Man is not more superior to a brute, than one man is to another by the
mere force of wisdom. Wisdom is the sole destroyer of equality, the
fountain of honour, and the only mark by which one man, for ten minutes
together, can be known from another.
Were men always skilful they would never use craft or treachery. That
men are so cunning, arises from the littleness of their minds, which, if
it can conceal itself in one place, quickly discovers itself in another.
Cunning men, like jugglers, are only versed in two or three little
tricks, while wisdom excels in the whole circle of action.
The cunning man and the wise man differ not only in point of honesty,
but ability. He that can pack the cards, does not always play well.
I have a right to hold my tongue, and to be silent at all times; but if
I speak to another, I have no right to make him answer for me just as I
please.
* * * * *
* * * *
THE VICTIM OF MAGICAL DELUSION.
_OR, INTERESTING MEMOIRS OF MIGUEL, DUKE DE CA*I*A._
Unfolding Many Curious Unknown Historical Facts.
_Translated from the German of Tschink._
(Continued from page 110.)
“I will not disappoint your hope; however, I must repeat once more that
I can lead you to truth by no other road but that of reason purified
from all sensual dregs. You will find it difficult to pursue that road,
and it will be no easy task to me to guide you. I shall be obliged to
avoid all emblematic language, in order to convey to your mind these
supersensible notions in their natural purity, and it will be necessary
that you should know how to apply the abstractest and purest notions,
although they should contradict your present manner of perception.”
“I shall at least not be wanting in attention and good-will.”
“First of all it will be necessary to agree in the notion of what is
called _spirit_. The best method of fixing that notion will be to
examine what the word spirit means according to the general rules of
language. If one man says, man consists of body and spirit, by the
former a corporeal, and by the latter an incorporeal being is
understood. We have, therefore, a common point from which we can proceed
in our investigation. _Spirit_ is opposite to body. In this point we
agree according to the most general meaning and use of the word.”
“I do.”
“Let us see what follows thence! Every _body_ is a compounded, extended,
impenetrable being, subject to the laws of motion, consequently, every
_spirit_ is a simple, unextended and penetrable being, not subject to
the laws of motion.”
“Exactly so!”
“Bodies are extended, that is they occupy a _room_, and the proportion
which one body bears to the other in point of _room_, constitutes its
_place_; spirits are not extended, and consequently exist in no _room_,
and in no _place_.”
“How am I to understand this?”
“Just as I have said.--But let me elucidate my argument. Why cannot two
bodies exist at the same time, in the same space? Because they exclude
each other on account of their extension and impenetrability. Two bodies
must, of course, occupy two different places, if existing at the same
time; that is, every individual body must occupy its own individual
place. And why must every body occupy its _own_ place?”
“Because of its expansion and impenetrability.”
“Very well! But these two qualities cannot appertain to a spirit, and,
consequently, a spirit can occupy no place.”
“This seems really to follow.”
“This argument can also be stated thus: a spirit has, as a simple being,
neither a right nor left, neither a front nor a back side, and
consequently can have no relation from _no side_ to any thing that
occupies a space. The conclusion is very palpable.”
“Then a spirit could occupy no room in the whole material world?”
“Would you perhaps assign to spirits a place in the immaterial world?
How could you imagine, without contradiction, that space or place can
exist in _such_ a world? If one spirit does not occupy a room, then all
spirits together can occupy none, how could therefore any proportion
exist among them with relation to space or place?”
“I comprehend and do not comprehend you. You want to convince me of the
possibility of apparitions of spirits, and deny the existence of
spirits; for if they do occupy no place either in the visible or
invisible world, _where_ else can they exist?”
“How sensitive and confused your ideas are! Don’t you perceive that your
question is equal to this: _in which place_ do spirits exist? and that,
of course, you premise in your question what I have just clearly proved
to be absurd. Do you not comprehend that _room_ and _place_ are nothing
else but _external_ qualities, only relations of _material_ things? and
do you believe that the existence of any being depends merely on
external qualities and material relations?”
“Have patience with me!”
“I have; for I am well aware how difficult it is to abstract from
material ideas; however, since they cannot be applicable to spirits we
must renounce them, else we cannot pass over the bounds of the material
world.”
“I intreat you, Hiermanfor, to go on!”
“From our investigation we have learnt, as yet, nothing farther than
what a spirit is _not_, and what attributes _cannot_ be ascribed to it.
We now must endeavour to state what _real_ qualities constitute the
nature of spirits. One of them we have already touched upon; I mean,
independence of the laws of physical nature, or _arbitrary choice_. A
second quality presses upon us, namely the _faculty of perception_,
which our soul is endowed with like all other spirits. And now we are
enabled to form a notion of spirits, which, however imperfect it be, yet
is determined: a spirit is a simple being, endowed with _arbitrary
choice_, and the _faculty of perception_. Don’t you think that this
definition answers the common manner of speaking.”
“An additional proof of its fitness.”
“In the same manner in which the body evinces its existence, by the
material effect it produces in the room, the spirit likewise proves its
existence by the manifestation of its faculty of perception and of free
will. However evident and generally received this proposition is, yet it
is misapplied very frequently; for it is, according to my premises,
absolutely false, and nothing else but a kind of optic illusion, if we
imagine our soul to be inclosed in the human body, nay even in some
particular place of it. This illusion may be opposed by another: there
are diversions of thought, in which the thinking principle leaves our
body so entirely, that only the animal powers are active in the latter,
and on the return of our awakening self-consciousness, the soul seems to
return from far distant regions. However, this too is mere illusion. We
can say nothing farther of the union which subsists between our soul and
body, than that our soul is sensible of the existence of a corporeal
organ, the mutations of which harmonise exactly with her ideas and
resolutions; however, as you never will suppose that your spirit is
inclosed by the walls of Amelia’s distant habitation, where your whole
soul, with all her sentiments and ideas, is, as it were, translated to;
so your spirit can also not be supposed to be inclosed in your body,
which seems to be its common residence. No, no, my Lord, that cannot be!
the bonds of space can never fetter an immaterial being to a material
one.”
“This is indeed the natural conclusion which flows from your premises;
but by _what_ bonds should then the communion between body and soul be
preserved?”
“Your question refers to a fact, the answer to it, consequently, belongs
to the practical part of this philosophy. Yet,” added the Irishman after
some reflections, “I can give you a hint upon that head, which will
throw some light upon it: Every substance, consequently the body too,
must possess an internal activity, that is the invisible cause of its
external actions, which are visible in the space. This internal
principle of the body, acts upon the spirit in the same manner in which
the spirit acts upon this principle. Soul and body, consequently, cannot
act upon each other _immediately_, but only by means of this principle.
As all material beings, concretively taken, compose a great totum, which
is called the physical world, so the concrete of all immaterial beings
composes what we call the immaterial world. It follows from the
antecedent, that the order, regularity, and union which are seen in the
former world, are entirely different from the order, regularity, and
union which prevails in the latter world. All material beings are
subject to the sceptre of stern necessity, and kept in order by physical
laws; the rank which these beings maintain towards one another, is
founded either on innate qualities, or such as have been attributed to
them by general agreement; and they are nearer each other, or more
distant from one another, according to their relations constituted by
space and time. How different is this in the material world! rational
beings, endowed with free will, are subject to no other laws but to
those of morality; the prerogatives and degrees which subsist among
them, depend on the different degrees of their wisdom and virtue, and
according to the similarity or difference of their manner of thinking,
and of their sentiments, they are nearer each other, or more distant
from one another; that is, they harmonize, or disharmonize. Man belongs,
by virtue of his body and soul, to both of these worlds, and,
consequently, is connected with the material and immaterial world. It
may therefore happen, that the same person who acts an important part on
earth, in virtue of his physical or political situation, occupies at the
same time the lowest degree among the super-terrestrial beings; that the
soul of a body whose beauty charms every eye here below, is an
indifferent, or a contemptible object in the spiritual world; that the
soul of an inhabitant of Saturn, and that of an inhabitant of the earth,
with regard to their spiritual communion, are oftentimes, nearer
neighbours than the souls of those whose abode is beneath the same
roof.”
“This is very plain!”
(_To be continued._)
* * * * *
_For the +New-York Weekly Magazine+._
* * *