=Source.=--Martineau's _History of the Peace_, Vol. I. pp. 406-408.
Bohn's Libraries. G. Bell & Sons.
It having been objected that the balance of dignity and honour
among nations had been affected by the French occupation of Spain,
which was thought to have exalted France and lowered England, Mr.
Canning replied: "I must beg leave to say that I dissent from that
averment. The House knows--the country knows--that when the French
army was on the point of entering Spain, his Majesty's Government
did all in their power to prevent it; that we resisted it by all
means short of war. I have just now stated some of the reasons why
we did not think the entry of that army into Spain a sufficient
ground for war; but there was, in addition to those which I have
stated, this peculiar reason, that whatever effect a war commenced
upon the mere ground of the entry of a French army into Spain,
might have, it probably would not have had the effect of getting
that army out of Spain. In a war against France at that time as
at any other, you might perhaps have acquired military glory;
you might, perhaps, have extended your colonial possessions; you
might even have achieved, at a great cost of blood and treasure,
an honourable peace; but as to getting the French out of Spain,
that would have been the one object which you almost certainly
would not have accomplished. How seldom, in the whole history of
the wars of Europe, has any war between two great powers ended in
the obtaining of the exact, the identical object for which the war
was begun! Besides, sir, I confess I think that the effects of the
French occupation of Spain have been infinitely exaggerated. I do
not blame those exaggerations, because I am aware that they are to
be attributed to the recollections of some of the best times of our
history; that they are the echoes of sentiments which, in the days
of William and Anne, animated the debates and dictated the votes
of the British Parliament. No peace was in those days thought safe
for this country while the crown of Spain continued on the head
of Bourbon; but were not the apprehensions of those days greatly
overstated? Has the power of Spain swallowed up the power of
maritime England? Or does England still remain, after the lapse of
more than a century, during which the crown of Spain has been worn
by a Bourbon, niched in the nook of that same Spain--Gibraltar?...
Again, sir, is the Spain of the present day the Spain ... whose
puissance was expected to shake England from her sphere? No, sir,
it was quite another Spain; it was the Spain within the limits of
whose empire the sun never set; it was Spain "with the Indies"
that excited the jealousies, and alarmed the imaginations of our
ancestors. But then, sir, the balance of power! The entry of the
French army into Spain disturbed that balance, and we ought to
have gone to war to restore it! I have already said that when the
French army entered Spain, we might, if we chose, have resisted or
resented that measure by war. But were there no other means than
war for restoring the balance of power? Is the balance of power a
fixed and unalterable standard? or is it not a standard perpetually
varying, as civilisation advances, and as new nations spring up,
and take their place among established political communities? The
balance of power, a century and a half ago, was to be adjusted
between France and Spain, the Netherlands, Austria and England.
Some years afterwards, Russia assumed her high station in European
politics. Some years after that again, Prussia became, not only a
substantive, but a preponderating monarchy. Thus, while the balance
of power continued in principle the same, the means of adjusting it
became more varied and enlarged. They became enlarged in proportion
to the increased number of considerable states--in proportion,
I may say, to the number of weights which might be shifted into
the one or the other scale. To look to the policy of Europe, in
the time of William and Anne, for the purpose of regulating the
balance of power in Europe at the present day, is to disregard the
progress of events, and to confuse dates and facts which throw a
reciprocal light upon each other. It would be disingenuous, indeed,
not to admit, that the entry of the French army into Spain was,
in a certain sense, a disparagement--an affront to the pride--a
blow to the feelings of England; and it can hardly be supposed
that the government did not sympathise, on that occasion, with the
feelings of the people. But I deny that, questionable or censurable
as the act might be, it was one which necessarily called for our
direct and hostile opposition. Was nothing then to be done? Was
there no other mode of resistance than by a direct attack upon
France; or by a war to be undertaken on the soil of Spain? What
if the possession of Spain might be rendered harmless in rival
hands--harmless as regarded us--and valueless to the possessors?
Might not compensation for disparagement be obtained and the policy
of our ancestors vindicated, by means better adapted to the present
time? If France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid
the consequences of that occupation, that we should blockade Cadiz?
No. I looked another way. I sought materials of compensation in
another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had
known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be
Spain 'with the Indies.' I called the New World into existence, to
redress the balance of the Old."