But during the period of its existence, how close and intimate in

appearance is this union with the body! Sensation extends to every part

of it, every fibre is instinct with life, and the direction of the will

is absolute and immediate over every muscle and joint, as if the whole

fabric and its tenant were one homogeneous system. The will tires not of

its supremacy, and is not wearied with the number of volitions required

of it to keep every joint in action, and every organ performing its

proper function. It would not delegate the control of the fingers to an

inferior power, nor contrive mechanical or automatic means for moving

the extremities. Within its sphere, it is sole sovereign, and is not

perplexed with the variety and constant succession of its duties,

extending to every part of the complex structure of which it is the

animating and directing spirit. Sensation is not cumbered with the

multitude of impressions it receives, nor is the fineness of perception

dulled by repeated exercise. The sharpness of its edge rather improves

by use, and we become more heedful of its lightest intimations. Is it

irreverent, then, to suppose that this union of body and soul shadows

forth the connection between the material universe and the Infinite One?

How else, indeed, can we attach any meaning to the attributes of

omnipresence and omnipotence? The unity of action, the regularity of

antecedence and consequence in outward events, which we commonly

designate by the lame metaphor of _law_, then become the fitting

expression of the consistent doings of an all-wise Being, in whom there

is no variableness, neither shadow of turning. The Creator, then, is no

longer banished from his creation, nor is the latter an orphan, or a

deserted child. It is not a great machine, that was wound up at the

beginning, and has continued to run on ever since, without aid or

direction from its artificer. As well might we conceive of the body of a

man moving about, and performing all its appropriate functions, without

the principle of life, or the indwelling of an immortal soul. The

universe is not lifeless or soulless. It is informed by God's spirit,

pervaded by his power, moved by his wisdom, directed by his beneficence,

controlled by his justice.

"Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus

Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet."

The harmony of physical and moral laws is not a mere fancy, nor a forced

analogy; they are both expressions of the same will, manifestations of

the same spirit.

The objection, that it is beneath the dignity of the Almighty--[Greek:

autourgein hapanta]--to put his hand to every thing--is founded on a

false analogy, as is seen by the form in which Aristotle states it. "If

it befit not the state and majesty of Xerxes, the great king of Persia,

that he should stoop to do all the meanest offices himself, much less

can this be thought suitable for God." The two cases do not correspond

in the very feature essential to the argument. An earthly potentate,

unable to execute with his own hand all the affairs of which he has

control, is obliged to delegate the larger portion of them to his

servants; selecting the lightest part for himself, he gratifies his

pride by calling it also the noblest, though the distinction is

factitious, there being no real difference, in point of honor or

dignity, between them. Omnipotence needs no minister, and is not

exhausted or wearied by the cares of a universe. Power in action is more

truly sublime than power in repose; and surely it is not derogatory to

divine energy to sustain and continue that which it was certainly not

beneath divine wisdom to create and appoint. Rightly considered, to

guide the falling of a leaf from a tree is an office as worthy of

omnipotence, as the creation of a world. "Are not two sparrows sold for

a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your

Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered."

Equally lame is the oft-repeated comparison of the universe to a machine

of man's device, which is considered the more perfect the less mending

or interposition it requires. A machine is a labor-saving contrivance,

fitted to supply the weakness and deficiencies of him who uses it. Where

the want does not exist, it is absurd to suppose the creation of the

remedy. Human conceptions of the Deity are for ever at fault in imputing

to him the errors and deficiencies which belong to our own limited

faculties and dependent condition. Hence the idea of the Epicureans,

that sublime indifference and unbroken repose are the only states of

being worthy of the gods. Viewed in the light of true philosophy, no

less than of Christianity, how base and grovelling does this conception

appear! The sublime description of the pagan poet becomes the fitting

expression and defence of the very theory it was designed to

controvert:--

"Nam (proh sancta Deum tranquilla pectora pace,

Quae placidum degunt aevum, vitamque serenam!)

Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi

Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?

Quis pariter coelos omneis convertere? et omneis

Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraceis?

Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore presto?

Nubibus ut tenebras faciat, coelique serena

Concutiat sonitu? tum fulmina mittat, et aedeis

Saepe suas disturbet?"

Returning to the theory of our author, may we not now characterize it as

at once unfounded in its details, inconceivable in its operation, and

vulgar and mechanical in its design? Considered in their proper aspect,

and by the light of a sound philosophy, whatever well accredited facts

or legitimate deductions he has gleaned from the whole field of modern

science afford the most striking evidence and illustration of that view

of creation which is directly at variance with his own hypothesis. He

has, in fact, exposed the insufficiency of what are called organic or

mechanical laws to supply the losses, and bridge over the interruptions,

that have occurred in the world's history. Geology has rendered at

least one signal service to the cause of natural religion, by

effectually doing away with the old atheistic objection, that, for aught

we know, the present constitution of things never had a beginning, but

has gone on for ever renewing itself in an endless series of

generations. Science now tells us distinctly, that time was when "the

earth was without form and void," no animated thing appearing "upon the

face of the deep"; that afterwards, "the waters were gathered together

unto one place, and the dry land appeared." Then "the earth brought

forth grass, and herb yielding seed _after his kind_, and the tree

yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after his kind." Next was

fulfilled the command, "Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving

creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth in the

open firmament of heaven." Then appeared "the beast of the earth after

his kind, and cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth

upon the earth after his kind." Last of all, "God created man in his own

image, male and female created he them." We are not merely quoting

Scripture; we are repeating the facts positively affirmed by the

geologists, and incorporated by our author into his "history"--as

authentic leaves taken from the "stone book"--_in the same order_ in

which they are narrated in the first chapter of Genesis. The coincidence

in the order of succession is certainly remarkable.

Geology farther informs us, that, at different times, all the animated

tribes which had peopled the earth's surface passed away, or became

extinct, and were replaced by new species of different organization and

characteristics; and probably at many other periods, as well as on

occasions of some great catastrophe in the earth's crust, races wholly

unlike any that had preceded them were introduced, from time to time, as

new inhabitants of the globe. Here, then, was an absolute necessity for

the continuous operation of an intelligent creative power, apart from

the blind mechanical laws, which, at the utmost, could only allow each

species, once introduced, to continue its kind. The marvellous

adaptations of these new races to the altered conditions of the earth's

surface when they appeared, then, become additional proofs of the wisdom

and constant oversight of a designing Creator. They came not till all

things were ready; they appeared when the extinction of former tribes

had left a gap for them in the scale of being. The gradual development

of what are called the powers of nature,--or, to speak more

intelligibly, the successive improvements in the habitations intended

for higher and higher races of animated life,--and the similarity of

plan on which these races were organized, the scheme being preserved in

all its essential features through countless generations, show unity of

design, and prove that the works of creation, however separated in time,

must be attributed to _one_ intelligent author. The same conclusion

follows almost irresistibly from the gradations at present observable

both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, so that all the races may be

arranged, not indeed in a linear series, but in families or groups,

bearing analogous relations to each other, and showing a general

progress from the more simple to the more complex forms. Surely, these

facts, so clearly explained by our author, instead of sustaining the

corpuscular philosophy, directly militate with it, and afford the most

satisfactory proof of the doctrine of the theist, and the theory of

continuous divine agency. We have hardly ever met with a book that

furnished more complete materials for its own refutation.

After all, the question is a very simple one. We have only to decide

whether it is more likely, that the complex system of things in the

midst of which we live,--the beautiful harmonies between the organic and

inorganic world, the nice arrangements and curious adaptations that

obtain in each, the simplicity and uniformity of the general plan to

which the vast multitude of details may be reduced,--was built up, and

is now sustained, by one all-wise and all-powerful Being, or by

particles of brute matter, acting of themselves, without direction,

interference, or control. We cannot now say, that possibly the system

never had a beginning, but has always existed under the form in which it

now appears to us; geology has disproved _that_ supposition most

effectually. Choose ye, then, between mind and matter, between an

intelligent being and a stone, for the parentage and support of this

wonderful system. For our own part, we will adopt the conclusion of one

of the most eloquent of those old pagan philosophers, on whose eyes the

light of immediate revelation never dawned:--"_Hic ego non mirer esse

quemquam, qui sibi persuadeat, corpora quaedam solida atque individua vi

et gravitate ferri, mundumque effici ornatissimum et pulcherrimum ex

corum corporum concursione fortuita? Quod si mundum efficere potest

concursus atomorum, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non

potest, quae sunt minus operosa, et multo quidem faciliora? Certe ita

temere de mundo effutiunt, ut mihi quidem nunquam hunc admirabilem

coeli ornatum, qui locus est proximus, suspexisse videantur._"

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: _N. A. Review_, Vol. LVI., pp. 339-351.]

[Footnote 2: "It is inconceivable, that inanimate brute matter should,

without the mediation of something else, which is not material, operate

upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must, if

gravitation, in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it.

And this is one reason why I desired you would not ascribe innate

gravity to me. That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to

matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a

_vacuum_, without the mediation of any thing else, by and through which

their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so

great an absurdity, that I believe no man, who has in philosophical

matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it. Gravity

must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain

laws."--_Newton's letter in Bentley's Works_, Vol. III., pp. 211, 212.]

[Footnote 3: And yet, so strong is the propensity to metaphor, that

scientific men talk of the _vis inertiae_ as a true force, though the

ideas expressed by the two Latin words are certainly incongruous. The

mistake here arises from confounding inertness, or resistance to

force,--a merely negative idea,--with the true force which is necessary

to overcome it; or rather, since force can only be measured by its

results, and must always be adequate to the effect produced, inquirers

have adopted the convenient hypothesis of two antagonistic forces, not

always recollecting that one of them is merely passive.]

A Theory of Creation: A Review of 'Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation' · 第 5 / 5 段