I. Forms of expression
(Includes all symbolizing forms: political editorials, novels,
poems, paintings, cartoons, plastic media, plays, acting)
Most effective style
Analytical and dialectical
Persecutory (sarcastic, denunciatory)
Enthusiastic
Humorous
Commanding
Range of style wide or limited
II. Mode of thought
Quick or slow to suggest policies or tactics
Almost totally uninventive
Systematically collects data prior to judgment
Impressionistic improvisation
Welcomes suggestion and criticism before decision
Impatient of suggestion and criticism before decision
Anxious to justify decision to those about or to world
Indifferent about justifying decision
Stubbornly holds to decision
Oscillates in decision
Much influenced by facts and arguments (or little)
Much influenced by appeals to sentiments (or little)
Much influenced by personal inducements (or little)
Much influenced by coercion (or little) (note that influence may
be negative as to direction)
Genuine pursuit of general interest in exercise of discretion, or not
Elated by victory or depressed
Genuine or narrow in sharing credit
Deeply depressed by defeat or satisfied in defeat
Interested in programs and values
Interested in processes and methods
Long-run or short-run objectives
Aims at immediate or eventual political action
Presses through to a decision capable of being tested
Conclusions or decisions vague
Ideal of responsible personal participation
Consistency between opinion and practices
Self-consciousness of own techniques
Conforms or not to family pattern (exaggerated, adoption of
opposite, ...)
III. Political interest
Formulated early and persists through life
Formulated early, lies dormant, reawakened
Aroused early, disillusioned
Aroused late
By this time it is perhaps superfluous to comment that every fact is
defined from the point of view of an observer, and that the problem
is to specify as definitely as possible the angle of observation of
the recorder. Trait lists are meaningless unless they can be filled
in by a fact-collecting process which surveys the various situations
with respect to which it is of possible relevance. It is very obvious
to the psychopathologist that the man who is “aggressive” at work
may be “timid” in sexuality. All too frequently personalities are
supposed to be “aggressive” when a certain number of raters have
agreed on it, without stopping to consider whether the raters have a
chance to become acquainted with the behavior of the individual in
many situations. The multiplication of ratings by persons who are in
a poor position to judge the subject (even by “intimate” friends who
do not, however, act as sexual partners) adds nothing but a spurious
specificity to the data. The interviewer who listens to the intimate
life of the individual through many weeks and months is in a very
strategic position to become acquainted with details of individual
reactions which even intimates have not seen. A “rating” must be taken
with special reference to the history of the relations of the rater
and the rated. It may be that we shall presently find that the ratings
of analysts in dealing with certain types of people who can be easily
identified do not substantially deviate from those of “intimates” or
even rather casual acquaintances of certain kinds. Such knowledge will
enable research to proceed with more certain pace toward the time when
we shall know what to look for and how to elicit what we want with the
maximum of economy. The specialist who interviews a man for an hour may
be able, during the course of what appears to be an ordinary social
relation, to find the tell-tale signs which detailed research has shown
to be invariably, or almost invariably, connected with particular
impulse systems and developmental histories. As Bjerre so well put it:
As soon as our intercourse with a certain person is no longer
governed by common interests, but by a desire to acquire a
knowledge of his inmost being, we immediately abandon the formal
content of his utterance and begin unconsciously to seek for
whatever indication of his inner life appears in his speech
independently of, or even in spite of, his conscious will.[76]
What is achieved is a correlation of the results of “casual” contact
and “intensive” study, a correlation which is the common target of a
converging attack upon the understanding of the human personality.
Some day we shall know how to validate the saying of the old physician
which is on the title-page of this book: “From him who has eyes to
see and ears to hear no mortal can hide his secret; he whose lips are
silent chatters with his fingertips and betrays himself through all his
pores.”
CHAPTER XIII
THE STATE AS A MANIFOLD OF EVENTS
Implications have continually been drawn in the foregoing pages
about the bearing of the intensive study of individual personalities
upon the meaning of the political process as a whole. Since the
psychopathological approach to the individual is the most elaborate
procedure yet devised for the study of human personality, it would
appear to raise in the most acute form the thorny problem of the
relation between research on the individual and research upon society.
We are therefore justified in devoting more extended attention to the
theoretical problem involved than we have yet taken occasion to do.
It may be asserted at the outset that our thinking is vitiated unless
we dispose of the fictitious cleavage which is sometimes supposed to
separate the study of the “individual” from the study of “society.”
There is no cleavage; there is but a gradual gradation of reference
points. Some events have their locus in but a single individual, and
are unsuitable for comparative investigation. Some events are widely
distributed among individuals, like breathing, but have no special
importance for interpersonal relations. Our starting-point as social
scientists is the statement of a distinctive event which is widely
spread among human beings who occupy a particular time-space manifold.
Subjective events occupy definite positions in the flow of events, and
the problem of explanation is the problem of locating stable relations.
Since subjective events are not open to direct observation, but are
inferred from movements, the observer, O, must infer the existence of
subjective terms in the sequence by imagining what he would experience
under all the similar circumstances which he can survey and compare
to his own experience. Reduced to its simplest terms, the observer’s
procedure is that of isolating a subjective event which he wishes to
investigate, and of searching for the “externals” which will make
the conditions of its occurrence clearly communicable to others.
These externals are sometimes fairly clear, and can readily be stated
in precise, “touchable” form. The sensation of “roughness” can be
predicted to follow the application of certain objects to specified
parts of the skin. A transition from a rough to a smooth object may
also produce “flinching,” which can be somewhat definitely described,
and which accompanies and (perhaps) initiates some of the subjective
events.
When any observer undertakes to talk about the state, he may choose
specific subjective experiences, such as a sense of loyalty to a
community, and say that all who have this experience (and/or certain
others) under specified conditions make up the state. Such specified
conditions may include the act of testifying to it when asked by an
intimate friend, or when warned that the community is in danger. The
concept of the state may be amplified by searching for the external
circumstances which precipitate the appearance of the subjective events
which are characteristic of stateness.
Such a method of defining the state absolves us from “superindividual”
constructs. The locus of the subjective events is still individual.
The group is not a superindividual phenomenon but a many-individual
phenomenon. The time-space abstraction of the “group” is just as “real”
or “unreal” as the time-space abstraction called the “individual.”
They are both equally real or unreal, and they stand and fall together.
The state has duration. It is a time-space frame of reference for
individual events. Particular individuals may pass on, but if the
overwhelming majority of those who occupy a certain geographical
area continue to experience the subjective events of the type chosen
as critical for the state, the state endures. The state is thus
independent of any one individual, but it ceases to exist when enough
individuals change their minds or die without procreating.
I have not yet defined the particular events which are to be treated as
the marks of the state. In the sea of subjective events we must choose
certain typical ones. Now definitions of this kind can be developed
most advantageously when we proceed, not by a method of rigorous
exclusion, but of relative emphasis. Suppose we tentatively begin by
saying that the distinguishing experience is that of communal unity,
when it is manifested by the use of coercion against outside and inside
disturbers of the communal order. Imagine an observer is overlooking
a primitive village. He sees a band of young men whose behavior he
interprets thus: They are wearing painted stripes, brandishing spears,
and having left the village, they engage in fighting a band of young
men from a neighboring village. Is this evidence of the existence of
the state? The facts are insufficient to justify a decision. Closer
observation may show that these young men all live in one quarter
of the village and that other young men are idling about. When the
“warriors” come back, they are only cheered by those who live in one
section. Those who live there may prove to be members of one family,
some of whose young men have avenged a private wrong in which the
village as a whole has no part. The system of claims and expectations
which is the essence of the communal order is not at stake. The
communal order must be involved if the state is involved.
Robert H. Lowie[77] has shown that the term “state” may properly be
used to designate even the most primitive communities, and that the
common distinction between a prestate and a state period of cultural
development is a distortion of the facts. The simplest peoples known,
the Yurok of northwestern California, the Angami of Assam, and the
Ifugao of northern Luzon, all have a sense of belonging to a social
unit larger than a kin group, and act in overt defense of this
order. The theft of property of one kin group, when committed by a
fellow-villager, is mulcted by a traditional fine, but the theft, when
committed by a marauding outsider, is punished by death. In the case
of adultery, warring families inside the village are merely engaged in
adjusting the size of the penalty; it is universally assumed that some
penalty is due.
The marginal cases notoriously play havoc with definitions. The
statement made before that the distinguishing mark of the state is
the experience of communal unity, when it is manifested by the use of
coercion against outside and inside disturbers of a communal order, is
too narrow to cover a small but extremely interesting series of facts.
There may be no use of coercion against outsiders, for the war pattern
may be entirely absent from the community, although violence against
insiders who threaten the communal system of claims and expectations
appears to be universal.
The view so far proposed rests upon a frank acceptance of social
“parallelism.”[78] Hans Kelsen has subjected the theories of
parallelism of psychological states (common emotion and the like) to a
sharp, and in many ways devastating, criticism. He says that “common
emotion, common volition and common idea can never mean anything more
than a description of the coincidence in consciousness of a number of
individuals.” But
if one really wished to consider the state as consisting of a
community of consciousness such as this, and as a matter of
fact, such a realistic, empirical psychological meaning is often
attributed to what is called the collective will or the collective
interest of the state, then, in order to avoid inadmissible
fictions, one would have only to be consistent enough really to
consider the state as formed only by the contents of those whose
consciousness had shown the necessary agreement. One would be
bound to realize that community of will, feeling or thought, as
a psychological group manifestation, fluctuates tremendously at
different times and places. In the ocean of psychic happenings,
such communities may rise like waves in the sea and after a brief
space be lost again in an ever-changing ebb and flow.[79]
In this keen dialectic Kelsen has been led astray by a failure to
recognize the time dimension of the events referred to by such a
concept as the state. Subjective facts are located in time in relation
to one another when viewed from the standpoint of any observer. The
concept of the state involves similar events in relation to one
another within a duration. The concept of the state includes this
idea of a temporal frame, and can best be grasped as a relational
system (a manifold) in which a certain frequency of subjective events
is maintained. Thus the state is not abolished when some individuals
sleep or occupy themselves with the banalities of existence, unless
the state is defined with reference to a duration of a few seconds
or hours or days. But there is no reason whatever for choosing such a
transitory frame of reference. It is just as valid to use a year as a
minute, or a decade as a year, for the time dimension. Thus the state
can be treated in what Kelsen speaks of as an “empirical psychological”
sense. It is a durable empirical fact just so long as a certain
frequency of subjective events occurs. If Kelsen agrees that contents
of consciousness are “empirical,” he is bound to see them in a world
of duration, and he has no authority to prescribe that the state must
refer to subjective events as a “knife-edge instant.”
The state, then, is a time-space manifold of similar subjective events.
Kelsen is incorrect in alleging that the acceptance of the parallelism
of psychological phenomena as a fundamental fact destroys the state as
a permanent institution.
Mere parallelism of psychological events does not give us the state,
for a distinguishing type of subjective event must be selected if
we are to characterize the state, the family, and other social
groups. Kelsen is entirely correct in criticizing those theories
of the state which invoke parallelism but neglect to specify the
particular “contents of consciousness,” “since not every and any group
manifestations formed upon the parallelism of psychic processes is able
to constitute that community.”
That subjective event which is the unique mark of the state is the
recognition that one belongs to a community with a system of paramount
claims and expectations. This recognition of belonging does not
necessarily imply an indorsement of this state of things. The essence
of the state is this recognition, and the individual may indorse or
deplore the fact without abolishing it. One need not be sentimentally
bound to the order; it is enough if the order is noted.
This unique experience is never found unassociated with other
subjective events. The recognition is usually amplified by pride in
belonging to the state, and by a determination to enforce the order
upon one’s self and others. One’s recognition of the order is usually
accompanied by an idealization of one’s participation in it, by an
idealization of the order itself, and by a condemnation of deviations
from it. All this is frequently expressed as the “sense of justice”
which is the foundation of certain theories of law and the state.
The subjective event which marks the state is usually manifested in
various “externals.” Thus the use of coercion is well-nigh universal.
The externals may be broadened to include behavior which may be treated
as a substitute for coercion. Ordering and obeying relationships which
function in a coercive crisis may continue when peace comes. There
may be an apparent “elaboration backward” of processes antecedent to
coercion in foreign and domestic affairs, and this may obviate a resort
to the _ultima ratio_. The regulation of the use of coercion, and the
maintenance of a certain degree of mobilization during non-crisis
periods, devolves upon “leaders,” who may preside over initiations,
goods distribution, and general ceremonials. The process by which
“heads” are selected may involve electoral colleges, elections, and
agitations.
It is worth observing that in the description of political processes
terms are employed which often carry no “subjective” connotations on
their face. But in fact every term unavoidably carries subjective
implications, and if these be ignored, there is danger that social
theory will hypostatize “patterns” or “traditions” as extra-subjective
entities, endowed with distinctive energies and amenable to special
laws.
Often the subjective “burr” on the pattern is so dim that the
subjective need scarcely ever be made explicit. Many generalizations
can be made by disregarding the subjective element and focusing
attention upon the transformations through which the associated
patterns pass. Linguistics has achieved notable success by this method.
Phonetic arrangements are named as objects of investigation and the
fact discovered that those sounds which occur in certain relationships
presently alter in regular ways.
It is theoretically possible to make a rough scale of descriptive
conceptions according to the relative fulness or thinness of the
subjective element in the pattern. To express this symbolically, the
complexity of the _S_ to the _E_ (subjective to external) varies
between nearly 100 and nearly 0. The contemporary prominence of what is
called “social psychology” is due to the effort to draw attention to
the consideration of patterns in which the _S_ factor is large.
The failure to stress the subjective dimensions of the events
referred to as “processes,” “patterns,” or “customs” is not only due
to the circumstance that the _S_ is often negligible, but that the
objective element may often appear with other subjective elements.
John B may rise when the national anthem is played, but he may do so
“automatically” with his mind mostly preoccupied with the sore on
his heel. The particular _S_ which is meant when the full pattern of
patriotic ceremonialism is discussed may thus be supplanted by another
_S_ with the same _E_. Thus the act becomes an entirely different
phenomenon, and may erroneously be classed with patriotic ceremonialism
in the full sense.
This point has far-reaching consequences for political science. The
accurate comparison of behavior patterns depends upon comparison of
the whole pattern. It must not be automatically inferred that _S_
exists where _E_ is found. The nature of the subjective factor can be
inferred from extending the observation in several directions. It may
be lengthened (John B may complain of a sore heel after the anthem). It
may be more intensively scrutinized within the same period (John B may
be seen to shift his weight from one foot to another, and to frown when
one heel touches the floor).
Descriptive political conceptions are undergoing a continuous
redefinition in the life of society, and unless the student of
political processes is on the alert to test his descriptive conceptions
in the light of changing reality, he will operate with falsifications
and not with simplifications. “Voting,” to choose an instance, is a
concept of the greatest complexity. It does not alone consist in the
dropping of ballots into urns or boxes or hats, or in the punching
of buttons on a machine. These external elements, the _E_’s, in
the concept of voting are not the heart of the matter. What count
especially are the subjective terms in the constellation of which these
externals are a part, and a highly variable part at that. How seriously
do people take the responsibility of collecting information about the
personalities and issues with which they are confronted and judging
these matters in the light of a conception of the public interest?
Voting is an entirely different matter when individuals are coerced
into casting ballots a certain way and when they are free, leisured,
and interested. To call the casting of ballots under all circumstances
“voting” is to deprive the term of most of its significance.
It is highly probable that the phenomenon which is loosely called
voting in Chicago is today quite different from what is was fifty years
ago; it is radically true that the phenomenon called voting in London
is something different from voting in Cook County.[80] How are we to
decide what meaning to assign to particular aspects of the political
process as we observe them at different times and places? The ocean
of subjective happenings which are related to external movements of a
kind often associated with politics is ever changing, and it cannot be
described by inventory methods. Not inventory but sampling is essential
if empirical definiteness is to be attached to a term.
Speaking very generally, two modes of procedure are possible. The first
is to begin with the externalities which are a rather fixed feature of
a pattern of social behavior with which the investigator is familiar,
and to proceed to find out how the subjective features of this pattern
change. One may study “balloting” or “modes of punishment” and the like
from this point of view. Throughout Western European culture there
prevails such relative homogeneity of pattern that research may proceed
directly from this starting-point.
The field ethnologist, who deals with cultures of a drastically
different kind, must often use another avenue of approach. A set of
external movements like “balloting” may not be sufficiently widespread
to permit comparison. The ethnologist must proceed by stating to
himself the subjective fact whose presence he would like to detect
(such as a desire to participate earnestly in deciding communal
problems), and participate as fully in the daily life of the people
as he can, in the hope that presently he will divine such a subjective
viewpoint and its characteristic modes of expression. It is true that
there are some movements of man whose significance is practically
universal, but these are too few to enable the utter alien to dispense
with a long period of participation in the day-to-day life of the
people. What happens is that the observer presently begins to recognize
the subjective fact behind the movements of the body, but this
primitive judgment of his is a diffused judgment, based upon a mass
of subtle particulars which he may long be unable to isolate in his
own thinking and to point out to others; indeed, this process is never
complete, or we should have a complete understanding of human life.
Obviously both points of departure for research have their advantages.
The American student of social patterns in Western Europe has thousands
of subtle meanings established in common with Frenchmen, Germans, or
British. This is an enormous time-saving asset. If anyone undertakes to
use the ethnologist’s approach to a familiar culture, the results are
likely to strike the participant in that culture as perfectly obvious
and hardly worth the effort.[81]
The whole aim of the scientific student of society is to make the
obvious unescapable, if one wishes to put the truth paradoxically. The
task is to bring into the center of rational attention the movements
which are critically significant in determining our judgment of
subjective events, and to discover the essential antecedents of those
patterns of subjectivity and of movement. For all the people who are
startled to find that they have spoken prose all their lives, there are
many to emulate the rustic who “know’d it all the time” when scientific
facts are stated about human nature. That which is known implicitly and
based upon diffused, unverbalized experience must be made explicit if
new ways of dealing with the world are to be invented.
The work of investigation may eventuate in statements of the subjective
constellations which find expression in particular cultural forms, or
in the description of the subjective constellations which are connected
with forms which are universal for all men. The frame of reference of
the social scientist is the culture; the frame of reference of the
human psychologist is the species.
What is known as the “quantitative method” provides a valuable
discipline for the student of culture because it directs his attention
toward the discovery of events which are often enough repeated to raise
a strong presumption that a particular sequence does actually exist.
These events must be so defined that similar events can be identified
by other workers. This necessitates an operational definition of the
concept, which is to say, terms must be used to specify the position of
the observer in relation to the configuration which it is proposed to
describe.[82]
The impatience among students of culture with the slow-footed
quantitative approach is partly due to the diffuse, implicit nature of
the experiences upon which is based the judgment about a subjective
event outside one’s self, and the resulting bias of the student of
culture against exaggerating the significance of items in the pattern.
The statement that “his life-experience has been hued with melancholy”
is a generalization which presupposes a knowledge of a prodigious
number of facts. Or the statement that “the prestige of public office
is greater in Germany than in any country” depends upon possible
observations as numerous as the sands of the sea. Any proposition
in Bryce’s _Modern Democracies_ or in Masaryk’s analysis of Russian
civilization refers to tremendous ranges of data. Of course, the
experience of any observer is puny beside the Gargantuan proportions
of the facts, and able inquirers always proceed upon a sampling basis.
They get in touch with men of every income group, every religious,
every racial, and every provincial group; they study the manifestations
of the culture in painting, literature, mathematics, legislation,
administration, and physical science.
The procedure of a Bryce was quantitative in the sense that many
observations were accumulated before inferences were fixed, but it was
not quantitative in the special mathematical sense of the word. The
student of culture is often alienated by the quantitative approach,
because the quantitative method necessitates the simplification of the
number of facts taken into account; the impressionistic-quantitative
approach of the student of culture gets an undivided reaction to the
whole and makes simplification afterward, perhaps revising and indeed
oscillating at frequent intervals.
There is more in common between the student of culture, and
especially of alien culture, and the student of the individual by
prolonged-interview methods than might appear at first sight. The
ethnologist confronting the manifestations of an alien culture and
the psychopathologist confronting the alien manifestations of the
unconscious secure unique training in their research for meanings in
details which escape the attention of the naïve man. Both form their
idea of the subjective events from a multitude of signs, which may
be spread over months of intimacy, and both are somewhat inclined to
disparage the search for simple external facts which can be relied upon
to indicate a specific subjective content.
The psychopathologist possesses the most elaborate known means of
exploring the manifold subjective events which may be associated
with external movements. Besides the conscious subjective experience
there is a rich unconscious life which he is especially proficient
in exposing. Thus our movements are not alone the outcome of simple
conscious processes; they are said to be “overdetermined” by a variety
of factors.
This concept of overdetermination is not unknown to popular common
sense. We know that John B is proud of being an American, and that he
wants to fight for his country; we comment slyly that John B’s best
girl likes the uniform, and this is one reason why he volunteers.
And more than that. We know that action is not always the outcome of
experiences that point in the same direction. We may know that John B.
is anxious to stay on the job a month longer and to get a promotion,
and that going into the army at a given moment means sacrifice. Thus
his mind is partly divided against itself. What psychopathological
methods do is to disclose yet wider vistas, and to expose the operation
of factors which cannot be readily seen. Thus a deep longing for death
may be a contributing factor to heroism.
The psychopathological approach is embarrassing less in the specific
content of its revelations than in the wealth of meaning which it
discovers behind what is at first glance but a simple pattern. The
rôle, of a particular subjective experience and of a movement cannot
be fully appraised apart from the total context at which it functions,
and this method discloses a wider context than common sense is aware of.
Now the multiplicity of human motives has always been a source
of embarrassment to people who wanted to manage men or merely to
understand them. The clumsy machinery of judicial administration has
been worked out along certain lines in the hope of introducing some
degree of uniformity into adjudication by limiting the consideration
of the motives which operate in a particular case. The judge is thus
supposed to limit himself to the determination of the existence
of a particular state of facts, and to act in a particular way if
these facts can be established according to a prescribed procedure.
The movement toward the standardization of the discretion of public
officers expresses itself in this general pattern of thought:
An act is prohibited by the state.
Certain prescribed “externals” shall establish the fact of the act
having been committed.
The actor shall be dealt with in certain specified ways.
This crusade against the subjective element in the mind of the public
officer is in some measure determined by the desire of the judge or
civil servant to avoid responsibility.[83]
The psychopathological approach precipitates something very like a
panic among those who have tried to box the manifestations of human
life into conventional common-sense categories. A dozen motives seem to
bloom where but one was found to bud before.
Let us see what this does for political theory. The prolonged study
of individuals enables us to discern the details of the process by
which the political pattern, as we meet it in adult life, comes to be
achieved by individuals.
When X runs for office or passes judgment, his behavior is
overdetermined by motives, conscious and unconscious, which were
organized in successive patterns during infancy, childhood and youth.
The recognition of belonging to a communal order never functions in
isolation, and the comparison of life-histories shows that this is
implanted in the child on the basis of meanings which he has elaborated
in his struggle, first against inhibitory factors in the environment,
and presently, when he has introjected the demands of the environment,
against his own antisocial impulses.
The early restrictions which the environment imposes upon a child
are important in that they are met by reactions on his part which
predispose him to meet subsequent limitations in certain ways. These
early restrictions are imposed upon the child by inflicting pain or
by distracting attention to pleasurable stimuli. Inhibition is thus
established in the organism by _force majeur_ on the part of the
environment, since the infant is simply overpowered or outgeneraled by
the environment.
Thus far in his development the growing individual has not become
socialized in the sense that he has become self-regulating in
relation to objects in the environment. The infant learns “sphincter
morality” (in the phrase of Ferenczi), but this involves no emotional
relationship to objects. His pleasures remain on his own body
(autoplastic), and the environment is an instrument for removing bodily
tensions in the simplest manner. Gradually the child begins to look for
gratification by lively erogenous activities upon the body of another.
This outward push of activity is again limited and frequently blocked
by _force majeur_. In the place of sexual relations to objects there
now appears a new form of relation, and the child socializes himself by
incorporating the practices of those about him.
It will be remembered that emotional bonds are established in two
ways: by object choice (for sexual acts) and by identification.
Identification, Freud writes, is the original form of emotional tie
with an object. It can become a substitute for a libidinal object tie,
and it may arise with every new perception of a common quality shared
with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct.
This latter is partial identification. The qualities of the object are
copied (introjected). The energy for the identification is said to be
supplied by aim-inhibited sexual instincts. The name of the state, the
ceremonial acts of deference toward ceremonial symbols--all this and
much more is characteristically a feature of the child’s growth.
Characteristic, that is to say, frequent, but not invariable. Children
are always brought in relation to a system of interferences and
indulgences (ways of raising children), and they always perceive an
order of some kind. But in some cases when a nation lives subjected to
a state, the recognition of the state relation may be accompanied by
resentment.
The state pattern itself prevails when many people take it as more than
a mere state of affairs, and the idea is reinforced by “irrelevant
meanings.” Some individuals impose motivations upon others through the
state pattern. These individuals, whether despots or enthusiasts, may
be termed “radicles,” the active ones who serve as radiating centers
for the preservation and amplification of the state pattern.
Freud treats the state as an emotional unity.[84] The members of the
state identify themselves with an abstract object (the idea of the
state) and are bound emotionally by the partial identification which
arises in perceiving an analogous relationship to the object. Kelsen
has objected to this conception of the state as a real subjective unity
by arguing that identification is a process between individuals, and
that each member of a state cannot be thought of as having entered into
personal relationships with every other member. Even if his narrow
construction of identification were well founded, the state could still
be treated as a real subjective unity on the basis of interlocking
identifications. A has identified with B and B with C, and one of the
features of B which the child A would typically take over (introject)
would be the name and other symbols of the state.
Indeed, it is the interlocking character of identifications which
reasonably insures the incorporation of the state symbol into the
child’s conception of himself. There is such a process as negative
identification, the rejection of patterns which are connected with
hated persons. The child is usually exposed to many adults and
contemporaries, and if they all associate themselves with the state,
the child is almost certain to reject only those patterns which pertain
exclusively to the hated individuals. This is the fundamental reason
for the staying power of patterns once accepted in a group.
It has been customary in the psychoanalytical literature on social
and political processes to describe the state as a universal
father-substitute. We are at length in a position to discuss the
problems raised by such a generalization. The distinctive contribution
of the psychopathological approach is the plurality of individual
meanings which it discloses. It is an anticlimax to discover that
the appearance of diversity is, after all, spurious, and that those
who insist upon the strenuous simplification of human motives are
justified. The point which I wish to insist upon is that the data
revealed by the psychopathological procedure are far more significant
for political and social science than this single-track generalization
would lead one to suppose.
The special value of the psychopathological approach is that it
represents a supermicroscopic method of utilizing individual instances
for the study of culture patterns. If we begin with a political pattern
and view it against the private histories of actual people, we find
that this pattern takes on variable meaning from one individual to
another, but that broad groupings of associated meanings are possible
of ascertainment. Any subjective event which is frequently associated
with a political pattern is important. Valid generalizations depend
upon multiplying cases which are selected from different groups in
the culture, and which are studied by methods capable of disclosing
subjective contexts. This is the point where quantitative procedures
can be made profitable to the student of culture, whose attention is
riveted on patterns whose subjective element is important.
But are these studies likely to lead to anything valuable if subjective
events are so variable that any subjective event may be associated
with any other subjective event? Why not terminate the investigation
at the outset by saying that the general law of probabilities can be
relied upon to predict the frequency with which any two of a number
of specified subjective events may be expected to occur together?
Is not our empirical inquiry likely to terminate in an inventory
of subjective states and their frequently accompanying movements,
thus foredooming any effort to discover more-frequent-than-chance
simultaneities, antecedents, and successions? If you look long enough,
won’t you find every subjective event associated with every other one?
A great many facts tend to substantiate this point of view. It is true
that many imposing psychological schools of thought have arisen, run
swiftly for a time in narrow channels, and then stagnated in a shallow
pool of “faculties” or “instincts,” mere inventories of patterns which
are abstracted from all concrete events and which are therefore capable
of being combined in any event in nearly infinite combinations. The
search for specific connections slacks down, and the psychological mill
pond is only stirred when somebody throws a stone in the pool in the
form of a new theory of specific causation, which troubles the waters
until it is found that the specific event is found to occur with only
chance frequency. In this sense the only contributors to psychology
are those who are sufficiently naïve, or sufficiently unscrupulous,
to exaggerate the rôle of a specific type of experience. So we have
psychologies based on “fear” or “love” or “imitation,” or we have a
long string of separate terms, “sub-fears,” which multiply as the range
of concrete observation widens, and the failure of the selected factor
to explain everything is made manifest, or disguised.
Thus a history of psychology could be written by taking “completed”
systems, analyzing the functional equivalence of the categories
applied, and reducing every new system to a collection of synonyms
for the terms of preceding systems. This hypothetical history of
psychological theories would show how an inquirer, much impressed by
certain experiences, would seize upon certain terms to describe them,
and how, confronted by more and more empirical realities, he would
modify the distinctive meaning of his explanatory conceptions out of
existence. A history of psychoanalytic terminology, such as Rank has
sketched in his treatment of genetic psychology, might be raw material
for such a comparison.
Would nothing remain but dictionaries of synonyms, all rather dubious
contributions to the grist of linguistic research? It might be that
our projected history would show that each psychological system left
a permanent legacy behind it in the form of a significant “mechanism”
which had not previously been stressed. Now the whole world of
“causation” is implicated in any event, and the whole number of
significant mechanisms which may be discerned in the “mind at a moment”
is infinite. So our hypothetical volume might conclude by accepting the
assumption that some events can be brought about by more than chance
frequency, subject to the reservation that experimental confirmation is
never reliable as to the future. The critical configurations may never
“reappear.” We commonly say that the probability of an event’s future
repetition is greater if it has been oft repeated in the past. But
there is no means of demonstrating that the future contains analogous
configurations to the elapsed. The probability of the future repetition
of an event is “no probability.” If events appear to be predictable,
this is so because our knowledge of contingencies is limited, and our
sequences of similar configurations may still be treated as special
instances of “no sequence.” The stable is a special case of the
unstable, to put the ultimate paradox. The discovery of aggregates
of mechanisms whose rearrangement in short periods would enrich the
apparatus of social control is the dream (the mirage?) of psychology.
Whether these objections will be well founded depends on the outcome
of the test, and are incapable of dialectical resolution. It may be
pointed out that the search for generalized mechanisms rests on no
firmer logical foundations than the search for subjective sequences,
since mechanisms are likewise aspects of the world of events, and as
such are subject to the same “no probability” laws of recurrence.
It should be repeated that the aim of life-history investigation is
not to arrive at such thin generalizations as the statement that the
state is a universal father-imago (symbol). What matters to the student
of culture is not the subjective similarities of the species, but the
subjective differences among members of the same and similar cultures.
The life-history configuration is precisely the one which has special
meaning for the study of culture, and has its own valid place as an
object of investigation in the world of events.
* * * * *
We may at this point briefly retrace the steps which have been taken in
this monograph. The psychopathological approach has been examined in
its historical setting, and the distinctive value of the free-fantasy
method of using the mind has been illustrated. Its importance,
likewise, for the understanding of political types has been shown with
special reference to the agitators and the administrators.
The general formula for the developmental history of the political man
employs three terms:
_p_ } _d_ } _r_ = _P_
_p_ equals private motives, _d_ equals displacement on to public
objects, _r_ equals rationalization in terms of public interest. _P_
signifies the political man, and } means “transformed into.”
The political man shares the _p_, the private motives which are
organized in the early life of the individual, with every man, and
the _d_, the displacement on to public objects, with some men. The
distinctive mark of the _homo politicus_ is the rationalization of
the displacement in terms of public interests. Political types may be
distinguished according to the specialized or the composite character
of the functions which they perform and which they are desirous of
performing. There are political agitators, administrators, theorists,
and various combinations thereof. There are significant differences in
the developmental history of each political type.
The hallmark of the agitator is the high value which he places on
the response of the public. As a class the agitators are strongly
narcissistic types. Narcissism is encouraged by obstacles encountered
in the early love relationships, or by overindulgence and admiration
in the family circle. Libido is blocked in moving outward toward
objects and settles back upon the self. Sexual objects which are like
the self are preferred, and a strong homoerotic component is thus
characteristic. Among the agitators yearning for emotional response of
the homoerotic kind is displaced upon generalized objects, and high
value is put on arousing emotional responses from the community at
large. The oratorical agitator, in contradistinction to the publicist,
seems to show a long history of successful impostorship in dealing
with his environment. Agitators differ appreciably in the specificity
or in the generality of the social objects upon which they succeed in
displacing their affects. Those who have been consciously attached
to their parents and who have been successful impostors (“model
children”) are disposed to choose remote and general objects. Those
who have been conscious of suppressing serious grievances against
the intimate circle, and who have been unable to carry off the
impostor’s rôle successfully, are inclined to pick more immediate and
personal substitutes. The rational structure tends toward theoretical
completeness in the former case. The object choices for displaced
affects depend on the models which are offered when the early
identifications are being made. When the homoerotic attitude is the
important one, the assaultive, provocative relation to the environment
is likely to display itself; when the impotence fear is active,
grandiose reactions figure more prominently.
As a group the administrators are distinguished by the value which they
place upon the co-ordination of effort in continuing activity. They
differ from the agitators in that their affects are displaced on less
remote and abstract objects. In the case of one important group this
failure to achieve abstract objects is due to excessive preoccupation
with specific individuals in the family circle, and to the correlative
difficulty of defining the rôle of the self. Very original and
overdriving administrators show a fundamental pattern which coincides
with that of the agitators. The differences in specific development are
principally due to the culture patterns available for identification
at critical phases of growth. Another group of administrators is
recruited from among those who have passed smoothly through their
developmental crises. They have not overrepressed powerful hostilities,
but either sublimated these drives, or expressed them boldly in the
intimate circle. They display an impersonal interest in the task of
organization itself, and assert themselves with firmness, though not
with overemphasis, in professional and intimate life. Their lack of
interest in abstractions is due to the fact that they have never needed
them as a means of dealing with their emotional problems. They can
take or leave general ideas without using them to arouse widespread
affective responses from the public. Tied neither to abstractions nor
to particular people, they are able to deal with both in a context of
human relations, impersonally conceived. Their affects flow freely;
they are not affectless, but affectively adjusted.
The psychopathological method was also employed to discover the
significance of political convictions, for it is evident that beliefs
are expressive of a rational and logical “manifest” content, and that
they symbolize a host of private motives. In this connection there
was passed in review the history of a compulsive conformist to the
pattern of the family, and the histories of several nonconformists. The
private meaning of militarism and pacifism, and of the pessimism and
censoriousness of old age, were explored.
Attention was then turned from the case-history fragments to the
problem of drawing out the implications of intensive personality study
for the theory of the collective political process.
Political movements derive their vitality from the displacement of
private affects upon public objects. The affects which are organized in
the family are redistributed upon various social objects, such as the
state. Political crises are complicated by the concurrent reactivation
of specific primitive impulses. One might suppose that when important
decisions are in process of being made society would deliberate very
calmly; but the disproportionality between the behavior of man during
wars, revolutions, and elections, and the requirements of rational
thinking is notorious. Evidently a reactivating process is at work
here; there is a regressive tendency to reawaken primitive sadism and
lust.
Political symbols are particularly adapted to serve as targets for
displaced effect because of their ambiguity of reference, in relation
to individual experience, and because of their general circulation.
Although the dynamic of politics is the tension of individuals, all
tension does not produce political acts. Nor do all emotional bonds
lead to political action. Political acts depend upon the symbolization
of the discontent of the individual in terms of a more inclusive self
which champions a set of demands for social action.
Political demands are of only a limited relevance to the changes which
will produce permanent reductions in the tension level of society. The
political methods of coercion, exhortation, and discussion assume that
the rôle of politics is to solve conflicts when they have happened.
The ideal of a politics of prevention is to obviate conflict by the
definite reduction of the tension level of society by effective
methods, of which discussion will be but one. The preventive point
of view insists upon a continuing audit of the human consequences of
social acts, and especially of political acts. The achievement of
the ideal of preventive politics depends less upon changes in social
organization than upon improving the methods and the education of the
social administrators and the social scientists.
The empirical material utilized in the book was brought together in
the course of prolonged interviews with individuals under unusually
intimate conditions. At the present time there are no satisfactory
records of what actually happens under these interview conditions,
and it is important for the future of personality study to improve the
methodology of these procedures. The objectification of what transpires
in the interview can be secured by arranging for a verbatim transcript
of what goes on, and by recording the physical changes which occur.
Effective personality research depends upon viewing the personality
reactions as a system, and upon perfecting the procedures by which the
substitutive reactions of this system may be exposed. Broadly speaking,
the personality may be treated as a system of object orientations,
adjustive thought, autistic reveries, and somatic reactions. The
problem is to introduce interferences into the system, and to reveal
the substitutive reactions for comparison and further analysis. Every
“fact” about personality events is to be defined from the standpoint
of a specified observer, and a major problem for the future is to
check the “facts” of the observer in the prolonged interview against
the “facts” of observers in other situations. Personality research can
be made more valuable for political science when the adult reactions
are clearly seen which chiefly interest the political scientist (see
Appendix B).
What, in general terms, is the relationship between research upon the
individual and upon society? There is no cleavage; there is but a
gradation of reference points. Events which are of collective interest
always have an individual locus, and these events may be studied in
their relation to the sequence of events “within the individual” or in
relation to the events “among individuals.” The distinctive event which
serves as the orienting frame for political research is the recognition
of belonging to a community with a system of paramount claims and
expectations. This event, when distributed with sufficient frequency
among the individuals who occupy a given territory during a specified
time period, define the state, which is thus a manifold of events.
Research which studies the order of events “within the individual” or
“among individuals” is equally relevant to the understanding of the
state; the difference is a difference of starting-point and not of
final result.
When the state is seen as a manifold of events the conditions of whose
occurrence are to be understood, the theoretical foundation is laid
for both the intensive and the distributive inquiries upon which the
politics of prevention can be built. In particular will it be possible
to profit as the years pass, and as psychopathology widens the range of
its investigations, and increases the dependability of its methods.
APPENDIX A
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
The literature of psychoanalysis from its inception to 1926 is
conveniently available in John Rickman’s _Index Psychoanalyticus,
1893-1926_. The _Gesammelte Schriften_ of Sigmund Freud have been
published by the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Vienna,
in eleven volumes. This publishing house puts out most of the
literature of the circle around Freud. Of Freud’s books the beginner
may be referred to his _General Introduction to Psychoanalysis,
The Interpretation of Dreams_, and _Three Contributions to Sexual
Theory_. An English edition of Freud’s collected papers is in
process of publication. The most important technical journal is the
_Internationale Zeitschrift für arztliche Psychoanalyse_. There is an
English journal, _The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis_, and
an American one, _The Psychoanalytic Review_. (A French periodical has
recently appeared.)
Among the “orthodox” psychoanalytical treatises the following are of
particular importance:
Ferenczi, S. _Bausteine zur Psychoanalyse_. Leipzig, 1926.
----. _Versuch einer Genitaltheorie_. Leipzig, 1924.
Ferenczi, S., and Hollos, S. _Psychoanalysis and the Psychic
Disorder of General Paresis_, “Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph
Series,” No. 42. New York and Washington, 1925.
The psychological manifestations of a physical disease are
predicted on the basis of the psychoanalytical theory of
personality development. Of great methodological importance.
Abraham, K. _Klinische Beitrage zur Psychoanalyse aus den Jahren
1907-20_. Leipzig, etc., 1921.
----. _Psychoanalytische Studien zur Charakterbildung_. Leipzig,
etc., 1925.
The most influential approach to the problem of character
formation. Amplified in many directions by Jones, Glover, etc.
Alexander, S. _Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit_. Leipzig,
etc., 1927.
A notably lucid presentation of the general theory. Recently
translated as _The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality_ and
published in the “Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series.”
Hartmann, H. _Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse._ Leipzig, 1927.
A very important book which views analytical concepts in relation
to the data of experimental psychology.
Deutsch, Felix. “Experimentelle Studien zur Psychoanalyse,”
_Internationale Zeitschrift_, IX (1923), 484-96.
Reports the demonstration of the mechanism of repression by the
use of post-hypnotic suggestion.
Kempf, E. _Psychopathology_. St. Louis, 1921.
Stresses the function of the autonomic functions, and undertakes
to amplify psychoanalytical theory in this direction.
Among those who have broken off from Freud, after having been
associated with him, are Stekel, Jung, and Adler. Stekel has published
ten volumes of case histories which are valuable for the beginner
who needs to acquire a sense of what sort of thing the human mind is
capable. The other two are of more theoretical importance. Jung’s
_Psychological Types_ is of the most immediate interest to social
scientists, although his speculations about the “racial unconscious”
are suggestive. Alfred Adler’s standpoint is set out in his _Individual
Psychology_. His circle in Vienna publishes a journal.
An excellent manual is _The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis_
(New York, 1930), by William Healy, Augusta F. Bronner, and Anna Mae
Bowers.
The psychoanalytical movement can be placed in the general perspective
of medical psychology by referring to such a manual as William A.
White’s _Outlines of Psychiatry_ or Bernard Hart’s _Psychopathology_.
There are excellent books in German on medical psychology by Kronfeld,
Birnbaum, Schilder, Kretschmer, and many others. The general movements
in the field can be followed in the _American Journal of Psychiatry_
or the _Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases_, the latter of which
is edited by William A. White and Smith Ely Jelliffe, who also
supervise the well-known series of books, usually translations, called
the “Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series.” Pierre Janet’s
_Psychological Healing_ reviews the general history of psychopathology.
Among the innumerable articles and books which undertake to appraise
the clinical and normal implications of psychoanalysis, the symposium
edited by Hans Prinzhorn may be chosen, _Krisis der Psychoanalyse_
(Leipzig, 1928), Band I (the projected second volume will not appear).
Otto Rank, who has likewise broken with Freud, is publishing a series
of books on the psychoanalytical interview which promises to serve as
a bridge between the general theory and the objective studies of the
interview situation which are in progress in America.
On the special problem of personality and character types, the volume
by A. A. Roback, _The Psychology of Character_, may be instanced as
a very comprehensive guide to the literature. His _A Bibliography on
Personality_ is also available. An acute analysis of typologies was
offered by O. Selz before the German experimental psychologists in
1923. See the following:
Selz, O. “Über die Personlichkeitstypen und die Methoden ihrer
Bestimmung,” _Bericht über den VIII. Kongress für experimentelle
Psychologie_. Jena, 1924.
Klüver, H. “An Analysis of Recent Work on the Problem of
Psychological Types,” _Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases_,
LXII, No. 6 (December, 1925).
The current output is reviewed from time to time in relation
to tests by Mark A. May, Gordon W. Allport, and certain other
psychologists who are especially interested in the field. The
_Psychological Index_ can be consulted for the purpose of keeping
abreast of the large quantity of published material.
The most influential recent book is Kretschmer’s _Physique and
Character_. The somatic factors in personality are stated with charm
and brevity by E. Miller, _Types of Mind and Body_. Useful summary and
critical volumes are by William I. Thomas and Dorothy S. Thomas, _The
Child in America_ (New York, 1928), chapters viii-xiii inclusive, and
by R. G. Gordon, _Personality_ (New York, 1926).
The psychoanalytical literature which has undertaken to deal with
politics or politicians explicitly may be appended here:
Pfister, Oskar. “Analytische Untersuchungen über die Psychologie
des Hasses und der Versöhnung,” _Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse_, II
(1910), 134-78.
----. “Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für die Staats- und
Gesellschaftslehre” (Vortrag an VI. Int. Psa. Kong., Hague,
September 8-11, 1920), abstract in _Internationale Zeitschrift_,
VI, 400.
----. “Die menschlichen Einigungsbestrebungen im Lichte der
Psychoanalyse,” _Imago_, XII (1926), 126-35.
The _Imago_ is the psychoanalytical journal which is devoted to
applications of psychoanalytical theory to the interpretation of
culture.
Sachs, Hanns. “Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für Probleme
der Soziologie” (Vortrag), abstract in _Centralblatt für
Psychoanalyse_, II (1911), 464-69.
----. “Ein Traum Bismarcks,” _Internationale Zeitschrift_, I
(1913), 80-83.
Sachs, Hanns, and Rank, Otto. _Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für
die Geisteswissenschaften._ Wiesbaden, 1913.
This was published in the “Grenzfragen des Nerven und
Seelenlebens,” No. 93, a series which contains many volumes
of great interest to social scientists. Kretschmer now is the
responsible editor. The book also appears as No. 23 in the
“Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series.”
Rank, Otto. “Der ‘Familienroman’ in der Psychologie des
Attentäters,” _Der Künstler_ (virte vermehrte Auflage; Leipzig,
etc., 1925), pp. 142-48.
This fragment first appeared in 1911.
Storfer, A. J. “Zur Sonderstellung des Vatermordes.” Leipzig, etc.,
1911.
Parricide and regicide are punished with unusual severity in
different legal systems.
Abraham, Karl. “Amenhotep IV (Echnaton),” _Imago_, I (1912), 334-60.
One of the earliest applications of analytical concepts to a
historical personage.
Freud, Sigmund. _Totem und Taboo_. Leipzig, etc., 1913.
Outlines his hypothesis of the origin of culture in an original
parricide by a band of revolting brothers, who resented the
monopoly of the females by the old man of the tribe, and who
undertook to repress memories of the crime. See the discussion by
Malinowski of this hypothesis in _Sex and Repression in Savage
Society_ (New York, 1927).
----. “Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod,” _Imago_, IV (1915-16),
1-21.
----. _Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse_. Leipzig, etc., 1921.
An application of Freud’s theories to the psychology of crowds
and social institutions. See William McDougall, “Professor
Freud’s Group Psychology and His Theory of Suggestion,” chapter
xvii of _Problems of Personality_ (ed. Campbell and others; New
York, 1925).
----. _Unbehagen der Kultur_. Leipzig, etc., 1929.
Jekels, Ludwig. “Der Wendepunkt im Leben Napoleons I,” _Imago_, III
(1914), 313-81.
Kaplan, Leo. “Der tragische Held und der Verbrecher,” _ibid._, IV
(1915), 96-124.
Jones, Ernest. “War and Sublimation.” Read before the British
Association for the Advancement of Science, Section of Physiology,
September 10, 1915; published in _Reports_ of the Association,
LXXXV, 699 ff.
----. (ed.). _The Social Aspects of Psychoanalysis_. London, 1923.
Tausk, Viktor. “Zur Psychologie des Deserteurs,” _Zeitschrift_, IV
(1916-17), 193-204, 228-40.
Blüher, Hans. _Die Rolle der Erotik in der männlichen
Gesellschaft_. 2 vols. Jena, 1917.
Bernfeld, Siegfried. “Die Psychoanalyse in der Jugendbewegung,”
_Imago_, V (1919), 283-89.
----. “Über eine typische Form der männlichen Pubertät,” _ibid._,
IX (1923), 169-188.
Federn, Paul. _Die Vaterlose Gesellschaft_. Leipzig, etc., 1919.
Clark, L. Pierce. “A Psychologic Study of Abraham Lincoln,”
_ibid._, VIII (1921), 1-21.
----. “A Psycho-historical Study of the Epileptic Personality in
the Genius,” _ibid._, IX (1922), 367-401.
----. “The Narcism of Alexander the Great,” _Ibid._, X (1923),
156-69.
----. _Napoleon: Self-Destroyed_. New York, 1929.
Kolnai, Aurel. _Psychoanalyse und Soziologie_. Leipzig, etc., 1920.
Lazell, Edward W. “Psychology of War and Schizophrenia,”
_Psychoanalytic Review_, VII (1920), 224-45.
Rinaldo, Joel. _The Psychoanalysis of the Reformer_. New York, 1921.
White, William A. _Thoughts of a Psychiatrist on the War and
After_. New York, 1919.
Low, Barbara. “Civic Ideals: Some Psycho-analytical
Considerations,” _Sociological Review_, 1922.
Boven, William. “Alexander der Grosse,” _Imago_, VIII (1922),
418-39.
Berger, G. “Zur Theorie der menschlichen Feindseligkeit,” _ibid._,
IX (1923), 344-67.
Lorenz, Emil. _Der politische mythus, Beitrage zur mythologie der
Kultur_. Leipzig, etc., 1923.
Illustrates the state-father relationship from the lore and
literature of many cultures.
Reik, Theodor. _Geständniszwang und Strafbedürfnis: Probleme der
Psychoanalyse und der Kriminologie_. Leipzig, etc., 1925.
Outlines in masterly fashion the implications of the need for
punishment and the compulsion to confess for criminology.
Reik has also published extensively on religion from the
psychoanalytical standpoint.
Kohn, Erwin, _Lasalle der Führer_. Leipzig, etc., 1926.
Alexander, Franz, and Staub, Hugo. _Der Verbrecher und seine
Richter_. Vienna, 1929.
A sketch of criminology from the psychoanalytical standpoint,
drawing heavily on Alexander’s conception of the neurotic
character, as distinguished from the neurotics who show hysteric
or compulsive symptoms.
Friedjung, Josef K. “Zur Psychologie des kleinen Politikers,”
_Imago_, XIV (1928), 498-501.
Among those who have undertaken from allied fields to apply
psychoanalytic viewpoints may be mentioned William F. Ogburn, who read
a paper before the economists in 1918; Thomas D. Eliot, sociologist;
Harry Elmer Barnes, historical sociologist; E. D. Martin, social
psychologist; Preserved Smith, historian; R. V. Harlow, historian;
W. H. R. Rivers, ethnologist; and Theodore Schroeder, lawyer. See
especially:
Barnes, Harry Elmer. _The New History and the Social Studies_,
chap. iii. New York, 1925.
Discusses the bibliography in English.
Swoboda, Hermann. “Zur Psychologie des Parlamentarismus,”
_Oesterreichische Rundschau_, Band XIV, Heft 1, January 1, 1908.
----. “Die Kunst des Regierens,” _ibid._, Band XVII, December 15,
1908.
----. “Der Volksvertreter,” _ibid._, Band XXXII, Heft 3, August 1,
1912.
These articles of Swoboda are the first well-considered
applications of psychoanalysis to politics by a non-specialist.
The first article treats the rôle of parliamentarism as
“catharsis,” and specifically refers to the work of Breuer and
Freud.
Aside from specifically psychoanalytical efforts to interpret
individuals and collective trends, there have been many efforts on the
part of other psychiatrists and physicians, or their followers, to
offer such interpretations. The whole literature of “pathography” is
abstracted and discussed here:
Lange-Eichbaum, Wilhelm. _Genie-Irrsinn, und Ruhm._ Leipzig, 1928.
Students of politics will be most interested in the references and
abstracts concerning Rousseau, Alexander the Great, Amenhotep IV,
Bismarck, Blücher, emperors and princes, Frederick the Great, Lincoln,
Loyola, Ludwig II of Bavaria, Napoleon, and Robespierre. Möbius put
“pathography” on a scientific basis. The following is one of the best
of the “pathographies,” since it stresses the diseased aspects of
the personality in the perspective of the total development of the
subject’s career:
Heidenhain, Adolf, _J.-J. Rousseau, Persönlichkeit, Philosophie and
Psychose_, “Grenzfragen des Nerven-und Seelenlebens,” Heft 117.
Munich, 1924.
The study of the effect of individual pathology on culture, and of
culture upon individual pathology, is envisaged as a program in the
following:
Birnbaum, Karl. _Grundzüge der Kulturpsychopathologie_,
“Grenzfragen des Nerven- und Seelenlebens,” Heft 116. Munich, 1924.
The reckless extension of individual pathological terms to the state of
society as a whole has caused much confusion, but a case can be made
out for a valid use of the concept of the pathological. Thus:
Schneersohn, F. “Zur Grundlegung einer Völker- und
Massenpsychopathologie (Soziopsychopathologie),” _Ethos_, I
(1925-26), 81-120.
This includes an exhaustive bibliography of the efforts of
psychiatrists to extend their conceptions to society, and a
detailed consideration of the methodological issues involved.
Special attention should be called to the forthcoming volume by Harry
Stack Sullivan on _Personal Psychopathology_ in which a systematic
treatment of the whole field of psychiatry and sociology is presented.
Dr. Sullivan has vastly stimulated a _rapprochement_ between physician
and social scientist in the United States. See the _Proceedings_ of
the two colloquiums on personality investigation, held under the
auspices of the American Psychiatric Association, first published in
the _American Journal of Psychiatry_ for May, 1929, and May, 1930, and
separately obtainable.
APPENDIX B
QUESTION LIST ON POLITICAL PRACTICES
This question list refers directly to the organized political life of
the subject. Questions which are designed to elicit preferences are not
included. For general personality questions and trait lists, the usual
sources may be consulted for suggestions.[85]
The question list here must, of course, be modified if used orally or
with naïve subjects. An effort is always to be made to elicit specific
incidents which arise in the mind. “Reminiscences” and not theories
about the self are desired.
1. List the various associations and organizations of which you
have been a member and in which you enjoyed rights which were
approximately equal to those exercised by everyone else. Specify
in each case whether you were almost inactive, moderately active,
quite active. State when you became a member and how your
subsequent activity fluctuated. Give dates when possible. Remember
that you have been a member of various democratically organized
political units. Mention also the prep-school class organizations,
school and college organizations, alumni associations, profession
organizations, civic associations, parties, and elective public
offices. Organizations which were autocratically organized (that
is, which exercised authority over those who had no formal right
to choose the officials) should not be included. Do not omit
associations of war veterans, Daughters or Sons of the Revolution,
pacifists, anarchists, reform agitators, constitutional defense
leagues, etc.
2. List the various organizations with which you have been
associated either as one in autocratic authority or as one subject
to autocratic authority. This should include schools which you
have attended, appointive offices in the government, most business
connections, trusteeships, etc.
3. List your various free-lance activities which have involved
scarcely any organization but which have been a source of income.
Partnerships which have involved practically no staff, private
secretaryships, and such are meant to be listed here.
The following questions are intended to bring out the salient facts in
connection with your relationship to each democratically organized and
autocratically organized association or institution with which you were
affiliated. Answer for each organization which you have listed in so
far as applicable.
4. Just how did you become a member of this organization? What
steps did you take? Who helped you? Why were you taken in? If
you organized this body, why did you do it? When did you first
entertain the idea? How did your plans develop? What assistance
did you get and by what means? What was your reputation inside
the organization when you first came in? Were you, for instance,
ignored or regarded as promising or accepted and given
responsibility immediately?
5. What friends or enemies did you have inside the organization
when you first came into it?
6. To what offices or positions of authority in the organization
were you elected or appointed?
7. In each case explain how it came about. When did you first
entertain the idea that selection was possible? How much did you
hesitate and ponder before deciding to try for the position or
before accepting it if it was thrust upon you? What alternatives
did you consider? With whom did you talk over the matter? What was
urged on you? What were the disadvantages which deterred you or
the advantages which lured you? Just what did you do to get the
office or position? Who were your chief aids? Who were your chief
competitors? What were the points in your favor and in favor of the
others? How did the various cliques, groups, and other components
of the organization line up? Sketch your strategy and practices in
dealing with each one before selection. Did any issues of policy
figure and how?
8. What were the cases in which you ran or were considered at one
stage or another for selection? Answer the questions as before for
each instance.
9. What appointive power or influence did you exercise in office?
Whom did you consult in making or influencing these appointments?
To what extent did you consider competence? The rewarding of
friends? The division or elimination of your opponents?
10. What objectives, if any, had you thought out when you assumed
responsibility?
11. What were the chief issues on which you took a position? How
did your influence make itself felt in each instance (in public
speaking, interviewing, appointive pressure, etc.)? How did each
major issue happen to emerge? How did you arrive at your position?
Whom did you consult? What considerations were balanced on both
sides of the question? To what extent did you make issues by
interjecting specific proposals into the situation? How did you
happen to do this? What were the elements in the organization which
were lined up on either side of the question? What concessions
did you make in order to achieve your ends? Do you regard your
concessions as too cheaply bought as you look back upon them? What
results did you secure which satisfy you?
12. During your tenure were there personal misunderstandings,
quarrels, and hatreds between you and anybody? How did they come
about? What did you do and what was the relation of what you did to
what happened?
13. Were there personal misunderstandings, quarrels, and
antipathies among others inside the organization which you were
asked to settle or which you tried to settle? What did you do and
what relation did it bear to what finally happened?
14. Were there personal misunderstandings, quarrels, and
antipathies between members of your own organization and people in
other organizations which you were asked to settle or which you
tried to settle? What did you do and what relation did it bear to
what finally happened?
15. Did your organization have any ill feelings as a body for other
organizations or groups when you came into office? What did you do
to inflame or reduce it? What effect? Why?
16. Did your organization have any friendly feelings as a body for
other organizations or groups? What did you do to cement or to
disrupt these relations? Why? With what effect on the course of
events?
17. Did your organization develop any friendly or unfriendly
relations with organizations or groups to which they had been
previously indifferent during your term in office? What did you do
that had anything to do with this result? Why?
18. Did your organization use physical, legal, or other forms of
pressure upon any other organization or group during your term?
What was your rôle in suggesting, supporting, directing, or
obstructing the adoption of these tactics? Why? What resulted?
19. Did your organization use physical, legal, economic, or other
forms of pressure upon any of its own members during your term?
What was your rôle in suggesting, supporting, directing, or
obstructing the adoption of these tactics? Why? With what effect?
20. By whom were you praised during and after your term of office
for your record? How were you praised or recognized and honored and
for what? Effect on you?
21. By whom were you adversely criticized during and after your
term in office for your record? How were you censured and for what?
Effect on you?
22. Were you re-elected or reappointed, promoted or demoted, after
serving your term or before? Why?
23. How did you get along with your immediate superiors,
collaborators, and assistants? To what extent did you manipulate
them? What different tactics did you employ with each? What success?
24. What were your formal and ceremonial duties in the organization
as an officer? Did you enjoy them?
25. How did you enjoy your other official activities?
26. As a non-official, or non-position-holding member of the
organization, what did you enjoy about it? The ceremonies? The
routine operations? The uncertain features?
27. As a member of the rank and file, what policies and activities
did you initiate, support, or oppose? Why? How much did you do and
to what effect? How did the elements of the organization line up?
Were you usually in the minority or the majority? What elements
were usually with you?
28. How did your reputation change during your years in the
organizations?
29. What particular friends and enemies did you acquire?
30. As a member of the rank and file, did you have personal
misunderstandings, quarrels, and hatreds between you and other
members? Why? What did you do? Results?
31. Did you arbitrate any grievances or try to smooth them out?
Success? Why?
32. What was your attitude toward other organizations or groups
with which your organization either competed or had some relations?
As a member of the rank and file, what did you do to change or
intensify prevailing attitudes? Influence?
33. Did your organization use physical or other means of
pressure against outside organizations and other members of your
organization? As a member of the rank and file, what did you do and
with what effect? Did you think your organization was the best of
its kind?
34. Have you severed your connection or become inactive? Why?
35. If you are still active, what are your plans and hopes?
36. How did this particular organization touch the administrative,
legislative, and judicial branches of the government? The political
parties? How? What methods were used to bring pressure to bear?
What was your part in them?
37. As you look back on your life in the organization do you think
of practices which you indulged in or tolerated which you regard
as perhaps questionable? Instances? Did you so regard them at the
time? What would have happened if you had not indulged in them?
Should an organization be run on a different basis now?
38. What effect did life in the organization have upon your
activity in the politics of the community at large? Did you have
impulses to express yourself publicly or privately upon matters
which you felt it expedient to follow? Or were you driven to such
expression and activity?
39. If you were to judge entirely in terms of your experience as
a member of this organization, what would be your judgment of the
honesty and efficiency of the public service and the party machine?
40. What political prejudices or philosophies were current among
various elements inside the organization?
41. Think of various members of this organization who were rather
typical. How did you act toward them when you met them? What topics
of conversation, of anecdote, etc., did you indulge in? What
activities in common were there?
42. Did you think that you were imposed upon by any members as you
look back upon it now? Did you estimate some of them too highly?
Who? Why?
43. Did you underestimate some? Who? Why?
44. Were you estimated too high or too low? By whom? Why?
45. What things apart from common dishonesty would have caused you
to lose standing in the organization? What opinions and activities
would have compromised you?
46. Did you risk loss of standing at any time by word or deed? Were
you tempted to? Why did you refrain?
47. When you tried to add others to the organization, whom did you
seek? What type of people, in general, were you interested in?
48. Did the organization live up to your ideal? Why?
49. Who were the most powerful ones in the organization at
different periods? What were your relations with them? What did you
do consciously to win them? Success? What did you do to antagonize
them? How did they take it? What, in short, was the attitude of the
leaders toward you?
50. Did you ever have a sense of frustration arising from your
failure to participate in discussions of policy, either because you
hesitated to express yourself or because you expressed yourself
badly?
51. What is your matured judgment of the utility of this
organization in society?
52. How did your organization connections help or hurt you socially
or any other way?
53. How did your outside connections help or hurt you in the
organization?
54. What, generally speaking, were your advantages and
disadvantages with reference to securing and holding a prominent
position in the organization?
55. In general, what place did this organization play in your life?
56. With respect to each one of your so-called free-lance or very
personal activities, answer such questions as these: How did you
happen to take it up? Upon what factors would your success and
failure depend? What did you do to manage the persons upon whom
success or failure depended? With what result? What reaction
did your experience have upon your outlook upon political life
generally?
INDEX
Abraham, Karl, 103, 150 n.
Adjustive thinking, 226
Adler, Alfred, 71 ff.
Administrators:
definition and histories of, 127 ff.;
general theory of, 151 ff.
Adolescence and politics, 187
Agitators:
definition and histories of, 78 ff.;
general theory of, 124 ff.
Aichhorn, August, 230
Alexander, Franz, 139, 178, 182, 199, 220 n., 254
Allport, Floyd, 58
Anderson, John, 232
Apfelbach, Hans, 61, 62, 64
Aristotle, 39
Attitudes, 234 ff.
Autistic reveries, 226
Bernfeld, S., 177
Bernheim, 20
Biography, political, uses and limitations of, 3
Birnbaum, K., 200 n.
Bjerre, 239
Blackstone, 175
Bleuler, 71
Blondel, 11
Blüher, Hans, 178 n.
Boas, 13
Bodin, 54
Boss, 48
Breuer, 19
Bridgman, P. W., 251 n.
Brücke, 18
Bryce, 252
Bühler, Charlotte, 230
Burrow, Trigant, 201 n.
Carlyle, 42
Case histories, 3 ff., 78 ff.
Catharsis, 195
Catlin, G. E. G., 46
Charcot, 18
Chave, 59 n.
Chicago, University of, 13, 201 n., 207 n.
Christensen, 39, 53 n.
Composite types, 53
Comte, 10
Consensus, 192
Convictions, political, 153 ff.
Conway, 52, 53 n.
Co-relational types, 55
Cowley, W. H., 59
Crises, political, 179 ff.
Croner, Else, 232 n.
Crowd, 193 n.
Debate, zone of, 192
De Grange, 10 n.
Democracy, 194 ff.
Despot, 46
Deutsch, Helene, 123 n.
Developmental types, 60
Dicey, 1
Dictator, 197
Dilthey, 11, 49
Discussion, 194 ff.
Dream, 26
Durkheim, 10
Eder, 173, 181, 190
Education, 201
Ellis, Havelock, 83 n., 199
Emotional bonds, 185, 192
Energy of developed personality, 65
Events, subjective and external, 240 ff.
Exhortation, 196
Fabian Society, 186
Familiarization, a purpose of the study, 14
Federn, Paul, 180, 234
Ferenczi, S., 71, 97, 103 n., 105 n., 150 n., 213, 220 n., 255
Fliess, 62, 69
Follett, Mary L., 48
Forms of expression, thought and interest, 235 ff.
Formula for development of political man, 75
Frazer, 73
Free-fantasy, 32
Freud, 12, 17 ff., 64, 65 ff., 103, 104 n., 111 n., 179 n., 199, 204
ff., 223, 256 ff.
Friendship and politics, 192
Functional meaning of politics, 42
Garner, J. W., 2
Giese, Fritz, 55, 56, 57, 60
Glover, E., 103 n.
Gneist, 1
Goodenough, Florence, 229
Gosnell, H. F., 53 n., 249 n.
Gould, 7 n.
Hall, G. Stanley, 71
Hamilton, G. V., 70
Hartman, Dale, 59 n.
Healy, William, 13
Heimsoth, K. G., 178
Hetzer, Hildegard, 231
Hobbes, 54
Hoffmann, 232
_Homo politicus_, 50
Hoover, 54
Hypnosis, 20
Identification, 256
Institutional meaning of politics, 42
Interview as a method, 204 ff.
Intimacy and politics, 187
Ireland, 7 n.
Irrationality and politics, 184, 193 ff.
Janet, Pierre, 18, 104 n., 223
Jellinek, 2
Jones, E., 103 n., 179 n.
Jung, 62 ff., 73 ff., 205
Keilholz, A., 179 n.
Kelsen, Hans, 2, 243 ff., 257 ff.
Kempf, E. J., 115 n., 159 n., 197
Kjellén, 2
Koller, 19
Kretschmer, 40, 81
Kropotkin, 92
Laband, 1
Lange-Eichbaum, W., 7 n., 200 n.
Laski, H. J., 2
Lassalle, 53
Lasswell, H. D., 3 n., 28 n., 39 n., 202 n., 204 n., 205 n., 221 n.
Lazarus, 12
Lee, Sir Edward, 1
Lenin, 54
Liébeault, 20
Logical thought, limitations of, 28 ff.
Lombroso, 7 n.
Lowell, A. L., 53 n., 191
Lowie, R. H., 243
Lynd, R. S. and Helen, 250 n.
Machiavelli, 39
Marx, Karl, 53
Masaryk, 53, 220
Masturbation, cultural history of, 83 n.
Meaning of political patterns, 248
Mechanism types, 63
Merriam, Charles E., 39, 46, 52, 53 n., 59, 249 n.
Meynart, 18
Michels, Robert, 39, 52, 53 n., 60
Möbius, 7 n.
Moore, Henry T., 58
Morgan, J. P., & Co., 45
Morley, John, 1
Movements, vitality of political, 173 ff.
Mowrer, E. A., 180
Munro, W. B., 40, 53 n.
Nancy, 20
Nexo, 186
Nuclear types, 49
Nunberg, 220 n.
Object orientation, 225
Old Testament prophets, 54
Paine, Tom, 54
Paley, 174
Park, Robert E., 192, 193 n.
Parten, Mildred, 230
Pathological, 200
Personality, 221
Persuasion, personal, oratorical and written, 188
Political methods, 196
Political movements, 173 ff.
Political patterns, 248 ff.
Political practices, 235
Political symbolization, 183 ff.
Political tension level, 185
Political types, 38 ff.
Politician, 47
Politics:
and conflict, 196;
effect of, on politicians, 198;
institutional and functional meaning of, 42
Prevention, politics of, 173 ff.
Propaganda and unconscious motives, 189
Psychoanalysis, 15
Psychopathology, 15
Public, 193 n.
Quantitative approach, 251
Radiating nucleus, 187
Radin, Paul, 13
Rado, S., 179 n.
Rank, O., 74, 205, 220 n.
Reactive interpretation, 222
Reich, Wilhelm, 105 n.
Reik, Theodor, 175, 213
Reininger, Karl, 231
Revolution, 179
Rice, S. A., 41
Rich, Gilbert J., 59
Rinaldo, Joel, 104 n.
Rohmer, 53 n.
Rôles, specialized and composite, 54
Rousseau, 54
Ruggiero, 40
Ruml, B., 201 n.
Rush, 199
Sadger, Wilhelm, 103 n.
Schmidt, 2
Sexuality, rôle of, 66 ff.
Shaw, Bernard, 78
Sidgwick, 2
Simmel, Georg, 11, 52
Smith, Adam, 48
Social scientist, 201
Somatic reactions, 226
Specialized types, 53
Spranger, Eduard, 49 ff., 232 n.
Statesman, 46
Staub, 182, 254
Steindhal, 12
Stekel, Wilhelm, 71, 74, 157
Strachey, Lytton, 1
Sullivan, Harry Stack, 126 n., 207 n., 233 n.
Sward Keith, 59 n.
Symbolization in politics, 185 ff.
Symbols, political, as targets of displacement, 183
Tendency interpretations, 221
Tension level, 185
Thomas, Dorothy S., 229, 230 n.
Thomas, W. I., 12, 188, 230 n.
Thurstone, L. L., 59
Tissot, 83 n.
Types:
co-relational, 55;
developmental, 60;
institutional and functional, 42;
nuclear, 49;
specialized and composite, 53
Typologies, popular and scientific, 39
Values, changes of, 201
Vienna, University of, 18
Vierkandt, 12
Views, political, 234 ff.
Violence a political method, 196
Voltaire, 83 n.
Wagner-Jauregg, 19
Walker, Marjorie, 230
Wallas, Graham, 46
Weber, Max, 39, 52
Weininger, 62
Wertheimer and Hesketh, 81
White, William A., 179 n.
Willoughby, W. W., 2
Winkler, Viktor, 231
Wittals, Fritz, 22
Wordsworth, W., 70
Zilboorg, Gregory, 123
Znaniecki, F., 12
FOOTNOTES
[1] See Harold D. Lasswell, “The Study of the Ill as a Method of
Research on Political Personalities,” _American Political Science
Review_, November, 1929.
[2] “Psychosis” means the more serious mental disturbances; “neurosis”
means the less serious ones.
[3] The best summary of this literature is Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum,
_Genie-Irrsinn und Ruhm_. See also the works of Ireland, Lombroso,
Möbius, and Gould.
[4] See De Grange’s excellent treatment of this matter in his paper on
the methodology of Comte in the case book to be published by the Social
Science Research Council.
[5] What has been said above is current in the biography of Freud by
Fritz Wittals, and in Freud’s autobiographical sketches.
[6] Modified from “Self-Analysis and Judicial Thinking,” _International
Journal of Ethics_, April, 1930.
[7] The training should, of course, be conducted by a specialist alert
to his responsibilities.
[8] “Politik als Beruf,” in _Gesammelte Schriften_.
[9] I summarized some of this literature in “Types of Political
Personalities,” _Proceedings of the American Sociological Society,
1927_. Reprinted in _Personality and the Group_ (edited by Burgess).
[10] _Personality in Politics._
[11] _The History of European Liberalism._
[12] _Physique and Character_, chap. xiii.
[13] _Quantitative Methods in Politics_, chap. v.
[14] _The Science and Method of Politics._
[15] _The New State._
[16] It is not profitable to pursue these distinctions farther. I
should prefer to distinguish the statesman from the politician by
treating the latter as a function of a democratically organized
community and as one who is limited to persuasion in the advancement of
his conceptions of public right. The statesman may use force, and is
not necessarily a function of democratically organized society.
[17] His viewpoint is best expressed in “Die Typen der Weltanschauung,”
in _Weltanschauung-Philosophie und Religion in Darstellungen_ (edited
by M. Frischeisen-Kohler).
[18] _Soziologie_, chap. iii.
[19] _Grundriss der Sozialökonomik_, III, 1.
[20] See Robert Michels, _Political Parties_; C. E. Merriam, _American
Party System_, and _Introduction_ to H. F. Gosnell’s _Boss Platt and
His New York Machine_; Martin Conway, _Instincts of the Herd in Peace
and War_; Lowell, _Public Opinion in War and Peace_; Rohmer, _Die Vier
Parteien_; A. Christensen, _Politics and Crowd Morality_; W. B. Munro,
_Personality in Politics_.
[21] _Die öffentliche Persönlichkeit._ Beihefte zur _Zeitschrift für
angewandte Psychologie_, Vol. XLIV.
[22] “Innate Factors in Radicalism and Conservatism,” _Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology_, XX (1925-26), 234-44.
[23] Allport really used a rank-order method of handling opinion
expressions which he unjustifiably treated as marking definite
positions along a base line. Thurstone has greatly improved the
technique of opinion measurement. See Thurstone and Chave, _The
Measurement of Attitude_ (Chicago, 1929). For Allport’s original paper
(with D. A. Hartman), see “Measurement and Motivation of Atypical
Opinion in a Certain Group,” _American Political Science Review_, XIX
(1925), 735-60.
[24] “Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders,” _Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology_, Vol. XXIII (July-September, 1928).
[25] By Keith Sward, Social Science Research Council Fellow, and
others. I discuss the problem of evaluating test results later on.
[26] “A Biochemical Approach to the Study of Personality,” _Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology_, Vol. XXIII (July-September, 1928).
[27] Hans Apfelbach, _Der Aufbau des Charakters_. Cf. Otto Weininger,
_Geschlecht und Charakter_; Fliess, _Ablauf des Lebens_.
[28] C. G. Jung, _Psychological Types_, chap. x.
[29] _Beyond the Pleasure Principle._
[30] “The Significance of Physical Constitution in Mental Disease,”
_Medicine_, V (1926), 375-451.
[31] The popular superstition about the dangers of masturbation seems
to have become widespread in Western Europe in the eighteenth century.
Havelock Ellis dates it from the appearance of a sensational book by
an anonymous English doctor which was called _Onania: or the Heinous
Sin of Self-Pollution and All Its Frightful Consequences in Both Sexes,
Considered, with Spiritual and Physical Advice, etc._ This is said to
have passed through eighty editions and to have been translated into
German. Tissot, a physician of Lausanne, contributed his _Traité_ on
the same subject in Latin in 1760. This appeared in French four years
later, and subsequently in nearly all European languages. His watchword
was that masturbation was a crime, “an act of suicide.” Voltaire
popularized his viewpoint in the _Dictionnaire philosophique_, and
the tradition became firmly set. See Havelock Ellis, _Studies in the
Psychology of Sex_, I, 248-49. The cultural relativity of this attitude
toward masturbation is brought out in ethnological reports.
[32] _Psychoanalytische Studien zur Charakterbildung_ (International
Psychoanalytische Bibliothek, 1925), Nr. XVI. Freud’s first
contribution to the subject was published in 1908. His brief article,
“Charakter and Analerotik,” is reprinted in the fifth volume of the
_Gesammelte Schriften_. Others who have written in the same field are
Sadger, Ferenczi, Jones, and E. Glover.
[33] Joel Rinaldo paraphrases Freud in his _Psychoanalysis of the
“Reformer”_ and without supporting cases argues that the reformer is
always a meddling hysteric. This is not to be taken for granted, for
he may more often prove to be an obsessive type, when he shows mental
pathology. For the best picture of the two clinical types, see Janet,
_Les névroses_.
[34] See Ferenczi, _Versuch einer Genitaltheorie_ (Internationale
Psychoanalytische Bibliothek, 1924), Band XV, esp. Sec. V. Also Wilhelm
Reich, _Die Funktion des Orgasmus_.
[35] See Freud’s discussion of paranoia in his “Psychoanalytische
Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von
Paranoia,” _Gesammelte Schriften_, Band VIII.
[36] This grandfather committed suicide at an unreported age, and his
youngest son is said to be “very nervous.” B’s oldest sister had a
nervous breakdown in high school. The third sister is “neurotic.” B is
described as having been a frail infant, and a shy child. Bed-wetting
continued until he was twelve or fourteen, and he occasionally had
attacks of indigestion. Physical examination failed to disclose any
significant physical factor in his difficulties.
[37] Examples are given in Kempf’s _Psychopathology_, and in other
textbooks on the subject.
[38] See Helene Deutsch, _Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunction_.
[39] See “The Dynamics of Schizophrenic Reactions Related to Pregnancy
and Childbirth,” _American Journal of Psychiatry_, VIII (1929), 733-66.
[40] The physician in charge of this case comments that there may be a
homosexual _anlage_ on the physical level, but that this is not certain.
[41] Harry Stack Sullivan has stressed the critical importance for
personality growth of the adolescent phase in which the individual is
impelled to enter into intimate emotional relations with one or two
other persons of his own age. Those who partially fail in this show
various warps in their subsequent development.
[42] “Der neurotische Charakter,” _Internationale Zeitschrift für
Psychoanalyse_, XIV (1928), 26-44.
[43] Abraham and Ferenczi have reported cases of this kind.
[44] _Op. cit._, p. 448.
[45] See the chapter on “Psycho-analysis in Relation to Politics” in
_Social Aspects of Psycho-Analysis_ (London, 1924).
[46] “Dogma und Zwangsidee,” _Imago_, XIII (1927), 247-382.
[47] Succinctly described in “Über eine typische Form der männlichen
pubertät,” _Imago_, IX (1923), 169 ff. On the homoerotic elements
see Hans Blüher, _Die deutsche Wandervogelbewegung als erotisches
Phänomen_, and his more elaborate volume cited in the Bibliography.
[48] I was kindly permitted to see this manuscript which is not yet
published.
[49] See Sandor Rado, “Die psychischen Wirkungen der Rauschgifte,”
_Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse_, XII (1926), 540-56; A.
Keilholz, “Analyseversuch bei Delirium Tremens,” _ibid._, pp. 478-92;
and Stekel’s volumes.
[50] For a sketch of the unconscious processes involved in warfare see
S. Freud, “Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod,” _Imago_, IV (1915-16),
1-21; Ernest Jones, _Essays in Psycho-Analysis_; William A. White,
_Thoughts of a Psychiatrist on the War and After_.
[51] _Chicago Daily News_, July 20, 1927.
[52] The distinction between the crowd and the public is best developed
in the writings of Robert E. Park. Freud undertook to explain the crowd
on the theory that an emotional bond was forged by identification
of the individual with a leader, and by a process of partial
identification through the perception of this similar relationship
to the leader. He set out from the observation that when people are
interacting upon one another they behave differently than when they
are alone. The loss of individuality represents a relinquishment
of narcissistic gratification which can only come when libido is
directed outward toward objects. Freud’s theory applies strictly to
a special case of crowd behavior only. Crowd states may also arise
when interlocking partial identifications occur on the perception of
a common threat. Crowd behavior often arises before anybody assumes a
“leading” rôle, and rival leaders are “selected” by the crowd.
[53] _Studies in the Psychology of Sex_, I, 231.
[54] Kempf, _Psychopathology_, p. 704.
[55] Franz Alexander, “Mental Hygiene and Criminology,” _First
International Congress on Mental Hygiene_.
[56] For an appreciation of the rôle of the pathological person in
society see Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum, _Genie-Irrsinn, und Ruhm_, and Karl
Birnbaum, _Grundzüge der Kulturpsychopathologie_.
[57] Something like this is no doubt the thought in Trigant Burrow’s
very obscure book on _The Social Basis of Consciousness_.
[58] This point was forcibly made by Beardsley Ruml in his speech
at the dedication of the Social Science Research Building at the
University of Chicago. See _The New Social Science_, edited by Leonard
D. White, pp. 99-111.
[59] I have suggested that those who write human biography should be
included among those who require this comprehensive training. See “The
Scientific Study of Human Biography,” _Scientific Monthly_, January,
1930.
[60] Modified and expanded from “The Psychoanalytic Interview as a
Method of Research on Personalities,” in _The Child’s Emotions_, pp.
136-59.
[61] See Harold D. Lasswell, “The Problem of Adequate Personality
Records: A Proposal,” _American Journal of Psychiatry_, May 1929. Also
Appendix B of _The Proceedings of the First Colloquium on Personality
Investigation_.
[62] We are now engaged upon studies of this kind at the Personality
Laboratory in the Social Science Research Building at the University of
Chicago. Harry Stack Sullivan is conducting a series of researches on
expression changes, with particular reference to schizophrenia, which
are of the greatest importance.
[63] The topic of reliable criteria will be dealt with in detail in the
reports upon experiments in progress.
[64] The best technical discussions of the nature of the analytical
situation are in the writings of Freud, Rank, Ferenczi, Nunberg, and
Alexander.
[65] Expanded from an article with the same title which appeared in the
_Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology_, January, 1930.
[66] Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Associates, _Some New Techniques for
Studying Social Behavior_.
[67] “Die ersten sozialen Verhaltungsweisen des Kindes,” _Quellen und
Studien zur Jugendkunde_, Heft 5.
[68] Referred to by John E. Anderson, “The Genesis of Social Reactions
in the Young Child,” _The Unconscious: A Symposium_. These researches
are abstracted in William I. Thomas and Dorothy S. Thomas, _The Child
in America_.
[69] _Über soziale Verhaltungsweisen in der Vorpubertät_, “Wiener
Arbeiten zur pädogogischen Psychologie” (herausgegeben von Charlotte
Bühler and Viktor Fadrus), Heft 2.
[70] _Das volkstümliche Kinderspiel_, Heft 6, in the same series as the
above.
[71] “Psychologie des Jugendführers,” _Quellen und Studien zur
Jugendkunde_ (herausgegeben von Dr. Charlotte Bühler).
[72] _Das Problem des Charakteraufbaus_, pp. 68-80. See E. Spranger,
_Psychologie des Jugendalters_, and Else Croner, “Die Psyche der
weiblichen Jugend,” _Schriften zur Frauenbildung_, Heft 6.
[73] _Internationale Psychoanalytische Bibliotek_, Band XIX.
[74] See especially p. 278. Harry Stack Sullivan is tracing out
the developmental history of various forms of personality in his
forthcoming volume on _Personal Psychopathology_.
[75] Paul Federn commented in his pamphlet that a democratic state must
depend upon a democratic family life.
[76] See his excellent methodological chapter in _The Psychology of
Murder_.
[77] _The Origin of the State._
[78] Not to be confused with mind-body parallelism, which is not
accepted.
[79] Cf. Kelsen, _Der Soziologische und der juristische
Staatsbegriff_; “Der Begriff des Staates und die Sozialpsychologie,”
_Imago_, VIII (1922), 97-141; “The Conception of the State and Social
Psychology,” _International Journal of Psycho-Analysis_, V (1924), 1-38.
[80] Perhaps the most important part of the Merriam and Gosnell study
of _Non-Voting_ is the symposium of conversational scraps which suggest
what balloting actually means to various classes and sections of a
modern metropolitan community.
[81] Such criticism has been directed against the pioneer venture of
the Lynds, _Middletown_.
[82] An able discussion of the operational concept is in P. W.
Bridgman, _The Logic of Modern Physics_.
[83] Alexander and Staub have commented on this in _Der Verbrecher
und seine Richter_. But it is principally due to the suspicion of the
public officer.
[84] See his sketch of social psychology in _Massenpsychologie und
Ich-Analyse_.
[85] More specifically, Kretschmer’s _Psychobiogramm_, published in
H. Hoffmann, _Das Problem des Charakteraufbaus_, as an appendix;
Heyman’s trait list (republished in _Gesammelte Kelinere Schriften_,
Dritter Teil); the psychograms of W. Stern (in _Die differentielle
Psychologie in ihren methodischen Grundlagen_), of Baade, Lipman, and
Stern (_Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie_, Band III), of P.
Margis (Breslau dissertation, 1911, _Das Problem und die Methoden der
Psychographie mit einer Individualanalyse von E. T. A. Hoffmann_), of
L. Lewin (_Friedrich Hebbel: Beitrag zu einem Psychogramm_ [Berlin,
1913]), of E. Stern (“Patho-psychographische Untersuchungen,” _Archiv
für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten_, Band LXI), of F. Kehrer and
S. Fischer (“Modell einer klinisch-experimentellen Pathographie,”
_Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie_, Band LXXXV);
the outlines of Dr. Paul Federn (_Schema der Libidoaufnahme_, MSS in my
possession), of F. D. Wells (MSS in my possession), of G. V. Hamilton,
of Adolf Meyer (mimeographed MSS in my possession), of Amsden and Hoch,
of Floyd Allport, and the lists of Woodworth, Laird, House, Freyd and
Thurstone.