=Source.=--Molesworthy's _History of the Reform Bill_, London,
1866, p. 103.
The object of ministers has been to produce a measure with which
every reasonable man in the country will be satisfied--we wish to
take our stand between the two hostile parties, neither agreeing
with the bigotry of those who would reject all Reform, nor with the
fanaticism of those who contend that only one plan of Reform would
be wholesome or satisfactory, but placing ourselves between both,
and between the abuses we intend to amend and the convulsion we
hope to avert.
The ancient constitution of our country declares that no man should
be taxed for the support of the State, who has not consented, by
himself or his representative, to the imposition of these taxes.
The well-known statute, _de tallagio non concedendo_, repeats the
same language; and, although some historical doubts have been
thrown upon it, its legal meaning has never been disputed. It
included "all the freemen of the land," and provided that each
county should send to the Commons of the realm, two knights, each
city two burgesses, and each borough two members. Thus about a
hundred places sent representatives, and some thirty or forty
others occasionally enjoyed the privilege, but it was discontinued
or revived as they rose or fell in the scale of wealth and
importance. Thus, no doubt, at that early period, the House of
Commons did represent the people of England; there is no doubt
likewise, that the House of Commons, as it now subsists, does not
represent the people of England. Therefore, if we look at the
question of right, the reformers have right in their favour. Then,
if we consider what is reasonable, we shall arrive at a similar
result.
A stranger, who was told that this country is unparalleled in
wealth and industry, and more civilized, and more enlightened
than any country was before it; that it is a country that prides
itself on its freedom, and that once in every seven years it elects
representatives from its population, to act as the guardians and
preservers of that freedom,--would be anxious and curious to see
how that representation is formed, and how the people chose those
representatives, to whose faith and guardianship they entrust
their free and liberal institutions. Such a person would be very
much astonished if he were taken to a ruined mound, and told that
that mound sent two representatives to Parliament--if he were
taken to a stone wall, and told that three niches in it sent
two representatives to Parliament--if he were taken to a park,
where no houses were to be seen, and told that that park sent two
representatives to Parliament; but if he were told all this, and
were astonished at hearing it, he would be still more astonished
if he were to see large and opulent towns full of enterprise and
industry, and intelligence, containing vast magazines of every
species of manufactures, and were then told that these towns sent
no representatives to Parliament.
Such a person would be still more astonished, if he were taken to
Liverpool, where there is a large constituency, and told, here you
will have a fine specimen of a popular election.
He would see bribery employed to the greatest extent, and in the
most unblushing manner; he would see every voter receiving a number
of guineas in a box, as the price of his corruption; and after such
a spectacle, he would no doubt be much astonished that a nation
whose representatives are thus chosen, could perform the functions
of legislation at all, or enjoy respect in any degree. I say, then,
that if the question before the House is a question of reason, the
present state of representation is against reason.
The confidence of the country in the construction and constitution
of the House of Commons is gone. It would be easier to transfer
the flourishing manufactures of Leeds and Manchester to Gatton and
Old Sarum, than re-establish confidence and sympathy between this
House and those whom it calls its constituents. If, therefore, the
question is one of right, right is in favour of Reform; if it be
a question of reason, reason is in favour of Reform; if it be a
question of policy and expediency, policy and expediency are in
favour of Reform.
I come now to the explanation of the measure which, representing
the ministers of the King, I am about to propose to the House.
Those ministers have thought, and in my opinion justly thought,
that no half measures would be sufficient; that no trifling or
paltering with Reform could give stability to the Crown, strength
to Parliament, or satisfaction to the country. The chief grievances
of which the people complain are these. First, the nomination of
members by individuals; second, the election by close corporations;
third, the expense of elections. With regard to the first, it may
be exercised in two ways, either over a place containing scarcely
any inhabitants, and with a very extensive right of election; or
over a place of wide extent and numerous population, but where the
franchise is confined to very few persons. Gatton is an example
of the first, and Bath of the second. At Gatton, where the right
of voting is by scot and lot, all householders have a vote, but
there are only five persons to exercise the right. At Bath the
inhabitants are numerous, but very few of them have any concern in
the election. In the former case, we propose to deprive the borough
of the franchise altogether. In doing so, we have taken for our
guide the population returns of 1821; and we propose that every
borough which in that year had less than 2,000 inhabitants, should
altogether lose the right of sending members to Parliament, the
effect of which will be to disfranchise sixty-two boroughs. But we
do not stop here. As the honourable member for Boroughbridge [Sir
C. Wetherell] would say, we go _plus ultra_; we find that there
are forty-seven boroughs of only 4,000 inhabitants, and these we
shall deprive of the right of sending more than one member to
Parliament. We likewise intend that Weymouth, which at present
sends four members to Parliament, should in the future send only
two. The total reduction thus effected in the number of the members
of this House will be 168. This is the whole extent to which we are
prepared to go in the way of disfranchisement.
We do not, however, mean to allow that the remaining boroughs
should be in the hands of a small number of persons to the
exclusion of the great body of the inhabitants who have property
and interest in the place. It is a point of great difficulty to
decide to whom the franchise should be extended. Though it is a
point much disputed, I believe it will be found that in ancient
times every inhabitant householder resident in a borough was
competent to vote for members of Parliament. As, however, this
arrangement excluded villeins and strangers, the franchise always
belonged to a particular body in every town;--that the voters
were persons of property is obvious, from the fact that they are
called upon to pay subsidies and taxes. Two different courses
seem to prevail in different places. In some, every person having
a house, and being free, was admitted to a general participation
in the privileges formerly possessed by burgesses; in others, the
burgesses became a select body, and were converted into a kind of
corporation, more or less exclusive. These differences, the House
will be aware, lead to the most difficult, and at the same time the
most useless questions that men can be called upon to decide. I
contend that it is proper to get rid of these complicated rights,
of these vexatious questions, and to give the real property and
real respectability of the different cities and towns, the right of
voting for members of Parliament. Finding that a qualification of
a house rated at £20 a year, would confine the elective franchise,
instead of enlarging it, we propose that the right of voting
should be given to the householders paying rates for houses of the
yearly value of £10 and upwards, upon certain conditions hereafter
to be stated. At the same time it is not intended to deprive the
present electors of their privilege of voting, provided they are
resident. With regard to non-residence, we are of opinion that it
produces much expense, is the cause of a great deal of bribery,
and occasions such manifest and manifold evils, that electors who
do not live in a place ought not to be permitted to retain their
votes. With regard to resident voters, we propose that they should
retain their right during life, but that no vote should be allowed
hereafter, except to £10 householders.
I shall now proceed to the manner in which we propose to extend
the franchise in counties. The bill I wish to introduce will give
all copyholders to the value of £10 a year, qualified to serve on
juries, under the right hon. gentlemen's [Sir R. Peel] bill, a
right to vote for the return of knights of the shire; also, that
leaseholders, for not less than twenty-one years, whose annual rent
is not less than £50, and whose leases have not been renewed within
two years, shall enjoy the same privilege.