Intervention of the Kings of France in Italy--Policy of Henri II.,
Henri IV., and Louis XIII.--Judicious Conduct of Richelieu--Treaty
of Cherasco--Menacing Ambition of Louis XIV.--Situation of the Court
of Savoy on the Death of Charles-Emmanuel--Portrait of Charles IV.,
Duke of Mantua--The Marquisate of Montferrat and Casale--The Count
Matthioly--His political Career--His Character--The Abbé d’Estrades
and Giuliani--Proposal to cede Casale to Louis XIV.--Interview at
Venice between Charles IV, and the Abbé d’Estrades--Journey of
Matthioly to Versailles--He communicates the Project formed to the
Enemies of France--How is his Conduct to be estimated?
It is almost always unwisely that the Kings of France have intermeddled
in the affairs of Italy. Their occupations have never been lasting,
because they have been in opposition to the true interests of France,
and have violated natural boundary laws imposed upon the two countries
by their geographical configurations. Charles VIII. conquered the
Kingdom of Naples, but Louis XII. lost it. The latter took possession
of the Milanese, but Francois I. was obliged to evacuate it; and by
giving up Piedmont, which his father had made himself master of, Henri
II. completed this retrograde movement. After having quitted the false
path into which his three predecessors had dragged France, Henri II.
indicated where the frontiers were to be enlarged, where national
conquests were to be made, and what was the true direction to be
given to her armies. He took Calais, thus pointing out the road to the
Netherlands, and by becoming the master of the Trois-Evêchés he opened
to his successors the glorious road to Alsace and the Rhine. While he
was so happily inaugurating a new struggle, he was also establishing
the basis of a new policy obscurely foreseen by Francois I., but the
merits of which certainly belong to Henri II. The latter understood
that the most effectual way of contending with the Emperor of Germany,
the head of the Catholic party, was to ally himself with the German
Princes and the Reformed party; and if he was too early interrupted
in his scheme by a violent death--if the minority or the weakness of
his children for a long time suspended its execution--it was again
undertaken, and we know with what success, by Henri IV., Richelieu,
Mazarin, and Louis XIV. To assure the neutrality of Spain, to watch
Italy without attempting to establish himself there, to lead all his
forces towards the North and the East, and to extend in this direction
the frontiers, which were too near to the capital: such was the
glorious policy of Henri IV., suspended for a time after his death, but
worthily continued by his successors.
At the same time it cannot be said that the latter were indifferent
to the affairs of Italy. When, in 1627, the Dukes of Savoy and
Guastalla, aided by the House of Austria, wished to secure to Charles
de Gonzaga the Duke of Mantua’s inheritance, Louis XIII. loudly
proclaimed the cause of this legitimate heir, and ensured the triumph
of his rights. Rendered by victory master of the destiny of the House
of Savoy, Richelieu did not allow himself to be dazzled by success.
This incomparable politician understood that to dispossess an Italian
dynasty and to establish himself on the other side of the Alps,
would necessarily result in uniting the Italians to the Spaniards,
in provoking against the French (who had suddenly become unpopular,
even by their presence) a coalition sooner or later victorious, and
creating, in fact, outside the natural sphere of action of France,
incessant grounds of anxiety, jealousies, struggles, and alarms. Thus,
in 1631, by the treaty of Cherasco, the skilful Minister, sacrificing
many of the fruits of his victory, restored Piedmont and Savoy,
contenting himself with retaining Pignerol, so as always to keep open
one of the passes into Italy. To watch over her without alarming
her, to be a protector of the rights of the Italian Princes without
menacing their independence, to exact complete confidence from them in
return, to baffle the intrigues of the Spaniards, and to allow them to
accumulate on themselves hatred and resentment; to assume, in a word,
an attitude passive yet vigilant, firm but not menacing, such was the
judicious conduct of Richelieu towards Italy.
Louis XIV. long remained faithful to this policy. It was towards the
North and East that he led his victorious armies, and by a succession
of enterprises, happily conceived and wonderfully well-conducted,
he extended the frontiers of France in the proper direction; and,
arbitrator of Europe, at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and subsequently
at that of Nimeguen, he inspired her with fear and admiration. In these
two cities his will alone was the sole basis of the negotiations. While
for every one the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had never appeared to be
aught but a truce, that of Nimeguen combined all the conditions of a
definitive peace. But even before this famous treaty was signed, Louis
XIV. had conceived ambitious projects on the other side of the Alps,
and the possession of Pignerol and the neighbouring valleys no longer
appeared to him sufficient for the part he was desirous of playing
in Italy. The influence of his government had, however, been better
accepted there, when it was more dissembled, and when everything that
could give the slightest offence had been avoided with the greatest
care. But, when the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, scrupulously
continued by De Lionne, had ceased to prevail--when the invading and
impetuous Louvois established a sort of military diplomacy, which
he directed as he pleased--the sentiments of the Italians, and in
particular of the Piedmontese, became somewhat modified: confiding
deference gave place to restrained apprehension, and led by degrees to
a hatred which burst out against France at the moment she was oppressed
by coalitions and defeats.
Charles-Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, had just died, leaving as his
successor a child, under the guardianship of a mother,[476] vain,
ardent, and impassioned, and whom littleness of mind, as much as
hastiness of character, led to exaggerated resistance, soon to be
followed by humiliating concessions. Instead of showing himself the
disinterested protector and sincere counsellor of Victor-Amadeus,
Louis XIV. sought from that time forward to become powerful in Italy
by profiting by the weakness of this government, the vanity of the
Regent, the inexperience of her son, and by the passions aroused in
this court around a frivolous and capricious woman. By an altogether
opposite line of conduct he might have eternally attached to himself
the young Duke, who, instead, was later to become his adversary, not
the most formidable, but certainly the most inconvenient, and who
was to contribute, above all others, to the diversion created in the
South, to paralyze the power of France, and place her within an inch of
her ruin. Victor-Amadeus has been represented, and with reason, as a
perfidious enemy and unreliable ally. But, in the first place, it was
the conduct of his mother, and afterwards that of Louis XIV., which
early disposed this prince to dissimulation. Left in retirement by a
hard and ambitious Regent, with his friends watched and suspected, and
himself isolated, yet not a stranger to the interests of his States,
taciturn, but thoughtful and observant, more patient than resigned, he
was submitting with apparent indifference to a double and oppressive
guardianship, from which he only awaited the opportunity to escape or
to be revenged. From this moment Louis XIV. himself prepared those
disasters which were to mark the end of his reign. Whilst those
audaciously arbitrary decisions of the _Chambres de Réunion_ for the
aggrandisement of France by conquests made in full peace, profoundly
irritated the North of Europe, he was about to agitate the South by
pretensions equally extravagant, for a long time concealed, then boldly
disclosed, and which tended to nothing less than to place a part of
Italy under his exclusive dominion.
The complacency, or at least the neutrality, which the vanity and
weakness of the Regent assured to Louis XIV., in Piedmont, was rendered
not less certain in Mantua by the frivolous indifference of Charles
IV., its young duke. This prince, a degenerate representative of the
House of Gonzaga, which has produced so many great men, and mingled
its blood with the most illustrious families of Europe, showed himself
unworthy of his rank and of his name, by the most extravagantly
dissipated conduct. Careless and thoughtless, he was quite indifferent
to the interests of his duchy, leaving its administration to
incompetent favourites; and himself a non-resident duke, was in
the habit of spending the greater part of his existence amidst the
pleasures of Venice, and only dreaming of returning to Mantua, when the
pressing need of money called him thither. A great gambler, and lavish
in his expenditure, he had soon exhausted in fêtes and adventures
the remnants of a fortune and of an equally broken constitution.
Anticipating the revenues of his duchy, he had just obtained from
some Jews advances on the taxes for several years.[477] This sum was
soon squandered, and Charles IV. deprived of resources, but not less
eager for pleasure, ruined, but not less anxious to assist at all the
festivals given outside his States, was reduced to expedients, and
in a manner compelled to sell himself. He was not long in finding a
purchaser.
Under his authority was placed the marquisate of Montferrat--that rich
and fertile country, so perpetually sought after, and the possession
of which was frequently contested by arms. Taken by the Romans from
the Goths, then by the latter from the Lombards, afterwards forming a
portion of the Empire of the West, eventually becoming an hereditary
fief, several times claimed by the House of Savoy, conquered by Charles
Emmanuel, then evacuated, this country had at length been annexed to
the Duchy of Mantua, from which vast States, nevertheless, separated
it. Casale was its capital. This fortified place, situated on the Po,
fifteen leagues to the east of Turin, was of the utmost importance, and
especially to Piedmont. From very remote times the Court of Turin had
coveted this natural dependency, which the defeats of Louis XIV. and
the conduct of Victor Amadeus would one day secure to it.
That the Duke of Mantua should possess this territory, bordering on
Piedmont, was no doubt an anomaly, but was scarcely dangerous. The
King of France, on the contrary, being already master of Pignerol,
on securing possession of Casale, would, in reality, enclose the
Court of Turin between two formidable places, of which the one to the
south-west gave access to the passage of the Alps, and the other,
to the north-east, commanded the road to the Milanese. This was the
project formed by Louis XIV. The intrigue was mysteriously commenced
in 1676; but for a long time previously he had turned his attention
to this important town. On September 17, 1665, a few days subsequent
to the death of Charles III., the preceding Duke of Mantua, he had
hastened to send to the Regent, mother[478] of Charles IV., the Sieur
d’Aubeville, instructed to insist “that no change should be tolerated
in the garrison of Casale during the minority of the young Duke”.[479]
This demand, which was very natural on account of the contiguity of
the Spaniards, seemed--and, perhaps, was, at the time--extremely
disinterested. In 1676, however, he no longer troubled himself with the
maintenance of a Mantuan garrison at Casale, but rather with throwing
the place open to his own troops.
One of the great personages of Mantua was Ercole Antonio Matthioly.
He was born at Bologna, December 1, 1640, and belonged to an old and
distinguished family of the long robe. His grandfather, Constantino
Matthioly, had been raised to the dignity of senator. One of his
uncles, Ercole Matthioly, a Jesuit father, was a very celebrated
orator.[480] He himself early attracted attention by obtaining, when
only nineteen years of age, the prize in civil and canon law, and
shortly afterwards the title of professor at the University of Bologna.
He subsequently made himself still further known by several much-prized
works; and after having formed an alliance with an honourable
senatorial family of Bologna, established himself at Mantua, where his
talents, dexterity, and early maturity caused him to be appreciated
by Duke Charles III. de Gonzaga, one of whose Secretaries of State he
became. After this prince’s death, his son, Charles IV. de Gonzaga,
when he attained his majority, accorded his friendship to Matthioly,
whom he named Supenumerary Senator of Mantua, a dignity to which the
title of Count was attached. Filled with ambition, Matthioly not only
hoped to reacquire the office of Secretary of State, but also to become
the principal Minister of his young master. Knowing his position to
be most precarious, he was ardently desirous of rendering him one
of those signal services which justify the highest rewards, and an
occasion offered itself during the latter months of the year 1677.
The Abbé d’Estrades,[481] then ambassador of Louis XIV. to the Venetian
Republic, was as ambitious and as restless as Matthioly. Belonging to a
family of _diplomates_, and anxious to become illustrious in his turn,
he had the cunning to enter resolutely into the views of the Court of
Versailles, and knowing very well, moreover, that his conduct would
be approved, to concoct the intrigue which was to end in the cession
of Casale to the King of France. Having long since been acquainted
with the condition of the Court of Mantua and with the individuals
holding the chief rank in it, he cast his eyes upon Matthioly as
being, from his character, the most likely to embrace the project of
surrender, and by using his influence over his master, to induce him
to adopt it. But before entering directly into communication with
Matthioly, he sent to Verona, where the latter frequently resided,
one Giuliani,[482] a perfectly sure man, whom his occupation of
journalist obliged to travel from place to place to collect news, and
whose stay at Verona consequently would not excite suspicion. Giuliani
had Matthioly watched, and, observing him himself, ascertained his
aversion to the Spaniards, from whom he had never received anything but
hopes. By degrees the connection became closer, and Giuliani was able
to indicate to him without danger the plans of the Abbé d’Estrades,
the pecuniary advantages which the Duke of Mantua would derive from
the surrender of Casale to Louis XIV., and the security as well as the
honour of an alliance with so powerful a sovereign. Matthioly leapt at
the proposition,[483] and undertook to expound it to the Duke, whom
he had no great difficulty in convincing. The intercourse soon became
more direct. Giuliani saw Charles IV. at Mantua, and it was agreed that
an interview between the latter and the Abbé d’Estrades might take
place at Venice with all the more secrecy, “as, in consequence of the
Carnival, every one, even the Doge, the oldest Senators, the Cardinals,
and the Nuncio, goes about masked.”[484] Louis XIV. and M. de Pomponne,
his Minister,[485] congratulated the Abbé d’Estrades with effusion on
the propitious commencement of this delicate negotiation,[486] and on
January 12, 1678, the King himself did not disdain to write to Count
Matthioly, in order to thank him.[487]
Matthioly and Charles IV., in fact, proceeded to Venice. They first
discussed with the Abbé the price of the surrender, which was fixed at
100,000 crowns,[488] payable after the exchange of the ratifications
of the treaty, and in two sums at three months’ interval. At midnight
on March 13, 1678,[489] the Ambassador of the King of France and the
Duke of Mantua met, as if by chance, in the middle of a public square
on leaving a ball, and there, away from every inquisitive ear, and
concealed from every glance by a mask similar to those then worn by
all noblemen at Venice, conversed for quite an hour concerning the
conditions of the treaty, the payments of the stipulated price, and
the manner in which Louis XIV. should defend Charles IV. against
the effects of the resentment of the Venetian Republic and the
Spaniards. Distrustful as were the Italian princes, disposed as the
Venetian Republic may have been to suspect an intrigue, and prevent so
dangerous an intervention as that of the King of France in the north
of Italy, numerous and accomplished as were the spies who swarmed
in Venice, it was in this same city, almost under the very eyes of
the representatives of the different powers, that the bases of a
treaty which was one of the most menacing to the independence of the
Peninsula, were settled, in a mysterious and impenetrable manner.
With the same precautions, and always without attracting the attention
of the other princes, Charles IV. saw the Abbé d’Estrades several
times afterwards. It was arranged between them that Matthioly should
proceed secretly to France, and that he should sign at Versailles, in
the name of his master, the definitive treaty which would permit Louis
XIV. to penetrate into the north of Italy. This journey of Matthioly’s
was delayed for some months, first by a rather lengthened illness,
which kept him at Mantua, then by Louis XIV.’s desire to defer till
the following spring,--that is, till April, 1679,--the despatch of his
troops to Casale.[490] At the end of October, 1678, Count Matthioly
and Giuliani, in order to avert suspicion, announced their intention
of paying a visit to Switzerland, and, in fact, proceeded thither,
traversed it,[491] and arrived in Paris on November 28. At once placed
in communication with M. de Pomponne, Minister of Exterior Relations,
they discussed, and drew up in the most profound secrecy, the treaty of
cession, which was signed on December 8,[492] and which stated:--
1st. That the Duke of Mantua should receive French troops into Casale;
2nd. That he should be named Generalissimo of any French army which
Louis XIV. might send into Italy;
3rd. And that after the execution of the treaty the sum of 100,000
crowns should be paid to the prince.[493]
Immediately after the signing of this document, Matthioly was received
by Louis XIV. with the most flattering distinction in a secret
audience. The King presented him with a valuable diamond in remembrance
of his visit, caused him to be paid 400 double louis,[494] and promised
him that after the ratification of the treaty he should receive a much
larger sum for his reward, as well as a place for his son among the
King’s pages, and a rich abbey for his brother.[495]
No intrigue was ever better conducted or had more chances of success.
In Piedmont a court divided, powerless, and almost servilely devoted
to France; in the remainder of Italy, as in Piedmont, princes kept in
the most complete ignorance; in Mantua a duke perfectly ready to sell
a portion of his states; lastly, the two ambassadors charged with the
negotiation of this affair having an equal interest in its success,
since it would enrich one and assure to both the gratitude of their
masters, and a high position.
Two months after Matthioly’s visit to France, the courts of Turin,
Madrid, and Vienna, the Spanish Governor of the Milanese, and the State
Inquisitors of the Venetian Republic--that is to say, all those who
were most interested in opposing this project--were acquainted with
the minutest details of it, and were ignorant neither of the price to
be paid for the surrender, the time at which it was to take place, nor
the names of the negotiators. In one word, they knew everything, for
at different times[496] they had received the confidence of the better
informed of the participators in this intrigue, of Count Matthioly
himself.
By what motive was he actuated? Must we see in this treason an act
inspired by base cupidity? Was Matthioly a rogue, who, after having
received Louis XIV.’s money, preceeded to sell himself by turns to
the Austrians, the Spaniards, the Venetians, and the Piedmontese?
Or, disquieted in mind and suddenly struck by the apparition of
his country in danger, was he seized with remorse at the moment of
bartering her away, and did he seek the only means of preserving her
from the encroachments of an ambitious King? Was he an intriguer, a
low informer, or a man struggling between two opposing sentiments,
whose greedy ambition had first led him to assist his master’s criminal
projects, and whose patriotism had then suddenly determined him to
cause them to miscarry? These are questions which nobody will ever be
able to answer, because nobody ever received his confidences. It is,
however, worthy of remark, that if cupidity alone had been Matthioly’s
motive, he would have stooped to the execution of the treaty of
Casale, since this offered him many more material advantages than he
could hope for from a sudden change of conduct. That Matthioly should
be designated a rogue in the despatches afterwards exchanged between
the Court of Versailles and the French representatives in Italy, is not
at all astonishing; this anger was the natural consequence of a bitter
disappointment. But the fact that there was room for a more noble
motive, and that a patriotic inspiration was possible, is sufficient to
prevent us from unreservedly condemning this man, who perhaps thought
to save his country. No doubt he ought to have cast aside all the
appearances of knavery, to have returned Louis XIV. his presents, to
have first dissuaded Charles IV., and if the latter had persisted in
introducing the French army into Italy, then, and then only, to have
revealed the danger to the other princes. In this case it would have
been necessary to do it openly, with frankness, without dissimulation,
and by informing the Abbé d’Estrades of what would have no longer
been a treason, but a truly patriotic act. Was, however, such a line
of conduct open to Matthioly, surrounded with spies, watched over and
having to fear a power so formidable as France, and a resentment so
dangerous as Louis XIV.’s? Must we altogether blame him if he could
not strip his character of all its craftiness and duplicity, and if,
amid the dishonouring appearances of treason, he thought to perform
an honourable act? To the present time people have seen in him only a
contemptible cheat, but however weak the contrary presumption may be,
do not let us altogether reject it. Let us cease to place ourselves
only in the French point of view, and by considering the peril to
which Italy would have been exposed by the cession of Casale, let us
not refuse to suppose that Matthioly, by preventing it, understood,
perhaps, the interest of his country better than his own, and that,
into a mind naturally greedy, a noble and disinterested sentiment was
able to penetrate.
FOOTNOTES:
[476] Marie-Jeanne-Baptiste de Nemours, widow of Charles-Emmanuel and
mother of Victor-Amadeus II.
[477] Despatch of the Marquis de Villars to Pomponne, January 8,
1677:--Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, section Savoy, 66.
[478] Isabella Clara of Austria, daughter of the Archduke Leopold, who
was grandson of the Emperor Ferdinand III. She was married June 13,
1649, to Charles III., Duke of Mantua.--_Trans._
[479] Unpublished letter of Louis XIV.:--Archives of the Ministry of
War, vol. dcxxxv, p. 36.
[480] Unpublished letter from Matthioly to the Empress Eleonora of
Austria:--Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, section Mantua,
5; _Arbor priscæ nobilisque masculinæ familiæ de Matthiolis_:--Archives
of the Empire, M. 746; _L’Italia regnante_, di Gregorio Leri, part
iii., Geneva, 1676, duodecimo, pp. 161-173.
[481] Son of Godefroi, Count d’Estrades, long employed in diplomatic
negotiations in Holland and appointed a Marshal of France on the death
of Turenne.--_Trans._
[482] A despatch from Varengeville, ambassador at Venice, to Pomponne,
July 1, 1679, given by Delort, states that Giuliani “is a little editor
of newspapers, in whose shop the letters of news are written, as it is
not the custom here [Venice] to print them. He works at this himself,
as well as at copying for the public; and his situation in this town
answers to that of the Secretaries of St. Innocent at Paris. Therefore
it would be a very improper thing to give a secretaryship of embassy to
a man of this profession [as the Abbé d’Estrades had proposed to do],
who, besides, in other respects, does not appear to me fit to properly
fill such an employment.... But as he is a sort of ferret who works out
and gets at all that is passing, I think it is necessary to encourage
his zeal by some such gratification as forty or fifty pistoles a year,
or whatever shall be approved of by his Majesty.”--_Trans._
[483] Despatches from the Abbé d’Estrades to Louis XIV., December 18,
1677; from the same to Pomponne, December 24, 1677; January 1 and 29,
1678. These have been given by Delort, as well as all those to which
the word “unpublished” is not prefixed. Delort had seen and made use
of the Mantua and Venice series, but not of that of Savoy, in which
the most curious and interesting are to be found, because the Abbé
d’Estrades, after having filled the post of ambassador at Venice, was
sent in the same capacity to Turin.
[484] Despatch from D’Estrades to Louis XIV., December 18, 1677.
[485] Simon Arnaud de Pomponne, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
at this epoch. In spite of his admittedly high character, he fell
into disgrace in the course of the following year, mainly through the
intrigues of Colbert, with whom he was at enmity, and whose brother was
promoted to his post.--_Trans._
[486] Letters from Louis XIV. and Pomponne to the Abbé d’Estrades,
January 12, 1678.
[487] “MONSIEUR LE COMTE MATTHIOLI,--I have perceived from the letter
that you have written to me, and from what my ambassador, the Abbé
d’Estrades, has informed me, the regard that you show for my interests.
You cannot doubt but that I am much obliged to you for it, and that
I shall have much pleasure in giving you proofs of my satisfaction
upon every occasion. Referring you, therefore, to what will be said
to you more particularly on my behalf by the Abbé d’Estrades, I shall
not lengthen this letter more than to pray God that he will have you,
Monsieur le Comte Matthioli, in his holy keeping.
“LOUIS.”
[488] 12,500_l._--_Trans._
[489] Despatch from D’Estrades to Louis XIV., March 19, 1678.
[490] Letters from Pomponne to D’Estrades, April 13, 1678; from
D’Estrades to Pomponne, April 30, May 21, and June 11, 1678; from
Pomponne to D’Estrades, June 15 and 22; Letters from Pinchesne,
Secretary of the French Embassy at Venice, to Pomponne, September 3 and
17, 1678.
[491] Letter from Pinchesne to Pomponne, November 19, 1678.
[492] Letter from Pomponne to Pinchesne, December 2, 1678.
[493] Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, section Mantua.
[494] 760_l._--_Trans._
[495] Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, section Mantua,
Italian Manuscript of Giuliani.
[496] Despatches from D’Estrades to the King, which will be referred to
hereafter:--Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, section Savoy,
68.