THE ARMENIAN QUESTION
A Fatal Treaty--Gladstone's Opinion--The Concert of Europe--The
Unspeakable Turk and His Methods--England's Responsibility--Mr.
Gladstone's Energetic Action--Lord Rosebery Resigns--Gladstone's
Astounding Letter--"I Shall Keep Myself to Myself"--"Abdul the
Damned"--"A Man whose every Impulse is Good"--The Convention of
Cyprus--Russia and England
There is an old and cynical saying that no lawyer draws up an agreement
or contract without an eye to the future. If ever a document left
trouble for the future it was the Berlin Treaty. The clause referring
to Armenia was tantamount to handing over the wretched Armenians to the
Turks; for the Concert of Europe, that misbegotten child of the Treaty
of Paris, has failed consistently in its futile endeavours.
The contention of Russia has never been better expressed than by
Gladstone in a letter to me dated January 2, 1877, in which he wrote:
"A guarantee dependent on the Turk for its execution becomes thereby no
guarantee at all." Again, on February 6, he wrote: "The real issue, so
far as I can see, will arise when the question shall assume this form:
Is Russia to be left alone to execute the will and work of Europe?"
This is exactly what Russia did in 1876, unless it be contended that
the "will of Europe" sanctioned the wholesale massacre of {148}
harmless citizens by the very power ordained to protect them--the
Ruling Power.
The Sublime Porte has been as consistent as the Concert of Europe in
evading its responsibilities, and it is needless to say that it as
carefully refrained from carrying out its undertaking with regard to
Armenia as the Powers on their part did from insisting on the reforms.
Possibly the argument of the Concert was that, as there were no
"ameliorations and reforms" on the part of the Sublime Porte, there was
no opportunity for them to "superintend their application."
None of us who knew the Turk had any doubts as to the truth of the
atrocities at Sassoun. These things were too common. The scale
differed, the crime was always the same. And what was it?
The crime was the establishment--or the re-establishment--of Turkish
Mussulman authority over a Christian race. If that were the crime, who
were the criminals? On that point I should like to be allowed to say
some plain truths, hoping that my English friends will tolerate the
candour in others which they never hesitate to practise themselves.
The real criminals who were responsible for the atrocities which
horrified the civilised world were not the Kurds--who at first got all
the blame. The criminals who perpetrated the massacre were Turkish
regular troops, commanded by Turkish officers acting in direct
obedience to explicit orders from the Turkish Government.
But although the direct complicity of the "Sublime" Porte in these
hideous crimes was not disputed even by the Pashas of Stamboul, it was
{149} not with them that the responsibility of these horrors originally
lay.
The crime at Sassoun lay primarily at the door of Disraeli. It was one
of the many disastrous results of that "peace with honour" which Mr.
Gladstone had the courage to describe as a peace that was no peace,
with the honour that prevailed among thieves.
That may seem to be a hard saying to those who do not know the facts.
To those who do it will be a mere truism.
Why was it that the Armenians at Sassoun were left as sheep before the
butcher? Why was it that the Sultan and his Pashas felt themselves
perfectly free to issue what order they pleased for the massacre of the
poor Armenians? The answer is, unfortunately, only too simple. It was
because England at the Berlin Congress, and _England alone_--for none
of the other Powers took any interest in the matter--destroyed the
security which Russia had extorted from the Turkish Government at San
Stéfano, and substituted for the sterling guarantee of Russia the
worthless paper-money of Ottoman promises. Was it not, then, England's
doing that these poor wretches were outraged and murdered by the
rulers, to whose tender mercies England insisted upon consigning them?
Let me prove my case: In the treaty of San Stéfano, the Turkish
Government entered into a direct and explicit obligation to Russia to
guarantee the security of the Armenians.
Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stéfano runs thus:
{150}
"As the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they
occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give
rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of
good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to
carry into effect without further delay the improvements and reforms
demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians,
and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians."
Now, it is obvious that this clause imposed clear and precise
obligations not only upon Turkey, but also upon Russia. If the reforms
were not carried out, if the security of the Armenians were not
guaranteed, Russia would have been bound to interfere, and _would have
interfered_, to compel the Turks to carry out their treaty obligations.
This article seemed to the British plenipotentiaries to give Russia a
virtual protectorate over Armenia, and therefore they insisted upon
striking it out. The poor Armenians were forbidden to look for their
protection to the strong arm of the Tsar. The Turks were delivered
from their express obligation to guarantee the security of their
Armenian subjects, and it was calmly decreed that the Armenians should
be content with Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty. That clause ran as
follows:
"The Sublime Porte engages to realise without delay those ameliorations
and reforms which local needs require in the provinces inhabited by the
Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and
the Kurds. It undertakes to make known, from time to time, the
measures taken {151} with this object to the Powers, who will watch
over their application."
Mark the difference. In place of a positive obligation entered into
with the only Power near enough and strong enough to enforce the
fulfilment of treaty engagements, there was substituted this
engagement, over the execution of which the Powers, in their
beneficence, promised to watch: as the execution has never begun, the
Powers were not overburdened with much "watching." "Waiting" rather
expresses what they did--waiting for the Turks to begin the fulfilment
of the promises which they made to collective Europe years and years
ago. They are waiting still. Meanwhile the Armenians were massacred,
as, for example, at Sassoun, and not there only. But even this did not
exhaust the criminal responsibility of Lord Beaconsfield. He had taken
Cyprus as a material pledge for the execution of reforms in Asiatic
Turkey. But there were no reforms in Asiatic Turkey. The only effect
of the Anglo-Turkish Convention was to increase the confidence of the
Sultan that he could do as he pleased in Armenia, Article 61 of the
Berlin Treaty notwithstanding.
England, therefore, was responsible in three ways. She destroyed the
Russian guarantee exacted by the Treaty of San Stéfano. She framed the
worthless "watching" clause of the Berlin Treaty, and then, to preclude
all possibility of effective pressure upon the Turk, she concluded the
Cyprus Convention, which established an illegal British protectorate
over the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan.
{152}
At Sassoun was seen the result of that policy. No amount of
dispatch-writing, friendly advice, or admonition would improve the
condition of the Armenians. Remonstrances were idle. What was wanted
was action. But who could act? No Power could occupy and administer
Armenia but Russia. Unfortunately, she had no wish and no obligation
now to undertake so arduous and so thankless a task. But who else was
to do it?
No one did it; for Russia had once played St. George and Europe had
thrown back the maiden to the dragon.
When I heard of the Armenian massacres in 1894, I was more horrified
than surprised. When the full confirmation of the horrible news
arrived, it made my heart sick. What was even worse, if that were
possible, was the fact that the relations between England and Russia
were strained. All Mr. Gladstone's energies were concentrated upon
urging on Lord Salisbury's Ministry the coercion of the Sultan,
single-handed if need be. The result was Lord Rosebery's resignation
as Leader of the Liberal Party in the Lords, as a protest against a
policy that in his opinion could not fail to plunge Europe into war.
Prince Lobanoff, who was responsible for Russia's policy of opposition
to armed intervention against Turkey, aroused Mr. Gladstone's
indignation, and I came in for a share of his wrath by virtue of my
defence of Prince Lobanoff. At that time Mr. Gladstone wrote to me:
{153}
HAWARDEN CASTLE,
_October_ 18_th_, 1895.
It is most kind of you to waste powder on an outcast like me; an
outcast first from active life; secondly I feel--from your scheme of
opinion I cannot read your articles--not because I deal so little with
newspaper print, but because I am afraid of disagreeing with you, and
in this case I prefer ignorance to strife. I am, you see, possessed
with an idea as to the truer mode of dealing with the Sultan and his
accursed system, founded upon my experience in the year 1880--when we
received most valuable and effective aid from your good and great
Emperor Alexander II.
Now I have no power and little knowledge--and my imagined knowledge may
be all wrong. It is to this effect:
(1) That Lord Salisbury is not up to the mark in all points, but that
he is the best of those who have the matter in their hands. The best
there is at the moment to do the work.
(2) That he is held back by others--not to act, say, according to
rumour, most by Russia.
If this is so it is most painful, for this Armenian case is the very
worst of all that has yet happened, and if the Powers are beaten by the
Sultan, whom every one of them can crush with the little finger, they
will be deservedly covered with indelible disgrace.
There is plain speaking for you.
{154}
It was; but I replied soothingly, trying to put to him Russia's case.
His reply electrified Europe. It ran:
_October_ 22_nd_, 1895.
MY DEAR MADAME NOVIKOFF,
In these sad circumstances I am so far comforted as to believe that
there is no occasion for controversy between you and me. We have in
some critical circumstances heartily co-operated, and I think we have
the same sentiments as to Armenia.
I shall carefully and for many reasons keep myself to myself.
I see in _The Times_ that the wretched Sultan, whom God has given as a
curse to mankind, waving his flag of triumph, and the adversaries at
his feet are Russia, France and England.
As to the division of the shame amongst them, I care little. Except
that I hope that my own country, and for its good, be made conscious
and be exhibited to the world for its own full share--whatever that may
be.
May God in His mercy send a speedy end to the grinning Turk and all his
doings. So I said when I could say, and could even sometimes do, so I
say in my political decrepitude and even death.
Always yours sincerely,
W. E. GLADSTONE.
This letter was the sensation of the hour. Here are some of the
English press comments upon it: "An extraordinary letter," "the
sensation of the hour," "startling vehemence," "now famous letter,"
{155} "essentially Gladstonian," "silly and wicked balderdash," "ring
of life and strength," "shameful letter," "Tory papers are terribly
shocked," "has startled the civilised world."
When I returned from Russia to England in 1896, one of the first things
I saw on reaching London was "Plain words to the Assassin," in large
letters on the newspaper posters, staring down upon me from the
hoardings, and I found people still telling each other what a dreadful
fellow the Turk really was!
Plain words, strong words, fierce words was the diet presented to the
Sultan in varied diplomatic sauces; but the dish was always the same,
and his response was quite as monotonous. To empty words, plain or
flavoured, he replied by massacres, and this seemed likely to go on for
ever. For us this _passe-temps_ was monotony. To the poor Armenian,
alas, it is death!
I rejoiced to see that the English nation was weary of the
vaticinations of diplomatists, and was urgently demanding not words,
but deeds. It reminded me of 1876, that great year when so many brave
attempts were made to change its traditional policy--attempts which,
unfortunately, met with but partial success. And above all I rejoiced
to hear once more sounding deep and loud, like the great bell of our
grand Kremlin, above the general hubbub, the commanding note of Mr.
Gladstone's voice--that voice through which the heart and conscience of
nations has so often found utterance.
But although in some respects like 1876, there was this difference,
which, as a Russian, I felt more keenly than any one. In 1876 Russia
led, and {156} though no other Power followed, we fought, we suffered,
we triumphed! In the Armenian question the initiative of chivalrous
action was no longer ours, and bitterly I regretted it. It did not
seem, however, to have passed into any other hands. But that made
things worse. Why was it that Russia was not as in 1876? The answer
was easy. Because of the Treaty of 1878.
Mr. Gladstone lamented and condemned the policy of Prince Lobanoff.
With the lament I concurred. From the condemnation I dissented.
Prince Lobanoff's policy in Turkey was inevitable. The responsibility
for that departure from our traditional policy rested with England, and
it was for England to say how long it should continue.
The vividness with which England's Armenian agitation brought 1876 back
to my mind also recalled not less vividly, the hideous disillusionment
of 1878; and I had reason. For through these years of trial and of
triumph I did my utmost to persuade my countrymen that England was Mr.
Gladstone and not Lord Beaconsfield. The generous enthusiasm of St.
James's Hall made me wrongly suppose that it was equivalent to a
resolute reversal of England's traditional policy. But when we had
made our sacrifices and settling day came, we found, alas! to our cost,
that England was Lord Beaconsfield after all, and not Mr. Gladstone.
Imagine the reproaches that were addressed to me! No one can ever
realise the reproaches I addressed to myself.
We were not likely to make that mistake again. We were no more to be
deluded with words than the {157} Sultan was to be coerced with
adjectives. We looked at facts--hard, disagreeable, ugly though they
were--and adjusted our policy accordingly.
The first fact was the Sultan. In 1896 England called him "the
Assassin" and the "accursed." Mr. William Watson even went to the
length of referring to him as "Abdul the Damned." But England, alas!
saved him in 1878, and she gloried in the deed. When Lord Salisbury
reported from Berlin the net result of English diplomacy at the
Congress, he boasted that it had "restored, with due security for good
government (!), a very large territory to the Government of the
Sultan," and that the alterations made in our Treaty of San Stéfano
tended "powerfully to secure from external assault the stability and
independence of his Empire."
It is difficult to repress a bitter smile when recalling the positive
assurances which were given to Europe by Lord Beaconsfield as to the
"angelic" character of Abdul Hamid, who was then England's _protégé_,
England's ally, England's favourite.
Russia maintained that no Sultan could be trusted to protect Christian
subjects, and Mr. Gladstone concurred. Everywhere there must be a
guarantee. Either the populations must be freed entirely from his rule
or an outside Power must superintend and enforce the execution of
reforms. England met this with a flat refusal. She made it the first
object of her policy to restore the direct uncontrolled authority of
the Sultan over as wide a territory as possible, and Lord Beaconsfield
exulted in the fatal success of that policy for many reasons, but
especially for one, which most of my English {158} friends seem to have
forgotten, but which Russians, being the sufferers, do not forget so
easily.
Lord Beaconsfield was sure he had done right because the Sultan was
such "a good man." On his return from Berlin, in his speech at the
Mansion House (July 27, 1898) he gave the following testimonial to
Abdul Hamid--the hero of to-day:
"I look to the individual character of that human being as of vast
importance. He is a man whose every impulse is good. However great
may be the difficulties he has to encounter, however various may be the
influences that may ultimately control him, his impulses are always
good. He is not a tyrant, he is not dissolute. He is not a bigot. He
is not corrupt."
The comments of the Young Turks on this pronouncement would be
interesting.
England had her way. Abdul Hamid, "whose every impulse was good,"
reigned by virtue of his action in 1878 over regions from which Russia
had driven him out. But that was not all. England deliberately
spoiled, as may be seen by reference to the protocols of the Congress,
every stipulation made to compel the Sultan to keep his word. His
"impulses were so good" it would be cruel to make provision for the
proper execution of his treaty obligations! He must be left unhampered
and uncontrolled. England rejected Russian proposals to impose upon
all contracting parties the mutual duty of controlling the stipulations
of the treaty because the Porte objected to allow within its own limits
the control of other States. That was not to be thought of. The
Sultan must be left free and {159} uncontrolled to obey those "good
impulses" of which Lord Beaconsfield was so well assured. Thus it is
that Europe was paralysed over the Armenian massacres.
In face of such a situation which had thus been created, and in the
midst of an impotence which was prepared in advance at the Berlin
Congress, Russia was overwhelmed with denunciations because she did not
remain true to the crusading policy of 1876. This hardly seemed to me
to be what in England you call "fair play."
But that was not all. If we had merely to do with the Berlin Treaty,
we might have endeavoured to make the best use of the worthless weapons
which it contains. Unfortunately, the responsibility of England for
the inaction of Russia was far more direct, far more deadly, than this.
For Lord Beaconsfield, and the English people applauded him, with the
evil prescience of hatred, foresaw the Armenian massacres, and provided
in advance for the paralysing of Russia's generous initiative. He even
fixed a date when events would compel Russia to face the necessity of
resorting to force to coerce the Sultan, and, as he publicly explained
in the heart of the City of London, he regarded it as the crowning
achievement of his policy to prevent such action on our part by the
solemn public pledge of immediate war by England in that case.
Lord Beaconsfield said:
"Suppose the settlement of Europe had been limited to the mere Treaty
of Berlin. What are the probable consequences which would then have
{160} occurred? In ten, fifteen, it might be twenty years [it has been
exactly eighteen!] the power of Russia being revived, her resources
having again resumed their general strength, some quarrel would again
have occurred, Bulgarian or otherwise [Armenian this time], between
Turkey and Russia, and in all probability the armies of Russia would
have assaulted the Ottoman dominions both in Europe and Asia,
enveloping with her armies the city of Constantinople and the powerful
position which it occupies. Well, what would have been the probable
conduct under these circumstances of the Government of this country?"
This was the vital question for Prince Lobanoff, and the answer to it
has shaped the whole policy of Russia.
Lord Beaconsfield continued:
"Whoever might have been the Minister and whatever the party in power,
the position of the Government would have been this. There must have
been hesitation for a time, there must have been a want of decision and
firmness, but no one could doubt that ultimately England would have
said: 'This will never do; we must prevent the conquest of Asia Minor
and must interfere in this matter to assist because of Russia.' No
one, I am sure, in this country who merely considers this question can
for a moment doubt that that must have been the ultimate policy of this
country."
Therefore, he went on to explain (I summarise the points of a long
speech), in order to remove any possible doubt on the subject, the
voice of England should be clearly, firmly, and decidedly expressed
{161} in advance, and this he claimed he had effected by the conclusion
of the Cyprus Convention. There has to be no more hesitating, doubting
and considering "contingencies." England was, once for all, definitely
committed to defend the Asiatic frontier of the Ottoman Empire against
any advances of the Russian army in any quarrel, "Bulgarian or
otherwise."
This, he declared, was "the ultimate policy" of England, and he
embodied it for all men to see in the Cyprus Convention. Lord
Salisbury had previously described that convention as an undertaking
given "fully and unreservedly" to prevent any further encroachments by
Russia upon Turkish territory in Asia.
That was plain speaking. The Convention of Cyprus, therefore, was a
document prepared to prevent our taking any action for the protection
of the Armenians. It meant war--war by England, by sea and land all
round the world, against Russia if she advanced a single company of
armed police into the valleys of Armenia. With this Convention still
in force, who could blame Russia for not joining in operations against
Abdul?
Of course I was told--even by Mr. Gladstone himself--that the Cyprus
Treaty contained no obligation to protect the Assassin in Armenia
except on condition of reforms, and that the Sultan had been informed
long ago that the covenant fell to the ground by his breach of faith in
not giving the reforms.
This, I confess, was news to me, and in Russia we knew nothing of any
such abandonment of the Convention by the English Government.
{162}
In those years the Russian people did not move, although they
undoubtedly followed with intense interest all the eloquent speeches
delivered in England on behalf of the unhappy Armenians, for Russia
certainly can never be indifferent to the Christian cause in Turkey.
All her policy in the East had that permanent basis. But this time the
lead was taken by Great Britain, who was credited with some definite
plan of her own. Russia's help was never asked in the _only_ way which
could be fruitful, and her Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince
Lobanoff, unhesitatingly expressed his dissent from the half-measures
which were proposed, and which would only irritate the Sultan and
further injure the cause of the unhappy Armenians--bad enough already.
Thank God, their losses did not amount to the 250,000 lives stated in
the English Press; but even the tenth part is a terrible, terrible
slaughter. The poor Armenians would never have risen in rebellion had
they not expected from Great Britain the help that the Slavs received
from Russia. I suppose our crime is that we did not do Great Britain's
work. But really this cannot constitute Russia's duty!
It was at the beginning of 1878, when the long agony of the War of
Emancipation in the Balkans and in Armenia was drawing to a close, that
I published _Is Russia Wrong?_ It was a protest and an appeal against
the fatal superstition that our two countries were natural enemies.
The appeal was for the re-establishment of the Russo-English alliance,
which seemed to me essential for the best interests of both countries.
It was venturesome, {163} perhaps even audacious, to issue such an
appeal when all your arsenals were ringing with preparations for war
with Russia, and when Lord Beaconsfield was even completing his
arrangements for forcing your fleet up to the gates of Constantinople.
In those days there were few who listened to Russian protests; among
these few, however, were the flower of English intellect. My great
friend, Mr. J. A. Froude, in an eloquent preface, commended my appeal
to the attention of his countrymen. Mr. Carlyle honoured it with his
emphatic assurances of support. In fact, it was he who was the first
in urging me to republish in book form all my letters on the
Anglo-Russian relations. Four years later, when I re-issued the appeal
with other matter in my _Russia and England_, M. Emile de Laveleye
reviewed it in the _Fortnightly_, but so great was the popular
prejudice against Russians, that Mr. Morley would not allow him even to
name the author of the book whose proposals were under review. I shall
never forget De Laveleye's indignation at having been so roughly
treated by the editor. "It is pure despotism," exclaimed he. "People
talk of freedom of opinion, and they will not allow you, at the same
time, to express that which you most strongly hold! It is despotism
and deceit combined. Of all kinds of despotism--the worst," concluded
he. I did not contradict my friend, as he was expressing exactly my
own views.
Fortunately for me, Mr. Gladstone was not handcuffed in the same way by
the editor of the _Nineteenth Century_. He reviewed the book not only
at length, but warmly supported my humble plea for {164} a cordial and
good understanding between the two great Empires which dominate Asia.
"Every Englishman," said he, with his wonderful outspokenness, "must
read this book." His advice may have been followed by some of his
party, but I certainly ignominiously failed to convince the Jingoes.
But all this is very long ago and a new era has since opened for Russia
and England. I have written this chapter to show what apparently
insurmountable obstacles have been overcome to allow Russia and England
to join forces in 1914 with the common object of freeing Europe from an
intolerable tyranny. In the meantime, poor Armenia suffers as even she
has not suffered before, and once more Russia is carrying hope to the
hearts of unfortunate Christians ground beneath the Turkish heel.
{165}