills" a

mile and a half from Richmond,[1182] Burr remained for five weeks. Three

large rooms were given him in the third story; the jailer was

considerate and kind; his friends called on him every day;[1183] and

servants constantly "arrived with messages, notes, and inquiries,

bringing oranges, lemons, pineapples, raspberries, apricots, cream,

butter, ice and some ordinary articles."[1184]

Burr wrote Theodosia of his many visitors, women as well as men: "It is

well that I have an ante-chamber, or I should often be _gêné_ with

visitors." If Theodosia should come on for the trial, he playfully

admonishes her that there must be "no agitations, no complaints, no

fears or anxieties on the road, or I renounce thee."[1185]

Finally Burr asked his daughter to come to him: "I want an independent

and discerning witness to my conduct and that of the government. The

scenes which have passed and those about to be transacted will exceed

all reasonable credibility, and will hereafter be deemed fables, unless

attested by very high authority.... I should never invite any one, much

less those so dear to me, to witness my disgrace. I may be immured in

dungeons, chained, murdered in legal form, but I cannot be humiliated or

disgraced. If absent, you will suffer great solicitude. In my presence

you will feel none, whatever be the _malice_ or the _power_ of my

enemies, and in both they abound."[1186]

Theodosia was soon with her father. Her husband, Joseph Alston, now

Governor of South Carolina, accompanied her; and she brought her little

son, who, almost as much as his beautiful mother, was the delight of

Burr's heart.

During these torrid weeks the public temper throughout the country rose

with the thermometer.[1187] The popular distrust of Marshall grew into

open hostility. A report of the proceedings, down to the time when Burr

was indicted for treason, was published in a thick pamphlet and sold all

over Virginia and neighboring States. The impression which the people

thus acquired was that Marshall was protecting Burr; for had he not

refused to imprison him until the grand jury indicted the "traitor"?

The Chief Justice estimated the situation accurately. He knew, moreover,

that prosecutions for treason might be instituted thereafter in other

parts of the country, particularly in New England. The Federalist

leaders in that section had already spoken and written sentiments as

disloyal, essentially, as those now attributed to Burr; and, at that

very time, when the outcry against Burr was loudest, they were beginning

to revive their project of seceding from the Union.[1188] To so

excellent a politician and so far-seeing a statesman as Marshall, it

must have seemed probable that his party friends in New England might be

brought before the courts to answer to the same charge as that against

Aaron Burr.

At all events, he took, at this time, a wise and characteristically

prudent step. Four days after the news of the Chesapeake affair reached

Richmond, the Chief Justice asked his associates on the Supreme Bench

for their opinion on the law of treason as presented in the case of

Aaron Burr. "I am aware," he wrote, "of the unwillingness with which a

judge will commit himself by an opinion on a case not before him, and on

which he has heard no argument. Could this case be readily carried

before the Supreme Court, I would not ask an opinion in its present

stage. But these questions must be decided by the judges separately on

their respective circuits, and I am sure that there would be a strong

and general repugnance to giving contradictory decisions on the same

points. Such a circumstance would be disreputable to the judges

themselves as well as to our judicial system. This suggestion suggests

the propriety of a consultation on new and different subjects and will,

I trust, apologize for this letter."[1189]

Whether a consultation was held during the five weeks that the Burr

trial was suspended is not known. But if the members of the Supreme

Court did not meet the Chief Justice, it would appear to be certain that

they wrote him their views of the American law of treason; and that, in

the crucial opinion which Marshall delivered on that subject more than

two months after he had written to his associates, he stated their

mature judgments as well as his own.

It was, therefore, with a composure, unwonted even for him, that

Marshall again opened court on August 3, 1807. The crowd was, if

possible, greater than ever. Burr entered the hall with his son-in-law,

Governor Alston.[1190] Not until a week later was counsel for the

Government ready to proceed. When at last the men summoned to serve on

the petit jury were examined as to their qualifications, it was all but

impossible to find one impartial man among them--utterly impossible to

secure one who had not formed opinions from what, for months, had been

printed in the newspapers.

Marshall described with fairness the indispensable qualifications of a

juror.[1191] Men were rejected as fast as they were questioned--all had

read the stories and editorial opinions that had filled the press, and

had accepted the deliberate judgment of Jefferson and the editors; also,

they had been impressed by the public clamor thus created, and believed

Burr guilty of treason. Out of forty-eight men examined during the first

day, only four could be accepted.[1192]

While the examination of jurors was in progress, one of the most

brilliant debates of the entire trial sprang up, as to the nature and

extent of opinions formed which would exclude a man from serving on a

jury.[1193]

When Marshall was ready to deliver his opinion, he had heard all the

reasoning that great lawyers could give on the subject, and had listened

to acute analyses of all the authorities. His statement of the law was

the ablest opinion he had yet delivered during the proceedings, and is

an admirable example of his best logical method. It appears, however, to

have been unnecessary, and was doubtless delivered as a part of

Marshall's carefully considered plan to go to the extreme throughout

the trial in the hearing and examination of every subject.[1194]

For nearly two weeks the efforts to select a jury continued. Not until

August 15 were twelve men secured, and most of these avowed that they

had formed opinions that Burr was a traitor. They were accepted only

because impartial men could not be found.

When Marshall finished the reading of his opinion, Hay promptly advised

Jefferson that "the [bi]as of Judge Marshall is as obvious, as if it was

[stam]ped upon his forehead.... [He is] endeavoring to work himself up

to a state of [f]eeling which will enable [him] to aid Burr throughout

the trial, without appearing to be conscious of doing wrong. He

[Marshall] seems to think that his reputation is irretrievably gone, and

that he has now nothing to lose by doing as he pleases.--His concern for

Burr is wonderful. He told me many years ago, when Burr was rising in

the estimation of the republican party, that he was as profligate in

principle, as he was desperate in fortune. I remember his words. They

astonished me.

"Yet," complained Hay, "when the Gr: Jury brought in their bill the

Chief Justice gazed at him, for a long time, without appearing conscious

that he was doing so, with an expression of sympathy & sorrow as strong,

as the human countenance can exhibit without _palpable_ emotion. If Mr.

Burr has any feeling left, yesterday must have been a day of agonizing

humiliation," because the answers of the jurors had been uniformly

against him; and Hay gleefully relates specimens of them.

"There is but one chance for the accused," he continued, "and that is a

good one because it rests with the Chief Justice. It is already hinted,

but not by himself [that] the decision of the Supreme Court will no[t

be] deemed binding. If the assembly of men on [Blennerhassett's is]land,

can be pronounced 'not an overt act' [it will] be so pronounced."[1195]

Hay's opening statement to the jury was his best performance of the

entire proceedings. He described Burr's purpose in almost the very words

of Jefferson's Special Message. The gathering on Blennerhassett's island

was, he said, the overt act; Burr, it was true, was not there at the

time, but his presence was not necessary. Had not Marshall, in the

Bollmann and Swartwout case, said that "if war be actually levied, ...

_all those who perform any part, however minute_, or _however remote

from the scene of action_, and who are actually _leagued in the general

conspiracy, are to be considered_ as _traitors_"?[1196]

The examination of the Government's witnesses began. Eaton took the

stand; but Burr insisted that the overt act must be proved before

collateral testimony could be admitted. So came the first crossing of

swords over the point that was to save the life of Aaron Burr. The

arguments of counsel were brilliant; but neither side forgot the public.

They must thrill the audience as well as convince the court. "There had

been a great deal of war in the newspapers," said Wickham, but

everybody knew "that there had been no war in fact." Wirt insisted on

"unfolding events as they occurred"; that was "the lucid order of nature

and reason." Martin pointed out that Eaton's testimony did not "relate

to any _acts_ committed any where, but to mere declarations out of the

district."[1197] Let the evidence be pertinent. The indictment charged a

specific act, and it must be proved as charged. No man could be expected

suddenly to answer for every act of his life. If Burr had planned to

free Mexico and had succeeded, "he would have merited the applause of

the friends of liberty and of posterity; ... but his friends may now

pray that he may not meet the fate that Washington himself would have

met, if the revolution had not been established."

A mass of decisions, English as well as American, were cited by both

Wirt and Martin;[1198] and when, that night, Marshall began to write his

opinion on whether the overt act must be proved before other testimony

could be received, all authorities had been reviewed, all arguments

made.

Must the overt act be proved before hearing collateral testimony? The

question, said Marshall, was precisely the same as that raised and

decided on the motion to commit Burr. But it came up now under different

circumstances--an indictment had been found "specifying a charge which

is to be proved," and thus "an issue made up which presents a point to

which all the testimony must apply." So Marshall could now "determine,

with some accuracy, on the relevancy of the testimony."

The prosecution contended that the crime consisted of "the fact and the

intention," and that the Government might first prove either of these;

the defense insisted that the overt act must be shown before any

testimony, explanatory or confirmatory of that fact, can be received. To

prove first the fact charged was certainly "the most useful ... and ...

natural order of testimony"; but no fixed rule of evidence required it,

and no case had been cited in which any court had ever "forced" it on

counsel for the prosecution.

The different impressions made upon the minds of the jury by the order

of testimony was important, said Marshall: "Although human laws punish

actions, the human mind spontaneously attaches guilt to intentions."

When testimony had prepared the mind to look upon the prisoner's designs

as criminal, a jury would consider a fact in a different light than if

it had been proved before guilty intentions had been shown. However,

since no rule prevented the prosecution from first proving either, "no

alteration of that arrangement ... will now be directed."

But, continued Marshall, "the intention which is ... relevant in this

stage of the inquiry is the intention which composes a part of the

crime, the intention with which the overt act itself was committed; not

a general evil disposition, or an intention to commit a distinct

[different] fact." Testimony as to such intentions, "if admissible at

all, is received as corroborative or confirmatory testimony," and could

not precede "that which it is to corroborate or confirm."

Apply this rule to Eaton's testimony: it would be admissible only

"so far as his testimony relate[d] to the fact charged in the

indictment, ... to levying war on Blennerhassett's island," and the

"design to seize on New-Orleans, or to separate by force, the western

from the Atlantic states"; but "so far as it respect[ed] other plans to

be executed in the city of Washington, or elsewhere," Eaton's story

would be at best merely "corroborative testimony," and, "if admissible

at any time," could be received only "after hearing that which it is to

confirm."

So let Hay "proceed according to his own judgment." Marshall would not

exclude any testimony except that which appeared to be irrelevant, and

upon this he would decide when it was offered.[1199]

Again Eaton was called to the stand. Before he began his tale, he wished

to explain "the motives" of his "own conduct." Marshall blandly

suggested that the witness stick to Burr's revelations to him. Then,

said Eaton, "concerning any overt act, which goes to prove Aaron Burr

guilty of treason I know nothing.... But concerning Colonel Burr's

expressions of treasonable intentions, I know much."

Notwithstanding Marshall's intimation that Eaton must confine his

testimony to Burr, "the hero of Derne" was not to be denied his

self-vindication; not even the Chief Justice should check his recital of

his patriotism, his glories, his wrongs. Burr had good reasons for

supposing him "disaffected toward the Government"; he then related at

length his services in Africa, the lack of appreciation of his ability

and heroism, the preferment of unworthy men to the neglect of himself.

Finally, Eaton, who "strutted more in buskin than usual," to the

amusement of "the whole court,"[1200] delivered his testimony, and once

more related what he had said in his deposition. Since Marshall had

"decided it to be irrelevant," Eaton omitted the details about Burr's

plans to murder Jefferson, turn Congress out of the Capitol, seize the

Navy, and make himself ruler of America at one bold and bloody

stroke.[1201]

Commodore Truxtun then gave the simple and direct account, already

related, of Burr's conversation with him;[1202] Peter Taylor and Jacob

Allbright once more told their strange tales; and the three Morgans

again narrated the incidents of Burr's incredible acts and statements

while visiting the elder Morgan at Morganza.[1203]

William Love, an Englishman, formerly Blennerhassett's servant--a dull,

ignorant, and timorous creature--testified to the gathering of "_about

betwixt_ twenty and twenty-five" men at his employer's island, some of

whom went "out a gunning." He saw no other arms except those belonging

to his master, nor did he "see any guns presented," as Allbright had

described. Blennerhassett told him that if he would go with him to the

Washita, he should have "a piece of land." Love "understood the object

of the expedition was to settle Washita lands."[1204]

Dudley Woodbridge, once a partner of Blennerhassett, told of Burr's

purchase from his firm of a hundred barrels of pork and fifteen boats,

paid by a draft on Ogden of New York; of Blennerhassett's short

conversation with Woodbridge about the enterprise, from which he

inferred that "the object was Mexico"; of his settlement with

Blennerhassett of their partnership accounts; of Blennerhassett's

financial resources; and of the characteristics of the man--"very

nearsighted," ignorant of military affairs, a literary person, a chemist

and musician, with the reputation of having "every kind of sense but

common sense."

The witness related his observation of the seizure at Marietta of Burr's

few boats and provisions by the Ohio militia, and the sale of them by

the Government; of the assemblage of the twenty or thirty men on

Blennerhassett's island; of their quiet, orderly conduct; of Comfort

Tyler's declaration "that he would not resist the constituted

authorities, but that he would not be stopped by a mob"; of Mrs.

Blennerhassett's taking part of her husband's library with her when she

followed him, after the flight of the terrified little band from the

island; and of the sale of the remainder of the cultivated visionary's

books.[1205]

Simeon Poole, who had been sent by Governor Tiffin of Ohio to arrest

Blennerhassett, said that he was not on the island, but from dusk until

ten o'clock watched from a concealed place on the Ohio shore. He saw a

few men walking about, who during the night kindled a fire, by the light

of which it seemed to Poole that some of them were "armed." He could not

be sure from where he watched, but they "looked like sentinels."

However, Poole "could not say whether the persons ... were not merely

loitering around the fire." There were some boats, he said, both big

and little. Also, when anybody wanted to cross from the Ohio side,

the acute Poole thought that "a watchword" was given. The night

was cold, the rural sleuth admitted, and it was customary to build

fires on the river-bank. He observed, however, another suspicious

circumstance--"lanterns were passing ... between the house and boats....

Most of the people were without guns," he admitted; but, although he

could not see clearly, he "apprehended that some of them had

guns."[1206]

Morris P. Belknap, an Ohio business man, testified that he had hailed a

boat and been taken to the island on the night when the gathering and

flight took place.[1207] He saw perhaps twenty men in the house; "two or

three ... near the door, had rifles, and appeared to be cleaning them.

These were all the arms I saw." He also observed two or three

boats.[1208]

Edmund P. Dana testified that, with two other young men, he had gone in

a skiff to the island on that war-levying night.[1209] In the hall he

saw about "fifteen or sixteen" men--"one of them was running some

bullets." Dana was shown to another room where he met "colonel Tyler,

Blennerhassett, Mr. Smith of New-York ... and three or four other

gentlemen." He had met Tyler the day before, and was now "introduced to

Mr. Smith and Doctor M'Castle[1210] who had his lady ... there." The men

in the hall "did not appear to be alarmed" when Dana and his companions

came in. Dana "never saw colonel Burr on the island."[1211]

The Government's counsel admitted that Burr was in Kentucky at that

time.[1212]

Such was the testimony, and the whole of it, adduced to support the

charge that Burr had, at Blennerhassett's island, on December 13, 1806,

levied war against the United States. Such was the entire proof of that

overt act as laid in the indictment when Marshall was called upon to

make that momentous decision upon which the fate of Aaron Burr depended.

The defense moved that, since no overt act was proved as charged,

collateral testimony as to what had been said and done elsewhere should

not be received. Wickham opened the argument in an address worthy of

that historic occasion. For nearly two days this superb lawyer spoke.

Burr's counsel would, he said, have preferred to go on, for they could

"adduce ... conclusive testimony" as to Burr's innocence. But only seven

witnesses out of "about one hundred and forty" summoned by the

Government had been examined, and it was admitted that these seven had

given all the testimony in existence to prove the overt act.

If that overt act had not been established and yet the more than one

hundred and thirty remaining witnesses were to be examined, it was

manifest that "weeks, perhaps months," would elapse before the

Government completed its case. It was the unhealthy season, and it was

most probable that one or more jurors would become ill. If so, said

Wickham, "the cause must lie over and our client, innocent, may be

subjected to a prolongation of that confinement which is in itself ...

punishment." Yet, after all this suffering, expense, and delay, the

result must be the same as if the evidence were arrested now, since

there was no testimony to the overt act other than that already given.

[Illustration: _John Wickham_]

Did that testimony, then, prove the overt act of levying war on the

United States? Those who wrote the Constitution "well knew the dreadful

punishments inflicted and the grievous oppressions produced by [the

doctrine of] constructive treasons in other countries." For this reason,

truly declared Wickham, the American Constitution explicitly defined

that crime and prescribed the only way it could be proved. This could

not be modified by the common law, since the United States, as a Nation,

had not adopted it; and the purpose of the Constitution was to destroy,

as far as America was concerned, the British theory of treason. The

Constitution "explains itself," said Wickham; under it treason is a

newly created offense against a newly created government. Even the

Government's counsel "will not contend that the words [in the

Constitution concerning treason] used in their natural sense," can

embrace the case of a person who never committed an act of hostility

against the United States and was not even present when one was

committed;[1213] otherwise what horrible cruelties any Administration

could inflict on any American citizen.

The Supreme Court, in the case of Bollmann and Swartwout, had, indeed,

pronounced a "_dictum_" to the contrary, said Wickham, but that had been

in a mere case of commitment; the present point did not then come before

the court; it was not argued by counsel. So Marshall's objectionable

language in that case was not authority.[1214]

It was only by the doctrine of constructive treason that Burr could be

said to be at Blennerhassett's island at the time charged--the doctrine

that "in treason all are principals," and that, by "construction of

law," he was present, although in reality he was hundreds of miles away.

But this was the very doctrine which the Constitution prohibited from

ever being applied in America.

If Burr "conspired to levy war against the United States, and ... the

war was carried on by others in his absence, his offense can only be

punished by _a special indictment charging the facts as they existed_."

The prosecution "should at once withdraw their indictment as it does

not contain a specification that can be supported by the

evidence."[1215]

Edmund Randolph followed Wickham, but added nothing to his rich and

solid argument. Addressing Marshall personally, Randolph exclaimed:

"Amidst all the difficulties of the trial, I congratulate Your Honour on

having the opportunity of fixing the law, relative to this peculiar

crime, on grounds which will not deceive, and with such regard for human

rights, that we shall bless the day on which the sentence was given, to

prevent the fate of Stafford."[1216]

When Randolph closed, on Friday, August 21, Hay asked Marshall to

postpone further discussion until Monday, that counsel for the

Government might prepare their arguments.[1217] Burr's attorneys stoutly

objected, but Marshall wisely granted Hay's request.[1218] "Did you not

do an unprecedented thing," a friend asked Marshall, "in suspending a

criminal prosecution and granting two days, in the midst of the argument

on a point then under discussion, for counsel to get ready to speak upon

it?" "Yes," replied the Chief Justice, "I did and I knew it. But if I

had not done so I should have been reproached with not being _disposed_

to give the prosecutors an opportunity to answer."[1219]

Saturday and Sunday were more than time enough to light the fires of

MacRae's Scotch wrath. His anger dominated him to such an extent that he

became almost incoherent.[1220] Burr not a principal! "Let all who are

in any manner concerned in treason be principals," and treason will be

suppressed.[1221] MacRae, speaking the language of Jeffreys, had, in his

rage, forgotten that he had immigrated to America.

On Tuesday, August 25, although the court opened at nine o'clock,[1222]

the heat was so oppressive that nothing but the public interest--now

reaching the point of hysteria--could have kept the densely packed

audience in the stifling hall.[1223] But the spectators soon forgot

their discomfort. The youthful, handsome William Wirt enraptured them

with an eloquence which has lived for a century. It is impossible to

give a faithful condensation of this charming and powerful address, the

mingled courtesy and boldness of it, the apt phrase, the effective

imagery, the firm logic, the wealth of learning. Only examples can be

presented; and these do scant justice to the young lawyer's speech.

"When we speak of treason, we must call it treason.... Why then are

gentlemen so sensitive ... as if instead of a hall of justice, we were

in a drawing-room with colonel Burr, and were barbarously violating

towards him every principle of decorum and humanity?[1224] This motion

[to arrest the testimony] is a bold and original stroke in the noble

science of defence," made to prevent the hearing of the evidence. But he

knew that Marshall would not "sacrifice public justice, committed to

[his] charge, by aiding this stratagem to elude the sentence of the

law."[1225]

Why had Wickham said so little of American and so much of British

precedents, vanishing "like a spirit from American ground and ...

resurging by a kind of intellectual magic in the middle of the 16th

century, complaining most dolefully of my lord Coke's bowels." It was to

get as far as possible away from Marshall's decision in the case of

Bollmann and Swartwout. If Marshall's opinion had been favorable,

Wickham "would not have ... deserted a rock so broad and solid, to walk

upon the waves of the Atlantic." Wirt made the most of Marshall's

careless language.[1226]

The youthful advocate was impressing Marshall as well as jury and

auditors. "Do you mean to say," asked the Chief Justice, "that it is not

necessary to state in the indictment in what manner the accused, who it

is admitted was absent, became connected with the acts on

Blennerhassett's island?" In reply Wirt condensed the theory of the

prosecution: "I mean to say, that the _count_ is _general_ in modern

cases; that we are endeavoring to make the accused a traitor by

connection, by stating the act which was done, and which act, from his

conduct in the transaction, he made his own; that it is sufficient to

make this charge generally, not only because it is authorized by the

constitutional definition, but because it is conformable to modern

cases, in which the indictments are pruned of all needless

luxuriances."[1227]

Burr's presence at the island necessary! If so, a man might devise and

set in motion "the whole mechanism" of treason, "go a hundred miles"

away, let it be operated by his agents, "and he is innocent, ... while

those whom he has deluded are to suffer the death of traitors." How

infamous! Burr only the accessory and Blennerhassett the principal!

"Will any man believe that Burr who is a soldier bold, ardent, restless

and aspiring, the great actor whose brain conceived and whose hand

brought the plot into operation, should sink down into an accessory and

Blennerhassett be elevated into a principal!"

Here Wirt delivered that passage which for nearly a hundred years was to

be printed in American schoolbooks, declaimed by American youth, and to

become second only to Jefferson's Proclamation, Messages, and letters,

in fixing, perhaps irremovably, public opinion as to Aaron Burr and

Harman Blennerhassett.[1228] But his speech was not all rhetoric.

Indeed, no advocate on either side, except John Wickham and Luther

Martin, approached him in analyses of authorities and closeness of

reasoning.[1229]

"I cannot promise you, sir, a speech manufactured out of tropes and

figures," remarked Botts in beginning his reply. No man better could

have been found to break the force of the address of his young brother

of the bar. Wirt had defaced his otherwise well-nigh perfect address by

the occasional use of extravagant rhetoric, some of which, it appears,

was not reported. Botts availed himself of one such display to make

Wirt's argument seem absurd and trivial: "Instead of the introduction of

a sleeping Venus with all the luxury of voluptuous and wanton nakedness

to charm the reason through the refined medium of sensuality, and to

convince us that the law of treason is with the prosecution by leading

our imaginations to the fascinating richness ... of heaving bosom and

luscious waist, I am compelled to plod heavily and meekly through the

dull doctrines of Hale and Foster." Botts continued, with daring but

brilliant satire, to ridicule Wirt's unhappy rhetoric.[1230] Soon

spectators, witnesses, jury, were in laughter. The older lawyers were

vastly amused. Even Marshall openly enjoyed the humor.

His purpose thus accomplished, Botts now addressed himself to the

evidence, to analyze which he had been assigned. And a perfect job he

made of it. He spoke with impetuous rapidity.[1231] He reviewed the

events at Blennerhassett's island: "There _was war_, when there was

confessedly no war; and it happened although it was prevented!" As to

arms: "No arms were necessary ... they might make war with their

fingers." Yes, yes, "a most bloody war indeed--and ten or twelve boats."

Referring to the flight from Blennerhassett's island, the sarcastic

lawyer observed: "If I run away and hide to avoid a beating I am guilty

and may be convicted of assault and battery!" What "simpletons" the

people of Kentucky and Mississippi had been! "They hunted but could not

find the war," although there it was, right among them![1232]

What was the moving force back of the prosecution? It was, charged

Botts, the rescue of the prestige of Jefferson's Administration. "It has

not only been said here but published in all the newspapers throughout

the United States, that if Aaron Burr should be acquitted it will be the

severest satire on the government; and that the people are called upon

to support the government by the conviction of colonel Burr; ... even

jurymen have been taught by the common example to insult him."

No lie was too contemptible to be published about him. For instance,

"when the grand jury returned a true bill, he was firm, serene, unmoved,

composed--no change of countenance.... Yet the next day they announced

in the newspapers," declared Botts, "that he was in a state of

indescribable consternation and dismay." Worse still, "every man who

dares to look at the accused with a smile or present him the hand of

friendship" is "denounced as a traitor."[1233]

Black but faithful was the picture the fearless lawyer drew of the

Government's conduct.[1234] He dwelt on the devices resorted to for

inflaming the people against Burr, and after they had been aroused, the

demand that public sentiment be heeded and the accused convicted. Was

that the method of justice! If so, where was the boasted beneficence of

democracies? Where the righteousness and wisdom of the people? What did

history tell us of the justice or mercy of the people? It was the people

who forced Socrates to drink hemlock, banished Aristides, compelled the

execution of Admiral Byng. "Jefferson was run down in 1780[1235] by the

voice of the people." If the law of constructive treason were to be

adopted in America and courts were to execute the will of the people,

alas for any man, however upright and innocent, whom public opinion had

been falsely led to condemn.[1236]

Hay, who had been ill for several days[1237] and was badly worn, spoke

heavily for the greater part of two days.[1238] His address, though

dull, was creditable; but he added nothing in thought or authorities to

Wirt's great speech. His principal point, which he repeated

interminably, was that the jury must decide both law and fact. In making

this contention he declared that Marshall was now asked by Burr's

counsel to do the very thing for which Chase had been impeached.[1239]

Time and again the District Attorney insinuated that impeachment would

be Marshall's fate if he did not permit the jury to hear all the

testimony.[1240]

Charles Lee, Attorney-General under President Adams, and an intimate

friend of Marshall,[1241] had joined Burr's legal forces some time

before. In opening his otherwise dry argument, Lee called Marshall's

attention to Hay's threat of impeachment. The exhausted District

Attorney finally denied that he meant such a thing, and Marshall mildly

observed: "I did not consider you as making any personal allusion, but

as merely referring to the law."[1242] Thus, with his kindly

tactfulness, Marshall put the incident aside.

On August 28, Luther Martin closed the debate. He had been drinking even

more than usual throughout the proceedings;[1243] but never was he in

more perfect command of all his wonderful powers. No outline of his

address will be attempted; but a few quotations may be illustrative.

It was the admitted legal right and "indispensable duty" of Burr's

counsel, began Martin, to make the motion to arrest the testimony; yet

for doing so "we have been denounced throughout the United States as

attempting to suppress the truth." Our act "has been held up to the

public and to this jury as conclusive proof of our guilt." Such,

declared the great lawyer, were the methods used to convict Burr.[1244]

He had been in favor, he avowed, of waiving "obvious and undeniable

rights," and of going on with the trial because he was convinced that

all the evidence would not only clear "his friend," but remove the

groundless prejudices which had so wickedly been excited against Burr.

But he had yielded to the judgment of his associates that the plan

adopted was more conformable to law.

"I shall ever feel the sincerest gratitude to heaven, that my life has

been preserved to this time, and that I am enabled to appear ... in his

defense." And if his fellow counsel and himself should be "successful in

rescuing a gentleman, for whom I with pleasure avow my friendship and

esteem, from the fangs of his persecutors ... what dear delight will my

heart enjoy!"[1245] Martin thanked Heaven, too, for the boon of being

permitted to oppose the "destructive" doctrine of treason advanced by

the Government. For hours he analyzed the British decisions which he

"thanked God ... are not binding authority in this country." He

described the origin and growth of the doctrine of constructive treason

and defined it with clearness and precision.[1246] It was admitted that

Burr was not actually present at the time and place at which the

indictment charged him with having committed the crime; but, according

to the Government, he was "constructively" present.

With perfect fearlessness Martin attacked Marshall's objectionable

language in the Bollmann and Swartwout opinion from the Supreme Bench:

"As a binding judicial opinion," he accurately declared, "it ought to

have no more weight than the ballad of Chevy Chase."[1247] Deftly he

impressed upon Marshall, Hay's threat of impeachment if the Chief

Justice should presume to decide in Burr's favor.[1248] Lamenting the

popular hostility toward Burr, Martin defied it: "I have with pain heard

it said[1249] that such are the public prejudice against colonel Burr,

that a jury, even should they be satisfied of his innocence, must have

considerable firmness of mind to pronounce him _not guilty_. I have not

heard it without horror.

"God of Heaven! have we already under our form of government (which we

have so often been told is best calculated of all governments to secure

all our rights) arrived at a period when a trial in a court of justice,

where life is at stake, shall be but ... a mere idle ... ceremony to

transfer innocence from the gaol to the gibbet, to gratify popular

indignation excited by bloodthirsty enemies!"

Martin closed by a personal appeal to Marshall: "But if it require in

such a situation firmness in a jury, so does it equally require

fortitude in judges to perform their duty.... If they do not and the

prisoner fall a victim, they are guilty of murder in _foro coeli_

whatever their guilt may be in _foro legis_.... May that God who now

looks down upon us, and who has in his infinite wisdom called you into

existence and placed you in that seat to dispense justice to your fellow

citizens, to preserve and protect innocence against persecution--may

that God so illuminate your understandings that you may _know_ what is

right; and may he nerve your souls with firmness and fortitude to _act_

according to that knowledge."[1250]

The last word of this notable debate had been spoken.[1251] The fate of

Aaron Burr and of American liberty, as affected by the law of treason,

now rested in the hands of John Marshall.

On Monday morning, August 31, the Chief Justice read his opinion. All

Richmond and the multitude of strangers within her gates knew that the

proceedings, which for four months had enchained the attention of all

America, had now reached their climax. Burr's friends were fearful, and

hoped that the laudanum calumny[1252] would "strengthen" Marshall to do

his duty.[1253] For the moment the passions of the throng were in

abeyance while the breathless spectators listened to Marshall's calm

voice as it pronounced the fateful words.

The opinion of the Chief Justice was one of the longest ever rendered by

him, and the only one in which an extensive examination of authorities

is made. Indeed, a greater number of decisions, treatises, and histories

are referred to than in all the rest of Marshall's foremost

Constitutional opinions. Like every one of these, the Burr opinion was a

state paper of first importance and marked a critical phase in the

development of the American Nation.

Marshall stated the points first to be decided: under the Constitution

can a man be convicted of treason in levying war who was not present

when the war was levied; and, if so, can testimony be received "to

charge one man with the overt acts of others until those overt acts as

laid in the indictment be proved to the satisfaction of the court"? He

made clear the gravity of the Constitutional question: "In every point

of view in which it can be contemplated, [it] is of infinite moment to

the people of this country and their government."[1254]

What was the meaning of the words, "'levying war'?... Had their first

application to treason been made by our constitution they would

certainly have admitted of some latitude of construction." Even so it

was obvious that the term "levying war" literally meant raising or

creating and making war. "It would be affirming boldly to say that those

only who actually constituted a portion of the military force appearing

in arms could be considered as levying war."

Suppose the case of "a commissary of purchases" for an army raised to

make war, who supplied it with provisions; would he not "levy war" as

much as any other officer, although he may never have seen the army? The

same was true of "a recruiting officer holding a commission in the rebel

service, who, though never in camp, executed the particular duty

assigned to him."

But levying war was not for the first time designated as treason by the

American Constitution. "It is a technical term," borrowed from an

ancient English statute[1255] and used in the Constitution in the sense

understood in that country and this at the time our fundamental law was

framed.

Not only British decisions, but "those celebrated elementary writers"

whose "books are in the hands of every student," and upon which "legal

opinions are formed" that are "carried to the bar, the bench and the

legislature"--all must be consulted in ascertaining the import of such

terms.[1256]

Marshall reviewed Coke, Hale, Foster, and Blackstone, and found them

vague upon the question "whether persons not in arms, but taking part in

a rebellion, could be said to levy war independent of that legal rule

[of constructive treason] which attaches the guilt of the principal to

an accessory." Nor were the British decisions more satisfactory: "If in

adjudged cases this question [has] been ... directly decided, the court

has not seen those cases."[1257] To trace the origin of "the doctrine

that in treason all are principals" was unimportant. However "spurious,"

it was the British principle settled for ages.

The American Constitution, however, "comprizes no question respecting

principal and accessory"--the traitor must "truly and in fact levy war."

He must "perform a part in the prosecution of the war."[1258]

Marshall then gingerly takes up the challenge of his opinion in the case

of Bollmann and Swartwout. Since it had been upon the understanding by

the grand jury of his language in that opinion that Burr had been

indicted for treason, and because the Government relied on it for

conviction so far as the prosecution depended on the law, the Chief

Justice took pains to make clear the disputed passages.

"Some gentlemen have argued as if the supreme court had adopted the

whole doctrine of the English books on the subject of accessories to

treason.[1259] But certainly such is not the fact. Those only who

perform a part, and who are leagued in the conspiracy, are declared to

be traitors. To complete the definition _both_ circumstances must occur.

They must 'perform a part' which will furnish the overt act; and they

must be 'leagued in the conspiracy.'"

Did the things proved to have happened on Blennerhassett's island amount

to the overt act of levying war? He had heard, said Marshall, that his

opinion in Bollmann and Swartwout was construed as meaning that "any

assemblage whatever for a treasonable purpose, whether in force or not

in force, whether in a condition to use violence or not in that

condition, is a levying of war." That view of his former opinion had

not, indeed, "been expressly advanced at the bar"; but Marshall

understood, he said, that "it was adopted elsewhere."[1260]

Relying exclusively on reason, all would agree, he continued, "that war

could not be levied without the employment and exhibition of force....

Intention to go to war may be proved by words," but the actual going to

war must "be proved by open deed."[1261]

This natural and reasonable understanding of the term was supported by

the authorities. Marshall then made specific reference to the opinions

of a large number of British writers and judges, and of all American

judges who had passed upon the question. In none of these, he asserted,

had "the words 'levying war' ... received a technical different from

their natural meaning"[1262]--that is, "the employment and exhibition of

force."

Had he overruled all these opinions in the Bollmann-Swartwout case? Had

he, in addition, reversed the natural interpretation of the Constitution

which reason dictated? Surely not! Yet this was what he was now charged

with having done.

But, said Marshall, "an opinion which is to overrule all former

precedents, and to establish a principle never before recognized, should

be expressed in plain and explicit terms." A mere implication was not

enough. Yet this was all there was to justify the erroneous construction

of his opinion in the case of Bollmann and Swartwout--"the omission of

the court to state that the assemblage which constitutes the fact of

levying war ought to be in force."[1263]

Marshall then went into an extended and minute analysis of his

misunderstood opinion, and painfully labored to show that he then

intended to say, as he now did say: that the act of levying war required

"an assemblage in force," and not merely "a secret furtive assemblage

without the appearance of force." The gathering "must be such as to

prove that [war] is its object." If it was not "a military assemblage in

a condition to make war, it was not a levying of war."[1264]

The indictment charged Burr with having levied war at a specific place

and stated the exact manner in which the act had been done; this was

necessary; otherwise the accused could not make adequate defense. So the

indictment "must be proved as laid"; otherwise "the charge of an overt

act would be a mischief instead of an advantage to the accused," and

would lead him from the true cause and nature of the accusation instead

of informing him respecting it.[1265]

The Government insisted that, although Burr "had never been with the

party ... on Blennerhassett's island, and was, at the time, at a great

distance and in a different state,... he was yet legally present, and

therefore may properly be charged in the indictment as being present in

fact." Thus, the question arose "whether in this case the doctrine of

constructive presence can apply." In answering it, John Marshall ended

the contention that so cruel a dogma can ever be applied in America.

This achievement was one of his noblest services to the American

people.[1266]

Again an imposing array of precedents was examined. "The man, who

incites, aids, or procures a treasonable act," is not, merely on that

account, "legally present when that act is committed."[1267] Of course,

other facts might require that a man should be considered to be present

although really absent; for example, if he were on the way there for the

purpose of taking part in the specific act charged, or if he were

stationed near in order to coöperate with those who actually did the

deed, he would be of them and associated with them in the perpetration

of that particular act.[1268] But otherwise he could not be said to be

present.

If this were not so, then a man levying war in one part of the country

might be construed to be present at and taking part in hostilities at

the most distant point of the Republic--a participator in "every overt

act performed anywhere"; and he would be liable to trial and conviction

"in any state on the continent where any overt act has been committed"

by anybody. "He may be proved to be guilty of an overt act laid in the

indictment in which he had no personal participation, by proving that he

advised it, or that he committed other acts."[1269]

If Burr were guilty of treason in connection with the assemblage on

Blennerhassett's island, it was only because Burr procured the men to

meet for the purpose of levying war against the United States. But the

fact that he did procure the treasonable assemblage must be charged in

the indictment and proved by two witnesses, precisely as must actual

physical presence--since the procuring of the assemblage takes the place

of presence at it. "If in one case," declared Marshall, "the presence

of the individual make the guilt of the assemblage his guilt, and in the

other case the procurement by the individual make the guilt of the

assemblage his guilt, then presence and procurement are equally

component parts of the overt act, and equally require two

witnesses."[1270]

Neither presence nor procurement could, therefore, be proved by

collateral testimony: "No presumptive evidence, no facts from which

presence may be conjectured or inferred will satisfy the constitution

and the law." And "if procurement take the place of presence and become

part of the overt act, then no presumptive evidence, no facts from which

the procurement may be conjectured, or inferred, can satisfy the

constitution and the law.

"The mind is not to be led to the conclusion that the individual was

present by a train of conjectures, of inferences, or of reasoning; the

fact must be proved by two witnesses," as required by the Constitution.

"Neither, where procurement supplies the want of presence, is the mind

to be conducted to the conclusion that the accused procured the

assembly, by a train of conjectures or inferences or of reasoning; the

fact itself must be proved by two witnesses."[1271]

To the objection that this could "scarcely ever" be done, since "the

advising or procurement of treason is a secret transaction," the answer

was, said Marshall, "that the difficulty of proving a fact will not

justify conviction without proof." And most "certainly it will not

justify conviction without [one] direct and positive witness in a case

where the constitution requires two." The true inference from "this

circumstance" was "that the advising of the fact is not within the

constitutional definition of the crime. To advise or procure a

treason ... is not treason in itself."[1272]

The testimony which the Government now proposed to offer was to

"prove--what? the overt act laid in the indictment? that the prisoner

was one of those who assembled at Blennerhassett's island? No!" But,

instead, "evidence [of] subsequent transactions at a different place and

in a different state." But such "testimony was not relevant." If it

could be introduced at all, it would be "only in the character of

corroborative or confirmatory testimony, after the overt act has been

proved by two witnesses in such a manner that the question of fact ought

to be left with the jury."[1273]

Before closing, Marshall answered the threats of Hay and Wirt that, if

he decided in favor of Burr, he would be impeached: "That this court

dares not usurp power is most true. That this court dares not shrink

from its duty is not less true.... No man is desirous of becoming the

peculiar subject of calumny. No man, might he let the bitter cup pass

from him without self reproach, would drain it to the bottom. But if he

have no choice in the case, if there be no alternative presented to him

but a dereliction of duty or the opprobrium of those who are denominated

the world, he merits the contempt as well as the indignation of his

country who can hesitate which to embrace."[1274]

Let the jury apply the law as announced to the facts as proved and "find

a verdict of guilty or not guilty as their own consciences shall

direct."

The next morning the petit jury retired, but quickly returned.

Marshall's brother-in-law, Colonel Edward Carrington, foreman, rose and

informed the court that the jury had agreed upon a verdict.

"Let it be read," gravely ordered Marshall.

And Colonel Carrington read the words of that peculiar verdict:

"We of the jury say that Aaron Burr is not proved to be guilty under

this indictment by any evidence submitted to us. We therefore find him

not guilty."[1275]

Instantly Burr, Martin, Wickham, and Botts were on their feet

protesting. This was no verdict, according to law. It was informal,

irregular. In such cases, said Burr, the jury always was sent back to

alter it or else the court itself corrected it; and he accurately stated

the proper procedure.

Discussion followed. Hay insisted that the verdict be received and

recorded as returned. "It was like the whole play," exclaimed Martin,

"Much Ado About Nothing." Of course the verdict must be corrected. Did

the jury mean to "censure ... the court for suppressing irrelevant

testimony?" Unthinkable! And if not, they ought to answer simply

"Guilty" or "Not Guilty."[1276]

Colonel Carrington informed the court that, among themselves, the jury

had said that "they would alter the verdict if it was informal--it was

in fact a verdict of acquittal." Richard E. Parker, also of the jury,

said he never would agree to change the form--they knew what they were

about when they adopted it. Parker was "a violent Jeffersonian

partisan," and Burr's friends had reproved him for accepting such a man

as a member of the jury.[1277]

Soothingly Marshall directed that the verdict "stand on the bill" as the

jury wished it; but, since it was "in effect a verdict of acquittal,"

let "an entry be made on the record of 'Not Guilty.'"

The Chief Justice "politely thanked the jury for their patient attention

during the whole course of this long trial, and then discharged

them."[1278]

A week before Marshall delivered his opinion, an attempt was made to

induce Blennerhassett to betray Burr. On August 23 William Duane, editor

of the _Aurora_, and an intimate friend, supporter, and agent of

Jefferson, approached Blennerhassett for that purpose, and offered to go

to Washington, "now or at any time hereafter," in his behalf. Duane

assured him that the Administration would refuse him (Duane) "nothing he

should ask." But Blennerhassett repulsed Duane's advances.[1279]

Hay, angry and discomfited, entered a _nolle prosequi_ to the

indictments of Dayton, Blennerhassett, and the others for the same

crime; but, in obedience to Jefferson's orders, demanded that all of

them, Burr included, be still held under the charge of treason, that

they might be sent for trial to some place where an overt act might have

been committed.[1280] Marshall, after enduring another long argument,

gently put the application aside because all the conspirators were now

to be tried upon the charge of misdemeanor under the second

indictment.[1281]

Marshall's motives were clearer than ever to Jefferson. "The event has

been what was evidently intended from the beginning of the trial; ...

not only to clear Burr, but to prevent the evidence from ever going

before the world. But this latter case must not take place." Hay must

see to it that "not a single witness be paid or permitted to depart

until his testimony has been committed to writing.... These whole

proceedings will be laid before Congress, that they may ... provide the

proper remedy."[1282]

Jefferson ordered Hay to press for trial on the indictment for

misdemeanor, not with the expectation of convicting Burr, but in the

hope that some sort of testimony would be brought out that would

convict Marshall in the court of public opinion, and perhaps serve as a

pretext for impeaching him. Thus, in the second trial of which we are

now to be spectators, "the chief-justice was occupied in hearing

testimony intended for use not against Burr, but against himself."[1283]

It was for this reason that Marshall, when the trial for misdemeanor

began, threw open wide the doors to testimony.[1284]

Burr's counsel, made unwise by victory, insisted that he should not be

required to give bail, and Marshall, although the point had been decided

and was not open to dispute, permitted and actually encouraged

exasperatingly extended argument upon it.[1285] Burr had submitted to

give bail at the beginning, said Botts, not because it was "demandable

of right," but because he and his counsel "had reason to apprehend

danger ... from the violence and turbulence of the mob."[1286]

Marshall was careful to deliver another long and, except for the

political effect, wholly unnecessary opinion; nor was it directly on the

matter at issue. Counsel floundered through a tangle of questions,

Marshall exhibiting apparent indecision by manifesting great concern,

even on the simplest points.

[Illustration: _John Marshall_

_From the portrait by Robert Matthew Sully, in the Corcoran Gallery of

Art, Washington, D.C._]

Finally, he ordered that Burr "be acquitted and discharged" as to the

indictment for treason, but to be held in five thousand dollars bail

under the indictment for misdemeanor. Jonathan Dayton and William

Langbourne offered themselves and were accepted as sureties; and on

September 3, after nearly nine weeks of imprisonment, Burr walked out of

court unhindered, no longer to be under lock and bar and armed

guard.[1287]

Merry were the scenes in the houses of Richmond society that night;

hilarious the rejoicing about the flowing board of Luther Martin; and,

confused and afflicted with a blurred anger, the patriotic multitude

talked resentfully of Marshall's decision. On one side it was said that

justice had prevailed and persecution had been defeated; on the other,

that justice had been mocked and treason protected. Hay, Wirt, and

MacRae were bitter and despondent; Edmund Randolph, Botts, Martin, and

Burr, jubilant and aggressive.

Many conflicting stories sprang up concerning Marshall--his majestic

bearing on the bench, his servility, his courage, his timidity. One of

these has survived: "Why did you not tell Judge Marshall that the people

of America demanded a conviction?" a disgusted Republican asked of Wirt.

"Tell _him_ that!" exclaimed Wirt. "I would as soon have gone to

Herschel, and told him that the people of America insisted that the moon

had horns as a reason why he should draw her with them."[1288]

The captain of the "conspiracy" had never lost heart, and, save when

angered by Marshall's seeming inconsistency and indecision, had

continued to be cheery and buoyant. Steadily he had assured his friends

that, when acquitted, he would again take up and put through his plans.

This thought now dominated him. Blennerhassett, upon visiting his chief,

found Burr "as gay as usual, and as busy in speculations on reorganizing

his projects for action as if he had never suffered the least

interruption," with better prospects for success than ever.[1289]

Quick to press his advantage, Burr the next morning demanded the

production of the letters called for in the subpoena _duces tecum_ to

Jefferson. These had not been forthcoming, and Burr asserted the

President to be in contempt of court and subject to punishment

therefor.[1290] Once more altercation flared up in debate. Hay said he

had one of the letters; that it had not "the most distant bearing on the

subject," and that he might prefer "to be put in prison" rather than

disclose its contents.[1291]

Jefferson had become very nervous about Marshall's order and plainly

feared that the Chief Justice might attempt to enforce it. The thought

frightened him; he had no stomach for a direct encounter. At last he

wished to compose the differences between himself and the obstinate and

fearless, if gentle-mannered, Marshall. So the President directed his

district attorney to tell the United States Marshal to obey no order of

the court and to intimate to the Chief Justice the wisdom of deferring

the vexed question until the next session of Congress.

He wrote, said Jefferson, "in a spirit of conciliation and with the

desire to avoid conflicts of authority between the high branches of the

government which would discredit equally at home and abroad." Naturally

Burr and his counsel would like "to convert this trial into a contest

between the judiciary & Exve Authorities"; but he had not "expected ...

that the Ch. Justice would lend himself to it." Surely Marshall's

"prudence and good sense" would not "permit him to press it."

But if Marshall was determined to attack Jefferson and "issue any

process which [would] involve any act of force to be committed on the

persons of the Exve or heads of departs," Hay was to give Jefferson

"instant notice, and by express if you find that can be done quicker

than by post; and ... moreover ... advise the marshal on his conduct as

he will be critically placed between us."

The "safest way" for that officer to pursue "will be to take no part in

the exercise of any act of force ordered in this case. The powers given

the Exve by the constn are sufficient to protect the other branches from

judiciary usurpation of pre-eminence, & every individual also from

judiciary vengeance, and the marshal may be assured of it's effective

exercise to cover him."

Such was Jefferson's threat to use force against the execution of the

process of the National courts. But the President went on: "I hope

however that the discretion of the C. J. will suffer this question to

lie over for the present, and at the ensuing session of the legislature

[Congress] he may have means provided for giving individuals the benefit

of the testimony of the Exve functionaries in proper cases, without

breaking up the government. _Will not the associate judge_ [Cyrus

Griffin] _assume to divide his court and procure a truce at least in so

critical a conjuncture?_"[1292]

When Hay acknowledged that he had one of the letters from Wilkinson to

Jefferson, a subpoena _duces tecum_ was served on the District

Attorney, notwithstanding his gallant declaration that he would not

produce it even if he were sent to jail for not doing so. Hay then

returned a copy of such parts of the letter as he thought "material for

the purposes of justice," declining to give those passages which

Jefferson deemed "confidential."[1293] Burr insisted on the production

of the entire letter.

The Life of John Marshall, Volume 3: Conflict and construction, 1800-1815 · 第 10 / 13 章