The majority of industrial workers are p_Area Handbook for Bulgaria

the importance of piecework has been declining and has varied widely

among industrial branches. In 1971 almost 62 percent of the workers were

paid on this basis--a significantly smaller proportion than the 80

percent of workers remunerated in this manner in 1957. The proportion of

workers employed on the piecework basis in 1971 was highest in the

manufacture of clothing--89.5 percent--and lowest in the production of

coal and petroleum--25.2 percent. In construction, 84.6 percent of the

workers were paid on the piecework basis.

The average annual wage of all industrial workers in 1971 was 1,526

leva, compared to an average of 962 leva in 1960. On the whole, wages of

production workers were somewhat higher than wages of auxiliary

personnel, and the pay of white-collar production workers was higher

than that of blue-collar workers. The average wage of workers in

capital goods industries was 21 percent higher than the wage of workers

in consumer goods industries. The wage was highest in mining and lowest

in manufacturing. Within the state industrial branches, average annual

wages ranged from 2,009 leva in the production of coal and petroleum to

1,196 leva in the manufacture of clothing. Wages in collective industry

were generally lower than in state industry; the difference between the

average annual wages in these sectors was 12 percent.

Industrial productivity and growth have suffered from a shortage of

trained workers and technical personnel. The supply of skilled workers

in the fall of 1972 was reported to be only half the number needed to

fill available positions. Responsibility for this situation has been

placed, in part, on the lack of coordination between the industrial

ministries and the Ministry of National Education concerning technical

and vocational training programs. There has been a pronounced

disproportion in the numbers of trainees in the various technical

specialities, and technical training generally has not been up to the

level demanded by modern technology. Enterprises themselves have been

slow in undertaking to train their own workers. The scarcity of skilled

personnel has been accentuated by the export of trained workers to the

Soviet Union to help develop the exportation of mineral and timber

resources in return for raw material imports.

Poor labor discipline and excessive labor turnover have aggravated the

shortage of skilled workers. The turnover has been particularly high

among younger workers. Dissatisfaction with the job, or with living and

transportation conditions, and the search for better pay have been cited

as the main reasons for the turnover. Progressively severe measures have

been introduced to enforce stricter labor discipline, but their

effectiveness has been weakened by lax application. One of these

measures concerning movement of labor gave workers the right to quit

their jobs freely but stipulated that any worker seeking reemployment

had to do so through district labor bureaus set up for that purpose. The

bureaus would direct the job applicants to industries and positions

where labor was most urgently needed. Because of the shortage of skilled

labor, however, enterprise managers continued to hire new labor without

regard to the requirements of the law.

The shortage of adequately trained personnel adversely affects the

utilization of available capacity; it entails frequent breakdowns of

machinery and inhibits multishift operation of plants. More than 20

percent of worktime is usually lost through idling, and equipment is

used at no more than 50 to 60 percent of capacity. New plants completed

in 1967 had not reached full production in 1972. Productivity has also

been kept low by the lack of mechanization of auxiliary activities, such

as loading and unloading, inter- and intrashop transport, and

warehousing. In 1972 the minister of labor and social welfare stated

that labor productivity in Bulgarian metallurgy was only half as high

as in some of the advanced industrial states.

The presence of unemployment has never been officially admitted, but a

certain degree of unemployment and underemployment, nevertheless, exists

in several rural areas of the country. Recognition of this fact was

evident in the decision of the BKP Central Committee plenum, published

in March 1970, on the territorial redistribution of production forces

(relocation of industry) and in subsequent economic studies concerning

this subject.

PRODUCTION

Gross industrial output amounted to about 13.9 billion leva in 1970 and

reached 15 billion leva in 1971. According to official data, industrial

output more than tripled in the 1960-71 period. The high average annual

growth rate of 11.1 percent was accounted for, in part, by the low

initial level of industrial development, as a result of which relatively

small absolute increases in output were equivalent to high percentage

rates of growth. The contribution of industry to national income (net

material product) rose from 46 percent in 1960 to 50 percent in 1969 but

declined to 49 percent in 1970.

The most rapid growth occurred in basic industries that were given

priority in the allocation of investment and labor. Production of the

iron and steel industry rose almost ninefold, and the output of fuels,

chemicals, and rubber increased more than sixfold. The output of machine

building and metalworking industries increased 5-1/2 times, and the

production of electric power, building materials, and cellulose and

paper rose about fourfold. Preferential development of basic industries

continued through 1972.

The lowest growth rates among basic industries were attained by the

timber and woodworking industry and nonferrous metallurgy. Some foreign

observers have wondered when the available nonferrous ore reserves have

not been exploited more intensively. As for timber production, its

volume has been restricted by the limitation of forest resources.

Production by consumer goods industries generally increased by from 2.1

to 2.7 times, except for glass and porcelain wares, the output of which

rose almost fivefold.

By far the most important industries in terms of output value in 1970

were food processing, and machine building and metalworking; these

industries accounted for 25.4 and 20.2 percent of total output,

respectively. Next in importance, with 9.1 percent and 7.5 percent of

the total were the textile and the chemical and rubber industries. The

output of the clothing industry--4.9 percent of total output--surpassed

the production of fuels. The contributions of other industries to the

total industrial output ranged from 0.9 to 3.7 percent. The structure of

industrial output in value terms reflects, in part, the system of prices

used in valuing the output.

Although the country's industrial development has had a history of only

two decades, industry produces a wide variety of industrial and consumer

products, including machine tools, ships, computers, automatic telephone

exchanges, and television sets (see table 20). Bulgaria was also

reported to possess the largest plant in Europe, and second largest in

the world, for the production of electric forklifts and similar

industrial vehicles. The quality of many products, however, though

improving, has not measured up to average world standards. In 1972 the

chairman of the Administration for Quality Standardization, and

Metrology stated that his organization was confronted with a difficult

long-term task of developing an effective quality control system and of

catching up and keeping pace with the constantly rising world quality

standards. In his view, attainment of these goals required a fundamental

improvement of domestic quality standards, effective organizational and

technical measures, well-conceived incentives, and an enormous amount of

indoctrination of the personnel involved in production. The chairman was

confident, nevertheless, that the country's industry would eventually

outstrip the qualitative standards of developed industrial nations in

the same way that it had succeeded in outstripping these nations'

industries with regard to quantitative growth.

_Table 20. Output of Selected Industrial Products in Bulgaria, Selected

Years, 1960-71_

-------------------+----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------

Product | Unit | 1960 | 1965 | 1968 | 1970 | 1971

-------------------+----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------

| kilowatt hours| 4,657 |10,244 |15,451 |19,513 |21,016

| metric tons |10,630 |10,116 | 9,930 | 7,280 | 6,450

Lignite | do | 5,356 |14,926 |20,967 |21,971 |20,558

Coke | do | 20 | 733 | 817 | 837 | 1,091

Crude oil | do | 200 | 229 | 475 | 334 | 305

| cubic yards | ... | 94 | 662 | 619 | 428

| metric tons | 188 | 585 | 870 | 792 | 993

Manganese ore[2] | do | 7 | 13 | 12 | 10 | 12

Pig iron | do | 136 | 547 | 1,064 | 1,195 | 1,329

Crude steel | do | 253 | 588 | 1,461 | 1,800 | 1,947

Rolled steel | do | 193 | 431 | 1,028 | 1,420 | 1,752

Steel tubes | do | 11 | 10 | 19 | 114 | 136

Copper ore[2] | do | 11 | 30 | 37 | 42 | n.a.

Lead-zinc ore[2] | do | 173 | 180 | 168 | 173 | n.a.

Electrolytic copper| do | 14 | 24 | 37 | 38 | n.a.

Lead | do | 40 | 93 | 93 | 97 | n.a.

Zinc | do | 17 | 66 | 75 | 76 | n.a.

Cement | do | 1,568 | 2,681 | 3,512 | 3,668 | 3,880

| cubic yards | 5,046 | 5,680 | 5,140 | 5,166 | 4,923

| metric tons | 54 | 85 | 187 | 200 | 215

fertilizers[3] | do | 84 | 246 | 276 | 287 | 306

Urea[3] | do | 2 | 15 | 228 | 315 | 256

Superphosphate[4] | do | 41 | 94 | 136 | 148 | 146

Pesticides[5] | do | 2 | 6 | 12 | 15 | 16

Automobile tires | do | 172 | 327 | 333 | 546 | 730

engines | horsepower | 155 | 179 | 280 | 229 | 250

machine tools | | 3,145 | 8,063 |11,160 |13,945 |14,636

Presses | do | 203 | 609 | 944 | 977 | 763

Textile looms | do | 505 | 555 | 1,088 | 676 | 437

Tractors | do | ... | 2,800 | 2,961 | 3,493 | 4,668

Freight cars | do | 2,007 | 1,583 | 1,550 | 1,991 | 2,016

Electric forklift | do | 3,104 |16,562 |22,673 |29,641 |30,202

Telephones | do | 80 | 57 | 245 | 349 | 416

Ships | do | 12 | 11 | 26 | 27 | n.a.

Radio sets | do | 157 | 130 | 139 | 145 | 148

Television sets | do |[6]... | 74 | 158 | 193 | 158

(domestic) | do | 3 | 41 | 91 | 134 | 140

(domestic)| | do | 38 | 89 | 184 | 56 | 57

Cotton textiles |million yards | 239 | 355 | 349 | 349 | 355

Woolen textiles | do | 20 | 31 | 25 | 29 | 31

Footwear[7] |million pairs | 7,534 |10,062 |15,671 |13,627 |16,095

Leather shoes | do |(4,251)|(5,154)|(5,781)|(4,105)|(4,694)

Rubber footwear | do |11,239 |12,683 |13,485 |12,805 |13,683

-------------------+----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------

n.a.--not available.

1: Anthracite, bituminous, and brown coal.

2: Metal content.

3: Nitrogen content.

4: P_{2}O_{5} content

5: Active ingredients.

6: Fewer than 400 units.

7: Excluding house slippers and rubber footwear.

SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 15

PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY

To maintain order and to retain control of the population, party and

governmental authorities rely on a number of police and security

organizations that are able to exert physical force and, also, upon a

group of large social organizations that are able to apply social

pressures. When individuals, in spite of the efforts of the law

enforcement agencies and the social organizations, engage in antisocial

or criminal behavior, the courts are charged with handing down

appropriate sentences, and the penal institutions are concerned with

rehabilitating the individuals for eventual return to society as

cooperative and productive members.

People's Militia units throughout the country are the local police

forces that enforce the laws, combat crime, and monitor the population.

They are assisted in local law enforcement by part-time voluntary

paramilitary auxiliaries and, in serious situations, by a small,

centrally organized, full-time internal security force that can act as a

light infantry unit and move quickly to any part of the country. State

security police, evolved from the secret police of the 1940s and 1950s

but much reduced in size, deal with crimes that are national in scope or

that pose a threat to the society or its institutions. Authorities

credit the security police with having almost eliminated the possibility

of large-scale subversive activities. The militia, its volunteer

auxiliaries, and the security units are organized within the Ministry of

Internal Affairs.

Border and construction troop organizations are administered separately.

The Border Troops, charged with defense of the country's boundaries and

with control of a border zone around the country's periphery, are a part

of the Bulgarian People's Army and are under the Ministry of National

Defense. The Construction Troops are labor forces, but the bulk of their

personnel comes from the annual military draft, and they are organized

into regular military units and are subject to military regulations and

discipline.

The rights of the individual citizen are defended in the 1971

Constitution and in the Criminal Code of 1968, which was not altered by

the constitution. The latter states that a crime can only be an act so

identified in the code and for which a punishment is prescribed. These

principles can and have been abused--the state is set above the

individual, and the judicial machinery is within an agency of the

executive branch of the government--but those who exercise the machinery

have become increasingly responsive to its guiding statutes. The limits

on punishments that are set down in the code allow somewhat greater

sentences to be handed down upon those committing crimes against the

state or state property than upon individuals or private property.

INTERNAL SECURITY

State and Internal Security Forces

During the time of readjustment after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953,

Bulgaria's police state period gradually came to a close. In the postwar

period until then, the country had had police machinery modeled on that

of Stalinist Soviet Union, with state security troops (secret police)

and garrisoned interior troops equipped like mobile army infantry units.

The state security troops, the garrisoned interior troops, and the

regular police forces are estimated to have totaled about 200,000 men.

Although state and internal security organs have been shifted among

ministries and renamed, and there has been an occasional move to abolish

them, they continue to exist in Bulgaria. Although the organizational

form is probably much the same as before, that is, an internal security

force and a state security police, the security apparatus has only a

fraction of its former personnel and has been shorn of its more

arbitrary powers. According to some observers, Bulgaria has emerged from

a police state, wherein security forces held arbitrary powers of arrest

that instilled fear in the people, to a police bureaucracy in which the

militia meddles in peoples' lives to the point of public frustration.

People no longer have reason to fear the tyranny of a secret police, but

they have developed a strong resentment of the petty militia regulations

that affect their daily lives.

State security functions--those that deal with espionage, treason, and

the group of so-called political crimes aimed at undermining or

upsetting the system--have been performed by a separate secret police

organization that was typical in communist systems, particularly during

the Stalinist period. An overriding preoccupation with state security

has not been as prevalent in Bulgaria as in many communist countries,

because the communist government had established itself firmly in

control of the country in a relatively short time. Nonetheless, a

sizable secret police force existed for many years and, after a reign of

terror lasting until 1948, the secret police contributed to a general

atmosphere of repression that lasted until the mid-1950s. After that

time most police functions were assumed by the People's Militia, and the

secret police faded into the background, greatly reduced in size and

importance but still functioning within one of the government

ministries.

After the unsuccessful coup d'etat of April 1965, there was a resurgence

of secret police activity with the creation of the new Committee of

State Security. As the political situation stabilized in the late 1960s,

the Committee of State Security was reabsorbed into the Ministry of

Internal Affairs, where the remaining units of state security police

continue to operate. They are evidently considered necessary in order to

take care of relations with foreigners, to collect some military

intelligence at the governmental level, and to monitor any potential

espionage or criminal activities that might pose a threat to the state.

The day-to-day role of the small remnant of the internal security force

is unknown. This elite, militarized unit, however, is probably held as a

bulwark against any large-scale, organized dissension.

The People's Militia

The People's Militia (local police) deals with crime and maintains

routine day-to-day contacts with the people. The militia operates under

the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and has intermediate

administrative offices at the level of the _okrug_ (district) and local

police stations at the _rayon_ (municipal) or _obshtina_ (urban borough

or village commune) level. Although the primary control descends from

the Ministry of Internal Affairs, all militia organizations have a

degree of responsibility to the people's councils at their levels.

Local militia forces ordinarily work only in the areas under the

jurisdiction of their people's councils. In urgent circumstances they

may be called upon the Ministry of Internal Affairs to assist the

militia in neighboring areas, and they may even cross _okrug_ lines. To

operate outside their own areas on their own volition they must have the

permission of an agency in the ministry.

The police are charged with maintaining order, enforcing the laws,

protecting personal and public property, and regulating traffic. They

assist governmental and party agencies in the execution of their various

resolutions, orders, and instructions. They monitor the rules of

residence and the collection of taxes. In the event of natural disasters

or major accidents they are equipped to rescue, to give first aid, and

to transport victims to medical facilities. They supervise observance of

quarantine measures imposed by health authorities. They monitor drinking

establishments to ascertain that alcoholic beverages are not served to

alcoholics, obviously drunken persons, juveniles, and drivers of motor

vehicles. They are instructed to combat rowdy and irresponsible

behavior--hooliganism, begging, and vagrancy--and other antisocial

manifestations. They see that unsupervised and stray children are

provided for.

Many militia functions are peripheral to the primary police duties of

law enforcement and criminal investigation. Such functions include

social controls having diverse objectives ranging from gun control to

keeping undesirables off Sofia streets during visits of foreign

dignitaries. The police have unusual powers in dealing with beggars,

vagabonds, and others in the category that they classify as socially

dangerous. Some of the controls are directed at preventing crime; others

appear intended to reduce the possibility of incidents on occasions when

the presence of such persons could be embarrassing. The regulation

allows the police to prohibit individuals from visiting specified towns

or areas or even from leaving their residences for a twenty-four-hour

period. Some may be prohibited from meeting certain other specified

persons or from frequenting certain parts of towns. Such restrictions

can be for definite or for indefinite periods of time. Persons may be

denied the use of common carriers or the privilege of attending sports

events or of visiting certain public institutions. Some, prostitutes for

example, may be denied the right to become telephone subscribers. If

they think it advisable, the police may require some persons whom they

are monitoring to report to them on a daily or other regular basis.

Individually held weapons, ammunition, and explosives are accounted for

and are registered with the militia. Certain forestry and farm

personnel, hunters, sportsmen, and youth organizations are authorized to

retain controlled weapons. Explosives are permitted when they are

required in, for example, construction projects. By law there is no

production of cold weapons--brass knuckles, daggers, scimitars, and the

like--in the country.

The police collect or maintain a major share of local records for the

_obshtina_ people's councils. These records deal with vital statistics,

citizenship, identification, travel visas, registration of residences,

licenses and permits, and employment data. A person acquires Bulgarian

citizenship in the circumstances that are accepted in most other

countries--by ancestry, place of birth, or naturalization--but there may

be somewhat more than the usual number of situations in which he may

lose it. Persons are deprived of citizenship if they leave the country

unlawfully, leave lawfully but fail to return within a reasonable time

after their visas expire, go abroad to avoid military service, acquire

foreign citizenship in a manner not specified in Bulgarian law, or if

they conduct themselves abroad in ways that are contrary to Bulgaria's

interests or that are unworthy of a Bulgarian citizen. Persons not

ethnically Bulgarian are released from their citizenship upon

emigration, although they are not released unless all of their

obligations in the country are settled.

Laws governing the stay of foreigners in the country also are

administered and enforced by the militia. According to the revised law

that took effect in 1972, the whereabouts of a foreigner is subject to

the same rules that apply to Bulgarian citizens. His hotel or other

local address, therefore, must be reported to the militia within

twenty-four hours of his arrival at each stop. Tourists are usually

unaware that such detailed records of their stays are being maintained,

because hotel personnel ordinarily take care of the reporting. If the

visitor stays at the home of a Bulgarian, that citizen must report his

presence on the same twenty-four-hour basis.

A foreign visitor may travel freely otherwise, except that he may not go

to certain restricted areas or to the border zone at any place other

than at one of the designated crossing points. He must leave the country

when the time specified in his visa has expired unless he has a criminal

charge against him and is awaiting trial, has been sentenced and is

serving a term in prison or at a correctional labor camp, or has the

obligation to provide support for a person in the country.

Border Troops

The Border Troops are part of the Bulgarian People's Army and are

organized within the Ministry of National Defense. Border units resemble

regular military forces more than they do the police. They are

considered militarized security units, and some 15,000 men serve in

them.

Their mission is described as safeguarding the country's frontiers

against penetration or illegal crossing. Because they are a part of the

regular armed forces, it is presumed that in time of war they would work

in coordination with those forces. If the enemy were to penetrate into

Bulgaria, the Border Troops would be expected to control the area

immediately behind the ground forces. If Bulgarian armies were driving

the enemy beyond the borders, they would probably remain at the old

border or establish a new one if the leadership expected to retain any

newly occupied territory.

The most strictly defended borders are those shared with Greece, Turkey,

and Yugoslavia, but the border with Romania is also defended. The Border

Troops operate a number of patrol boats, both on the Danube River, where

it forms the border with Romania, and along the Black Sea coast. The

troops also control the movement of people into and within a border

zone, which is a strip approximately eight miles wide in from the

border. Smuggling, however, even large-scale smuggling, is the concern

of the Ministry of Internal Affairs customs police and not of the Border

Troops.

Construction Troops

A Bulgarian institution that is unique among the Eastern European

communist countries is the organization known as the Construction

Troops. Thousands of young men who are not called for service in the

regular armed forces are drafted into the Construction Troops, from

which the government derives productive labor at the same time that it

instills military discipline and political indoctrination into a large

segment of the young male population. Similar organizations have been

maintained since the establishment of the original Labor Service in the

early 1920s, which was a means of circumventing the World War I peace

terms that prohibited large conscript military forces. Obligatory

military service was restored during the 1930s and, as part of the

change, the Labor Service was militarized. It was made a part of the

army and remained so during World War II, when it became known as the

Labor Army.

Two types of compulsory labor forces emerged after the communist seizure

of power in 1944. The Labor Army continued in existence and, following

the example of the Soviet Union under Stalin and of the other states in

the Soviet post-World War II orbit, Bulgaria also placed those of its

citizens considered politically dangerous in forced labor camps. These

were the prison colonies populated by victims of the secret police,

persons who might or might not have had proper trials but who were

considered to be enemies of the party or the government. Some camps were

temporarily located at sites where large numbers of manual laborers were

needed, but more often camps were at permanent locations. Buildings at

all camps were flimsy, and facilities were minimal. In the early period,

while the Communists were establishing their control over the country,

about 1 percent of the population was imprisoned at hard labor in such

camps at any given time.

In the early 1970s the Construction Troops organization that had evolved

from the Labor Army was military in form and character. Its men were

provided from the annual draft and were subject to military regulations

and discipline. Its officers, who had regular military ranks, were

provided from the armed forces or had been prepared for that specific

assignment in the Construction Troops own school. The headquarters of

the organization, however, was a main administration responsible

directly to the Council of Ministers; it was not within either the

Ministry of National Defense or the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Furthermore, the work of the organization was heavy construction and, at

least in peacetime, the greatest portion of it was unrelated to any

requirement of the armed forces. The Construction Troops worked on

various construction projects on a five-day-week basis but assumed a

military routine on Saturdays, which were devoted to platoon and company

drill and to political education classes.

Until the mid-1960s the troops were used mainly in roadbuilding and land

reclamation. By the early 1970s more than one-half of their work was in

factory, housing, water supply, and other such construction. Its 1972

projects included building a tire manufacturing plant and a resort hotel

complex and harnessing a river for hydroelectric power, recreation, and

supplies of irrigation water and city water. One of the organization's

spokesmen claimed that there was not a large-scale project underway

anywhere in the country where its troops were not at work.

The men acquired in the annual draft serve two years, which satisfies

their military service obligation. Almost all of the conscripts in the

Construction Troops work as unskilled laborers. During or at the end of

their two-year tours, those who enjoy or show a special aptitude for

construction work may volunteer for extended duty tours and serve as

noncommissioned officers. Some of those who are accepted are sent to

technical schools for further education.

Career officers who are educated in the Construction Troops service

academy are expected to serve for ten years after graduation. This

school, the full title of which is the General Blagony Ivanov People's

Military School for Officers in the Construction Troops, offers a

so-called semihigher course of instruction. Applicants to it must have

completed their secondary education, and its three-year course can be

used for undergraduate transfer credit toward a university-level degree

elsewhere. Many graduates continue their education at the Higher

Institute of Construction and Engineering in Sofia, from which they may

receive a further career specialization and bachelor's or advanced

degrees.

CIVIL DEFENSE

Authorities responsible for the civil defense program justify their

efforts by arguing that modern warfare has virtually eliminated the

difference in importance between the armed forces at the front and their

support in the rear areas. They stress that it is essential to provide

for continued production and delivery of supplies, primarily foodstuffs,

that are needed for survival. Such arguments have been effective in

Bulgaria, and civil defense training is compulsory for all citizens from

twelve to sixty years of age.

The civil defense organization is staffed at all administrative levels

in the country. It is within the Ministry of National Defense in the

national government and has committees under the people's councils in

each _okrug_ and _rayon_ or _obshtina_. Committees or working teams are

also set up in manufacturing plants, enterprises, schools, and

collectives. Indicative of the importance placed upon civil defense

activities, its national chief in the early 1970s was one of the deputy

ministers of national defense, a level shared with only the topmost

officers of the military establishment.

Civil defense tasks are divided into three categories. The first

includes provision of shelters and defense for the population, providing

warning of attack, and training of the people for implementation of

dispersal and evacuation plans and for defense and salvage work. The

second includes implementation of measures intended to maintain

production and to keep transportation, communications media, and power

supplies in operation. The third includes industrial salvage,

restoration of production, fire fighting, decontamination, and provision

of medical assistance.

Specific work assignments vary widely in differing locations and

enterprises. For example, industrial teams train to maintain or restore

production. Agricultural teams work to save crops, farm animals, or to

protect feed and watering spots. People's councils at all levels, party

and youth groups, and the mass organizations are instructed to assist in

specific ways and to volunteer in other ways as opportunities arise.

Enthusiasm for civil defense activities varies widely. One town with a

population of just over 1,000, for example, built or modified areas to

shelter 6,000 people. In more typical situations tasks such as those of

civil defense that have little to contribute to the needs of the moment

receive much lower priority.

PUBLIC ORDER

The Communist Party and Social Organizations

The most important element in establishing control of the country at the

inception of the post-World War II communist government was the

Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP--see Glossary), with the iron discipline

it held over its carefully chosen members and its single-minded planning

and direction. After gaining control, the party attempted to retain its

exclusive character, insofar as possible recruiting as members only

those whose loyalty was unquestioned and who could organize and lead.

To maintain control based on a broader segment of the population, the

party then encouraged the development of a number of social and

special-interest organizations, designed to appeal to the interests of

as many of the people as possible and to enlist them in activities that

shape public opinion, regulate the conduct of the people, and support

the party and its policies. These organizations ranged in size from the

extremely large Fatherland Front and the trade unions to the painters,

writers, and composers unions, whose memberships numbered between 100

and 800 (see ch. 9).

With the exceptions of the party, the Fatherland Front, and the small

artists unions, these groups are called mass organizations. The small

unions do not qualify because they are far from massive in size; the

party and the front have the requisite membership, but they are set

apart from the others. The Fatherland Front attempts to gather members

from all other socially or politically active organizations in the

country, combining as many as possible of them within it. Its membership

includes nearly one-half of the country's population. The party,

although ostensibly a member organization of the Fatherland Front, is

set above all other organizations. It controls and directs the others

and requires them to support it in general and specific ways (see ch.

9).

The largest of the mass organizations are, in descending order, the

trade unions, the Bulgarian Red Cross, the Dimitrov Communist Youth

Union (Dimitrovski Komunisticheski Mladezhki Suyuz--commonly referred to

as the Komsomol), the Bulgarian Union for Physical Culture and Sports,

and the Bulgarian Union of Tourists. Their memberships range from about

1 million to approximately 2.5 million. The Bulgarian Agrarian Union,

the Bulgarian Hunting and Fishing Union, the Teachers Union, and the

Scientific and Technical Union are much smaller, having memberships

between 100,000 and 200,000. The Fatherland Front attracts nearly 4

million people; the party has 700,000 members.

Youth Programs

The first sizable leftist youth organization in the country, then called

the Union of Working Youth, was formed in 1926, and by 1940 it had a

membership of approximately 15,000. It and the party furnished most of

the partisan fighters that harassed the Germans and the pro-German

government of the country during World War II. Both the party and the

youth group grew stronger during the war, largely because the partisan

cause was more popular than that of the government.

The youth organization became the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union after

the war. The new name did not come about from a major reorganization or

reorientation of the group; transition to its postwar status was smooth,

but it saw fit to honor Georgi Dimitrov, who had by then become the most

powerful and famous of the party's leaders. Even after its renaming in

Dimitrov's honor, the organization has usually been referred to, in

official government communications as well as in conversation, as the

Komsomol, which is the name of the Soviet Union's youth organization.

The Komsomol became the organization through which the party reached the

nation's youth. Its responsibilities were expanded, and its membership

grew rapidly. In the ideal situation the entire youth segment of the

population of eligible age, both male and female, would be members of

the organization. In 1970 its 1.16 million members did include about 77

percent of those between fourteen and twenty-four years of age. Some of

the organization's leaders, instructors, and exceptionally active

members stay in the group beyond the upper age limit of twenty-four, but

their number is too small to alter the membership statistics

significantly. Male members outnumbered female members by a large

margin; 88 percent of the eligible males were members, only 66 percent

of the females. The disparity in membership by sex reflects the fact

that more of the organization's activities--sports and premilitary

training, for example--appeal to or are oriented toward the future

needs of the males. Membership is either a prerequisite for admission to

higher educational institutions or makes admission much easier.

Statistics notwithstanding, party and other national leaders complain

that Komsomol membership is lower than it should be, but they have

greater concern about the number who are members merely for expediency

and who are apathetic toward the organization's activities. A low point

in the Komsomol's appeal was reached during the 1960s and, sensing an

urgent need to reattract the cooperation of the nation's youth, its

programs were given a major reevaluation and overhaul beginning in about

1968.

The youth problem in 1968 was probably less serious in Bulgaria than it

was in many Western countries and other communist countries, but it had

reached proportions that warranted action. Among symptoms cited by the

authorities was apathy toward education, work, and party ideology. Young

people in rural areas seemed anxious to move to the cities, where

idleness, crime, and so-called parasitic living were increasing.

Consumption of alcohol by young people was up markedly.

Many young people were described as silent nihilists, persons who were

characterized by unresponsiveness and vast indifference. No expression

of group youth protest, for example, was recorded between the inception

of the communist government and the late 1960s. When individual

complaints were solicited, however, they appeared to come out freely.

Some said that they would have cooperated but spoke of the anemic and

empty lives of the youth organizations where the dull, boring meetings

consisted largely of upbraiding sermons full of pious admonitions and

reprimands. Others assumed an offensive posture, indulging in

self-praise, pointing out shortcomings in party work, complaining about

the lack of individual freedom and the lack of opportunity for showing

initiative, and criticizing the older generation.

Consumption of alcoholic beverages is common enough in typical families

so that early exposure to it is considered natural, but its use by young

people became excessive enough to be considered a national problem in

the mid-1960s. According to a survey published in 1971, more than 50

percent of the students in Sofia secondary schools consumed alcohol

regularly. Percentages were considerably higher in provincial secondary

schools. Few of the youthful users had consumed it over a long enough

period to have become addicted, but more than one-half of the inebriated

persons brought to sobering-up facilities in Sofia hospitals and clinics

were young people.

Authorities blame advertising of alcoholic beverages, imitation of

Western fashions, disillusionment, and monotony in daily living for most

of the increase in youthful drinking. They also blame lax parental

control, but the surveys concluded that the influence of contemporary

social habits and the pressures of peer groups were forces more

powerful than those exerted by the family.

Measures have been undertaken to reduce the so-called parasitic element

that according to party and governmental spokesmen, is composed of those

who neither study nor work. As early as 1968 the minister of national

education was given six months to organize a nationwide program to cope

with the problem, and the Center for Amateur Scientific and Technical

Activities among Youth and Children was created to coordinate planning.

The Committee for Youth and Sports, the State Committee on Scientific

and Technical Progress (renamed the State Committee for Science,

Technical Progress, and Higher Education), the Komsomol, and the trade

unions were charged with contributing ideas and assistance. As a result

of the center's activities, the next year each _okrug_ was directed to

organize schools with three-month-long vocational training courses and

to canvass its area for young people who required the instruction.

Enterprises in the _okrug_ were directed to cooperate by indicating the

skills they most needed, by furnishing facilities and, finally, by

hiring those who completed the training.

As of 1972 the program had achieved spotty or inconclusive results. Most

spokesmen considered it as satisfactory as could have been expected.

They did not consider that it reflected badly on the effort when a few

groups reported that about 30 percent of the students who completed

their classes never reported to the jobs for which they had been

prepared and that others stayed at work for only a short time. Other

observers consider that the authorities are concerned over a problem

much of which does not exist or that is blown out of proportion to its

seriousness. For example, 85 percent of the offending group were girls

or young women. A few of them were undoubtedly ideological malcontents,

members of youth gangs, prostitutes, or criminals, but a large majority

considered themselves living inoffensively at home or, at the worst,

were working at small family enterprises. In rural areas they might have

been attending the family's private agricultural plot or the privately

owned livestock.

CRIME AND JUSTICE

Crime

The country's most widely quoted authorities on crime view it as a

social phenomenon, that is, actions by people within society against the

interests of the society as a whole or against the principles directing

it. Combating crime, therefore, becomes a matter both of law enforcement

and of social edification and persuasion. Although they adhere to the

argument that in a developing communist society most of the crime is

related to holdover attitudes from the old society and to unavoidable

contacts with such societies still existing, they do not expect to

eradicate crime according to any existing timetable.

Petty crime is an irritant to the leadership, not so much for the damage

or lasting effects of the individual criminal acts, but because such

acts reflect an attitude on the part of the perpetrators indicating that

they hold the society, if not in ridicule or contempt, at least in less

than proper respect. Such attitudes prompted an official in the Ministry

of Internal Affairs to state, "Social democracy does not take a

conciliatory attitude toward petty criminals, or tolerate individuals

who disturb the public order or who are engaged in a parasitical life."

The actual amount of petty crime is less worrisome to the authorities

than the fact that it is increasing. Also disturbing are statistics

showing that most of those apprehended for it are in the

eighteen-to-thirty-year age-group.

Authorities have found themselves facing a problem in relation to petty

crime that is in no way unique to Bulgaria. Misuse of government

property, including theft and pilfering, has become rampant and is

considered forgivable by those who are guilty because "everybody does

it." The courts have become reluctant to hand down harsh sentences upon

people who consider that they have done no wrong and, at least in the

opinion of some government spokesmen, lenient court sentences have

helped foster a view that theft of public property is wrong only because

it is so described in certain of the laws.

The authorities also point out that statistics accumulated on such

thefts reported in 1970 are revealing in other respects. Almost 90

percent of those recorded fell into the category of petty crime, but

about one-half of them were carried out by overcoming locks or other

barriers protecting the property. Over one-half of the persons

apprehended for such thefts were repeaters. Analysis of other records

also indicated that in all but a very few cases the most serious crimes

were committed by individuals who had begun their criminal careers by

stealing.

At the same time the courts were handing down sentences of the minimum

punishment for theft or even less than the prescribed minimum. More

often than not, the culprits were given suspended sentences. Of those

convicted of serious theft, less than one-half were sentenced to a

period of deprivation of freedom considered appropriate--that is, the

six months or more prescribed in the criminal code.

More serious are the crimes of violence, political crimes, and economic

crimes involving abuse of management positions or large amounts of

property. In the period since the mid-1950s crimes of violence have

increased; political and serious economic crimes have decreased.

Citizens convicted of political crimes no longer constitute the bulk of

the prison population, as they did during the early post-World War II

period. Active or aggressively vocal opposition to the regime is usually

called ideological subversion, diversion, or revisionism, and it is

described as activity or expression of thoughts related to the old

society and not in accord with the policies of the new. It is still

listed among the more serious crimes. Officials of the Ministry of

Internal Affairs blame both external influences and dissident internal

factions for having caused the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the

Czechoslovak troubles in 1968. They say, however, that such events are

unlikely in Bulgaria because the ministry's state security agencies are

busy combating foreign intelligence efforts and the native elements that

would bore from within. The success of their efforts is credited with

having reduced political trials to only a few each year.

Economic crimes include those of dishonest or illegal operation of an

enterprise, the misuse of socialist property by its management or

workers, currency manipulations, and improper sale or transfer of

property. If inefficient management practices are serious enough to

result in less than optimum production, they are considered criminal,

but sufficient guilt has been difficult to prove, and those accused are

rarely, if ever, prosecuted. They are occasionally reprimanded,

transferred, or dismissed for bureaucratic practices. Management

personnel who are brought before the courts are usually tried for

corruption, using their positions for personal enrichment, or violation

of administrative or financial regulations.

Workers can be prosecuted for theft, waste, willful damage, or illegal

use of materials. Poor labor discipline, shirking on the job, or

nonmalicious negligence may result in individuals or entire work shifts

being brought before party groups or trade union committees. Action in

such cases usually involves counseling, social pressure, or the like.

Consumption of alcohol is not excessive when compared with that of other

European countries, but it has been increasing steadily and has been a

major contributor to crime and antisocial behavior. During the 1960s per

capita consumption of absolute alcohol increased by a factor of nearly

50 percent, from 4.01 quarts per person annually to 5.93 quarts.

Strenuous efforts on the part of the country's leadership to combat the

trend resulted in a decrease between 1968 and 1970, but the dip in

consumption was temporary. Per capita consumption in 1971 reached the

highest level yet recorded.

Police are involved in aspects of the programs combating the rise in

consumption of alcohol and alcoholism because alcohol has figured

increasingly in crime. Nearly 90 percent of those charged with rowdiness

or disturbing the peace were under its influence, as were increasing

percentages of those apprehended on rape, assault, and murder charges.

Many more men than women have alcohol problems, but the percentage of

women problem drinkers has risen more rapidly. Similarly, consumption by

youths is less than that of adults, but the numbers of youths becoming

habitual drinkers has been increasing. Many of the campaigns against

the use of alcohol are also directed against smoking and drugs, although

neither of these is considered a cause of serious concern. Smoking is

viewed as an evil that may be damaging to the user's health but that has

no serious social consequences. By 1973 drugs had not become a serious

problem.

The police monitor a large number of alcoholics whose conditions are

chronic but who can work. These persons get a period--ordinarily from

six months to a year--of compulsory treatment. This may include work

therapy in groups that are supervised to the degree necessary to prevent

the members from acquiring alcoholic beverages.

Increasing tourism has resulted in special problems in resort areas.

Spokesmen note that what they refer to as petit bourgeois attitudes

toward moneymaking have shown up, especially at the new Black Sea

coastal resorts. Local people inflate prices for tourists, accept and

encourage tips, and buy and sell merchandise illegally. On some

occasions the Bulgarians exploit their guests; at other times the

foreigners exploit the local population. Most seriously viewed of the

adverse tourist influences are the introduction of unacceptable ideology

and foreign encouragement of moral laxity which, according to the

authorities, pervades the area. Occasionally, however, there is an

example of an ideological diversity in a direction opposite that of lax

morality. One group of tourists was evicted from the country after

distributing what the police described as forty Bibles and 150 godly

booklets. Many tourists enter the country by automobile; traffic has

become congested, and violations of traffic laws are more numerous than

the police can cope with.

Criminal Code

The criminal code's preamble states that its purpose is to protect the

society and the state, the person and the rights of its citizens, the

economy, and the state's property and laws and to educate the citizens

in the rules of life in the socialist society. It defines crimes as

socially dangerous acts that are identified and declared by law as

punishable.

In addition to the qualification that a crime must be set down as such

and declared punishable, the individual is further protected by the

stipulation that he may be punished only when he has been found guilty

of one of the listed crimes by a proper court. The punishment may be

only what is set down in the code and declared consistent with the

crime, and it may be imposed only by the court trying the case.

Adults, eighteen years of age or older, are criminally liable. Minors,

between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, are criminally liable if they

are judged capable of understanding the act and its significance and of

controlling their actions. Juveniles under fourteen years of age and

mentally deficient persons unable to understand the nature or

significance of a criminal act are not criminally liable.

Courts may hand down punishments of eleven different varieties. In

addition to fines, confiscation of property, and confinement, they may

sentence a guilty person to corrective labor or compulsory residence

without confinement. They may deprive an individual of the right to

occupy certain governmental or public positions, of the right to

practice certain professions or activities, of the right to residence in

a specified place, or of the right to earn decorations and awards. If he

is on duty with the military, a court may remove his rank. It may also

administer a public reprimand, alone or in combination with another type

of punishment. The sentence, however, should be within the upper and

lower limits in the amounts of fines or the time period for which the

other sentences may apply. Such limits are set down in the code.

The death penalty is never a mandatory sentence in peacetime. It is

optional for a considerable number of crimes, but it is handed down only

if the circumstances of a particular crime that is before the court are

exceptionally serious. When the maximum sentence is deprivation of

freedom and does not include a possible death sentence, the duration of

the sentence will be no longer than fifteen years. If the maximum

sentence can be death, twenty years deprivation of freedom may be

substituted for execution.

The stipulated sentences for crimes against the state tend to be more

severe than sentences for crimes against individuals. Theft of public

property is punishable by confinement of up to eight years, of private

property by no more than three years. Robbery involving public property

may result in a sentence of from three to ten years; if it involves

private property, the range is from three to eight years.

Although the individual's rights appear to have more than ample

safeguards, the situation may be less utopian than the wording of the

criminal code would suggest. For example, a 1973 amendment to the laws

pertaining to personal property states that "when a citizen is found to

possess more property than he could reasonably have acquired from his

regular income, he is considered to have acquired it illegally unless he

can prove to the contrary."

Courts

All of the formal judicial machinery of the country is within the

governmental organization under the Ministry of Justice, but special

courts--such as those of the military establishment--may be administered

separately and independently in their lower echelons. Although the

ministry serves as a part of the executive branch of the government, as

the interpreter of laws it can check upon their compatibility with the

constitution and other legislation. It might also function as a check

upon the powers of the legislature and upon the other ministries in the

executive branch. So far as is known, however, during the framing of

legislation its professional expertise is used only to provide technical

advice on the phrasing or structure of the text, to make sure that it

says in legal terms what the framers intend (see ch. 8).

The Ministry of Justice is responsive to the policies of the BKP,

although the minister appears to be chosen for his professional

qualifications. In the early 1970s the incumbent was one of the very few

important officials in the government who did not also have a

high-ranking party position, and only one of his immediate staff was a

member of the Central Committee of the BKP. None of the others is

believed to have had an equivalent party status.

Each people's council has a legal department or a group that provides it

with legal counsel. The chiefs of such departments at _obshtina_ level

are appointed and relieved by the _okrug_ people's council.

The size and legal qualifications of the legal staff vary with the

population of the _okrug_ or _obshtina_. The departments at _okrug_

level and those of the larger _obshtini_ have staffs that are relied

upon for competence in a wide range of criminal and administrative

procedures; the legal problems that are encountered by a remote rural

_obshtina_ are usually minor.

Legal departments are charged with monitoring the activities of the

people's councils and their committees to keep them consistent with the

law; with interpreting laws for the people's councils and for

inhabitants in the area of their jurisdiction; with strengthening the

contractual and financial disciplines of the people's councils and of

enterprises within their areas; and, as a by-product, with tightening

the safeguards on public property. Most of the daily work of the

departments consists of giving legal counsel to the people's councils

and of reviewing the councils' resolutions to ensure that they conform

to national laws and party policies.

Penal Institutions

The Ministry of Justice is responsible for the overall administration,

activities, and security of prisons. Outside guards are provided by the

Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to the regulations, the primary

responsibilities of prison administrators are to rehabilitate and to

reeducate inmates.

Reeducation includes political reorientation, general education, and

vocational training. All inmates are obligated to receive political

indoctrination, which is intended to reorient them toward becoming

cooperating members of the community. All of them are also required to

perform useful labor--for vocational training, prison income, and

benefit to the state. General education is compulsory for all prisoners

under forty years of age who have not completed eight years of primary

schooling. Vocational training, other than that derived from prison

labor, varies with facilities available.

The physical facilities for confinement are classified as prisons,

labor-correctional institutions, and correctional homes. The

correctional homes are for minors. According to the seriousness of the

offense and other factors, a prisoner may be confined in light, general,

strict, or enforced strict disciplinary regimes, one of which is

specified in his court sentence. The light regime is prescribed for

first offenders who are serving time for minor crimes. The enforced

strict regime is applied to recidivists, as an alternative to the death

sentence, or to those considered dangerous or willfully and excessively

uncooperative. The stricter regimes have less comfortable cells and

furnishings, more rigid discipline, fewer individual privileges, and

tighter security.

Prisoners are segregated by age, sex, and disciplinary regime. Women and

minors serve their sentences in separate prisons or correctional homes.

They are subject to much the same schedules as those in the prisons for

male adults, except that theirs have no enforced strict regime.

According to the law, those serving in different regimes are to be

confined separately, and repeaters are to be confined in separate

prisons from first offenders. Because there are a limited number of

prisons, it may be necessary to meet the law's requirement for

separation of prisoners by having different regimes in wards or

buildings of the same prison complex.

The law on prison labor states that prisoners have the right to

employment and political education and, at the same time, that they have

the obligation to do the work and receive the political indoctrination.

Inmates are given work assignments within seven days of their arrival at

a prison. Their wages are based on the norms for the same kind of work

done in enterprises throughout the country, and the same work and safety

regulations apply. Inmates receive 20 percent or more of their wages.

None except minors, incapacitated persons, or individuals who would work

but who are for some reason unemployed may receive money from the

outside.

Prisoners have the right to communicate with the prosecutors and courts

that investigated and tried their cases and to submit petitions to them

and to the Ministry of Justice. They may also see the chiefs of their

prisons, correctional homes, or labor-correctional institutions in

person. Other rights include time outdoors, exercise, visitors,

correspondence, food parcels, possession of personal effects, and

meetings and special correspondence with lawyers or other persons having

a status or authority relative to their sentencing or confinement. The

amount of time outdoors and correspondence and the numbers of visitors

and parcels allowed vary with the severity of the inmate's disciplinary

regime.

Correspondence and parcels are opened and inspected by prison officials.

Visits are monitored; conversation must be in Bulgarian unless the

administration has or can find a person who can understand the language

to be spoken. Inmates are not allowed to gamble, consume alcohol, use

narcotics, or sell or exchange personal property with other inmates.

Minors may not smoke. Prisoners and their property may be searched.

Prisoners are rewarded for good behavior and punished for bad. When his

pattern of conduct has become apparent over a period of time and it

appears appropriate, a prisoner may be moved into a lighter or more

severe disciplinary regime. If he has insufficient time remaining in his

sentence to be moved into a different regime, he may be given extra

privileges or be denied some of those to which he would ordinarily be

entitled. Commitment to solitary confinement is limited to two weeks at

any one time.

A number of sentences do not involve confinement. For a group of

offenses related to poor working discipline, an individual can be given

a corrective labor sentence. This usually involves harder work, somewhat

longer hours, and strict supervision on the job. The law also provides

for sentences that restrict the movement of an individual. In the most

severe of these, he may be banished to and be required to remain in one

certain area. In other situations he may be prohibited from visiting

specified areas or, in the least severe case, he may visit but not take

up residence in some specified locality.

Another such sentence involves "internment without deprivation of

liberty." This sentence restricts the individual to his place of

residence or to another specified place. The term is usually from one to

three years but, in the case of a repeated crime or in some other

special circumstance, it can be for as long as five years. The essence

of the penalty is that it consists of a restriction to the confines of

the area within which the offender lives and works. He may not hold a

job outside of the area, but he does not live in a special billet, nor

is he isolated from his neighbors and local society. The usual

objective, when this type of sentence is handed down, is to keep the

individual in his home environment, where he retains responsibility for

his share of the family support and is subject to its influences.

CHAPTER 16

ARMED FORCES

Bulgaria's regular military forces are organized within the Bulgarian

People's Army (Bulgarska Narodna Armiya) and are subordinate in the

governmental system to the Ministry of National Defense. Approximately

80 percent of the personnel are in the ground forces. Of the remaining

20 percent about three-quarters are in air and air defense units, and

about one-quarter are naval forces.

Although Bulgaria is possibly the most staunch and sympathetic of the

Soviet Union's allies in Eastern Europe, the country has no common

border with the Soviet Union nor with any other of its Warsaw Treaty

Organization (Warsaw Pact) allies except Romania. Because Romania has

succeeded in establishing a precedent prohibiting movement of any

foreign forces across its borders--even those of its closest

allies--Bulgaria is to a large degree isolated from pact affairs. Unable

to participate in more than token fashion in pact training, short of

skilled men to care for complex equipment, and possibly restricted from

an ability to become engaged during the early days of a combat

situation, Bulgaria has undoubtedly lost some Soviet materiel support.

Because of this the forces have only small armored units, although the

military establishment as a whole is large in relation to the population

of the country. The air forces have been supplied with a few modern

aircraft, but most of its airplanes are older than those of its pact

allies. Naval forces are small. Even though logistic support has been

meager, morale has been considered good, and the men and their leaders

have been considered ideologically reliable.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The communist leadership considers only a few incidents in the history

and tradition of the armed forces before World War II to be significant.

Even in respect to that war, the sole esteemed service is that of the

partisans in their resistance movement against their own government and

against German troops in the country. Driving out the Turks to gain

national independence in 1878 is remembered, as is the abortive uprising

of the leftists against the government in September 1923. Emphasis on

only these few historical events is encouraged, at least in part,

because in much of their other warfare Bulgaria's fighting men

frequently experienced frustration or defeat, sometimes violent and

humiliating.

As no indigenous armed forces had been allowed during the five centuries

of Ottoman occupation, there were no national forces at the time that

independence was gained. The uprising by the local population two years

earlier, in 1876, had been heroic, and it contributed to the weakening

of the Turkish grip on the land, but it was a failure at the time. It is

still, however, remembered. On ceremonial military occasions a roll call

of the local men killed in the uprising is read aloud at memorial rites.

Participation in four wars between 1912 and 1945 produced negative

results for the country. Bulgarian forces were engaged in a major share

of the fighting during the First Balkan War (1912) but, from its

standpoint, the country received an inadequate share of the spoils at

the peace table. A year later, when Turkey and its former allies joined

forces against Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria was defeated.

Allied with Germany in both world wars, Bulgaria experienced defeat

twice more, although the situation was somewhat different in World War

II. The government and nationalists bent on acquiring territory they

considered theirs--primarily from Greece and Yugoslavia--succeeded in

joining in the war on Germany's side. The population was generally far

more sympathetic to the Soviet Union, however, and during the years of

German success in the early part of the war, Bulgarian forces did little

in support of their ally. In the latter days of the war, as the Germans

were being driven back, the Bulgarians joined the armies of the Soviet

Union. In fact, the 30,000 casualties they claim to have suffered in

campaigns against the Germans were far more than were suffered in their

support (see ch. 2).

After World War II, when the Communists had gained control of the

country, training and unit organization were modeled on those of the

Soviet army; heavy materiel items were supplied by the Soviet Union; and

all other equipment was made to adapt to Soviet specifications.

Personnel considered unreliable by the new regime were weeded out as

fast as possible, and rigorous measures were taken to ensure that

political orientation considered correct in the new atmosphere would be

adhered to by those who replaced them.

Equipment received first was surplus to the needs of the Soviet Union as

three-quarters or more of its massive wartime forces were demobilized.

Replacement materiel came more slowly, having to await the reequipping

of Soviet units, but by the late 1950s the most essential combat weapons

had been upgraded.

GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES

The armed forces are subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense,

which is one of the governmental ministries whose chief is a member of

the Council of Ministers. Administration and routine operational

controls are accomplished through government channels. The party,

however, has policy authority and ultimate operational control. Division

of authority is more apparent than real because nearly all high-ranking

governmental officials are also important party members. The minister of

national defense in 1973, Army General Dobri Dzhurov, was also a member

of the party's Central Committee. Almost without exception the higher

ranking military officers are party members, as are nearly 85 percent of

the officers of all ranks. The 15 percent who are not in the party are

junior officers who are still members of the Dimitrov Communist Youth

Union (Dimitrovski Komunisticheski Mladezhki Suyuz), commonly referred

to as the Komsomol. Only a small percentage of Komsomol members become

party members, but all except a very few of the young officers are

selected for party membership when it becomes apparent that they

probably will be successful career officers.

Political education is given priority equal to that of combat training

at all levels in the military organization. Party cells are formed in

all units where there are three or more party members; Komsomol cells

exist in virtually all units. In 1972, 65 percent of the armed forces

participated in scientific-technical competitions, symposia,

conferences, reviews, exhibitions, and other Komsomol activities.

One-man command has superseded the dual control system of the 1950s. In

those days a political officer was placed alongside the commanding

officer of all units to ensure the reliability of the forces. The

political officer was in many ways equal in authority to, and

independent of, the commander. The unit commander has allegedly

reassumed a position where he is described as the central figure,

leader, planner, and organizer; he is responsible for the discipline and

combat effectiveness of his unit and for fulfilling its party tasks. The

unit commander's deputy is still a political officer in most units and,

although there is no question of his subordinate position, the political

officer is still responsible in part directly to the Main Political

Administration of the army.

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

The several military forces under the Ministry of National Defense are

referred to collectively as the Bulgarian People's Army. The army

includes the ground, naval, and air and air defense forces and also the

Border Troops (see ch. 15). Tradition prevails in common usage and even

in official pronouncements, so that when the term _army_ is used alone,

it invariably refers to the ground forces or the directorates and

service organizations that are common to all of the forces. Naval and

air forces are frequently referred to as though they were separate

service branches.

Uniformed military personnel permeate the Ministry of National Defense.

All deputy ministers and, with the exception of the medical branch, all

major administrative chiefs are military officers. During the early

1970s the first deputy minister of national defense was also chairman of

the General Staff and chief of the ground forces. One of the deputies

was chief of the air and air defense forces, and all of the others were

generals. Following the pattern of other Warsaw Pact armed forces

organizations, the political, rear services (logistics), training,

armor, artillery, communications, engineering, and chemical sections are

directorates, administrations, or branches responsible to the minister

of national defense. This is the case in spite of the facts that such

branches as armor and artillery are concerned primarily with the ground

forces and that others--training, for example--must be tailored to

widely different kinds of operations of all the individual services.

Bulgaria is the point of contact between the Warsaw Pact nations and

Greece and Turkey, which are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) countries on the southern flank of the Soviet alliance. Although

little is known of Warsaw Pact war plans, it is probable that Bulgarian

forces would be charged with containing an attack from the south.

Statements of military leaders indicate that considerable thought has

been given to the problems they would face in a nuclear war. They

apparently anticipate involvement in the initial engagements but, if

nuclear weapons are used, they would employ holding tactics, staying

alert to exploit any opportunities that might develop. Their

pronouncements repeatedly affirm a determination to perform their pact

mission to the best of their capabilities.

Ground Forces

The ground forces have approximately 120,000 men. Their major units

consist of eight motorized rifle divisions and five tank brigades. There

are also various smaller special purpose units and support

organizations. The forces are distributed among three territorial

commands having headquarters at Sofia, Plovdiv, and Sliven. The division

is the basic organizational unit in Warsaw Pact combat forces and has

about 10,000 men. Five of Bulgaria's divisions are believed to be near

combat strength, but three probably have only skeletal strengths and

would be built up with the mobilization that would accompany a major

national emergency.

Each of the other Warsaw Pact armies has a number of tank divisions. The

fact that Bulgaria has only tank brigades, which are probably one-half

or less the strength of divisions, reflects the austerity of its armed

forces. Motorized rifle divisions have one tank regiment, one artillery

regiment, and three motorized rifle regiments. The tank brigades,

because they are smaller, probably have fewer tanks than the motorized

rifle divisions.

Most of the tanks used by the Bulgarian army are the early post-World

War II model T-54. There are some newer models in the inventory, and a

few of the older World War II T-34s are still being retained. Artillery

pieces include guns and gun-howitzers from 82 mm to 152 mm, antitank

weapons up to 100 mm, and small antiaircraft guns. Some units are

equipped with short-range missiles and unguided rockets. There are

enough personnel carriers or self-propelled weapons so that all men in a

unit can be transported simultaneously.

Air and Air Defense Forces

The air and air defense forces have approximately 20,000 men, 250 combat

aircraft, an assortment of antiaircraft guns, a few surface-to-air

missiles, and a modest quantity of air defense radar and communications

equipment. Combat aircraft are organized in squadrons, usually with

twelve airplanes each. In 1973 there were six fighter-bomber, twelve

fighter-interceptor, and three reconnaissance squadrons.

The fighter-bomber squadrons use the MiG-17, an aircraft that is

obsolescent but that performs well in a ground support role. About

one-half of the fighter-interceptors are also MiG-17s, but three of the

interceptor squadrons have the newer MiG-21. The only bomber aircraft in

the air forces is the near-obsolete Il-28. The Il-28 squadron has a

reconnaissance role. A few old cargo or passenger planes provide a

minimal transport capability, but there are about forty helicopters that

can perform shorter range personnel and transport functions.

Air defense forces are positioned to provide protection for the

country's periphery as well as for a few cities and air installations.

Ground and naval forces have antiaircraft weapons to defend their own

units. Early warning radars are located mainly along southern and

western borders, and their communications lines are presumably linked

with the Warsaw Pact air defense warning network.

Naval Forces

Naval forces, with only about 7,000 men, constitute less than 5 percent

of the armed forces' personnel strength. They man a variety of vessels,

however, including escort ships, patrol boats, torpedo boats, two

submarines, and miscellaneous supply and service vessels. They also

include a contingent of naval infantry, or marines. Some of the smaller

craft make up a Danube River flotilla. Other than the torpedo- and

missile-carrying patrol boats, the major offensive strength consists of

the submarines, which are Soviet-built W-class medium boats, and about

twenty landing craft. All of the larger vessels built since World War II

have been Soviet built or designed.

Although the naval mission includes tasks confined to the portion of the

Black Sea near Bulgaria's coastline, a few fleet units have joined the

Soviet fleet for maneuvers in the Mediterranean Sea, and the naval cadet

training ship sails any of the high seas. For example, it visited Cuba

on its 1972 summer cruise.

FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS

Bulgaria joined the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,

Romania, and Albania in bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation,

and mutual assistance during the early post-World War II period and

added another with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) a few

years later. This group became the tighter and more formal Warsaw Pact

military alliance in 1955. Albania dissociated itself from the pact in

the early 1960s, and its treaties with Bulgaria and the other members

have not been renewed since then. Bulgaria's treaties with the remainder

of the original allies have been renewed regularly and are the cause for

official observances each year on their anniversary dates.

Although Bulgaria may be the most loyal and reliable of the Soviet

Union's allies, military cooperation between the two countries is

limited by their geographical separation. Even if Romania were to permit

Bulgaria's forces to cross its territory in order to participate in

Warsaw Pact training, it is probable that Bulgaria's role in a future

European war would be limited to southeastern Europe, an area that would

be of less immediate concern at the outset of a war between the Warsaw

Pact members and NATO. In any event, air and sea transport is in limited

supply and is not used for the delivery of large numbers of Bulgarian

troops to exercises in an area where they probably would not be

employed. As a consequence, Bulgaria sends only token forces and

observers to the larger pact exercises.

Bulgaria is not a warm proponent of ideological coexistence but is

strongly in favor of arms reductions and limitations on future weapons.

It was a member of a United Nations disarmament committee in the early

1970s, and much space in the printed media is devoted to support of

proposals for restricting deployment and use of nuclear weapons in

certain areas.

MANPOWER, TRAINING, AND SUPPORT

Manpower

Interpolations of the United Nations estimate of the country's 1973

population indicate that there were about 2.3 million males in the

fifteen- to forty-nine-year age-group, which Bulgarian authorities

consider military age. There were also about 70,000 in the annual groups

that were reaching the draft age of nineteen each year. Those

conscripted serve two- or three-year duty tours. The basic ground force

tour is two years; that of special units and air and naval forces is

three years.

Approximately 70 percent of the military age groups, or 1.6 million

males, are considered physically and otherwise fit for military duty.

Any number of them could be called up in the event of an emergency

requiring total mobilization, but it is likely that many of the group

would be occupying positions having higher priority than basic military

duty. A somewhat larger proportion, or about 75 percent, of the

nineteen-year-olds are in satisfactory physical condition. Most of them

are drafted; a turnover of one-third of the 150,000-man regular armed

forces each year would require nearly all of the group. Because there is

very little room for flexibility, a young man's education is interrupted

unless he was actually enrolled in a university or college before he

reached the age of eighteen. In this case he continues his education but

serves his military obligation upon completion of his education.

Occupational deferments were eliminated by law in 1970, and other

deferments are given infrequently and reluctantly. Young men unfit for

military duty or for work in the Construction Troops, but who are fit to

earn a living in some other work, pay a military tax (see ch. 15).

Those who have had military service and who have not reached the age of

fifty are considered reserves. Officers remain in the reserve until the

age of sixty. Various factors--primarily occupational situations,

physical condition, and lack of reserve training--operate to erode this

force, and those considered useful, or trained, reserves constitute

one-half or less of the group. Most of the some 250,000 men released in

the latest five-year period, however, are available, physically fit, and

familiar with the weapons and equipment in use by the armed forces.

Training

In common with its Warsaw Pact allies, Bulgaria uses equipment that is

produced or designed in the Soviet Union or that is compatible with

Soviet designs. The training program is patterned after that of the

Soviet army because the Soviet equipment dictates the training required

to maintain and operate it, and joint maneuvers participated in by any

or all of the pact forces make it necessary to employ standard

procedures and tactics.

The program is carried on in an annual cycle. Immediately after

induction a conscript's time is spent in so-called individual or basic

training. Physical exercise is rigorous, and the soldier is initiated

into the care and use of individual weapons, military drill, and the

various aspects of military existence with which he had not been

familiar and to which he must learn to adjust. He also learns individual

actions that may become necessary in group or combat situations, ranging

from personal combat techniques to first aid treatment for battle wounds

or exposure to gas or nuclear radiation.

As the cycle progresses, the individual usually becomes part of a crew

manning a larger weapon or a more complex piece of equipment. When the

crew knows its equipment, it then becomes involved in exercises of

increasing size, in which it learns to employ weapons and equipment in

coordination with other systems. The training cycle culminates in late

summer or autumn with the largest of the year's maneuvers. Although the

more important Warsaw Pact maneuvers have been held in the northern

group of Eastern European countries, smaller exercises are held in

Bulgaria and are occasionally participated in by visiting Soviet or

Romanian forces.

Air defense crews with small-caliber antiaircraft guns and tracking

radar practice in conjunction with the early warning network and air

defense communications. After target identification they practice

holding their weapons on the aircraft by radar or visual sighting.

Target aircraft average about 450 miles per hour and fly just above the

treetops.

Ground forces train with a wide variety of weapons and in many

situations, but they claim special capabilities and excellence in

mountain and winter exercises. These maneuvers are scheduled to exploit

the long winter nights and fog, snow, or blizzard conditions to teach

troops how to achieve surprise in encircling movements. Troops

exercising in the snow are provided a white outergarment for camouflage.

Combined arms exercises are held when all support units are engaged in

supporting offensive operations led by tank and motorized rifle groups.

In such exercises the equipment is used as realistically as possible,

with blank ammunition and training grenades. Ultra-shortwave

communication equipment, whose normal fifty- to sixty-mile range would

suffice more than adequately in small maneuver areas, is relayed over

long distances to simulate a more typical combat situation.

Political education is the responsibility of a main administration of

the Ministry of National Defense and has status on a par with the other

most important ministry functions. The administration states its mission

as "cultivating moral-political and combat virtues that train men and

units for skillful and selfless action under the conditions of modern

warfare." Its leaders stress the point that, although large forces and

massive firepower are employed in modern combat, the complexity and use

of weapons is such that individual initiative is increasingly important.

A small group left alone to employ a highly complex weapon must be able

to make decisions and must be motivated to do the best that is possible

under any kind of unpleasant circumstances.

Political indoctrination is also aimed at combating potentially

subversive elements. Political instructors urge stronger "ideological

vigilance" and act to counter the influences of, for example, Western

radio stations.

Schools and the Komsomol, with the various youth clubs and organizations

that it sponsors, are charged with preparing predraft-age youths for

military service. A preliminary training program was reorganized and

revitalized in 1968. National leaders had noted that the physical

condition of the average conscript was becoming less satisfactory each

year and that the idea of serving in the armed forces appeared to be

meeting with resistance from a small but increasing number of youths.

They also were aware that juvenile crime was increasing. Sensing that

poor physical fitness, a reluctance to perform military duty, and

increasing crime could be related and have common causes, they

attributed much of the problem to a change in youth attitudes. Political

indoctrination and ideological subjects, presented in an attempt to

encourage a more proper attitude are, therefore, given highest

priorities in the new program.

The formal portion of the program initiated in 1968 consists of a

schedule of premilitary training, obligatory for all young men and women

between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. Facilities for it were made

available in schools for those who were students and at cooperative

farms, enterprises, or anywhere that groups of working youths were

employed. Young army officers on active duty and reserve officers in the

local area were made available for classroom and field instruction.

The party's Politburo issued a statement in March 1971 to the effect

that the Komsomol had successfully organized the required program. It

cited statistics on recreational facilities, among which were camps that

were preparing to accept 125,000 boys and girls for that summer. Camp

programs feature political instruction, physical training, sports

activities, military field training, and a wide variety of specialized

subjects. Other Komsomol cells sponsor aero clubs for those interested

in air force service and rowing, sailing, and diving clubs for those

interested in the navy. Radio communication, vehicle driving,

marksmanship, and many other subjects are sponsored at year-round

classes in local areas.

Other than preinduction orientation, conscripts get their basic

training, weapons and skills specialization, and combat training while

in the service. Noncommissioned officers may also come up from the ranks

and be prepared for better positions at in-service schools, but they may

also attend special schools and enter regular military units for the

first time with a noncommissioned officer grade. Noncommissioned officer

secondary schools were provided for in a 1971 law. The schools were to

be available to acceptable applicants who had completed the eighth grade

and were seventeen years of age or younger. The courses would last a

minimum of three years, during which students would be considered to be

on active military duty and after which graduates could continue in the

service as noncommissioned officers. If an individual did not go on with

a military career, he would be credited with a completed secondary

school education and also with the completion of his regular required

military service. Under any but exceptional circumstances, however,

graduates would be obligated to serve in the armed forces for at least

ten more years.

Cadet programs in several university-level higher military schools

provide officers for the services. Applicants to these schools must have

completed secondary school, be active members of the Komsomol, and

indicate an intention that, upon graduation, they would accept

appointment to serve in one of the armed services. They must also be

single, in excellent physical condition, and under twenty-four years of

age. Many apply during their tours of conscript service but are accepted

only if they have the prerequisite educational qualifications.

Line officers for infantry or armored units and logistics officers have

four-year courses. Engineer, signal, transportation, artillery,

electronics, and other technical specialties are five-year courses, as

are those that fit candidates for air and naval careers. The men are

commissioned in a common ceremony shortly after they have graduated.

Morale and Conditions of Service

The basic ingredients of good morale are present in good measure in

Bulgaria's armed forces. The vast majority of the troops believe in

their overall mission, take their obligation for granted, enjoy a

respected status, and receive valuable training. The country's principal

ally, the Soviet Union, is a long-standing friend and is held in high

esteem. Greece and Turkey, the countries that the men are taught to

expect to fight, are traditional enemies; so also is Yugoslavia.

In addition to being obligatory, military service is nearly universal,

and it is difficult to evade. Service life is extolled in the media, and

no widespread criticism, either of the forces as a whole or of

individuals as servicemen, is aired. Military experience provides

vocational training, much of which is beneficial to the individual and

to the national economy.

Special social benefits are available to the forces' personnel. If their

service results in unusual hardships for their dependents, the families

are given extra consideration. Monthly benefit payments to wives or

parents experiencing financial problems exceed those to nonmilitary

families by 30 percent. Wives who remain behind get preferential

treatment for prenatal or child care or while job hunting. As the men

come to the end of their duty tours, they are assisted in their

transition to civilian life, in their search for educational

opportunities, or in job placement. If disabled in the service, a

veteran gets a pension that is more liberal than usual for the same

disability acquired elsewhere and continuing assistance that includes

free transportation on public transport as well as medical treatment and

care of such things as orthopedic apparatus.

Medicine

The medical service provides treatment and preventive medicine for

military personnel and, in certain circumstances, for dependents and for

persons employed by the military. Its services are also available to the

public at large during individual emergencies, if they are the most

immediately available, and on a larger scale during epidemics or natural

disasters. Military personnel may also avail themselves of emergency

facilities in nonmilitary hospitals or clinics.

Since about 1960 the medical service has been upgraded in several major

respects. That year saw the formation of a higher military medical

institute, located on the site of the army's general hospital, for

advanced, specialized training of physicians. In addition to providing

better training for military doctors, the objective was to establish a

research center for in-depth study of the special military aspects of

medical science. A more pragmatic objective was to initiate long-overdue

improvement in medical services for the armed forces. In its first ten

years the institute gave advanced instruction to 6,500 medical personnel

and an additional specialty to some 200 medical officers.

After the formation of the higher medical institute, the medical

services were given considerably broader authority over sanitation and

hygienic conditions throughout the military establishment. They

determine standards to be maintained and make inspections of living

quarters, food services, water supplies, bathing and laundry facilities,

and training and recreational areas; they give instruction in personal

and group hygiene. They also participate in the planning and design of

new barracks and any other buildings where troops work or train.

Appropriate to the enhanced status and authority of the medical service,

its section of the ministry was upgraded and has become one of the dozen

more important branches under the minister of national defense. Its

chief has been a doctor, the only major staff member who has been

neither a general officer of one of the armed services nor a

high-ranking party official.

Military Justice

Military courts, or tribunals, are special courts but are part of the

national judicial system and subject to the same codes as are the

civilian courts. In the same kind of relationship, military crimes are a

special category of crime but are listed within the overall Bulgarian

criminal code. The separation of military justice from the rest of the

judicial machinery is almost complete, however, although jurisdiction in

a criminal situation could be in question and, in its early treatment, a

case could be transferred from the jurisdiction of a military to a civil

court or vice versa. Once tried before a military tribunal, the

proceedings and sentence of a trial might be reviewed by a higher

military court or might go to the Supreme Court, but it would be

extremely rare for a case to be reviewed by a civil court. Within the

Supreme Court a review would be accomplished only by a military panel of

that court.

Military crimes are those committed on military installations or those

that relate to the performance of military duty, to military property or

personnel, to military honor, or to certain aspects of national

security. Servicemen of all ranks, military reserves during their

training or whenever they are under military control, personnel of the

police or any of the other militarized security units, or any other

persons involved in military crimes are liable to military justice. In

general, sentences for military crimes are more severe than for

equivalent crimes tried before civilian courts. For example, failing to

carry out the order of a superior is punishable by up to two years'

deprivation of freedom, and conviction for "clearly indicating

dissatisfaction with an instruction" can result in a year's confinement.

On the other hand, in many such crimes the perpetrator's fate is subject

to the discretion of his commander. If the commander determines that the

offense does not "substantially affect military discipline," he may

administer some lesser punishment without a trial, or he may refer the

case to a Komsomol or party cell in his unit and allow it to take

whatever action it sees fit. In times of war or under combat conditions

possible sentences are much more severe, and the death penalty may be

handed down for many more crimes.

Logistics

Bulgaria's armed forces cost the country considerably less per man than

do those of its allies, and the amount spent on equipment and

maintenance is relatively austere. This is also indicated by the

composition of its forces, in which all armored units, for example, are

of less than division strength.

Nearly all heavier and more complex items of military hardware are

produced in the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria receives only those items

that are being replaced in the Soviet forces' inventory or that have

been produced in quantities greater than needed in Soviet units. Older

equipment, however, is seldom retained after it has become obsolete.

Armies engaged in combined operations must have compatible equipment,

and maintaining supply channels required for indefinite maintenance of

old items can become more costly than replacing them.

Each of the Warsaw Pact allies produces ammunition, small arms, some

vehicles, and spare parts for a portion of its materiel that was

originally produced elsewhere. Bulgaria, with its less developed

industrial base, produces a relatively small amount of military

equipment locally. In order to preserve items on hand, much of the

training schedule is devoted to proper storage and handling of

equipment. Because the standard of living in the country is low, most of

the troops are familiar with few luxuries and get along with fewer

nonessentials than do the forces of its more relatively affluent allies.

Ranks, Uniforms, and Decorations

Ground and air forces use the same system of ranks although, at least

during peacetime, the four-star army general rank has no equivalent in

the air or naval forces. Below the army general there are three general

grade, three field grade, and four company grade officer ranks. In

descending order the general grades are colonel general, lieutenant

general, and major general; the field grades are colonel, lieutenant

colonel, and major; and the company grades are captain, senior

lieutenant, lieutenant, and junior lieutenant. Naval officer ranks

include three admiral, four captain, and three lieutenant grades. The

ground and air forces have six enlisted grades: four sergeant and two

private. The naval forces have equivalent petty officer and seaman

grades.

According to military spokesmen there has been a continuing program to

improve uniforms since about 1958, when the forces began to replace

Soviet World War II styles with locally designed and manufactured

models. Most of the changes adopted since the original change-over have

consisted of improvements in the materials used and increasing the

number of clothing items issued to each man. Until the early 1960s, for

example, the same uniform was used by several classes of draftees. Each

draftee now receives a complete new issue and receives new trousers and

footwear each year.

New styles, several including changes in materials and minor changes in

color, were shown and tested in 1970. Issue of the newer varieties to

the forces was begun in 1972. Most changes involved tailoring details

and the use of more wrinkle-resistant and lighter, tighter woven cloth.

The aim has been to improve the appearance of the men with as little as

possible sacrifice in long-wearing qualities.

Officers continue to wear a service uniform consisting of a tailored

blouse with patch pockets and trousers that tuck into high boots. A Sam

Browne belt and sidearms are optional. The styles introduced in the

early 1970s have a vent in the blouse to make it fit in a better

tailored fashion, and they are a lighter green than their predecessors.

Ground forces have stripes and piping on caps and rank insignia that

vary in color to identify their branch of service (armored forces,

infantry, transport, engineer, and others). The enlisted men's uniform

is similar in design but has different quality material and less ornate

trim. Air forces have the same uniforms but may be identified by their

blue stripes and piping. Naval personnel wear the traditional navy blues

and whites.

Rank insignia on the uniforms seen most frequently consists of stars or

stripes on shoulder boards. Officer ranks are identified by varying

numbers of stars. The boards themselves become progressively more ornate

with higher rank. Those of the company grades are relatively plain;

those of the generals are highly ornate. Enlisted grades are shown by

stripes. Privates have none, their shoulder boards are plain; and the

number and width of the stripes increase with promotion to higher

grades.

Decorations and medals are awarded profusely, and most of them are

ornate and colorful. The highest ranking and most respected, however, is

a simple gold star, which identifies its recipient as a Hero of the

People's Republic of Bulgaria. The Order of Georgi Dimitrov and the

newer Stara Planina medal, which has been declared equal to the former

in seniority, are the next most important. These three most highly

cherished decorations are awarded in only one class each. The highest

of the orders that are presented in several classes are the Order of the

People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Madarski Konnik medal, which are

equal in seniority. They are awarded in three and two classes,

respectively.

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Bulgaria's gross national product (GNP) is only about one-third the

average of the other Warsaw Pact allies, and during the late 1960s and

early 1970s Bulgaria spent a smaller proportion of its GNP on defense

than did any of its allies. Although its 1973 estimated population was

less than one-half the average of its allies, it maintained about

five-sixths as many men in its regular forces. On the surface,

therefore, it would appear that the armed forces were a

less-than-average financial burden but a greater-than-average manpower

burden.

The appearances may be misleading to some degree. The country has been

the slowest of the pact nations to industrialize, and its standard of

living has been the lowest. It is probably, therefore, less able to

afford its relatively moderate defense costs. Its labor force is large

enough for the level of the country's industrialization, but there is a

shortage of skilled workers. The training and experience that young men

receive in the armed forces broaden their familiarity with complex

mechanical and electronic equipment and provide many of them with skills

that are of value to the national economy. The regime also considers

that the disciplinary habits and the political orientation acquired in

military service are of positive social value, outweighing the time that

young men are withheld from the labor force.

When extraordinary measures are required in an emergency situation--such

as during the 1972 drought--the armed forces are able to provide a mass

labor force and to contribute the use of a considerable amount of heavy

mechanical equipment. In 1972 force units were called upon to get

maximum efficiency from irrigation systems and to add to the sources of

irrigation water whenever possible. Military units also do field work on

public projects. They are encouraged to contribute the days before

public holidays, the holidays themselves, and other time that does not

interfere with training schedules.

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Section I. Social

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Monov, Georgi. "Semi-Boarding Schools," _Bulgaria Today_ [Sofia], XX,

No. 8, August 1971, 7-8.

Morgan, Dan. "Bulgaria Moving Cautiously to Better U.S. Ties."

_Washington Post_, March 29, 1973, A15.

Moser, Charles A. _A History of Bulgarian Literature 1865-1944._ New

York: Humanities Press, 1972.

"National Revival Architecture," _Bulgaria Today_ [Sofia], XXI, No.

7, July 1972, 16-17.

"The New Architecture," _East Europe_, XIV, No. 4, April 1965, 7-15.

Newman, Bernard. _Bulgaria Background._ London: Robert Hale, 1961.

Olson, Kenneth E. _The History Makers._ Baton Rouge: Louisiana State

University Press, 1966.

Oren, Nissan. _Bulgarian Communism._ New York: Columbia University

Press, 1971.

----. _Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in

Bulgaria._ Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.

Oshavkov, Zhivko. "Religious Belief in Bulgaria," _Bulgaria Today_

[Sofia], XVI, No. 10, October 1967, 20-22.

Parkin, Frank. _Class Inequality and Political Order._ New York:

Praeger, 1971.

Perl, Lila. _Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria._ Camden: Thomas Nelson,

1970.

Petrov, Staian. _The Struggle of the Bulgarian Communist Party to

Organize the Social Basis of the Revolution._ Sofia: Sofia Press,

1970.

Pounds, Norman J. G. _Eastern Europe._ Chicago: Aldine, 1969.

"The Professional Gap," _East Europe_, X, No. 10, October 1969, 40.

Rizov, Alexander (ed.). _Bulgaria, A Survey._ Sofia: Foreign Languages

Press, 1965.

Rose, Harold. _Your Guide to Bulgaria._ London: Alvin Redman, 1964.

Rothschild, Joseph. _Communist Eastern Europe._ New York: Walker,

1964.

Rusinov, Spas. _Bulgaria: A Survey._ Sofia, Sofia Press, 1969.

Sanders, Irwin T. _Balkan Village._ Lexington: University of Kentucky

Press, 1949.

Schoepflin, George (ed.). _The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe._ New

York: Praeger, 1970.

Severin, R. Keith. "Bulgaria's Agricultural Economy in Brief," U.S.

Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. _Foreign

Agriculture_, (ERS-Foreign 136.) September 1965, 1-11.

Sharp, Samuel L., and Fedlam, Fruzsina H. _The Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe, 1972._ (The World Series.) Washington: Stryker-Post

Publications, 1972.

Staar, Richard F. _The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe_ (Rev. ed.)

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

_The Statesman's Year Book, 1972-73._ (Ed., John Paxton.) London:

Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, 1972, 789-797.

_Statistical Yearbook, 1971._ Sofia, National Information Office,

1971.

_Statistical Yearbook, 1972._ Sofia, National Information Office,

1972.

Stavrianos, Leften S. _Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement

Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times._ (Smith College Studies in

History, XXVII, Nos. 1-4.) Northampton: Department of History, Smith

College, 1942.

Stillman, Edmund (and the Editors of Life). _The Balkans_ (Life World

Library Series.) New York: _Time_, 1964.

Stoyanov, Lludmil. "Poet, Humanist and Fighter," _Bulgaria Today_

[Sofia], XXI, No. 7, July 1972, 22.

Sylvester, Anthony. "The Bulgaria Paradox," _East Europe_, XVII, No.

1, January 1968, 15-19.

Todorov, Nikolai. "Pencho Koulekov, an Original Master of Graphic Art"

_Bulgaria Today_ [Sofia], XXI, No. 5, May 1972, 32.

_UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1971._ Paris: United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1971, 59.

U.S. Department of Army. _Communist Eastern Europe: Analytical Survey

of Literature._ (DA Pam 550-8) Washington: GPO, 1971.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Office of Technical Services. Joint

Publications Research Service--JPRS (Washington). The following

items are from the JPRS series _Translations on Eastern Europe:

Economic and Industrial Affairs_.

"Analysis of Changes in Average Family Budget Made," _Otechestven

Front_, Sofia, March 27, 1973. (JPRS 58,842, No. 874, 1973.)

"Dynamics of Personal Income Described, 1965-70," _Ikonomicheski

Zhivot_, Sofia: December 16, 1970. (JPRS 52,476, No. 424, 1971.)

"Household Income, Consumption Statistics Given," _Statistika_,

Sofia, No. 5, September-October 1970. (JPRS 52,106, No. 397,

1971.)

"Light Ministry Plans to Supply Lacking Goods Revealed,"

_Otechestven Front_, Sofia, May 7, 1972. (JPRS 56,742, No. 727,

1972.)

U.S. Department of Commerce. Office of Technical Services. Joint

Publications Research Service--JPRS (Washington). The following

items are from the JPRS series _Translations on Eastern Europe:

Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs_.

"Admission Rules to Foreign-Language High Schools," _Durzhaven

Vestnik_, Sofia, June 8, 1971. (JPRS 53,764, No. 396, 1971).

"Aspects of Standard of Living Analyzed," _Statistika_, Sofia, No.

3, 1969. (JPRS 48,717, No. 126, 1969).

"Caloric Intake of Blue-Collar Workers and Cooperative Farm

Members," _Khranitelna Promishlenost_, Sofia, No. 2, 1968. (JPRS

45,795, No. 8, 1968).

"Causes for 1961-65 Infant Mortality Reviewed," _Statistika_, Sofia,

December 1969. (JPRS 49,929, No. 187, 1970).

"Census Studies Bulgarian Educational Level," _Statistika_, Sofia,

November-December 1968. (JPRS 47,697, No. 81, 1969).

"Class Influence on Consumption Analyzed," _Ikonomicheski Zhivot_,

Sofia, October 10, 1968. (JPRS 46,866, No. 42, 1968).

"The Communists and the Family," _Partien Zhivot_, Sofia, XVI,

November 1971. (JPRS: 55,275, No. 485, 1972).

"Decree on Post-Graduate Training for Specialists Issued,"

_Durzhaven Vestnik_, Sofia, February 20, 1973. (JPRS 58,807, No.

700, 1973).

"Economics of Higher Education Reviewed," _Novo Vreme_, Sofia,

September 1970. (JPRS 50,328, No. 280, 1970).

"Health Minister Describes Public Health Plans," _Zdraven Front_,

Sofia, June 19, 1971. (JPRS 54,178, No. 421, 1971).

"Improvements in Standard of Living Traced," _Ikonomicheski Zhivot_,

Sofia, November 1970. (JPRS 52,321, No. 310, 1971).

"Military Training for Secondary Students," _Narodna Mladezh_,

Sofia, March 20, 1972. (JPRS 55,828, No. 516, 1972).

"Minister Cites Progress in Public Health Service," _Khigiena i

Zdraveopazvane_, Sofia, No. 1, January-February 1969. (JPRS

48,333, No. 110, 1969.)

"New Model for Secondary Polytechnical School," _Vecherni Novini_,

Sofia, January 25, 1972. (JPRS 55,447, No. 495, 1972).

"Party Policy at Center of Educational Work," _Armeyski Komunist_,

Sofia, December 1972. (JPRS 58,368, No. 676, 1973).

"Physicians' Attitude Toward Polyclinics Surveyed," _Suvremenna

Meditsina_, Sofia, No. 12, 1970. (JPRS 52,840, No. 337, 1971).

"Religious Survey in Plovdiv Okrug Taken," _Filosofska Misul_,

Sofia, VI, June 1968. (JPRS 46,478, No. 30, 1968).

"Schools Experiment with New Educational Program," _Zemedelsko

Zname_, Sofia, July 24, 1968. (JPRS 46,334, No. 25, 1968).

"School Statistics," _Uchitelsko Delo_, Sofia, September 7, 1971.

(JPRS 54,419, No. 435, 1971).

"Serious Shortage of Medical Personnel Reported," _Pogled_, Sofia,

July 19, 1971. (JPRS 54,004, No. 409, 1971).

"Shortages of Schoolteachers in Some Areas Noted," _Trud_, Sofia,

August 21, 1971. (JPRS 54,094, No. 415, 1971).

"Sociological Legal Analysis of Divorce," _Khigiena i

Zdraveopazvane_, Sofia, III, 1970. (JPRS 51,271, No. 250, 1970).

"Specialization, Training of Polyclinic Physicians Discussed,"

_Zdraven Front_, Sofia, June 12, 1971. (JPRS 53,958, No. 407,

1971).

"Statistics on Rising Living Standard Given," _Naruchnik na

Agitatore_, Sofia, No. 24, December 1972. (JPRS 58,480, No. 851,

1973).

"Status Prospects of Medical Science Discussed," _Zdraven Front_,

Sofia, April 24, 1971. (JPRS 53,482, No. 375, 1971).

"Study of Services in Burgas Area Reviewed," _Narodni Suveti_,

Sofia, No. 1, 1970. (JPRS 50,150, No. 197, 1970).

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

_Educational and Cultural Exchanges Between Communist and

Non-Communist Countries in 1970._ (Research Study RSES-34.)

Washington: 1971.

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of Media

Services. "Educational and Cultural Exchange Between Communist and

Non-Communist Countries in 1971." (News Release.) December 8, 1972.

U.S. Department of State. Geographer. Office of Research in Economics

and Science. _Bulgaria-Greece Boundary._ (International Boundary

Study, No. 56). Washington: 1965.

Wolff, Robert Lee. _The Balkans in Our Time._ Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1956.

_World Christian Handbook, 1968._ (Eds., H. Wakelin Coxill and Kenneth

G. Grubb.) New York: Abingdon Press, 1967.

_World of Learning, 1972-73._ London: Europa Publications, 1973,

207-212.

_World Population Data Sheet, 1972._ Washington: Population Reference

Bureau, 1972.

Yovkov, Yordav. _Short Stories._ (Trans., Monco Mincoff and Marguerite

Alexieva.) Sofia: Foreign Language Press, 1965.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the

preparation of this section: _Bulgaria Today_ [Sofia], 1967-1972;

and _East Europe_ [New York], 1965-1973.)

Section II. Political

Antonoff, Nicolas. _The Bulgarian Crisis._ New York: Mid-European

Studies Center, 1953.

----. _The Constitutional Evolution of Bulgaria._ New York:

Mid-European Studies Center, 1953.

Black, Cyril E. _The Establishment of Constitutional Government in

Bulgaria._ Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.

Blemenfeld, Yorick. _Seesaw: Cultural Life in Eastern Europe._ New

York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968.

Bromke, Adam. "The CSCE and Eastern Europe," _World Today_ [London],

XXIX, No. 5, May 1973, 196-206.

Brown, James F. "Bulgaria." Pages 11-15 in Richard F. Staar (ed.),

_Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1973._ Hoover

Institution Press, 1973.

----. _Bulgaria Under Communist Rule._ New York: Praeger, 1970.

Bulgaria. Central Council of the Trade Unions. _Bulgaria Traditions_,

Sofia, 1971.

Bulgaria. Laws, Statutes, etc.

_Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria._ Sofia: Sofia

Press, 1971.

The majority of industrial workers are paid on a piecework basis, but